JUDGMENT - D.G. DESHPANDE, J.:---The appellants are an Insurance Company which has challenged by this appeal the judgment of the Civil Judge, Senior Division in Arbitration Special Suit No. 119 of 1991, by which the Civil Judge, Senior Division rejected the objections filed by the Insurance Company and the award was made rule of the Court with further direction to draw the decree in terms of the Award. 2. In so far as the facts of the case are concerned, respondent No. 1 had taken an insurance policy from the appellants in respect of 2500 rubber plants for a period from 13th January, 1987 to 13th January, 1988 for Rs. 3,00,000/-. Thereafter the policy was renewed for one more year and while the policy was alive, a fire broke out in the rubber plantation. The respondent No. 1 lodged a claim before the appellants for claiming insurance under the policy. The appellants assessed the loss for an amount Rs. 91,500/- and showed their willingness to pay this amount of compensation. The respondent No. 1 was not ready to accept the same and a dispute arose. 3. In the Insurance Policy there was a clause to refer the dispute, in case the appellants accepted their liability to pay, to an arbitrator. The appellants appointed their arbitrator, so also respondent No. 1. Both the arbitrators could not concur. Both of them gave different findings. The arbitrator appointed by the Insurance Company/appellants fixed the damages at Rs. 91,500/- whereas the arbitrator appointed by the respondent No. 1 fixed the compensation at Rs. 2,00,000/- and odd. The matter was therefore referred to the Umpire, who gave his award in favour of the respondent No. 1 for Rs. 2,37,500/- with interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of the award till the date of final payment or till the date of the decree whichever is earlier. The payment was to be made through the co-claimant Indian Overseas Bank with whom the plantation was mortgaged. 4. Thereafter the matter went before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, who ultimately made the award rule of the Court. It is this order that is challenged in the present appeal. 5. The payment was to be made through the co-claimant Indian Overseas Bank with whom the plantation was mortgaged. 4. Thereafter the matter went before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, who ultimately made the award rule of the Court. It is this order that is challenged in the present appeal. 5. It was contended by the Counsel for the appellants that the Umpire misconducted himself as defined or contemplated under section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, which was applicable in the instant case, and misconduct was in respect of the proceedings inasmuch as the Umpire did not give any opportunity of being heard to the appellants or for that matter even to the respondents. Secondly, according to the Counsel for the appellants, the Umpire has relied upon section 29(2) of the Marine Insurance Act for the purpose of coming to the conclusion against the appellants and this reliance was totally uncalled for and unjustified because by no stretch of imagination it could be said that Marine Insurance Act was applicable to the instant case. Misquoting the wrong provisions of law or relying upon it was, according to the Counsel for the appellants, misconducting the proceedings and, therefore, on that count alone the award or the judgment of the lower Court was liable to be set aside. Thirdly, it was contended by the Counsel for the appellants, that as per Clause 6 of the Fire Policy, the Insurance Company was liable to pay not the value of the property for which insurance was made but the liability was limited to the extent of value of the property at the time of the happening of the destruction. Appellants Counsel further contended that eventhough the policy was for Rs. 3,00,000/-, there were, documents on record to show that the plantation was valued at Rs. 1,25,000/- only and the remaining amount of Insurance Policy was for covering other structures etc. at the site of the plantation. In support of all these contentions Counsel for the appellants relied upon certain authorities, namely, (State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. and another)1, reported in 1994(6) S.C.C. 485 , (The Industrial Gases Ltd. v. The Ganesh Flour Mills Co., Ltd.)2, reported in A.I.R. 1971 Allahabad 428, (M/s. Allen Berry and Co. at the site of the plantation. In support of all these contentions Counsel for the appellants relied upon certain authorities, namely, (State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. and another)1, reported in 1994(6) S.C.C. 485 , (The Industrial Gases Ltd. v. The Ganesh Flour Mills Co., Ltd.)2, reported in A.I.R. 1971 Allahabad 428, (M/s. Allen Berry and Co. Private Ltd. v. The Union of India)3, reported in A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 696 and (Rajasthan State Mines Minerals Ltd. v. Eastern Engineering Enterprises and another)4, reported in 1999(9) S.C.C. 283 . 