Judgment SHRIKRISHNA B.N., J.:---This appeal is directed against an order of the learned Single Judge made on 2nd December, 1999 in the Notice of Motion [reported in 2000(2) Bom.C.R. 556 ] holding that this Court has no jurisdiction to try the admiralty suit filed by the appellants-original plaintiffs, directing the return of the plaint to the plaintiffs for presentation to proper Court and for discharge of the Bank Guarantee furnished by the respondents-original defendants pursuant to the order of the Court made on 12th March, 1997. FACTS 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall hereinafter be referred or as arrayed in the suit. 3. The plaintiffs brought the suit in admiralty jurisdiction of this Court for arrest and condemning the first defendant vessel m.v. Umang along with her equipments, accessories, etc. in the sum of Rupees Forty Five lakhs, together with interest at the rate of eighteen per cent, from the date of claim till payment or satisfaction of the decree and a decree to sell the said vessel and for applying the proceedings towards satisfaction of the claim of the plaintiffs. 4. The first defendant vessel is registered in St. Vincent Grenadines and the second defendant, which at all material times was the owner of the first defendant vessel, is a Liberian Shipping Company. The third defendant is the local agent of the first defendant vessel. It is the case of the plaintiffs that they are the parents of one Arvind Kamla Kant Dube who died on 16th August, 1996 on board the first defendant vessel when she was "lying in Port of Kandla". The deceased Arvind Kamla Kant Dube joined the service of the second defendant as an Engineer on board effective 22nd September, 1995. He was the sole bread earner for the aged parents by regular remittance of monies for upkeep of the household. When he was not on board the ship, he used to reside with the plaintiffs in the family home at Allahabad. On 15th August, 1996, when the first defendant vessel was "lying in the Port of Kandla", the deceased along with other officers and crew was working on the job of maintenance of electric cranes on the vessel. When he was not on board the ship, he used to reside with the plaintiffs in the family home at Allahabad. On 15th August, 1996, when the first defendant vessel was "lying in the Port of Kandla", the deceased along with other officers and crew was working on the job of maintenance of electric cranes on the vessel. During the course of repair work on crane No. 8, the deceased received severe and fatal electric shock from the equipment that was being repaired, though the equipment was not expected to be supplied with electric current during the period of repairs. After the death of the deceased, information was received by the plaintiffs who proceeded to Kandla and took possession of the dead body of their son. Subsequent letters addressed by them to the vessel P I agent M/s. James Mackintosh Co. Ltd. requesting for relevant documents in connection with the death of their son and also asking for settlement of the compensation payable on the death of the son, after a number of reminders, elicited the reply that the only compensation the defendants were ready to pay to the plaintiffs was a sum of Rs. 83,250/- which was said to have been deposited with the Executive Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation Act, Rajkot. The plaintiffs allege that the death of the deceased occurred on account of wrongful act and/or failure or negligence on the part of the defendant, their managers, servants and agents in not ensuring that the equipment under repair was not supplied with electric current during the period of the repairs. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants failed to maintain the said vessel in proper and sea-worthy condition, failed to exercise due care and caution for the maintenance of the crane and equipment, and allowed it to be kept, handled, repaired and operated without ensuring disconnection of electric supply thereto, resulting in the death of their son. It is alleged in the plaint by the plaintiffs that, because of failure to take necessary care and caution for the safety of the crew of the vessel, death of their son had occurred. It is alleged in the plaint by the plaintiffs that, because of failure to take necessary care and caution for the safety of the crew of the vessel, death of their son had occurred. Consequently, the plaintiffs contend that the defendants are liable to pay to them compensation as and by way of damages for the estate of the said deceased under the proviso to section 2 of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and compensation for loss of dependency under the provisions of section 1(a) of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. The plaintiffs estimate their claim in the suit at Rupees Forty Five lakhs as detailed in the plaint and hold the defendants responsible to satisfy the claim. The plaintiffs allege that their son's death was on account of "damage caused by a ship", within the meaning of the law relating to admiralty jurisdiction, and contend that the International Law Maritime has for long recognised that wrongful death is a maritime and admiralty cause and, consequently, this Court has jurisdiction on its admiralty side to entertain and decree the suit. 5. The defendants has traversed the pleas in the plaint by a written statement and, inter alia, contend that this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Notice of Motion No. 1153 of 1998 was taken out by the defendants seeking dismissal of the suit on the ground that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit or in the alternative to direct that the plaint be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation to the proper Court. The contention of the defendants is that no cause of action has arisen within the local area within the jurisdiction of this Court, nor do any of the plaintiffs or defendants reside or do any business within the local area within the jurisdiction of this Court. According to the defendants, on 15th August, 1996, the vessel was lying in the Port of Kandla in District Kutch, which is within the State of Gujarat; the territories of the District of Kutch were formerly part of the Indian sovereign State of Kutch, but by virtue of the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, the territory of the erstwhile sovereign State of Kutch became part of the bigger bilingual State of Bombay. Hence, with effect from November, 1956, the High Court of Bombay became invested with jurisdiction to exercise powers in relation to Kutch District. Upon enactment of the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960, there was further bifurcation of the bilingual State of Bombay and Kutch District became part of the new State of Gujarat. A new High Court was established for the State of Gujarat at Ahmedabad and, simultaneously, the powers and jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court over the areas of the State of Gujarat including the Kutch District were taken away and vested in then newly established High Court for the State of Gujarat. It is, therefore, contended by the defendants that on and from the date on which the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960 came into effect, i.e. 1st May, 1960, this Court ceased to have jurisdiction to exercise any judicial power over the territory comprised in Kandla Port, within Kutch District, now part of in the State of Gujarat. 6. The learned Single Judge accepted the contentions of the defendants and held as follows : (a) The jurisdiction in admiralty of this Court for an action in rem or in personam can be exercised only against a vessel which is within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. As on the material date the vessel was anchored at No. 2 morning buoy of Kandla Port, which is situated in Kutch District of the State of Gujarat, this Court could not exercise jurisdiction in respect thereof. (b) The admiralty jurisdiction of this Court does not extend to the whole of India, but is restricted only to territories in relation to which this Court has been established. Clause 32 of Letters Patent establishing this Court must be read in the light of the constitutional provisions, the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956, and the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960. When so read, it follows that the admiralty jurisdiction has to be confined to the local territories limits of this Court. (c) That it is a trite principle in admiralty law that the vessel must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court for being proceeded against. This conclusion was inevitable from a reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court in (M.V. Elizabeth and another v. Harwan Investment Trading Co. (c) That it is a trite principle in admiralty law that the vessel must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court for being proceeded against. This conclusion was inevitable from a reading of the judgment of the Supreme Court in (M.V. Elizabeth and another v. Harwan Investment Trading Co. and another)1, A.I.R. 1993 S.C. 1014, which holds that for exercise of an action in rem of the admiralty jurisdiction of this High Court, the ship had to be within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. (d) As at the material time the ship was lying in Kandla Port, this Court has no jurisdiction to order the arrest of the ship in exercise of its powers in admiralty. 7. Consequently, the learned Single Judge directed that the plaint be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation to the proper Court and discharged the Bank Guarantee furnished by the defendants. Hence, this Appeal. Does the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 apply? 8. The first question which arises for our consideration is, what exactly are the limits of the jurisdiction exercised by this Court in admiralty in an action in rem or in personam? Though, Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendants, vehemently urged that, after the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra), whatever might have been the erstwhile admiralty jurisdiction of this Court, all claims must now be processed under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 in the "High Court" as defined in section 3(5) of the Act. Since this contention goes to the root of the matter, we propose to examine it in the first instance. 9. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, is "an Act to foster the development and ensure the efficient maintenance of an Indian mercantile marine in a manner best suited to serve the national interests and for that purpose to establish a National Shipping Board and a Shipping Development Fund, to provide for the registration of Indian ships and generally to amend and consolidate the law relating to merchant shipping", as indicated in its long preamble. Different provisions of the Act came into force on different dates between 15th December, 1958 to 1st January, 1961. The enactment is a long one containing 461 sections, but we need notice only some sections relevant for our purpose. 10. Different provisions of the Act came into force on different dates between 15th December, 1958 to 1st January, 1961. The enactment is a long one containing 461 sections, but we need notice only some sections relevant for our purpose. 10. Section 2 provides that unless otherwise expressly provided, the provisions of the Act would apply to : (a) any vessel which is registered in India : or (b) any vessel which is required by this Act to be so registered : or (c) any other vessel owned which is wholly by persons to each of whom any of the descriptions specified in Clauses (a), (b) or (c), as the case may be, of section 21 applies. It also provides that these provisions of the Act shall so apply, wherever the vessel may be. Sub-section (2) of section 2 provides that unless otherwise expressly provided, "the provisions of this Act which apply to vessels other than those referred to in sub-section (1) shall so apply only while any such vessel is within India, including the territorial waters thereof". Section 3(15) defines the expression "High Court" in relation to a vessel to mean the High Court within the limits of whose appellate jurisdiction ; (a) the port of registry of the vessel is situate; or (b) the vessel is for the time being ; or (c) the cause of action wholly or in part arises. 11. Sections 342, 346 and 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 are of relevance to us. Section 342, which is found in the fasciculus of sections 337 to 344, under the sub-division "Costs of detention and damages incidental thereto", provides that when a ship other than an Indian ship is in a port in India and is, whilst at that port, unsafe by reason of the defective condition of her hull, equipment or machinery, or by reason of overloading or improper loading, provisions of the part with respect to detention of ship shall apply to that ship as if she were an Indian ship subject to certain prescribed conditions. Part X of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 contains several provisions for detention of the ships at the instance of the Central Government or the appropriate authority appointed by it on the ground of unseaworthiness or grounds of safety. Part X deals with "Collisions, accidents at sea and liability". Section 346 reads as under :- "346. Part X of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 contains several provisions for detention of the ships at the instance of the Central Government or the appropriate authority appointed by it on the ground of unseaworthiness or grounds of safety. Part X deals with "Collisions, accidents at sea and liability". Section 346 reads as under :- "346. Damages for personal injury.—(1) Whenever loss of life or personal injuries are suffered by any person on board a ship owing to the fault of that ship and of any other ship or ships, the liability of the owners of the ships concerned shall be joint and several. (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed as depriving any person of any right of defence on which, independently of this section, he might have relied in an action brought against him by the person injured, or any person entitled to sue in respect of such loss of life, or shall affect the right of any person to limit his liability in cases to which this section relates in the manner provided by law." The right of arrest of a ship at the instance of a party is provided for under section 443 which reads as under :- "443. Power to detain foreign ship that has occasioned damage.—(1) Whenever any damage has in any part of the world been caused to property belonging to the Government or to any citizen of India or a company by a ship other than an Indian ship and at any time thereafter that ship is found within Indian jurisdiction, the High Court may, upon the application of any person who alleges that the damage was accused by the misconduct or want of skill of the master or any member of the crew of the ship, issue an order directed to any proper or other officer named in the order requiring him to detain the ship until such time as the owner, master or consignee thereof has satisfied any claim in respect of the damage or has given security to the satisfaction of the High Court to pay all costs and damages that may be awarded in any legal proceedings that may be instituted in respect of the damage, and any officer to whom the order is directed shall detain the ship accordingly. (2) Whenever it appears that before an application can be made under this section, the ship in respect of which the application is to be made will have departed from India or the territorial waters of India, any proper officer may detain the ship for such time as to allow the application to be made and the result thereof to be communicated to the officer detaining the ship, and that officer shall not be liable for any costs or damages in respect of the detention unless the same is proved to have been made without reasonable grounds. (3) In any legal proceedings in relation to any such damage aforesaid, the person giving security shall be made a defendant and shall for the purpose of such proceeding be deemed to be the owner of the ship that has occasioned the damage." 12. A reading of this section suggests that the High Court may, on the application of the aggrieved person, detain a foreign ship that has occasioned damage in any part of the world to "property" belonging to the Government or the citizen of India or a company, if at any time that offending ship is found within the Indian jurisdiction. This is the right of arrest of the foreign ship granted to the Government or a citizen. As already pointed out, this right of arrest can be exercised only by an order of the "High Court" as defined in section 3(15) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. In other words, this power of arrest of the foreign ship can be exercised only within the territorial limits of the High Court's appellate jurisdiction. The significant aspect in section 443 is that this power of detention of the foreign ship can be exercised only where there is damage to "property" belonging to the Government or any Indian citizen or an Indian Company. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendants, that the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 is a complete code in so far as the right of arrest of a ship is concerned or that there is no such power of arrest of a foreign ship in exercise of admiralty jurisdiction in the High Court otherwise than under the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. If the argument were correct, then there is no right of arrest of a foreign ship, if such ship causes death to an Indian citizen anywhere in the world, though damage to property may entail arrest of the foreign ship under section 343. For reasons which we shall indicate hereinafter, we are not inclined to accept this contention urged by the defendants. Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court. 13. That takes us to the question as to whether the High Court of Bombay has powers in admiralty jurisdiction even apart from those granted under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, and the next question, if there is such power, what is its extent and how it is to be exercised? 14. The answers to these two questions raised above would require an extensive survey of the historical development of admiralty jurisdiction of this Court. 