R. H. ZAIDI, J. ( 1 ) BY means of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioners pray for issuance of a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the order passed by the Board of Revenue, U. P. at Allahabad dated 23-8-1986, the order passed by the Collector (Revenue), Varanasi dated 24-7-1982 and the order dated 17-7-1975 passed by Deputy Collector, Revenue, Varanasi. ( 2 ) RELEVANT and brief facts of the case giving rise to the present petition are that Amar Nath and others, plaintiffs-respondents filed Suit No. 599 of 1974 under S. 229-B of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (for short the Act) against Vishwanath, Kashi Nath and other defendants for declaration that they were sole Bhumidhars of plot No. 499 (measuring 67 decimal) situated in village Kandawa, district Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as the plot in dispute) on the basis of a private partition. The plot in dispute was stated to be recorded in the name of the plaintiffs and defendants Nos. 1 to 17 in the revenue papers. The aforesaid suit proceeded ex parte and was ultimately decreed on 17-7-1975 against the defendants including the present petitioners. The plaintiffs-respondents were, by means of ex parte decree, declared sole Bhumidhars of the land in dispute. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs-respondents thereafter transferred the land in dispute in favour of one Nanku, through a sale deed dated 2-2-1976. It was further pleaded that subsequently Vishwanath, Kashi Nath and other defendants filed Suit No. 104 of 1976 for cancellation of sale deed dated 2-2-1976 referred to above with the allegations that the land in dispute was acquired through a registered Patta dated 20-3-1928, executed by a Zamindar in favour of 12 persons including one Batuk (the predecessor of the plaintiffs) and Lachhiman (father of Vishwanath and Kashi Nath) and predecessor of other defendants, therefore, the plaintiffs and Amar Nath and other defendants were co-Bhumidhars; and that Amar Nath and others had no right to execute the sale deed in favour of Nanku in respect of the plot in dispute. ( 3 ) IN the plaint, the following pedigree of the family was given :- (See pedigree of the family on next page) ( 4 ) THE aforesaid suit was contested by Nanku, who filed his written statement on 4-10-1976, a copy of which is contained as Annexure-12 to the writ petition. Nanku denied the facts stated in the plaint and also set up a pedigree contrary to given in the plaint, but subsequently did not participate in the proceedings, hence, the suit was decreed as stated above. Vishwanath came to know about the ex parte decree dated 17-7-1975 on 14-11-1977. He, therefore, filed a restoration application immediately thereafter on 15-11-1977, which was supported by an affidavit. It has been stated that Kashi Nath,petitioner came to know about the ex parte decree dated 17-7-1975 from Vishwanath and Kashi Nath also filed a restoration application on 17-11-1977, which was also supported by an affidavit. Against the aforesaid restoration applications, objections were filed, which were also supported by affidavits filed by the contesting opposite parties. In support of their cases, parties have produced evidence. The trial Court by its judgment and order dated 24-7-1982 dismissed the restoration applications filed by Vishwanath and Kashi Nath referred to above. The petitioners thereafter filed appeals before the Commissioner against the judgments and orders passed by the trial Court dated 24-7-1982. The Additional Commissioner after going through the material on the record, recorded finfings of fact to the effect that Shri Nath, Amar Nath and Bhola Nath were served with summons personally while Kashi Nath refused to receive the summon. It was also held that out of five defendants only two filed restoration applications while the other three did not file any restoration application. It was noted that summons bearing signatures of the parties were available on the record, which were served upon the parties. The persons upon whom the summons were served did not file any objection. He, however, was of the view that from the material on the record, the service of summons was doubtful. It was also noted that in the objection dated 4-10-1976 Vishwanath referred to the statement in question regarding suit filed between the parties under S. 229-B of the Act, which was decreed on 17-7-1985 which was also given effect to in the revenue papers. It was also noted that in the objection dated 4-10-1976 Vishwanath referred to the statement in question regarding suit filed between the parties under S. 229-B of the Act, which was decreed on 17-7-1985 which was also given effect to in the revenue papers. From the said fact it was clear that Vishwanath had full knowledge of the said suit, therefore, he should have filed an application for setting aside the ex parte decree within the time7 8 prescribed under the law. It was also observed that there was no evidence on the record to show that Kashi Nath and others have knowledge of the filing of the said suit. It was observed that merely on the basis of allegations made by Nanku in his plaint, summons cannot be said to have been served because the statement was not very specific. Further, the Court should act in these matters liberally. Even if there was a slight delay in making applications for setting aside ex parte decrees, the same could be condoned. It was after discussing the evidence the Commissioner specifically held that the defendants had no knowledge of the pendency of the suit. It was also observed that the defendants were not resident of the said village but he used to carry on Pan Shop in village Kakrata and also used to reside there. He, therefore, disbelieved the knowledge of ex parte decree dated 15-11-1977. Having recorded the said findings, the appeal filed by the petitioners was allowed by judgment and decree dated 17-9-1999 