6. On the other hand, it was contended by the Counsel for the respondent No. 1, who was supported in his submissions by the Counsel for the respondent No. 2 that there was absolutely no substance in the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellants and all of them were liable to be rejected. According to him, firstly, the Umpire had not misconducted in the proceedings by not giving an opportunity to the appellants of being heard. He contended that the Umpire was present at the arbitration proceedings throughout, right from the beginning. He had heard the submissions, perused the documents and, therefore, it was not necessary for the Umpire to rehear the matter. Secondly, it was contended by the Counsel for the respondent No. 1, that the Umpire had not placed reliance upon section 29(2) of the Marine Insurance Act but, as rightly held by the trial Court, has relied upon the same for the purpose of drawing an analogy in the facts of the present case. Therefore, according to him, it cannot be said that the Umpire had based his conclusion on the provisions of the Marine Insurance Act. 7. Thirdly, it was contended by the Counsel for the respondent No. 1 that in the Insurance Policy itself the property insured was described as "2500 Nos. rubber plants valued Rs. 3,00,000/-". Therefore, admittedly, if 2000 plantations were destroyed in the fire, then the Umpire was right in awarding Rs. 2,37,500/- in proportion to their value. He, therefore, contended that it was not open for the appellants, considering the scope of this appeal, to rely upon certain documents, namely, the noting or letter of the appellants splitting the value of the insured property. 8. 2,37,500/- in proportion to their value. He, therefore, contended that it was not open for the appellants, considering the scope of this appeal, to rely upon certain documents, namely, the noting or letter of the appellants splitting the value of the insured property. 8. Counsel for the respondent No. 1 also relied upon certain authorities, namely, (Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India v. The Western Company of North America)5, reported in 1989(2) Bom.C.R. 332 : A.I.R. 1990 Bombay 276 in support of his contention that Umpire is not bound and required to give any hearing, he having been a party to the arbitration proceedings right from the beginning. 9. Since the Counsel for the appellants laid stress of misconducting the proceedings by the Umpire by relying upon section 29(2) of the Marine Insurance Act, it is necessary to consider the submission at the outset. 10. The award of the Umpire is there in the paperbook, it is dated 30th September, 1991 and it is under section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940. The discussion of the Umpire regarding the provisions of the Marine Insurance Act are to be found in paragraphs 11, 12, and 13 and since the main controversy is regarding this provision of the Marine Insurance Act, it is necessary to reproduce the said paragraphs, which read as follows: "11. The Fire Insurance Policy in question is a valued policy within the meaning of sub-section (2) of section 29 of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963, specifying the agreed value of Rs. 3 lakhs of the subject matter insured (2500 rubber plants). In terms of sub-section (3) of the said section 29, subject to the provisions of the said Marine Insurance Act, and in the absence of fraud, the value fixed by the policy is, as between the insurer and assured, conclusive of the insurable value of the subject, intended to be insured, whether the loss be total or partial. 12. In the present case, the respondent has failed to establish that their value of the rubber plants at the time of the happening of the destruction was not the value agreed in the policy and there is no reason whatsoever why bona fide valuation given in the policy should not be accepted. 13. In my considered opinion, the loss suffered by the claimant by destruction of 2000 rubber plants is Rs. 13. In my considered opinion, the loss suffered by the claimant by destruction of 2000 rubber plants is Rs. 2,40,000/- in accordance with the value fixed in the policy and the claimant is entitled to be indemnified of such loss with deduction of Rs. 2500/-. This means that the claimant shall be entitled to a compensation of Rs. 2,37,500/-." The appellants had raised the same point before the Civil Court and the Civil Court in its judgment rejected the contention of the appellants by observing that:--- "In my opinion, the findings of para 11 of the award are not based on any legal proposition, but, as rightly pointed out, on behalf of the applicant, the learned Umpire has drawn only an analogy from the Marine Insurance Act, 1963 and therefore, it cannot be said that the arbitrator has made a award on a wrong proposition of law, which has become an error apparent on the face of the record." 11. Counsel for the appellants repeatedly urged that these observations of the Civil Judge are wrong because it was not open for the Civil Court to read into the mind of the Umpire while interpreting paragraph 11 of the Umpire's Award. According to him, the Umpire has directly placed reliance on section 29(2) of the Marine Insurance Act, 1963 and has come to the conclusion on the liability of the appellants, and, therefore, the award and judgment of the Civil Court were liable to be set aside. 