15. For the first time, admiralty jurisdiction came to be invested in the Recorder's Court at Bombay which was established by a Royal Charter dated 20th February, 1798. Prior to that, there was a Mayor's Court at Bombay established by a Charter dated 8th January, 1788 which exercised only civil, criminal and ecclesiastical jurisdictions. The Recorder's Court, however, was substituted by the Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay which was established by Letters Patent issued under the Charter of 1823. This Court had four jurisdictions, namely, Civil, Criminal, Ecclesiastical and Admiralty. Clause 53 of the said Letters Patent provided as follows :- "And it is our further will and pleasure, and we do hereby grant, ordain, establish, and appoint, that the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay shall be a Court of Admiralty, in and for the said Town and Island of Bombay, and the limits thereof, and the Factories subordinate thereto, and all the territories which now are or hereafter may be subject to, or dependant upon the said Government. And we do hereby commit and grant to the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay full power and authority to take cognizance of, hear, examine, try and determine all causes, civil and maritime, and all pleas of contracts, debts, exchanges, policies of assurance, accounts, charter parties agreements, loading of ships, and all matters and contracts which, in any manner whatsoever, relate to freight or money due for ships hired and let out, transport money, maritime usury, bottomry or respondentia, or to extortions, trespasses, injuries, complaints, demands and matters civil and maritime whatsoever, between merchants, owners, and proprietors of ships and vessels, employed or used within the jurisdiction aforesaid, or between others, contracted, done, had or commenced in, upon, or by the high seas or public rivers or ports, creeks, harbours and places overflown within the ebbing and flowing of the sea and high water mark within about, and throughout the Town, Island and territories aforesaid, the cognizance whereof both belong to the jurisdiction of the admiralty, as the same is used and exercised in that part of Great Britain called England, together with all and singular their incidents, emergents, and dependencies, annexed and connexed causes whatsoever; and to proceed summarily therein, with all possible despatch, according to the course of our admiralty of that part of Great Britain called England, without the strict formalities of law, considering only the truth of the fact and the equity of the case." A reading of this clause suggests that though several matters are enumerated in respect of which the Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay had full power and authority to take cognizance, the jurisdiction of the admiralty side of the Supreme Court was the same as was exercised in that part of the Great Britain called England. In other words, the Supreme Court of judicature at Bombay was invested with the same jurisdiction on its admiralty side as the jurisdiction exercised by High Court of Admiralty in England. Clause 53 of the said Letters Patent specifically gave jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay to try and determine all cases, civil and maritime and all matters which inter alia related to injuries between owners and proprietors of ships and vessels or between others which were done upon the high seas. 16. Clause 53 of the said Letters Patent specifically gave jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay to try and determine all cases, civil and maritime and all matters which inter alia related to injuries between owners and proprietors of ships and vessels or between others which were done upon the high seas. 16. The Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay established in 1823 was replaced by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay established by the Letters Patent of 1862. Clause 31 of the said Letters Patent provided as follows : "Admiralty and Vice Admiralty jurisdiction : And we do further ordain that the said High Court of Judicature at Bombay shall have and exercise all such civil and maritime jurisdiction as may not be exercised by the said Supreme Court as a Court of Admiralty or by any Judge of the said Court as Commissary to the Vice Admiralty Court, and also such jurisdiction for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions arising in India as is now vested in any commissioner or commissioner appointed by us or our predecessors under the powers given by an Act passed in the Session of Parliament, held in the Thirtyninth and fortieth years of the Reigon of his late Majesty King George the Third, "for establishing further regulations for the Government of the British territories in India and the better administration of justice within the same." Thus, in addition to the jurisdiction for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions arising in India as was vested in any commissioner appointed under an Act passed by the Imperial Parliament, the Court was empowered to exercise the Admiralty and Vice Admiralty jurisdiction which was then exercised by the Supreme Court as a Court of Admiralty or by any Judge of the Supreme Court as a Commissary to the Vice Admiralty Court. It may be noted that, at the material time, the Chief Justice had Vice Admiralty jurisdiction under the commission of 19th July 1822 and all or any of the Judges of the Supreme Court could be appointed Commissioners under the provisions of sections 39 and 40 Geo, III Clause 79, SC. 25 for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions arising in India. 17. 25 for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions arising in India. 17. The Indian High Courts Act, 1861, abolished the Supreme Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and the Company Courts of Appeal at those places and provided for the establishment by charter of High Courts at those places. Pursuant to this Act, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay was established by Letters Patent in the year 1862. 18. The Letters Patent of 1862 was once again replaced by Letters Patent of 1865 and Clause 32 of the said Letters Patent provided as follows :- "And we do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Bombay shall have and exercise all such civil and maritime jurisdiction as may now be exercised by the said High Court as a Court of Admiralty or of Vice Admiralty, and also such jurisdiction for the trial and adjudication of prize causes and other maritime questions arising in India as may now be exercised by the said High Court." 19. In 1890 the British Parliament passed an Act called the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 (53, 54 Victoria Chapter 27) providing that the legislature of British India may declare certain courts to be Colonial Courts of Admiralty and the courts so declared shall have the admiralty jurisdiction declared under the Act. In exercise of the powers conferred by this Act, the Indian Legislature passed Act 16 of 1891. Section 2 whereof declared the High Courts at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and some other courts to be Colonial Courts of Admiralty and these courts were invested with such admiralty jurisdiction as was exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England under "any statute or otherwise". The provisions of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890, make it clear that, whatever may have been the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay prior to its being declared as Colonial Court of Admiralty by Act 16 of 1891, as from the date of that High Court being declared as a Colonial Court of Admiralty, it exercised such admiralty jurisdiction as was exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England under "any statute or otherwise." 20. This then taken us to the question as to what was the admiralty jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England when the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 was passed by the British Parliament. 21. It may be mentioned here that, in the meanwhile, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in England had considerably expanded inter alia under the Act of 1840 and the Act of 1861 and this expanded jurisdiction was not conferred on the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, though it had been established in 1862. In order to bring about uniformity between the jurisdiction of High Court of Admiralty in England and the jurisdiction of the High Courts of Admiralty in India as well as in other British possessions, the British Parliament found it necessary to enact the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 providing, inter alia, that the legislature of British India may declare certain courts to be Colonial Courts of Admiralty and the courts so declared shall have the admiralty jurisdiction as exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England "under any statute or otherwise". 22. By sections 18(1) and 18(3) of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, the existing laws were continued in force until other provision was made by the appropriate legislature of India and Pakistan or other authority having power in that behalf. By section 1 of the India (Consequential Provision) Act, 1949, all the existing laws were continued in force. Article 372 of the Constitution of India provided that notwithstanding the repeal of the Indian Independence Act, 1947, all the laws in force in India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue in force until altered or repealed or amended by a competent legislature or other competent authority. The Indian Independence Act, 1947 was itself repealed by Article 395 of the Constitution of India. The result, therefore, is that the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, being one of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty under Act 16 of 1891, exercised and continued to exercise the same admiralty jurisdiction as was exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England in 1890 when the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act was passed by the British Parliament. The result, therefore, is that the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, being one of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty under Act 16 of 1891, exercised and continued to exercise the same admiralty jurisdiction as was exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England in 1890 when the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act was passed by the British Parliament. The Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) pointed out that this Admiralty jurisdiction exercised by High Court did not remain frozen or atrophied to the jurisdiction exercisable under the Act of 1891 and indicated that, as a Court of plenary power, the High Court's jurisdiction had further expanded. What is of significance is that, M.V. Elizabeth (supra), on which considerable reliance was placed by the defendants and the learned Single Judge, at no place says that the jurisdiction exercisable by the High Court as a result of 1891 Act was whittled down or circumscribed in any manner, though in terms it has ascribed certain additional powers and jurisdiction to the High Court, which we shall have occasion to discuss later. The jurisdiction of Admiralty Court in England in 1891. 23. This then brings us back as to what exactly was the admiralty jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England. Admiralty jurisdiction in England had an ancient origin in the International Law Maritime and developed during the past several centuries. The jurisdiction is based not only on International Law Maritime, but also on subsequent statutes passed by the British Parliament. The admiralty courts followed and adopted principles from the general law of the sea observed by Western nations, instanced in early times, e.g. by the laws of oleron, and in later times, widely followed in the general practice of continental nations. It had been characteristic of English Judges exercising admiralty jurisdiction to look to "the general law of the sea" for two allied, but distinct, purposes; first, to resolve doubts on a question of English law by adopting what they believed to be the relevant rule of the "general law", and secondly, as a principle of judicial policy, in order to avoid creating divergence from the general law. Concomitant with the importance of maritime commerce, the Judicature Acts in England, from time to time, amended the laws to bring them in accord with the admiralty law followed and practiced in other countries. 24. Concomitant with the importance of maritime commerce, the Judicature Acts in England, from time to time, amended the laws to bring them in accord with the admiralty law followed and practiced in other countries. 24. The genesis and development of the powers and jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in England is best illustrated by the following passage in "Roscoe's Admiralty Practice". 5th edition, at pages 2 and 3:- "In medieval times not only was there a Lord High Admiral, but also admirals for different portions of the seas around the British Islands, there was, for instance, an admiral of the West and an admiral of the North. These officers necessarily possessed disciplinary powers over vessels under their command, and in addition were in a sense sea magistrates, for they were the only maritime officials with both authority and power. They had especially to determine disputes in regard to the capture at sea of enemy property; in other words, in regard to prize. By a natural evolution they became also arbitrators in maritime disputes. It was an obvious step from the exercise of a personal jurisdiction of rude legal kind by officials whose functions were primarily executive to the appointment of deputies who became recognized judges. Finally there emerged from among these deputies a personage who, from deputy of the Lord High Admiral, became the appointed Judge of the English High Court of Admiralty, who had criminal jurisdiction, who in time of war fulfilled duties as a Judge of the Prize Court and exercised in the Instance Court jurisdiction finally limited to certain maritime causes. The germs of these two jurisdictions, which eventually became quite separate, we have already noted in the functions in medieval times of the Lord High Admiral an his fellows. This is in a few lines an epitome of the genesis of the High Court of Admiralty which struggled on for centuries side by side with the common law and Chancery courts of England the one seeking to enlarge, the others to limit its jurisdiction." 25. The intense rivalry between the High Court of Admiralty and the Court of Common Law with regard to their respective jurisdictions led to the passing of an Act in 1389 entitled " An Act concerning what things the Admiral and his deputy shall meddle". The intense rivalry between the High Court of Admiralty and the Court of Common Law with regard to their respective jurisdictions led to the passing of an Act in 1389 entitled " An Act concerning what things the Admiral and his deputy shall meddle". It enunciated in clear terms as to what the admiral and deputies shall not meddle in. Despite this clear enunciation of the law, however, the Admiralty Court did not seem to have lost its enthusiasm to expand its jurisdiction. It continued to exercise jurisdiction in civil areas to which common law did not apply. In 1391, the British Legislature passed an Act couched in more restrictive language so as to demarcate the admiralty jurisdiction. The Act declared as follows :- "It is declared, ordained and established that of all manner of contracts, pleas, and quarrels, and all other things rising within the bodies of the counties, as well by land as by water, and also of wreck of the sea, the Admiral's Court shall have no manner of cognizance, power, nor jurisdiction but all such manner of contracts, pleas, and quarrels and all other things rising within the bodies of counties, as well by land as by water, as afore, and also wreck of the sea, shall be tried, determined, discussed and remedied by the laws of the land, and not before nor by the admiral nor his lieutenant in any wise." 26. By the Act of 1391, the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in England was restricted only to things done upon the high seas and the High Court of Admiralty had no jurisdiction whatsoever to similar things arising within the body of a county. This raised a formidable barrier against the encroachments of the admiralty on the jurisdiction of the common law Court, but the encroachments continued frequently and had to be corrected by frequent issuance of writs by Common Law Courts. A further enactment in England gave direct remedy to persons wrongfully pursued in the Court of Admiralty and this Act gave remedy as against the admiral and his deputies. The backlash of this Act was that, though the contest for jurisdiction was not abandoned, the efforts of Admiralty Court to assert its power for a long time became feeble and intermittent. 27. The backlash of this Act was that, though the contest for jurisdiction was not abandoned, the efforts of Admiralty Court to assert its power for a long time became feeble and intermittent. 