and the ex parte decree dated 24-7-1982 were set aside by the Commissioner and the suit was directed to be decided on merits after contest. ( 5 ) THE effect of the aforesaid order was that the suit had to be decided on merits, parties would have availed opportunity to produce their evidence, oral and documentary. In support of their cases, the suit could be decided on merits after hearing them by the trial Court to which it was remanded. Challenging the validity of the judgment and order passed by the appellate Court, a revision was filed by Nanku before the Board of Revenue, U. P. at Allahabad. In support of their cases, the suit could be decided on merits after hearing them by the trial Court to which it was remanded. Challenging the validity of the judgment and order passed by the appellate Court, a revision was filed by Nanku before the Board of Revenue, U. P. at Allahabad. The Board of Revenue, respondent No. 1 re-appraised the evidence on the record, set aside the findings of fact recorded by the appellate Court and allowed the revision by its judgment and order dated 23-8-1996, hence, the present petition. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioners vehemently urged that the Court below has acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction in interfering with the findings of fact and substituting its own findings for the findings recorded by the Court below contrary to the provisions of S. 333 of the Act. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents supported the validity of the judgments and orders passed by the Courts below. It was urged that the Court below was right in setting aside the orders passed by the trial Court and, therefore, the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. It was also urged that in any event of the matter the application should have been remanded for decision afresh. ( 7 ) THE aforesaid revision was filed under S. 333 of the Act, which reads as under :-"333. Power of Board to call for cases :- The Board may call for the record of any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate Court in which no appeal lies or, where an appeal lies but has not preferred, and if such subordinate Court appears :- (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it in law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of jurisdiction illegally or with material integrity the Board may pass such order in the case as it thinks fit. " ( 8 ) THE scope of aforesaid Section came to be considered in various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court. It has consistently been held by the Apex Court and this Court that in exercise of power under S. 333 of the Act, the revisional Court has got no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact. " ( 8 ) THE scope of aforesaid Section came to be considered in various decisions of the Apex Court and this Court. It has consistently been held by the Apex Court and this Court that in exercise of power under S. 333 of the Act, the revisional Court has got no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact. The revisional Court has got no power to reappraise the evidence and to substitute its own findings for the findings recorded by the appellate Court. Section 333 of the Act applies to jurisdictional errors alone and not to irregular exercise or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it. A reference in this regard may be made to a decision of Privy Council in T. A. Balakrishna Udyayar v. Vasudeva Ayyar reported in (1917) 15 All LJ 645 : (AIR 1917 PC 71), wherein it was held that S. 333 of the Act is not directed against conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction was not involved. ( 9 ) SO long as a court has jurisdiction to determine a question, even if it arrives at a wrong decision, the High Court will not interfere in revision especially where substantial justice has been done. ( 10 ) FURTHER the Apex Court in Ramji Das v. Mohan Singh, reported in 1978 All Rent Cas, 496 while considering the scope of S. 115, C. P. C. which is analogous to S. 333 of the Act ruled as under :-"the High Court, in exercise of its power under S. 115, C. P. C. , set aside on various9 grounds. After having heard counsel, we are inclined to the view that, as far as possible, Courts discretion should be exercised in favour of hearing and not to shut out hearing. Therefore, we think that order of the High Court should not have been passed in the interest of justice which always informs the power under S. 115, C. P. C. We, therefore, set aside that order and also the ex parte decree. We direct the trial Court to take back the suit on file and proceed forthwith to trial. The suit is very old and it should be disposed of within six months from the receipt of this order by the trial Court. We direct the trial Court to take back the suit on file and proceed forthwith to trial. The suit is very old and it should be disposed of within six months from the receipt of this order by the trial Court. " ( 11 ) IT is evident from the view taken by the Apex Court that the Courts always appreciate exercise of power in favour of hearing and not to shut out the hearing. The Court below by passing the impugned order shut out the hearing and it illegally up-held the validity of the ex parte decree, which was passed without service of notice upon the petitioners. Similarly, learned counsel for the petitioners also referred to and relied upon the decision in State of U. P. v. III Additional District Judge, Azamgarh reported in AIR 1989 All 14 , wherein it was ruled as under :-"8. In the instant case I am of the view that reappraisal of the evidence made by the learned Additional District Judge, either to ascertain whether sufficient cause was made out for an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code or not, or whether sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act or not, was beyond his jurisdiction in exercise of powers under S. 115 of the Code. He appears to have presumed as if he was exercising jurisdiction of the appellate Court. It would not be out of place to mention that in Manik Chandra Nandy v. Debdas Nandy, AIR 1986 SC 446 , their Lordships of Supreme Court explaining the jurisdiction of revisional Court under S. 115 of the Code in particular reference to an application under Order 9, Rule 13 of the Code, observed that learned Additional District Judge must have been cautious about the scope of his revisional jurisdiction and he need not have mixed it with the appellate jurisdiction. In my considered opinion it is needless to repeat that exercise of appellate jurisdiction is free to decide all, questions of law and fact. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Court is not entitled to reappraisal of the evidence on the record and to substitute its own findings in place of the findings of the trial Court. The plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. In exercise of revisional jurisdiction the Court is not entitled to reappraisal of the evidence on the record and to substitute its own findings in place of the findings of the trial Court. The plea of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact. The findings of the trial Court that sufficient cause was made out for allowing application under Order 9, Rule 13 and also that sufficient cause was made out for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Act, could not be said to be not borne but by the evidence on the record nor the same could be said to be manifestly contrary to the evidence on the record or palpably wrong and at the same time it could not be said that in case those findings are permitted to continue they would in any way result in miscarriage of justice. 9. Matter can be viewed from other angle as well. The Court should see in a given case that the parties may be given an opportunity of being heard on merits and not that the opportunity of hearing may be shut outt. In the instant case in case ex parte decree is maintained, the petitioners would be prevented from appearing before the Court or from proving their case on merits. The findings recorded by the trial Court about the sufficient cause having been made out by the defendants under O. 9, R. 13 of the Code for restoring the suit and sufficient ground for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Act was made out, were essentially findings of fact and the same cannot be re-examined by the revisional Court under S. 115 of the Code. The impugned order appears to be manifestly erroneous in respect of exercise of jurisdiction under S. 115 o f the Code. The revisional Court assumed as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction conferred under O. 43, R. 1 or under S. 96 of the Code. In this view of the matter as the question of jurisdiction was not involved and the lower appellate Court assumed the jurisdiction of 1st appellate Court, whereas in fact it has got only the limited jurisdiction of a revisional Court, a case for interference and issuance of writ of certiorari has been made out. In this view of the matter as the question of jurisdiction was not involved and the lower appellate Court assumed the jurisdiction of 1st appellate Court, whereas in fact it has got only the limited jurisdiction of a revisional Court, a case for interference and issuance of writ of certiorari has been made out. The only inescapable conclusion is that the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court could not be set aside in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Present petition accordingly succeeds and is allowed. Impugned order dated 7-9-1987 passed by III Additional District Judge is quashed. As the matter has dragged on for too long what is required is expedition (expeditious decision ). Accordingly I direct that the trial Court shall decide the suit on merits within a period of 6 months from the date a certified copy of this0 order is produced before it. An undertaking to this effect has also been given by the learned counsel for the parties. Under the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. " ( 12 ) SO far as the argument of learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent is concerned that the case application under Order IX, Rule 13 must have been remanded for reconsideration. It is well settled in law that the order of remand cannot be passed by the appellate Court or any stautory authority as a matter of course. One will have to make out a case for remand of the case. In the present case learned counsel for the contesting respondent has utterly failed to show any material evidence was either ignored, mis-read or misconstrued by the appellate Court. No other illegality was at all pointed out which could necessitate remand of the application under Order IX, Rule 13, C. P. C. , therefore, submission made by the learned counsel for contesting respondent to the contrary cannot be accepted. ( 13 ) IN view of the aforesaid decisions, I come to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1 acted illegally in exercise of its jurisdiction and in re-appraising and interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the Court below and substituting its own findings for the findings of fact recorded by the Court below, which was legally not permissible under S. 333 of the Act. This petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed. This petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed. ( 14 ) THE writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and orders dated 23-8-1996, 24-7-1982 and 17-7-1975 are set aside. Since the suit is pending since long, it is hereby directed that the suit shall be decided expeditiously, preferably within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this order is communicated to the trial Court after following the procedure prescribed under the law. Petition allowed.