12. In State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. and another (supra), which was pressed into service by the Counsel for the appellants in this regard, it was held by the Supreme Court in paragraph 31 as under:--- "In recent times, error in law and fact in basing an award has not been given the wide immunity as enjoyed earlier, by expanding the import and implication of "legal misconduct" of an arbitrator so that award by the arbitrator does not perpetrate gross miscarriage of justice and the same is not reduced to mockery of a fair decision of the lis between the parties to arbitration. Precisely for the aforesaid reasons, the erroneous application of law constituting the very basis of the award and improper and incorrect findings of fact, which without closer and intrinsic scrutiny, are demonstrable on the face of the materials on record, have been held, very rightly, as legal misconduct rendering the award as invalid." 13. No doubt these observations have been made by the Supreme Court by putting the exact position of law. However, the entire approach of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment is that the award under the Arbitration Act should not be lightly interfered with and even if such decisions are erroneous, either in factual implication or interpretation of law correctly, they are binding and valid. Even if the arbitrator commits an error in appreciating correct legal position while passing the award, the same does not affect the validity of the award. 14. Considering the aforesaid dictum of the Apex Court, it has to be seen whether the appellants succeed in their challenge of the Award on the ground of reliance being placed by the Umpire on the provisions of section 29(2) of the Marine Insurance Act. Considering the entire dispute, the reasons given by the Umpire and those given by the lower Court, it cannot be said that the Umpire relied on section 29(2) of the Marine Insurance Act as provisions of law directly applicable to the facts of the case. As rightly held by the trial Court he has relied upon those provisions for the purpose of analogy. 15. Apart from these facts, as rightly pointed out by the Counsel for the respondent No. 1, the findings in the paragraph quoted above are not the sole basis for passing the award. The Umpire has given separate and convincing reasons for coming to his decision and those are clear from paragraphs 12, 13 and other paragraphs wherein the Umpire has held that the appellants, that is, the Insurance Company has failed to establish the value of the rubber plants at the time of the fire. 16. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the Counsel for the appellants that the award and the order of the trial Court are liable to be set aside on the ground of wrong reliance by the Umpire on the wrong and inapplicable provisions of law. 16. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the Counsel for the appellants that the award and the order of the trial Court are liable to be set aside on the ground of wrong reliance by the Umpire on the wrong and inapplicable provisions of law. The award of the Umpire is not solely based on the provisions of the Marine Insurance Act nor can it be said that if those provisions of the Marine Insurance Act were not quoted by the Umpire or were not relied upon by him, he could not have given the award. The objection of the appellants in this regard has, therefore, to be rejected. 17. The Counsel for the appellants also relied upon the judgment in M/s. Allen Berry and Co. Private Ltd. v. The Union of India (supra). It appears that reliance was placed by the Counsel for the appellants on this judgment on the basis of paragraph 7 thereof, which is reproduced as under:--- "An error in law on the face of the award means,- that you can find in the award or a document actually incorporated thereto, as for instance, a note appended by the arbitrator stating the reasons for his judgment, some legal proposition which is the basis of the award and which you can then say is erroneous. .........." 18. I am afraid that no reliance whatsoever can be placed upon this paragraph because it is not the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court but the aforesaid portion was a formulation of principle by Lord Dunedin that the correctness of the decision in (1905(2) K.B. 184)6 was challenged before the Privy Council in (Champsey Bhara and Co. v. Jivraj Balloo Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd.)7, 1923 A.C. 480. But even after formulating the principle, the Privy Council upheld the award. 19. The second contention raised by the appellants was that the Umpire did not give an opportunity to the appellants of being heard. However, this submission is also required to be rejected firstly because even under the policy of the Insurance Clause 13 the Umpire was to be there alongwith the two arbitrators right from the beginning of the matter being taken up by the arbitrators. However, this submission is also required to be rejected firstly because even under the policy of the Insurance Clause 13 the Umpire was to be there alongwith the two arbitrators right from the beginning of the matter being taken up by the arbitrators. He, therefore, had an opportunity to hear the parties, go through their documents, consider their objections and consequently it was not necessary for him to give any fresh hearing to the appellants. In fact this controversy has been concluded by the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission of India v. The Western Company of North