27. The following two passages from Roscoe's Admiralty Practice at page 8, indicate the eventual development of the Admiralty Court's developing jurisdiction :- "To examine the various cases of prohibition relating to the admiralty, which are to be found in the early reports, would be a long and tedious labour. It is sufficient to observe that although the common lawyers were not able always to hold, firmly and consistently, the ground which they had taken, they seem, so far as they could, to have acted upon the broad rule that nothing was to be left to the admiralty of which the common law could conveniently take cognizance. This principle, though not always avowed, and often hidden behind quaint arguments, and sometimes only loosely enforced, seems to have been the guiding principle of all the early decisions. Had the system of common law procedure been more elastic than it was, doubtless it would have been made to embrace the whole jurisdiction of the admiralty, and one great anomaly in our law would thus have been removed. But the technical process of the courts of common law limited their jurisdiction, and hampered their procedure, and it was impossible, with any show of justice, to prohibit suitors from resorting to the admiralty in cases where that Court alone could afford a satisfactory remedy. So that as matters at last adjusted themselves, the Admiralty Judges, although compelled to abandon all claim to general maritime jurisdiction, were yet suffered to exercise undisputed authority in all maritime cases where the common law could not give redress. The Admiralty Court was left in possession of its jurisdiction over torts committed on the high seas, for that had never been disputed, and in suits of salvage also its authority prevailed, for that was regarded as a branch of the royal prerogative, with the exercise of which the Court was properly entrusted. The Court had jurisdiction over tortious acts done upon the high seas. This jurisdiction has not been affected or altered by modern legislation, and has been exercised by the High Court in recent times to restrain such acts by injunction. The Court had jurisdiction over tortious acts done upon the high seas. This jurisdiction has not been affected or altered by modern legislation, and has been exercised by the High Court in recent times to restrain such acts by injunction. In suits of possession the admiralty acquired jurisdiction because it afforded a summary process unknown to the common law, by which the possession of the very thing in dispute was at once dealt with. Again, in cases of hypothecation the admiralty was suffered to exercise jurisdiction, because the contract of hypothecation was not recognized by the common law, and it was only in the admiralty that the thing hypothecated could be directly proceeded against. Over seamen's waves the Court, though only after a severe struggle, obtained jurisdiction, apparently, on the grounds that as the crew could sue together in the Admiralty Court, the remedy there was more convenient than at law, and that seamen were entitled to the advantage the Admiralty afforded them of having the ship itself arrested as a security for their wages. These were the principal matters left within the jurisdiction of the Court, and even as to some of these the Admiralty Judges were compelled to move within very narrow limits........". 28. In 1648, an ordinance was passed which provided as under :- "That the Court of Admiralty shall have cognizance and jurisdiction against the ship in all causes which concern the repairing, victualling, and furnishing provisions for the setting of such ships to sea; and in all cases of bottomry, and likewise in contracts made beyond the seas concerning shipping, or navigation, or damages happening thereon, or arising at sea in any voyage; and likewise in all cases of charter-parties or contracts for freight, bills of lading, mariners wages or damages to goods laden on board ships, or other damages done by one ship or vessel to another, or by anchors or want of buoys." This ordinance was later set aside, but a bill was introduced in British Parliament to carry out in legal form the same provisions. The bill was also thrown out by the British Parliament. Thence the decline of the Admiralty Court began. The Admiralty Court fell into a feeble and neglected condition and for long its proceedings excited no attention. The bill was also thrown out by the British Parliament. Thence the decline of the Admiralty Court began. The Admiralty Court fell into a feeble and neglected condition and for long its proceedings excited no attention. In the Eighteenth century when England was engaged in maritime wars, constant appeals were made to the jurisdiction which the Admiralty Court exercised in prize causes and the learning and ability of Lord Stowell, both in prize cases and instance cases, raised the Court to a position of highest importance. It was only from this time onwards that the maritime jurisprudence of the Admiralty Court a definite and reasoned body of law began. 29. In 1833, a Select Committee of the House of Commons appointed to consider the question, presented a report recommending the extension of the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court. These recommendations were, however, not acted upon till the year 1840, when the British Parliament passed an Act. One purpose of this Act of 1840 was to eliminate the common law veto on the exercise of the common law jurisdiction within the body of county so that the High Court of Admiralty would also take cognizance of causes arising within the body of a county as much as common law courts themselves. By Clause 23 of that Act it was provided as under :- "That nothing herein contained shall be deemed to preclude any of Her Majesty's Courts of Law or Equity now having jurisdiction over the several subject matters and causes of action hereinbefore mentioned from continuing to exercise such jurisdiction as fully as if this Act had not been passed." 30. Unfortunately, the 1840 Act was confined only to pleas of damages "received by ships" and it was not until 1861 that British Parliament enlarged and further extended the jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty and conferred jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty with regard to claims for building equipping etc. of ships, claims for necessaries supplied to any ship, claims for damage to cargo imported into the country and claims for "damage done by any ship". The Act of 1861 conferred very wide jurisdiction on the High Court of Admiralty on several of the matters enumerated therein and almost the same powers as exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England in regard to certain matters. The Act of 1861 conferred very wide jurisdiction on the High Court of Admiralty on several of the matters enumerated therein and almost the same powers as exercised by the High Court of Chancery in England in regard to certain matters. It was also provided that the High Court of Admiralty shall be a Court of Record for all intents and purposes. Clause 35 of the 1861 Act provided that the jurisdiction conferred by the Act on the High Court of Admiralty may be exercised either by proceedings in rem or by proceedings in personam. The net result was that the High Court of Admiralty in certain matters had the same jurisdiction as the Court of Chancery, but in certain other matters and claims it was given exclusive jurisdiction and one of them pertained to the claim for "damage done by any ship" as provided in Clause 7 of the Act. Thus, so far as the claim based upon damage caused by a ship to person or property on the high seas is concerned, the High Court of Admiralty under the 1861 Act read with Act of 1860 had exclusive jurisdiction under Clause 35 of that Act either by proceedings in rem or by proceedings in personam. 31. At this juncture, it is relevant to notice the distinction in the jurisdictions exercised by ordinary Civil Court in suits and by the High Court in Admiralty. As Admiralty jurisdiction is rooted in the International Law Maritime, and is largely based on the principles of law of the sea, much of the jurisdiction can be understood against the backdrop of International Law Maritime. One of the fundamental principles in International Law Maritime is that all ships have a right of innocent passage through territorial waters of a sovereign State, but that, while passing through such territorial waters of a sovereign State, they must owe allegiance to the sovereign State. An important corollary of this principle is that the sovereign State exercises jurisdiction over the foreign ship both with regard to civil and criminal causes. In order to obviate the difficulty of foreign ships not being amenable to jurisdiction, International Maritime Law developed the principle of "maritime lien" which had a far reaching effect. An important corollary of this principle is that the sovereign State exercises jurisdiction over the foreign ship both with regard to civil and criminal causes. In order to obviate the difficulty of foreign ships not being amenable to jurisdiction, International Maritime Law developed the principle of "maritime lien" which had a far reaching effect. It is on account of this maritime lien that the claim for damage done by a ship on high seas to a person or property can be enforced only by an Admiralty Court. The Common Law Courts neither recognised such a lien, nor were they capable of giving effect to or enforcing the maritime lien. The maritime lien was enforced in the Admiralty Court by proceedings in rem and it was only by virtue of later development in the law maritime that a choice was given to the aggrieved person to enforce a maritime lien in respect of damage done to him or to his property by a ship on high seas or to proceed in personam against the owner of that ship. Though it is open to such a person to proceed in personam, it is only an alternative to proceed in rem. But for the maritime lien to which he is entitled by the law of sea, he would not be entitled to sue either in rem or in personam. See (Harmer v. Bell Bold Buccleugh)2, 1852(7) Moo P.C.C. 267. 32. It was Lord Tenterden's observations in Harmer v. Bell which developed this theory of maritime lien. As to its nature, Lord Machnagthen said in (Hamilton v. Baker, The Sara)3, 1889(14) A.C. 209 at page 225 as follows :- "The definition of a maritime lien as recognized by the law of maritime given by Lord Tenterden has thus been adopted. It is a privileged claim upon a thing in respect of service done to it or injury caused by it, to be carried into effect by legal proceeds. ....... The result of my examination of these principles and authorities is as follows. The law now recognizes maritime liens in certain clauses of claims, the principal being bottomry, salvage, wages, mates; wages, disbursements and liabilities, and damage. According to the definition above given, such a lien is a privileged claim upon a vessel in respect of service done to it, or injury caused by it, to be carried into effect by legal process. The law now recognizes maritime liens in certain clauses of claims, the principal being bottomry, salvage, wages, mates; wages, disbursements and liabilities, and damage. According to the definition above given, such a lien is a privileged claim upon a vessel in respect of service done to it, or injury caused by it, to be carried into effect by legal process. It is a right acquired by one over a thing belonging to another a jus in re aliena. It is, so to speak a substaction from the absolute property of the owner in the thing." 33. Thus, in respect of certain classes of claims, including damage done by a ship, a rule of substantive law was developed in Admiralty of attaching a lien to the ship which located with the ship wherever it want. Any person aggrieved had a right to move the Admiralty Court of the country, within whose territorial waters the ship was, to arrest the ship and sell it for satisfying his claim. If the owner was out of the jurisdiction of the Court and he appeared before the Court, the arrest could be lifted by calling upon the owner to furnish bail in an amount equal to the claim made by the person seeking the arrest. Once the owner appeared within the jurisdiction of the Court, the cause would then be tried as in any action in personam. There were detailed principles evolved with regard to priorities and distribution of the sale proceeds of the condemned ship which need not detain us. 34. The admiralty jurisdiction is an integral whole and cannot be divided into watertight compartments. In (The Tolten)4, 1946 P. 135 at page 147 Scott, L.J., observed as under :- "In my view the law maritime of "damage" as administered in our Admiralty Court, vests a right of action in any person, who suffers an injury anywhere in the world either to his person or to his property, whether moveable or immovable afloat or ashore, when caused by the maritime fault of the owner of a ship, he being responsible for the acts or defaults of his servants..... If the substantive law administered by our admiralty Court be what I have stated, it follows, at least logically, that it must be the same whether the procedure be in rem or in personam." 35. If the substantive law administered by our admiralty Court be what I have stated, it follows, at least logically, that it must be the same whether the procedure be in rem or in personam." 35. Decided cases of English Courts have established the principles that the Admiralty Courts had exclusive jurisdiction over torts committed on high seas. Not only did the Courts of Admiralty have complete exclusive jurisdiction over torts committed on high seas, but they also had exclusive jurisdiction to grant reliefs in respect of such torts by virtue of maritime lien, either in proceedings in rem or in proceedings in personam. The common law courts had no jurisdiction to entertain such claims. Lord Herschell L.C. in (The "Zeta")5, 1893 A.C. 468 at page 482, approved the proposition that the High Courts of Admiralty had exclusive jurisdiction in respect of torts committed on high seas and approved the passage quoted from the 3rd Volume of Blackstone's Commentaries (106), where the law is laid down thus :- "Admiralty courts have jurisdiction and power to try and determine all maritime causes; or such injuries, which though they are in their nature of common law cognizance, yet being committed upon the high seas, out of the reach of our ordinary courts of justice, are therefore to be remedied in a peculiar Court of this own ......". 36. The English Law Reports are replete with the observations of English Judges which have fine tuned and refined the principles applicable in Admiralty jurisdiction, but, for our purpose, it is needless to burden this judgment with all of them. 37. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 3rd Edition, Vol. 1, under section 9 entitled "Damage by Collision", the extent of the jurisdiction of Admiralty Court is stated as follows :- "The High Court of Justice acquired from the High Court of Admiralty jurisdiction over all wrongs committed by or to British subjects on the High seas. By statute the High Court has also admiralty jurisdiction in rem and in personam over any claim for damage received by a ship whether within the body of county or on the high seas and over any claim for damage done by a ship...... By statute the High Court has also admiralty jurisdiction in rem and in personam over any claim for damage received by a ship whether within the body of county or on the high seas and over any claim for damage done by a ship...... Damage "done by a ship" includes a claim for loss of life, or for personal injuries, but it does not include a claim for an indemnity in respect of statutory compensation paid either for personal injuries or for loss of life." With regard to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court of Admiralty in England, at page 48 under section 2 entitled "Exercise of Jurisdiction" of the same volume of Halsbury's Laws of England, it is stated as follows :- "88. Arrest of defendant or his property. The jurisdiction possessed by the High Court of Admiralty seems at first to have been ordinarily exercised by means of the arrest of the person of the defendant, who was required to give bail both to enter an appearance and to answer judgment in the cause. Where a defendant was not arrested, there was apparently always an alternative method of proceedings; by arresting any property belonging to him in tidal waters, and then citing the debtor and all parties interested in the goods attached to appear at the suit of the plaintiff." The origin of actions in rem in respect of torts committed on the high seas is explained at page 49 of the volume as follows :- "These methods of procedure became obsolete, but the Admiralty Court succeeded in establishing a right to arrest property the subject-matter of a dispute, and to enforce its judgments against the property so arrested, on the theory that a pre-existing maritime lien to the extent of the claim attached to the property from the moment of the creation of such claim. Such an action became known as an action in rem. Such an action became known as an action in rem. It is difficult to determine the exact source from which the present law as to maritime liens is derived, but whatever may have been the origin and process of development of a maritime lien for damage there is no doubt that the doctrine of such a lien is now established, and the right to enforce it differs from the ancient right of arrest to compel appearance and security in this, that it is confined to the property by which the damage was caused or in relation to which the claim arose, and may be enforced against that property in the hands of an innocent purchaser. A maritime lien has been defined as a privileged claim upon a thing in respect of service done to it or injury caused by it, and is carried into effect by special legal process." Then on the same page is explained what is meant by proceeding in personam:- "The inherent jurisdiction possessed by the Court of Admiralty was not only exercised by proceedings in rem brought to enforce the maritime liens attaching to the res in each cases; but, where the ship was lost or for some other reason could not be arrested, a plaintiff having a claim cognizable by the Court, other than a claim on a bottomry or respondents bond or to the possession of the ship, might take proceedings in personam against the owners of the property which would have been arrested if the proceedings had been in rem. Subsequently, in 1854, the High Court of Admiralty was empowered by statute to institute proceedings by personal service of a monition upon the owners of the property the subject-matter of the dispute, without the necessity of issuing a warrant to arrest the property." As regards the nature of law administered in admiralty, it is stated in the same volume of Halsbury's Laws of England as under :- "The law administered in Admiralty actions is not the ordinary municipal law of England, but is the law which by Act of Parliament or reiterated decisions, traditions, and principles, has become the English maritime law." 38. To summarize; firstly, the High Court of Admiralty had exclusive jurisdiction over torts committed on high seas particularly to any person or property, secondly, proceedings in rem or in personam could be instituted in respect of damage caused by torts, and, thirdly, the High Court of Admiralty had exclusive jurisdiction to entertain an action in personam where proceedings in rem could have been taken. 39. In 1873, the British Parliament passed an enactment entitled the "Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873". It is this Act which merged the different jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Judicature for the whole of England and abolished the differences in the distinct jurisdictions. The causes which were within the exclusive cognizance of the High Court of Admiralty were not described by the Supreme Court Act and, therefore, they had to be ascertained by the law prevailing prior to the Act of Judicature of 1873. Though there have been subsequent Acts in England for expanding the jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice in its admiralty jurisdiction, for giving effect to several International Conventions of Maritime Law, we are not concerned with those developments. 40. In Marsden's "Collisions at Sea", 10th Edition, at page 327 the learned Author graphically described the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Courts in England in the following words :- "The Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Justice, which may be exercised in proceedings in rem or in personam, is co-extensive, geographically, with that of the late High Court of Admiralty from the coming into force of the Admiralty Court Act, 1840, until the jurisdiction of the letter Court was, by the Judicature Act, 1873, section 16, transferred to the High Court of justice; the geographical extent of the jurisdiction is world-wide. The jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty originally extended to every sort of collision and damage to property occurring upon the high seas and upon tidal waters not within the body of a county. By the Admiralty Court Act, 1840, section 6, its jurisdiction was extended to (amongst other things) claims for damage received by "any ship or seagoing vessel" within the body of a county; and by the Admiralty Court Act, 1861, sections 2, 7, it was further extended to claims for damage done by "any description of vessel used in navigation not propelled by cars". It appears that these statutes covered every case of collision between craft of all sorts, except a collision within the body of a county between lighters or other craft both of which were propelled by cars only." 41. By the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act of 1890 read with the declaration made under the 1891 Act, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay was constituted a Colonial Court of Admiralty and invested with the same jurisdiction as exercisable by the High Courts of Admiralty in England "under any statute or otherwise". This Court, therefore, has been exercising the same jurisdiction on the admiralty side from then. 42. Though, as a result of the discussion of the development of admiralty law as above, it would be clear that a claim on behalf of the estate of a deceased seaman could be a maritime claim, fortunately, we are not required to pronounce on this issue since the defendants before us did not dispute that the claim made in the suit by the plaintiffs is a "maritime claim" enforceable in admiralty action. Their only contention is that the admiralty action could not have been brought in this Court as the res was located in Kandla Port on the date on which the cause of action arose. Is Admiralty jurisdiction territorial by limited? 43. Mr. Mukharjee, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, impugned the correctness of the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and urged that the High Court exercising powers is its Admiralty jurisdiction has the power to arrest a vessel as long as it is in Indian territorial waters. According to him, the concept of territorial jurisdiction has no relevance when applied to exercise of admiralty jurisdiction. As a matter of historical fact, several warrants of arrest have been issued by this Court to arrest ships lying in different ports within India; converesely, warrants of arrest issued by High Courts in other states were being enforced within the jurisdiction of this Court. It is, however, contended by Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendants, that even assuming that this was the position earlier, the judgment in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) has brought about a sea change in the Admiralty law and a careful perusal of the judgment leaves one in no doubt that admiralty jurisdiction of a High Court cannot extend beyond territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court. 44. 44. We have already pointed out that admiralty jurisdiction is based partly on the international law maritime, partly on statute and partly on international conventions adopted in England by statutes. Regrettably, no efforts were taken by the Indian Legislature to formalize and streamline admiralty law by statutes, until the passing of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1956, which too is only a partial remedy and not a complete code, as we have pointed out earlier. Thus, we are left with the 1890 and 1891 Colonial Courts Acts to understand the sweep of the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court. The 1890 and 1891 Acts of Colonial Admiralty Courts equated the powers in admiralty exercised by the High Courts of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and some others to the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England. 45. It is contended on behalf of the defendants that, whatever may have been the scope of the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Courts prior to the Constitution of India being brought into force, the jurisdiction must now yield to the constitutional provisions. It is pointed out that Article 214 of the Constitution provides that there shall be a High Court for each State. The jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court cannot extend to arresting a ship beyond the territories of the State of Mahararshtra as the Bombay High Court has been constituted as the High Court for the State of Maharashtra under the States Re-organization Act of 1956 read with the Bombay Reorganizations Act, 1960. We need to critically appraise this contention. 46. We have already discussed how under section 18 of the Indian Independence Act, 1947 and section 1 of the Indian (Consequential Provisions) Act, 1949, the existing laws prior to the Constitution were continued in force. Article 372 of the Constitution provides for the continuation of all laws in force, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and law made by a competent legislature. Read in conjunction with Article 225, Article 372 leaves the High Court with all earlier powers intact except as affected by the Constitution or by law made by a competent legislature. Article 372 of the Constitution provides for the continuation of all laws in force, subject to the provisions of the Constitution and law made by a competent legislature. Read in conjunction with Article 225, Article 372 leaves the High Court with all earlier powers intact except as affected by the Constitution or by law made by a competent legislature. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention that merely because Article 214 states that there shall be a High Court for each State, and the Bombay High Court under the appropriate statute is declared to be the High Court for the State of Maharashtra, the jurisdiction exercisable by this High Court in Admiralty is abridged by Article 214. On the contrary, we are of the view that, in the absence of any clear cut provision in the Constitution or in a law made by the appropriate legislature, the jurisdiction exercisable by this Court, atleast in Admiralty, continued as before under the Constitution and continues to be the same. Perhaps, it has been improved upon and expanded by the decision under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra), but not whittled down, at any rate. 47. Another reason why we are not inclined to accept the contention of the defendants that the territorial jurisdiction of the State delimits the admiralty jurisdiction of this Court, is that ships float on water and except when they are in dry dock, the admiralty jurisdiction is exercisable with regard to ocean going ships. The power to arrest a ship is an incident of sovereignty. Sovereignty in this country resides in the people or country as a whole and not in any of the States. Though an imperfect federal pattern of polity has been adopted under the Constitution, the residuary powers are left with the Parliament and no State is sovereign by itself, though empowered to exercise such sovereign power as vested in it by the Constitution. 48. The Constitution has evolved an intricate scheme of distribution of sovereign powers. Article 246 provides that the Parliament alone shall have exclusive powers to make laws with respect to the matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution entitled as "Union List". The State Legislature has been given exclusive power to make laws for such State with respect to the matters enumerated in List II, referred to as the "State List". The State Legislature has been given exclusive power to make laws for such State with respect to the matters enumerated in List II, referred to as the "State List". Both Parliament and State Legislature can equally competently legislate with regard to matters in the IIIrd List to the Seventh Schedule, referred to as the "Concurrent List". Item 30 of List I (Union List) gives exclusive power to Parliament to legislate on "Carriage of passengers and goods by railway, sea or air, or by national waterways in mechanically propelled vessels". Item 95 of List I (Union List) is of interest, and reads, "jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court, with respect to any of the matters in this List: admiralty jurisdiction". Article 297 of the Constitution reads as under :- "297. Things of value within territorial waters or continental shelf and resources of the exclusive economic zone to vest in the Union.---(1) All lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters, or the continental shelf, or the exclusive economic zone, of India shall vest in the union and be held for the purposes of the union. (2) all other resources of the exclusive economic zone of India shall also vest in the Union and be held for the purposes of the union. (3) The limits of the territorial waters, the continental shelf, the exclusive economic zone, and other maritime zones, of India shall be such as may be specified from time to time, by or under any law made by Parliament." Thus, the jurisdiction of a State does not extend to land underlying the ocean within the territorial waters or the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zones. 49. Parliament has also passed the "Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act, 1976" in exercise of its legislative powers. Section 3 of this Act declare the sovereignty of India over the territorial waters of India and reads as under :- "3. Sovereignty over, and limits of, territorial waters.—(1) The sovereignty of India extends and has always extended to the territorial waters of India (hereinafter referred to as the territorial waters) and to the seabed and subsoil underlying, and the air space over such waters. Sovereignty over, and limits of, territorial waters.—(1) The sovereignty of India extends and has always extended to the territorial waters of India (hereinafter referred to as the territorial waters) and to the seabed and subsoil underlying, and the air space over such waters. (2) The limit of the territorial waters is the line every point of which is at a distance of twelve nautical miles from the nearest point of the appropriate baseline. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Central Government may whenever it considers necessary so to do having regards to International Law and State practice, alter, by notification in the Official Gazette, the limit of the territorial waters. (4) No notification shall be issued under sub-section (3) unless resolutions approving the issue of such notification are passed by both Houses of Parliament.” We are concerned with an ocean going ship which has to be berthed in the territorial waters. Its arrest can only be ordered by the authority which exercises sovereignty over the territorial waters. The provisions of the Constitution read with the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976, make it clear that it is the Union of India, which exercises sovereignty over the territorial waters and law underneath them. Conversely, a State exercises no sovereignty over the territorial waters or the land thereunder. Thus, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Vyas that the admiralty law jurisdiction for arrest of the ship can only be exercised by the High Court within the limits of the territorial jurisdiction. All limits of territorial jurisdiction of a Court are prescribed with reference to the land borders of the State. Nothing is shown to us that there is any concept of territorial waters of a State under the Indian Constitution; nor, are we able to imagine what could be the territorial limits of a State over the sea adjoining it. May be, it is capable of artificial delimitation by a statute, but no such statute is shown to be applicable, barring the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, which, we have already held does not apply to the case of the plaintiffs. 50. May be, it is capable of artificial delimitation by a statute, but no such statute is shown to be applicable, barring the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, which, we have already held does not apply to the case of the plaintiffs. 50. In Admiralty law, as developed under the International Law Maritime, the arrest of a foreign sea going vessel was a necessary concomitant of the exercise of sovereign power and could be exercised over a ship found in the territorial waters of a sovereign State. It is precisely for this reason that all ships within the territorial waters of India were liable to be arrested in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction of all High Courts exercising such jurisdiction as part of the sovereign powers of the country. We see, neither in the Constitution nor in any statute made by a competent legislature, other than the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, any limitation upon the exercise of such jurisdiction. We have already held that the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 does not apply here. 51. Mr. Vyas, urged that admiralty jurisdiction is also subject to territorial limits by relying on certain judgments and the practice in other maritime nations. We shall first deal with the international practice and then take up for consideration, the judicial precedents. 52. Mr. Vyas, referred to the American Admiralty practice by inviting our attention to Corpus Juris Secandum, Volume 2, Page 75, Article 13 at page 162. All that is stated here is that a vessel must be within the territorial jurisdiction of a Court of Admiralty when seized in order to be subject to its process, although where jurisdiction has been acquired subsequent improper removal of the vessel will not destroy the Court's jurisdiction. Further inquiry in this direction would be useful since United States of America is an example of a Federal Constitution. In the same article, at paragraph (b) under the heading "Admiralty jurisdiction of District Courts as affected by State boundaries", it is observed as under :- "Territorial jurisdiction of a District Court in admiralty coincides with the territorial boundaries of the State wherein the Court sits. In the same article, at paragraph (b) under the heading "Admiralty jurisdiction of District Courts as affected by State boundaries", it is observed as under :- "Territorial jurisdiction of a District Court in admiralty coincides with the territorial boundaries of the State wherein the Court sits. The jurisdiction of a District Court in civil causes in admiralty is coextensive with the territorial limits of the State wherein located, but where the boundary of the State stops at the seacoast line, the jurisdiction of the District Court does not extend beyond such line to include the belt of ocean contiguous to the shore and within the jurisdiction of the United States for purposes of revenue and defence, although prior to adoption of the federal constitution the State or colony had jurisdiction, exercised by its courts of common law, over continuous ocean waters to the extent of a marine league". (Chase v. American Steamboat Co.)6, 9 R.I. 419, 11 Am. R. 274." (emphasis ours) We see that even in the United States of America, a District Court has jurisdiction only in respect of waters which form the boundaries between two States i.e. internal navigable waters of rivers, but with regard to coastal sea waters, it is only the Federal Government which has jurisdiction, irrespective of whether such jurisdiction was exercised by the State prior to the promulgation of the Constitution. Far from advancing the contention of the learned Counsel, this militates against the argument. Again, in Article 10 at page 74 (supra), it is stated as under :- "10. High Seas and Tidewaters Admiralty jurisdiction was formerly restricted to the High seas and tidewaters, but now includes all navigable waters connecting with other States or foreign countries. Early decisions in the United States restricted admiralty jurisdiction to the high seas and tidewaters and exclude from the jurisdiction of admiralty tidal waters infra corpus comitatus or "within the body of a county". Later decisions established the rule that tidal waters infra corpus comitatus were included, and under modern law admiralty jurisdiction includes tidal waters but is not limited thereto, and extends to all navigable waters connecting with other States or countries. .........." 53. In Article 11 (supra), it is stated "All navigable waters communicating as such with other States or Countries are within admiralty jurisdiction which also extends to vessels moored at wharves or lying within dry-docks in navigable waters". .........." 53. In Article 11 (supra), it is stated "All navigable waters communicating as such with other States or Countries are within admiralty jurisdiction which also extends to vessels moored at wharves or lying within dry-docks in navigable waters". It would thus appear that even in the United States Admiralty jurisdiction over coastal waters is exercised by the Federal Government as sovereign power. 