America (supra). In that case also the Umpire presided over the proceedings before the arbitrators and when the arbitrators could not concur, the matter was referred to the Umpire and in that background it was held by the Divisions Bench that question of giving rehearing by the Umpire to the parties did not arise. Counsel for the appellants tried to distinguish this case from the facts of the present case and contended that in that case there was an agreement between the parties that the Umpire would preside over the meetings before the arbitrators and he was also entitled to put questions to the witnesses and peruse documents which was absent in the present case. I do not find any justification in this submission because in the instant case also as per the admitted facts the Umpire was present for all the meetings held before the arbitrators. He, therefore, had an opportunity to listen to the submissions, to peruse the documents produced by the parties and in addition to these facts, looking to the approach of the Courts, particularly Apex Court and earlier judgments of this Court, it is only on the ground of patent illegality or misconduct that the award has to be set aside. Giving an opportunity of hearing is not a right of the party before the Umpire and nothing in that regard was pointed out by the Counsel for the appellants and, therefore, once it was held that the appellants had no right of hearing before the Umpire, no grievance can be made in that regard nor the award can be challenged on that count. 20. Counsel, for the appellants relied upon The Industrial Gases Ltd. v. The Ganesh Flour Mills Co. Ltd. (supra). 20. Counsel, for the appellants relied upon The Industrial Gases Ltd. v. The Ganesh Flour Mills Co. Ltd. (supra). In that case it was held that Umpire must hear the evidence of the parties and other witnesses. He must enter upon reference, give notice to the parties, so that they would have had an opportunity of making any other submission that they desire in the difference of opinion between the arbitrators. 21. I am unable to agree with the reasoning given by the Allahabad High Court because I am bound by the judgment of our Court, that is, of the Division Bench as quoted above and also the approach of the Court has changed considerably in arbitration proceedings as has been observed frequently in many cases as observed in State of Rajasthan v. Puri Construction Co. Ltd. and another (supra). In fact this judgment of the Supreme Court has considered the purpose and object of appointing arbitrators, their need in the present time and the limited scope of challenge to their powers. Therefore, I am unable to agree with the Counsel for the appellants that the judgment of the Allahabad High Court can be pressed into service for declaring the Award and the Order of the Civil Court as invalid. 22. The third submission that was made by the Counsel for the appellants was that the Umpire as well as the Civil Court erred in passing an Award for Rs. 2,37,500/- because under the Insurance Policy, the Insurance Company was liable to pay "the value of the property at the time of the happening of its destruction". According to him, the Inspector of the Insurance Company had assessed the damage soon after the fire to be Rs. 91,500/- and since the value of the plantation was Rs. 1,25,000/-, granting award for Rs. 2,40,000/- was also an error apparent on the face of the record. This argument has to be outright rejected because in the Insurance cover, that is, the policy the property insured has been described in the Schedule as "2500 Nos. rubber plants valued Rs. 3,00,000/-". When the Policy itself depicts the value of the 2500 rubber plants as Rs. 2,40,000/- was also an error apparent on the face of the record. This argument has to be outright rejected because in the Insurance cover, that is, the policy the property insured has been described in the Schedule as "2500 Nos. rubber plants valued Rs. 3,00,000/-". When the Policy itself depicts the value of the 2500 rubber plants as Rs. 3,00,000/- and when admittedly 2000 rubber plants were destroyed in the fire, it could not be said that the Award to that extent was illegal or against the contractual terms, for the Insurance Policy makes the Insurance Company liable to pay the value of the property at the time of the destruction. If out of 2500 plants, 2000 were destroyed, then the value was rightly arrived at by the Umpire and the Court at Rs. 2,37,500/-. Attempt of the appellants to rely upon some document/letter showing the splitting of the insured amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- has to be negatived because if the Insurance Policy is itself clear about the valuation of the plantation, no other evidence can be permitted to be adduced. This is apart from the fact that this Court nor the Civil Court can go into questions of facts. 23. Considering all these aspects of the matter, there is no illegality in the award of the Umpire or the order of the Court making the award the rule of the Court nor can it be said that the Umpire misconducted his proceedings with reference to the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellants and consequently the appeal is liable to be dismissed. Hence the following order: 24. The appeal is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. -----