54. Mr. Vyas referred to several judgments of Courts in the United States, most of them dealing with jurisdiction over navigable internal waters, to demonstrate that the Admiralty jurisdiction to arrest a vessel could be exercised only when the res of the vessel was found within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court. We may point out that this is the result, not of the International Law Maritime, but domestic statute law in the United States, which has, for purpose of convenience, allocated different jurisdictions. We are unable to discern from any of these judgments the principle that is advanced at the bar, namely, that the admiralty jurisdiction, as understood in International Law Maritime, is delimited by the borders of a state under the Indian Constitution. He cited (Internatio-Rotterdam Inc v. Thomsen)7, 218 F2d 514, (Broussard v. The Jersbek)8, (DC NY) 140 F Supp. 851, (Cf. Torres v. Walsh)9, 221 F2d 319, (Clinton Foods, Inc v. United States)10, 188 F2d 289 and (The Ann)11, (U.S.) 9 Cranch 289. We do not propose to discuss the facts of these American judgments in detail as we observe that they pertain to internal naviable waters and do not assist us in deciding the issue before us. 55. Mr. Vyas then contended that the power to arrest a ship has now been recognised by International Conventions. He invited our attention to the "Brussels Convention of 1952 (the International Convention relating to the arrest of sea going ships signed at Brussels on May 10, 1952 Arrest Convention) and the International Convention for Unification of Certain Rules Concerning Civil Jurisdiction in Matters of Collision Signed at Brussels on May 10, 1952 ("The Collision Convention") and contended that these conventions indicate the limits and curtailment of the wide jurisdiction exercised in Admiralty. There are two difficulties in the way of accepting Mr. Vyas's contention. First, India is not a party to these conventions, nor has Parliament enacted any statute adopting these conventions. There are two difficulties in the way of accepting Mr. Vyas's contention. First, India is not a party to these conventions, nor has Parliament enacted any statute adopting these conventions. Second, even if principles of International Law are to be borrowed and implemented by the courts in India, in the absence of a municipal law to the contrary, (as laid down by the Supreme Court in several judgments), we do not find anything in the Arrest Convention of 1952 which limits the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Courts in the manner suggested by the learned Counsel. In fact, the Arrest Convention of 1952. Article 7, provides as under :- "Article 7 (1) The courts of the country in which the arrest was made shall have jurisdiction to determine the case upon its merits: if the domestic law of the country in which the arrest is made gives jurisdiction to such courts or in any of the following cases namely: (a) if the claimant has his habitual residence or principal place of business in the country in which the arrest was made: (b) if the claim arose in the country in which the arrest was made: (c) if the claim concerns the voyage of the ship during which the arrest was made: (d) if the claim arose out of a collision or in circumstances covered by Article 13 of the International Convention for the unification of certain rules of law with respect to collisions between vessels, signed at Brussels on 23rd September, 1910: (e) if the claim is for salvage : (f) if the claim is upon a mortgage or hypothecation of the ship arrested. (2) If the Court within whose jurisdiction the ship was arrested has not jurisdiction to decide upon the merits, the bail or other security given in accordance with Article 5 to procure the release of the ship shall specifically provide that it is given as security for the satisfaction of any judgment which may eventually be pronounced by a Court having jurisdiction so to decide; and the Court or other appropriate judicial authority of the country in which the arrest is made shall fix the time within which the claimant shall bring an action before a Court having such jurisdiction. (3) If the parties have agreed to submit the dispute to the jurisdiction of a particular Court other than that within whose jurisdiction the arrest was made or to arbitration, the Court or other appropriate judicial authority within whose jurisdiction the arrest was made may fix the time within which the claimant shall bring proceedings. (4) If, in any of the case mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, the action or proceedings are not brought within the time so fixed, the defendant may apply for the release of the ship or of the bail or other security. (5) This Article shall not apply in cases covered by the provisions of the revised Rhine Navigation Convention of 17 October, 1868." In our judgment, this Convention merely says that the Court of a country in which the arrest was made shall have the jurisdiction to determine the case upon its merits "if the domestic law of the country in which the arrest is made gives jurisdiction to such courts", and in certain other cases. This Convention is merely a crystallization of the principle in International Law Maritime that the sovereign State (or its Court exercising sovereign power of that State) shall have the right to arrest the ship in respect of a maritime lien. The Convention, per se, neither deals with, nor answers the issue confronting us. 56. Mr. Vyas referred to the international practice in several jurisdictions and, for this purpose, he invited our attention to the observations in certain passages from Berlingieri On Arrest of Ships. (A Commentary on the 1952 Arrest Convention, Second Edition, by Francesco Berlingieri published by the Comite Maritime International). Our attention was invited to Chapter VI at page 95. Article 4 (supra). "A ship may only be arrested under the authority of a Court or of the appropriate judicial authority of the Contracting State in which the arrest is made". If there are more courts than one in a country, this Article does not help in identifying as to which of them would have exclusive jurisdiction. The learned Counsel then invited our attention to several passages in this book which indicates as to how the admiralty jurisdiction is exercised for arrest of a ship in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The learned Counsel then invited our attention to several passages in this book which indicates as to how the admiralty jurisdiction is exercised for arrest of a ship in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. We, however, notice that in all these countries there are detailed rules as to exercise of jurisdiction which are made by municipal statutes which, in the event of there being more competent courts than one, decide as to which Court would have exclusive jurisdiction. In fact, all these countries are countries which have accepted the Arrest Convention of 1952 and implemented the terms of the convention by appropriate municipal legislative enactments. We have already referred to Article 7 of the Arrest Convention which is material for this purpose. In fact, paragraph 5 of Article 2 of the Arrest Convention provides, "subject to the provisions of this Convention, the procedure relating to arrest of a ship or its release shall be governed by the law of the State in which the arrest is demanded or has been affected". We are afraid that this discussion does not carry us further. Before we part company with Berlingieri, we may indicate that, while dealing with the jurisdiction and procedure in United Kingdom relating to arrest of ships, it is said at page 113 (supra), "At the time of issuing the warrant of arrest, the only justification required is that the case comes within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty Court, and this is supported by the affidavit which is lodged with the Admiralty Court Registry when the warrant of arrest is stamped". We shall have occasion to refer to in greater detail to the law in United Kingdom, which is a closer paradigm. 57. Our attention was invited by Mr. Mukherjee to the book "British Shipping Laws, Marsden on Collisions at Sea". Twelfth Edition, 1998. In Articles 2.05 and 2.06 on page 20 (supra), it is stated that writs in rem may only be served on property within the jurisdiction. A writ by which an admiralty action is begun cannot be served out of the jurisdiction by virtue of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982 (as amended) and that there are restrictions on the power to give leave to serve a writ in personam in a collision action out of jurisdiction. A writ by which an admiralty action is begun cannot be served out of the jurisdiction by virtue of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, 1982 (as amended) and that there are restrictions on the power to give leave to serve a writ in personam in a collision action out of jurisdiction. It is pointed out that it may also be necessary to determine the area of the Court's territorial jurisdiction in order to decide whether an act has occurred within it for the purpose of the Court's power to permit service of its process out of the jurisdiction. Again in Article 2.09 at page 21 (supra), it is pointed out, "The territorial jurisdiction of the English Courts extends to the whole of the land mass of England, including Wales and Berwick-on-Tweed upto the low-water marks. It includes ports and harbours and rivers above the bridges nearest to the sea, as well as British ships on the high seas. It does not include Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Isle of Man, or the Channel Islands." 58. Article 2-10 (supra), says that the question whether the territorial jurisdiction of English Courts includes any area of the sea on the seaward side of these limits arose in R. v. Keyn and the Court by majority held that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the offence. This led to the enactment of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878 which makes it amply clear that the jurisdiction of the Crown extends over the territorial waters on the seaward side to a breadth of the territorial sea adjacent to the United Kingdom to a limit of 12 nautical miles determined from the base line as prescribed in the said Act. In fact, in Article 2-12, while dealing with the powers of the English Courts, the learned Author states, "In its wider meaning, the jurisdiction of the English Courts is in principle subject neither to geographical limitations, nor to limitations on the persons who may be made a party to an action, nor to the property which may be the subject-matter of an action, nor to the circumstances in which the cause of action arose. In principle, the English Courts can give judgments against any person on whom a writ or other process can be served. In principle, the English Courts can give judgments against any person on whom a writ or other process can be served. The courts will try any issue arising between any party in any part of the world or relating to any property". (emphasis ours). It is then pointed out that the wide jurisdiction of the English Courts has been curtailed in a number of important respects : (a) by a number of international conventions to which United Kingdom has become a party and under which it has accepted the restrictions; (b) the position of the Crown and the foreign states is regulated by statute; and (c) an enemy cannot pursue a claim in an English Court. 59. The sum and substance of this discussion shows that the Admiralty jurisdiction, as originally exercised in England, was not limited either by geographical or other limitations, except by International Conventions and exceptions by municipal laws. 60. Mr. Vyas then referred to Lloyd's Practical Shipping Guides, Maritime Law by Christopher Hill, Fifth Edition, LLP page 92 to demonstrate the limits of the Admiralty jurisdiction of the English Courts. Observations of the Supreme Court of Canada in (The Capricorn Antares Shipping Corp. v. Delmar Shipping and Portland Shipping Co. Inc.)12, 1977(1) Lloyd's Rep. 180 have been referred therein. The Canadian Supreme Court quoted its previous judgment in (The Atlantic Star)13, 1973(2) Lloyd's Rep. 197. HL, where it was said, "Ships are elusive. The power to arrest in any port and found thereon an action in rem is increasingly required with the custom of ships being owned singly and sailing under flags of convenience. A large tanker may be negligent navigation cause extensive damage to beaches or to other shipping; she will take very good care to keep out of the ports of the "convenient forum". (It should be understood that the expression "forum non conveniens" is used to describe the position where the competent Court of a State will not excise its jurisdiction if it is a seriously inconvenient forum or place for the action to be tried provided that a more appropriate forum or place is available to the plaintiff in the action). If the aggrieved party manages to arrest her elsewhere, it will be said forcibly that the defendant has no sort of connection with the forum except that she was arrested within its jurisdiction. If the aggrieved party manages to arrest her elsewhere, it will be said forcibly that the defendant has no sort of connection with the forum except that she was arrested within its jurisdiction. That, however, will frequently be the only way to secure justice". It is also recalled that "forum shopping" is a phrase much used in everyday language in the maritime world and it is inextricably linked with the principles of the action in rem and the availability of maritime liens. The word "forum" in Latin meant 'market-place' where men met to discuss everything from politics to cattle. Every port is potentially a legal forum in Admiralty. The system, inconvenient though it may be to some has overall lent itself to the preservation of justice. It is then pointed out that for an action in rem to be entertained in the Admiralty Court, however, the writ must be served on the 'res' in England or be deemed to have been duly served on the defendant. Hence a writ which commences actions in rem cannot be served outside the jurisdiction. We see nothing in this discussion which militates against the view we are inclined to take. 61. Our attention was invited to the principles adopted in Private International Law, 1928 in the United States of America, in particular to Article 276, wherein it is said that the power of judicial attachment and sale of a ship, whether or not it is loaded and cleared, should be subject to the law of the place where it is situated. We are mindful of the fact that it is International Law we are dealing; the expression "place where the ship is situated" necessarily means the country within whose territorial waters the ship is found. 62. Reliance is placed on Enforcement of Maritime Claims by D.C. Jackson, Second Edition, LLP. This is a book expounding the principles of the Brussels Convention of 1952 pertaining to the arrest of sea going ships. Pages 88, 101 and 127 were relied upon. At page 88, under the caption. "The Role of National Laws", it is stated that, save for specified categories of cases, the issue of jurisdiction in all proceedings within the ambit of the convention, where the defendant is not domiciled in a contracting State, are referred to the law of the forum. Pages 88, 101 and 127 were relied upon. At page 88, under the caption. "The Role of National Laws", it is stated that, save for specified categories of cases, the issue of jurisdiction in all proceedings within the ambit of the convention, where the defendant is not domiciled in a contracting State, are referred to the law of the forum. We may reiterate that in International Law the expression "State" means a sovereign State and the law of the forum would be law of such sovereign State. On page 89 under the heading "Application within the United Kingdom", it is specifically stated : "For the purpose of 1968 Convention, the United Kingdom is one State, but for intra United Kingdom purposes it consists of three constituent parts England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland (see section 50 of the Act). For internal United Kingdom purposes Convention jurisdiction must be geared to a part of the United Kingdom". Details are given as to how the Convention operates within England subject to the statute law made therein. At page 127, the text of the Arrest Convention of 1952 is given which we have already referred to. At page 191, under the heading "County Court Jurisdiction", it is pointed out that County Court jurisdiction is by District and limited primarily by the value of the claim. It is also pointed out that by County Court Act, 1948, section 26, the jurisdiction of the County Courts includes adjacent sea up to three miles from the shore. Each District now has a Court for Admiralty purposes. Here again, the jurisdiction is delimited by a validly made municipal statute. 63. The survey of the manner in which Admiralty jurisdiction is exercised in several parts of the Western World, leads only to this conclusion that the International Law Maritime, as supplemented, amended or modified by International Conventions and municipal statutes, governs the exercise of the jurisdiction. The details as to which municipal Court would have exclusive jurisdiction, in case there are more than one, is mostly left for determination by the domestic laws of the State. We have already pointed out that our country is neither signatory to the International Conventions on Arrest, nor is there any statute law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction other than the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. We have already pointed out that our country is neither signatory to the International Conventions on Arrest, nor is there any statute law governing the exercise of the jurisdiction other than the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. Reliance on worldwide admiralty practice by the learned Counsel for the defendants, therefore, does not lend support to the proposition canvassed by him, namely, that the admiralty jurisdiction is restricted to the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the vessel is located at the time of the arrest. Has M.V. Elizabeth changed the law? 64. Mr. Vyas then contended that whatever might have been the Admiralty jurisdiction prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra), the law has been drastically changed as result of the judgment in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) and now the law is as exactly as formulated by him. 65. The judgment on which very heavy reliance is placed by the learned Counsel for the defendants as well as the learned Single Judge is the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra). In that case, the vessel M.V. Elizabeth was lying in the Port of Marmagao on 1st February, 1984 and on 8th February 1984 the vessel left the Port without issuing bills of lading and other documents for the goods shipped as required by the plaintiff-shipper. The goods were discharged and handed over to the consignee at the port of destination at Ras-Al-Khaimah, United Arab Emirates, during the period 13th February, 1984 to 19th February, 1984, despite the clear directions of the plaintiff not to deliver the goods on account of the buyer's failure to pay the agreed price. The vessel was a vessel of foreign nationality, owned by a foreign company carrying on business in Greece. The plaintiff was a Private Limited Company with its registered office at Goa. When the vessel entered the Port of Vishakhapatnam on 13th April, 1985, the vessel was arrested by the plaintiff who had filed a suit in the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The owner of the ship appeared under protest and furnished bail after which the vessel was released from arrest. The defendants moved an application before the High Court raising a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court. The owner of the ship appeared under protest and furnished bail after which the vessel was released from arrest. The defendants moved an application before the High Court raising a preliminary objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court. They contended that the suit against a foreign ship owned by a foreign company not having a place of residence or business in India was not liable to be proceeded against on the Admiralty side of the High Court by an action in rem in respect of a cause of action alleged to have arisen by reason of a tort or a breach of obligation arising from the carriage of goods from a port in India to a foreign port. They did not, however, contend that the alleged cause of action not having arisen in Andhra Pradesh, the suit ought not to have been filed in Andhra Pradesh. The sole contention of the defendants on the question of jurisdiction was as regards the lack of admiralty jurisdiction of any Court in Andhra Pradesh, or of any other State in India, to proceed in rem against the ship on the alleged cause of action concerning carriage of goods from an Indian Port to a foreign port. It was contended before the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction of the High Court in Admiralty was delimited by the Admiralty Courts Act, 1861 (24 and 25 Victoriae, Ch. 10) made applicable to India by the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 read with Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891 declaring certain Indian Courts of unlimited civil jurisdiction as Colonial Courts of Admiralty and declaring the High Court of Judicature at Madras as one such Court. By reason of Andhra State Act, 1953 read with States Re-organisation Act, 1956 read with the Government of India Act, 1915 and 1935 and the Constitution of India, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, being successor of the High Court of Madras, had inherited such admiralty jurisdiction as was granted under the aforesaid Acts to the High Court of Madras. However, it was contended that the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts remained frozen and amounted to no more than the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England under the Act of 1861. However, it was contended that the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts remained frozen and amounted to no more than the jurisdiction exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England under the Act of 1861. Section 6 of the 1861 Act provided certain acts of damage, tort or negligence with respect to cargo carried by ships in connection with a ship could be arrested. Section 6 applied only to goods "carried into any Port of England or Wales in any ship". Placing reliance on the analogy, it was argued that an arrest could be made in Admiralty jurisdiction only in respect of a tort or a damage caused to cargo which was carried to India by a ship and not in connection with such carriage from a port in India outside. The Supreme Court, after an exhaustive analysis of the Admiralty jurisdiction, took the view that the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty in England was derived from sources such as custom and practice as recognised by the courts exercising Admiralty jurisdiction and the same jurisdiction was vested in the Indian High Court by reason of section 2(2) of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 and as existed in England "whether existing by virtue of any statute or otherwise". The Supreme Court took the view that the Colonial Courts of Admiralty did not constitute the Court of Admiralty, but merely declared the Indian High Courts to be possessed of Admiralty jurisdiction equivalent to the one exercised by the High Court of Admiralty in England. It also held that there was no reason to take the view that the Admiralty jurisdiction in India remained frozen as of 1890, particularly since the High Courts in India were established by the Constitution as plenary constitutional courts. The Supreme Court noticed that sadly in India statutes lacked in the development of International Law in comparison to other maritime nations. Several International Conventions noticed by the Supreme Court have not been adopted in India. Despite this lacuna, the Supreme Court was of the opinion that, though the International Conventions had not been adopted by legislation, the principles incorporated in the Conventions being derived from the common law of nations as embodying the felt necessities of international trade, are part of the common law of India and applicable for the enforcement of maritime claims against foreign ships. The Supreme Court noticed the provisions of sections 443 and 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 and held that, in the absence of any statute in India comparable to English statutes on admiralty jurisdiction, there is no reason why the words "damage caused by a ship" appearing in section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 should be so narrowly construed as to limit them to physical damage and exclude any other damage arising by reason of the operation of the vessel in connection with the carriage of goods. In the opinion of the Supreme Court, ........."the expression is wide enough to include all maritime questions of claims. If goods or other property are lost or damaged, whether by physical contact or otherwise, by reason of unauthorised acts or negligent conduct on the part of the ship-owner or his agents or servants, wherever the cause of action has arisen, or wherever the ship is registered, or wherever the owner has his residence or domicile or place of business, such a ship, at the request of the person aggrieved, is liable to be detained when found within Indian jurisdiction by recourse to sections 443 and 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 read with the appropriate rules of practice and procedure of the High Court....." (emphasis ours). The Supreme Court emphasized that the laws of procedure are but tools for enforcement of substantive rights which are rooted in general principles of law, apart from statutes, for the enforcement of which a party aggrieved has a right to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of a Superior Court. 66. The claim raised by the plaintiffs in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) was held to be damage to property covered by the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 in respect of which the ship could be arrested by recourse to sections 443 and 444 of the said Act. Once the conclusions is reached that section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 applies, then the definition of "High Court" under section 3(15) would govern the issue. It is not in dispute that the jurisdiction of the "High Court" under the Merchant Shipping Act is artificial and circumscribed by the limits of its appellate jurisdiction by reason of section 3(15)(b). In our view, the claim in the instant case is not capable of being subsumed under section 443 or 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. It is not in dispute that the jurisdiction of the "High Court" under the Merchant Shipping Act is artificial and circumscribed by the limits of its appellate jurisdiction by reason of section 3(15)(b). In our view, the claim in the instant case is not capable of being subsumed under section 443 or 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. Hence, neither the definition of "High Court" in section 3(15) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 nor the statutory circumscription of its jurisdiction would apply. 67. Mr. Vyas, however, urged that, apart from the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1959, for finding in favour of the jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, the Supreme Court has at several places in the judgment indicated by the general principles of admiralty law intending to lay down the limits of Admiralty jurisdiction. There are three reasons why it is not possible to accept this contention. First, we cannot interpret words in a judgment as we would interpret words in a statute. Second, a judgment is only an authority for what it decides and not for any other proposition which may be logically deducible therefrom. To recapitulate the felicitous words of Lord Chancellor Halsbury in (Quinn v. Leathem)14, H.L.(I) 1901, 495 : ".......there are two observations of a general character which I wish to make, and one is to repeat what I have very often said before, that every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all." Third, we are unable to read the judgment of the Supreme Court as intending to make a change in the Admiralty law with respect to the jurisdiction so as to whittle it down. In our view, the judgment in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) was intended to liberate the jurisdiction of the Indian High Courts from the time warp in which it was said to have been frozen by reason of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 and 1891, and the total vacuum in statute law thereafter. All that the Supreme Court did was to read subsequent statutes in England and International Maritime Conventions and breathe their spirit into the interpretation of the words in sections 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. The Supreme Court perhaps undertook a judicial exercise of expanding the jurisdiction, but not of whittling down or curtailing the jurisdiction which already existed. If we accept the argument of the learned Counsel for the defendants, then we must impute to the Supreme Court the intention of cutting down the admiralty jurisdiction, which existed without geographical boundaries in 1891, to what is limited to the geographical boundaries of a State. This, in the absence of a statute delimiting it, even in cases where Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 does not apply. Finally, the contention that is urged before us was neither raised before the Supreme Court nor considered by it; it was, in our view, neither addressed or answered. We are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the defendants that the Supreme Court intended to change the law to shrink the Admiralty jurisdiction of High Courts, so to say, by a side wind. 68. Mr. Vyas, however, insisted that there are a number of passages wherein the Supreme Court has used the word "High Court concerned", suggesting that a ship could be arrested if it was within the jurisdiction of the "concerned High Court". These words present no difficulty, nor do they militate against our view, if we remember that the focus of attention was a situation covered by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 and, therefore, reference was to "the concerned High Court" as the High Court within the meaning of section 3(15) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. 69. Mr. These words present no difficulty, nor do they militate against our view, if we remember that the focus of attention was a situation covered by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 and, therefore, reference was to "the concerned High Court" as the High Court within the meaning of section 3(15) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. 69. Mr. Vyas then contended that, apart from places where the Supreme Court referred to situations covered by Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, even when dealing with International Maritime Law, the Supreme Court has used words which would suggest that it intended to cut down the jurisdiction of the State High Court to what is prescribed by section 3(15) of the Merchant Shipping Act. We find it difficult to accept this contention. Certain portions of the judgment in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) were read out to us as supporting the contention. For example, in paragraph 56, the Supreme Court says:- "56. An action in rem is directed against the ship itself to satisfy the claim of the plaintiff out of the res. The ship is for this purpose treated as a person. Such an action may constitute an inducement to the owner to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court, thereby making himself liable to be proceeded against by the plaintiff in personam. It is, however, imperative in an action in rem that the ship could be within jurisdiction at the time the proceedings are started. A decree of the Court in such an action binds not merely the parties to the writ but everybody in the world who might dispute the plaintiff's claim." We see nothing in this observation which militates against our view. It is an undisputed proposition in Admiralty law from the 13th to 21st century that jurisdiction to arrest a ship can only be exercised when the ship is within the "territorial waters" or "jurisdiction" of the Court arresting it. 70. The following observations in paragraph 66 of the judgment were cited for the same purpose:- "66. It is likewise within the competence of the appropriate Indian Courts to deal, in accordance with the general principles of maritime law and the applicable provisions of statutory law, with all persons and things found within their jurisdiction. The power of the Court is plenary and unlimited unless it is expressly or by necessary implication curtailed. It is likewise within the competence of the appropriate Indian Courts to deal, in accordance with the general principles of maritime law and the applicable provisions of statutory law, with all persons and things found within their jurisdiction. The power of the Court is plenary and unlimited unless it is expressly or by necessary implication curtailed. Absent such curtailment of jurisdiction, all remedies which are available to the courts to administer justice are available to a claimant against a foreign ship and its owner found within the jurisdiction of the concerned High Court. This power of the Court to render justice must necessarily include the power to make interlocutory orders for arrest and attachment before judgment." It was particularly emphasized that the expression "found within the jurisdiction of the concerned High Court" (emphasis ours) indicate such intention. In the very same paragraph, the Supreme Court indicated that it was for the appropriate "Indian Courts" to deal with "in accordance with the general principles of maritime law" and the applicable provisions of the statutory law with all persons and things found within their jurisdiction. The observations relied upon were obviously made in connection with the case on hand and the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 in view. 71. The general observations as to International Maritime Law in paragraph 75 were cited in support. We have already pointed out that in International Law, the expression "State" means a sovereign State and that is why the Supreme Court has used the expression "jurisdiction of a coastal State as they enter its waters" in paragraph 75. There is nothing like 'coastal waters' of any State of India a proposition which we have already rejected. 72. It is unnecessary for us to multiply such instances. We have carefully considered all passages of the judgment in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) referred to and emphasized by Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendants, during his submissions. There is nothing like 'coastal waters' of any State of India a proposition which we have already rejected. 72. It is unnecessary for us to multiply such instances. We have carefully considered all passages of the judgment in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) referred to and emphasized by Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendants, during his submissions. After a careful and anxious reading of the entire judgment, we are of the considered view that the judgment in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) merely highlights that the claim before Their Lordships of the Supreme Court was subsumable under section 443 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 within the words "or any other damage", therefore, the Supreme Court by an interpretative exercise held that the arrest of the ship was warranted under sections 443 and 444 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. Once this conclusion was reached, the expression "High Court" had to be understood within the meaning of definition in section 3(15)(b) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 as the High Court within whose appellate jurisdictional limits the ship was situated. If the claim of the plaintiffs before us were covered by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, then, perhaps, the definition of "High Court" in section 3(15)(b) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 might have applied. We have already held that the plaintiffs' claim is not covered by the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. Consequently, it has to be adjudicated on the general principles of Admiralty law; which means by exercise of jurisdiction of the High Court in Admiralty as it existed in England in 1891, without being curtailed or delimited by several statutory provisions to which we have already referred. The contention of the learned Counsel for the defendants, therefore, must fail. 73. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, relied on the judgment of this Court in (The Shipping Development Fund Committee v. M.V. Charisma and another)15, A.I.R. 1981 Bom. 42 and an unreported judgment dated 4th December, 1995 (per Smt. K.K. Baam, J.) of this Court in Admiralty Suit No. 43 of 1994 (Marine Engineers (India) and another v. The Vessel "Innovative-1" and others)16. 42 and an unreported judgment dated 4th December, 1995 (per Smt. K.K. Baam, J.) of this Court in Admiralty Suit No. 43 of 1994 (Marine Engineers (India) and another v. The Vessel "Innovative-1" and others)16. In Shipping Development Fund Committee (supra), it was pointed out by S.P. Bharucha, J. (as His Lordship then was) that, consequent upon the enactment of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958, the Admiralty Court had lost its country wide jurisdiction to entertain suits to enforce ship mortgages and retains it only within the limits of the particular High Court's appellate jurisdiction. That was a case where the claim was governed by the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 and, therefore, the jurisdictional limits of the High Court as indicated in the definition by section 3(15)(b) were held applicable. The judgment in Marine Engineers (India) (supra) in terms hold that so far as the Admiralty jurisdiction is concerned, it was a special jurisdiction and by virtue of Clause 32 Bombay High Court Letters Patent, 1865, it was exercisable all over the territorial waters of the country. It is unfortunate that the learned Single Judge has declined to follow these judgments, in our view, by an erroneous interpretation of the Supreme Court's observations in M.V. Elizabeth (supra). 74. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the defendants that if we were to take the view that Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court could be exercised all over the country, then it would lead to a situation of absurdity, avoidable overlap of jurisdiction and inevitable confusion. As rightly contended by Mr. Mukherjee, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, from the time this High Court was established, till the learned Single Judge in the present case took the contrary view, it was always held that the Admiralty jurisdiction did not have territorial boundaries. We have already pointed out that warrants of arrest of other High Courts were enforced within our jurisdiction, and vice a versa. Nothing is shown to us that this had resulted in any chaos or confusion, as contended by the learned Counsel for the defendants. Mr. Mukherjee brings to our attention the judgment of the High Court of Australia in (McILwraith McEacharn Limited v. The Shell Company of Australia Limited)17, 70 C.L.R. 175. Nothing is shown to us that this had resulted in any chaos or confusion, as contended by the learned Counsel for the defendants. Mr. Mukherjee brings to our attention the judgment of the High Court of Australia in (McILwraith McEacharn Limited v. The Shell Company of Australia Limited)17, 70 C.L.R. 175. The High Court of Australia was also considering the nature of the Admiralty jurisdiction exercised by it and by placing reliance on Colonial Courts Admiralty Act, 1890 came to the conclusion "thus the jurisdiction of a Colonial Court of Admiralty is the same geographically and otherwise as the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in England but only as it existed at the time of the passing of the Act (The Yuri Mary v. The Woron)18, 1927 A.C. 906. It also noticed the subsequent developments in England by the Judiciary Acts of 1914 and 1939. A similar argument was addressed to the High Court of Australia that if all the courts had jurisdiction which was unlimited geographically, difficulties and confusion might arise. This contention was rejected by Latham, C.J. by observing :- "It is true, as pointed out by Mr. Evans, that the result is that all these courts have jurisdiction which is unlimited geographically. It was suggested that difficulties might arise if the High Court, as well as the State Courts, were held to have such jurisdiction. But the State Courts have had this geographically unlimited jurisdiction in admiralty for many years, and no difficulties have arisen, and there is no reason to suppose that the added jurisdiction of the High Court as a Colonial Court of Admiralty will create any difficulties." With respect, we concur with the observations of Latham, C.J. Our practice has also not thrown up any such insurmountable difficulty or confusion, which appears to be merely conjectural, in our view. 75. Mr. Vyas referred to three judgments of different High Courts in order to contend that, even prior to the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra), it was accepted judicially that the Admiralty jurisdiction was subject to territorial limits and that the converse view was rejected as likely to cause confusion. 76. The first, is the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in (M/s. Seawaves Shipping Services v. M/s. Adraitic Tankers Shipping Co.)19, 1996-1 L.W. 182. 76. The first, is the judgment of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in (M/s. Seawaves Shipping Services v. M/s. Adraitic Tankers Shipping Co.)19, 1996-1 L.W. 182. In the first place, we notice that this is a judgment which proceeds on the basis of the law in M.V. Elizabeth (supra). It is true that it was contended by the appellants before the Madras High Court that Admiralty jurisdiction of the Madras High Court was very wide and extends to the entirety of the territorial waters of the country and that the Court exercising Admiralty jurisdiction could arrest a ship in whichever Port of India it was berthed. In fact, the appellants' Counsel relied on M.V. Elizabeth (supra) as supporting this proposition. The Madras High Court was of the view that M.V. Elizabeth (supra) did not support such a proposition and that the Supreme Court had no occasion to expressly decide the territorial jurisdiction of such jurisdiction. The Court, however, felt that several passages in the judgment would show that the Admiralty jurisdiction of a High Court has to be exercised only with reference to territorial jurisdiction of that Court in exercise of its appellate powers. With respect, we are unable to agree with this reading of the Supreme Court judgment by the Madras High Court for reason which we have already elaborated. 77. The Madras High Court, in M/s. Seawaves (supra), then referred to the history of the Admiralty jurisdiction and particularly the Royal Charter dated 20th February, 1798 establishing the Recorder's Court at Fort St. George, Madras. It was pointed out that while establishing the Recorder's Court at Madras, the Letters Patent read, "And it is our further will and pleasure, and we do hereby grant, ordain, establish, and appoint that the said Court of the Recorder of Madras shall be a Court of Admiralty, in and for Fort Saint George, and the said Town of Madras, and the Limits thereof, and the Factories subordinate thereto and all the Territories which now are, or hereafter may be subject to, or dependent upon the said Government". It was then observed that by subsequent enactments, the same jurisdiction was continued without any change. It was then observed that by subsequent enactments, the same jurisdiction was continued without any change. On the basis of this reasoning, the Madras High Court says (vide paragraph 12) : "With reference to the subjects and causes, the scope of the jurisdiction has been as wide as that of the High Court of England. But with reference to territorial limits it can by no stretch of imagination be said that all the three High Courts had and have concurrent jurisdiction over the entirety of Indian Territorial waters. If that contention is accepted it will lead to uncertainty and conflict of decisions". Again, with respect, we find it difficult to agree with this view of the Madras High Court. In our view, the Recorder's Court was established in respect of Fort St. George and the Town of Madras; (The Letters Patent of Bombay also reads identically, mutatis mutandis). It cannot be forgotten that when the Recorder's Courts were established by the Royal Charter of 1798, the whole of India was not one country, nor did the British rule all over the country. The British Queen reigned only over certain parts of the country, the three Presidency towns being the principal ones. Hence, in each of these Letters Patent there is reference to the town and island of Bombay, town of Madras and the town of Calcutta and all the territories which may be subject to or dependent upon the said Government in the said Royal Charter. If the reasoning of the Madras High Court is to be accepted, then the Admiralty jurisdiction stood frozen at the town limits and did not advance beyond the territorial limits of the three Presidency town. Taken to its logical extreme, it would mean that the High Court of Bombay can exercise Admiralty jurisdiction only within the limits of Greater Bombay and would not be able to arrest a ship in any other Port within Maharashtra also. 78. The second reason which induces us to disagree with the view of the Madras High Court is that the subsequent Letters Patent read with Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 and 1891, make it clear that the jurisdiction, at any rate in 1891, was the same was exercised by the High Courts of Admiralty in England. 78. The second reason which induces us to disagree with the view of the Madras High Court is that the subsequent Letters Patent read with Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 and 1891, make it clear that the jurisdiction, at any rate in 1891, was the same was exercised by the High Courts of Admiralty in England. That by the Act of 1861, the High Court of Admiralty in England exercised Admiralty jurisdiction without geographical limits, is a fact to which we have adverted earlier. With respect, this seems to have escaped attention of Their Lordships of the Madras High Court. For this reason also, with respect, we therefore, find it difficult to agree with the view expressed by the Madras High Court its judgment in Seawaves (supra). 79. The other reason which weighed with the Madras High Court for reaching its conclusion is indicated in paragraph 17, namely, that the Supreme Court has used the expression "concerned High Court" in several places in its judgment in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) and "that shows that the Supreme Court proceeded on the principle that each High Court exercises jurisdiction exclusively over a particular territory". We respectfully disagree with this view of the Madras High Court, as, for reasons already indicated, we are not inclined to read the judgment of the Supreme Court thus. 80. Mr. Vyas then relied upon the judgment of the Rangoon High Court in (SS. Heiwa Maru v. Bird Co.)20, 1923 Rangoon 163. We see nothing in this judgment which supports the proposition that Admiralty jurisdiction exercised by the High Courts of Admiralty constituted under the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1891 was circumscribed by territorial limits. The case before the Rangoon High Court was a case of arrest of a ship in connection with a claim towards necessaries supplied to the ship. In connection therewith, the Rangoon High Court observed, "It seems clear therefore that a claim for necessaries can be enforced in a Colonial Court of Admiralty by a suit in rem, and such a suit can presumably be instituted in any Admiralty Court within whose jurisdiction the ship happens to be at the time when the suit is instituted, so that if respondents, suit is a suit in rem, there would seem to be no doubt the jurisdiction of this Court which undoubtedly has Admiralty jurisdiction". There has never been a doubt that the Colonial Court of Admiralty can arrests a ship within its jurisdiction. The contentious issue before us is, what are the limits of its jurisdiction and that question was not addressed by the Rangoon High Court, nor answered. 81. The Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 empowers the legislature of a British possession to declare a Court of original unlimited civil jurisdiction to be a Court of Admiralty. Section 2(2) of the said Act provides that such a Colonial Court of Admiralty shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, "be over the like places, persons, matters and things, as the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court in England, whether existing by virtue of any statute or otherwise, and the Colonial Court of Admiralty may exercise such jurisdiction in like manner and to as full an extend as the High Court in England, and shall have the same regard as that Court to International law and the comity of nations". (emphasis ours). Section 3 of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1890 empowered all British possession to declare any Court of unlimited jurisdiction as Colonial Court of Admiralty and"..... provide for the exercise by such Court of its jurisdiction under this Act, and limit territorially, or otherwise, the extent of such jurisdiction". (emphasis ours). Pursuant to the power vested in the Indian Colonial Legislature, the Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891 (Act of 16 of 1891) was enacted. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Bill, significantly points out (paragraph 5) : "The Governor-General in Council has accepted the opinion of the Governor of Bombay in Council, and the unanimous opinion of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Calcutta High Court, that the jurisdiction of Colonial Courts of Admiralty in India should not be limited territorially or otherwise". (Gazette of India, 1891. Part V. page 140). Besides investing the High Courts of Judicature at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay with Admiralty jurisdiction, the 1891 Act also established the Court of Recorder of Rangoon, the Court of the Resident at Aden and the District Court at Karachi as other Colonial Courts of Admiralty. Significantly, no limitation with regard to the jurisdiction of Colonial Courts of Admiralty at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, territorially or otherwise, was imposed. The 1891 Act contends no such limitations. Significantly, no limitation with regard to the jurisdiction of Colonial Courts of Admiralty at Calcutta, Madras and Bombay, territorially or otherwise, was imposed. The 1891 Act contends no such limitations. This also supports the view which we are inclined to take. 82. Mr. Vyas then referred to the judgment of the Orissa High Court in (Reena Padhi v. Owners of Motor Vesel 'Jagdhir')21, A.I.R. 1982 Orissa 57, as establishing the proposition he canvassed, namely, that the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court as exercised under the 1891 Act is subject to territorial limits. Here again, the Orissa High Court traced the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court which devolved on the Orissa High Court after the State of Orissa was formed. It too was of the view that the jurisdiction of the Admiralty jurisdiction stood frozen at the level it had reached in England when the Colonial Courts of Admiralty Act, 1891 was passed. But, the theory of concurrent jurisdiction was rejected on the ground of avoiding uncertainly and conflict of jurisdiction. Though the attention of the Court was drawn to paragraph 5 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Colonial Courts of Admiralty (India) Act, 1891, the learned Judges dismissed the reasons contained therein by observing. "As already stated, the Orissa High Court has not been declared as a Colonial Court of Admiralty and the 1891 Act has no application to this High Court. Hence the above extracted passage from the 'Statement of Objects and Reasons' of the 1891 Act cannot throw any light on the territorial limits of the Admiralty jurisdiction of this High Court". The Orissa High Court, however, referred to Clause 28 of the Charter of the Calcutta High Court establishing the Recorder's Court issued on 26th March, 1774 establishing a Court of Admiralty to extend only "the subjects of us, our heirs, or successors, who shall reside in the Kingdoms or provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa" and thus took a restricted view of the matter. With respect, the reasoning of the Orissa High Court does not appeal to us and we cannot accept it. With respect, the reasoning of the Orissa High Court does not appeal to us and we cannot accept it. There is no doubt that the High Court of Bombay was declared as a Colonial Court of Admiralty by the Act of 1891 and what is stated in paragraph 5 of the Statement of Objects and Reasons of this Act is very relevant for ascertaining the jurisdictional limits of this Court. 83. Mr. Vyas referred to (Nalluri Venkataraju v. The State of Andhra Pradesh)22, A.I.R. 1961 Andhra Pradesh 50, to contend that sections 18 and 19 of the Andhra Pradesh and Madras (Alteration of Boundaries) Act, 1959, were held not to contravene Article 214 of the Constitution of India as they merely give effect to that Article. Hence, the Andhra Pradesh High Court was pleased to observe, "Under these sections, the jurisdiction of the respective High Courts is extended over the territories which form part of the respective States. In other words, the jurisdiction of each High Court is made coterminous with the territories of that State" (vide paragraph 23). Indubitably, when States are reorganised and Parliament enacts an Act to delimit the territorial limits of the State, the State High Court's jurisdiction does not extend beyond the frontier of the State. If the jurisdiction were to be exercised over land, then there is no doubt that the proposition is correct. We are, however, in a situation where the jurisdiction is to be exercised over 'coastal waters' for which no State boundaries have been fixed by any Act of Parliament; at any rate, none was shown to us. Coastal waters have remained the domain of the Union of India subject to powers of Parliament to legislate and the Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, Exclusive Economic Zone and Other Maritime Zones Act, 1976. The judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is not one dealing with Admiralty jurisdiction and as such the observations made therein, with which we respectfully concur, do not apply to the facts before us and afford no assistance in deciding the appeal. 84. Reference by Mr. Vyas, to (Madappa v. Mahadevappa)23, A.I.R. 1966 Mysore 49, is also of no assistance, for the same reason. 84. Reference by Mr. Vyas, to (Madappa v. Mahadevappa)23, A.I.R. 1966 Mysore 49, is also of no assistance, for the same reason. That was also a situation of jurisdiction over land consequent upon the States Reorganisation Act coming into force and in that context it was observed (vide paragraph 30) as under :- "Thus, it is clear that the High Court of the new State of Mysore has the jurisdiction which it can exercise in respect of the territory of Kollegal Taluk from 1st November, 1956. This is also clear from the provisions of section 62 of the said Act; that the High Court of Madras shall have no power or jurisdiction in respect of any territory transferred from the existing State to the new State of Mysore, subject of course to the provisions of sub-section (3) of the said section. ..... Thus the combined effect of the provisions of sections 52 and 62 is that the High Court of the new State of Mysore has the jurisdiction, such as original, appellate or other jurisdiction, which it can exercise in respect of the territory transferred to the new State of Mysore and, therefore the order of transfer which under section 13 is subject to the order of the High Court, means the order of this Court....." This judgment also does not carry us further as it does not deal with the admiralty jurisdiction and deals only with the situation arising as a result of changes made in territorial jurisdiction on land pursuant to the States Re-organisation Act and the establishment of new State High Court. 85. Mr. Vyas cited the judgment of the Division Bench of our High Court in (m.v. Mariner IV v. V.S.N.L.)24, 1998(5) Bom.C.R. (O.O.C.J.)312 : 1998(1) Mh.L.J. 751 . The issue before the Court was whether a "sister ship" could be arrested in exercise of Admiralty jurisdiction. It was contended before this Court that under the Admiralty jurisdiction, as delineated in the 1891 Act, no arrest could be made of a "sister ship" of an offending ship. Reading the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) and interpreting it liberally, this Court observed (in paragraph 29) as under :- "29. It was contended before this Court that under the Admiralty jurisdiction, as delineated in the 1891 Act, no arrest could be made of a "sister ship" of an offending ship. Reading the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) and interpreting it liberally, this Court observed (in paragraph 29) as under :- "29. The aforesaid observations of the Apex Court in our opinion very clearly suggest that unless there is any prohibition by the municipal laws the principles of trans-national law or international conventions could be applied for affording remedy for the satisfaction or realisation of maritime claim. It is clear that every person, thing and foreign vessel entering Indian waters comes within the jurisdiction of the High Court of the Coastal State by the very act of its entering the Indian territorial waters. In such a case if any one has any maritime claim against the owner of offending ship then not only the offending ship but also any other property or ship belonging to such a person within Indian territorial waters, can be attached or arrested by the High Court of the Coastal State. Such a course is not only not prohibited by any municipal laws but in our opinion the provisions of Order XXXVIII and particularly Rule 5 thereof clearly shows acceptance of such principle by the municipal laws." 86. Mr. Vyas urges that the significant words here are "High Courts of Coastal State". This Court was merely making a gloss on the observations of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra), which, as we have pointed out, dealt with a situation of applicability of Merchant Shipping Act, 1958. We do not read this judgment as having laid down the proposition which is contended for, as no such proposition was canvassed before the Court. The only proposition of law canvassed before the Court was whether a "sister ship" could be arrested and the Court answered it by saying that it could take notice of subsequent international conventions, although the law had not progressed from 1891. We are unable to read in this judgment any support to the contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the defendants. 87. Finally, Mr. Vyas relied on (M.V. Al. We are unable to read in this judgment any support to the contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the defendants. 87. Finally, Mr. Vyas relied on (M.V. Al. Quamar v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd.)25, A.I.R. 2000 S.C. 2829, and highlighted from paragraph 10 the words, ".....What the English Court could do in connection with the suit validly filed on 11-10-1994 by respondent No. 1 against respondent No. 2 would have been validly done by the Andhra Pradesh High Court if the vessel, respondent No. 1 and respondent No. 2 were all within the territorial admiralty jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court at that time. .....But the fact remains that in such settings of the dispute between the parties such a suit could have been validly filed in the Andhra Pradesh High Courts admiralty jurisdiction if the vessel was in its territorial waters on 11-10-1994. ....", And further again, (in paragraph 10), after referring to M.V. Elizabeth (supra), "......that was a case in which the res in question was found within the employees waters of Visakhapatnam Port. .....it must be held that once the vessel, MV. Al Tabish came within the territorial waters of the Andhra Pradesh, the Andhra Pradesh High Court, as Admiralty Court, had complete jurisdiction to even initially entertain the suit against not only the ship but against its owner, that is alleged to have committed breach of salvage contract qua that ship. .....It has to be kept in view that if the ship in question which is arrested at Visakhapatnam had sailed out of the territorial waters of Andhra Pradesh then the Andhra Pradesh High Court would have lost its jurisdiction to entertain such a suit......". 88. Emphasizing these observations, it is contended by the learned Counsel for the defendants, that the Supreme Court has laid down two propositions, namely, (a) that there could be territorial waters of a State in India and that, (b) the jurisdiction in Admiralty of a High Court was delimited with reference to the limits of such territorial waters of the State. It is true that the Supreme Court has used the expression "territorial waters" on more than one occasion in the paragraph referred to. We do not think that the Supreme Court was laying down any such proposition as contended by the learned Counsel. That was not the proposition which was in issue before the Supreme Court. It is true that the Supreme Court has used the expression "territorial waters" on more than one occasion in the paragraph referred to. We do not think that the Supreme Court was laying down any such proposition as contended by the learned Counsel. That was not the proposition which was in issue before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in Al Quamar (supra) was only concerned with the execution of a foreign decree in personam in terms of section 44-A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. While considering the issue, it was pointed out that the ship which happened to be in Visakhapatnam Port, had been arrested by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in exercise of Admiralty jurisdiction and, consequently, an action in rem could have been validly instituted in the said High Court, hence the decree was enforceable by reason of section 44-A. Since the observations of Supreme Court were made in the context of M.V. Elizabeth (supra), it was referring to the restrictive definition of "High Court" in section 3(15) of the Merchant Shipping Act. At any rate, a ship in Visakhapatnam Port would undoubtedly be in 'Indian territorial waters and, consequently, within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, as much as any other High Court having Admiralty jurisdiction. We do not think that the observations referred to were made for any other purpose as contended by the learned Counsel. Where was 'M.V. Umang' on the material date? 89. The next issue to be considered is , whether on the date when the cause of action arose, the first defendant 'm.v. Umang' was lying in the Port of Kandla, within the Kutch District, as found by the learned Single Judge. 90. Though, strictly speaking, on our finding that there are no geographical boundaries to the exercise of the Admiralty jurisdiction, this issue pales into insignificance, we have decided to address ourselves to this issue also and answer it, since it was seriously urged by the learned Counsel on both sides. 91. The learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that the fact that the ship was at the Port of Kandla, within Kutch District, has been admitted by the plaintiffs. Mr. Mukharjee, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, strongly urged that this finding is completely erroneous. 91. The learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that the fact that the ship was at the Port of Kandla, within Kutch District, has been admitted by the plaintiffs. Mr. Mukharjee, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, strongly urged that this finding is completely erroneous. He pointed out that, in the plaint, all that was averred in paragraph 1 was that the defendant vessel was "lying in Kandla Port" and again, in paragraph 2, "the said vessel is presently lying at Kandla". He urges that the averment that "the vessel was lying in Kandla Port" does not amount to an admission as read by the learned Single Judge. In the affidavit in support of Suresh Kewalramani dated 8th April, 1998 filed in support of the Notice of Motion, it is urged in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 as under :- "2. The opponent plaintiffs have filed the Admiralty Suit No. 33/97 before the Hon'ble Court inter alia stating that M/s. Sea Tiger Shipping Corporation a body corporate registered in Liberia (hereinafter referred to as "the company"), having its office at 80, Broad Street, Monrovia Liberia, is owning a vessel m.v. Umang" registered in Cent S.E. Vincent and Grenadines. It is stated by Mr. Kamlakant Dubey and Mrs. Santosh Dubey who claimed to be the parents of Arvind Kamlakant Dubey that their son Arvind was engaged as 3rd Engineer on Board of the Vessel of the company. It is stated that on or about August 15, 1996, the said vessel was lying in the port of Kandla, District Kutch of the State of Gujarat. It is stated that while doing the maintenance of electrical crane of the vessel, the said Arvind received severe and fatal electric shock from the crane/equipment that was being repaired and it is stated that because of the said injury, he expired in Kandla. In the aforesaid suit, the vessel has been joined as defendant No. 1. The company is shown as defendant No. 2 and M/s. Jaisu Shipping Co. Pvt. Ltd. of Kandla in the District of Kutch in the State of Gujarat has been joined as defendant No. 3. 3. The averments made in the complaint show that the claim made by the plaintiff is about their son having been engaged by defendant No. 2 company of a foreign country in Liberia, for defendant No. 1 vessel. Pvt. Ltd. of Kandla in the District of Kutch in the State of Gujarat has been joined as defendant No. 3. 3. The averments made in the complaint show that the claim made by the plaintiff is about their son having been engaged by defendant No. 2 company of a foreign country in Liberia, for defendant No. 1 vessel. The defendant No. 3 who is also in Kandla in the District of Kutch in the State of Gujarat are said to be the agents of defendant No. 2. 4. The incident is said to have happened in Kandla in the District of Kutch in the State of Gujarat, where it is said that because of accident the said Arvind expired on August 15, 1996 at Kandla in the District of Kutch within the State of Gujarat." 92. A rejoinder was filed by the Constituted Attorney of the plaintiffs on 22nd July, 1998 (D.P. Fernandes). While dealing with paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the affidavit of Suresh Kewalramani, D.P. Fernandes said in paragraph 4, "with reference to paras 2, 3 and 4 of the said affidavit, I say that the statements made therein appear to be substantially correct". Subsequently, an affidavit was filed by the first plaintiff on 25th August, 1999 to clarify the statements made by his Constituted Attorney D.P. Fernades in paragraphs 4 and 5 of his affidavit. It was stated specifically in the first plaintiff's affidavit that Fernandes's affidavit should not be taken as an admission made by him or on his behalf and it was reiterated that the Port of Kandla is not situated within the District of Kutch and at the relevant time the first defendant vessel was lying at anchorage i.e. mooring No. 2 buoy and beyond the high water mark in the Port of Kandla. 93. The learned Single Judge (vide paragraph 16 of the judgment under appeal) assumes that there was a clear and categorical admission made by the plaintiffs through Constituted Attorney that the Port of Kandla is within the District of Kutch and in the State of Gujarat. In our view, no such admission could have been imputed. As a matter of fact, such an admission was not there in the plaint itself; it is only the wrong reiteration of the averments in the plaint by Suresh Kewalramani that led to the confusion. In our view, no such admission could have been imputed. As a matter of fact, such an admission was not there in the plaint itself; it is only the wrong reiteration of the averments in the plaint by Suresh Kewalramani that led to the confusion. In any event, it was a factual matter of serious import which could be established independently and not determined on the basis of admission. We, therefore, take the view that the issue as to where the vessel was lying on the material date and whether the Port of Kandla is within the District of Kutch in the State of Gujarat are not matters which could have been decided on admissions, but have to be decided on the basis of the material on record. 94. When we turn to the material on record, we find that the exact place where the ship was on the material date is not at all available from the material on record. The Certificate of Kandla Port Trust dated October 31, 1999 indicates the several dates on which the vessel m.v. Umang had called at Kandla Port during the year 1996 and the place where it was secured to berth/mooring. The Certificate indicates that the vessel m.v. Umang had arrived and anchored at OTB on 15th August, 1996 and was secured at No. 2 Mooring buoy on 15th August, 1996 and sailed on 27th August, 1996 from No. 2 mooring buoy. The certificate further says :- "These moorings are placed in Kandla Creek within the port limit of Kandla which include New Kandla and Old Kandla and are not beyond High Water mark. Kandla Port is situated in Anjar Taluka of Kutch District, Gujarat State. The Marine Department is administered by Deputy Conservator." This certificate is signed by the Deputy Conservator, Kandla Port Trust dated October 31, 1999. 95. A formidable contention was urged before the learned Single Judge and prevailed with him. The contention goes thus :- (a) The State Reorganisation Act, 1956 was enacted to provide for reorganisation of States in India. The existing States were divided or expanded and new States came to be formed from the appointed day i.e. 1st November, 1956. 95. A formidable contention was urged before the learned Single Judge and prevailed with him. The contention goes thus :- (a) The State Reorganisation Act, 1956 was enacted to provide for reorganisation of States in India. The existing States were divided or expanded and new States came to be formed from the appointed day i.e. 1st November, 1956. (b) Under section 8 of the Act of 1956, a new Part A State known as State of Bombay came to be formed comprising the territories stated therein which, inter alia, included the territories of the erstwhile sovereign State of Kutch. Section 49 of the 1956 Act provides that the High Courts exercising jurisdiction immediately before the appointed day shall be deemed to be High Courts of the new States and accordingly the High Court of Judicature at Bombay became the High Court in respect of the new State of Bombay by virtue of section 52 of the Act of 1956. Section 49 and 52 of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956 are relevant and they read as under :- "49. High Courts for the new states.—(1) The High Courts exercising immediately before the appointed day jurisdiction in relation to the existing States of Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab shall, as from the appointed day, be deemed to be the High Courts for the new States of Bombay, Madhya Pradesh and Punjab, respectively. (2) As from the appointed day, there shall be established a High Court for each of the new States of Kerala, Mysore and Rajasthan. 52. Jurisdiction of High Courts for new States.---The High Court for a new State shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included in the law in force immediately before the appointed day, is exercisable in respect of that part of the said territories by any High Court or Judicial Commissioner's Court for an existing State." (c) The State of Bombay was further reorganised under the Bombay Re-organisation Act, 1960 (Act of 1960) with effect from 1st May 1960. Section 3 of the said Act of 1960 provides as under :- "3. Section 3 of the said Act of 1960 provides as under :- "3. Formation of Gujarat State.—(1) As from the appointed day, there shall be formed a new State to be known as the State of Gujarat comprising the following territories of the State of Bombay, namely:- (a) Banaskantha, Mehsana, Sabarkantha, Ahmedabad, Kaira, Panchamahals, Baroda, Broach, Surat, Dangs, Amreli, Surendrangar, Rajkot, Jamnagar, Junagadh, Bhavnagar and Kutch Districts; and (b) the villages in Umbergaon taluka of Thana District, the villages in Nawapur and Nandurbar talukas of West Khandesh District and the villages in Akkalkuwa and Taloda talukas of West Khandesh District, respectively specified in Parts I, II and III of the First Schedule: and thereupon, the said territories shall cases to form part of the State of Bombay and the residuary State of Bombay shall be known as the State of Maharashtra. (2) The villages of Umbergaon taluka specified in Part I of the First Schedule shall form a separate taluka of the same name and be included in Surat District and the remaining villages in the said taluka shall be included in and form part of, Dahanu taluka of Thane District, and the villages specified in Parts II and III of the First Schedule shall respectively be included in, and form part of, Songadh taluka of Surat District and Sagbara taluka of Broach District." (d) As a result of the 1960 Act coming into force, a new State of Gujarat was formed comprising some of the territories of the erstwhile State of Bombay, and the residuary areas of erstwhile State of Bombay were renamed as the State of Maharashtra. The territories which went to the State of Gujarat included Kutch District. (e) Under section 28 of the Bombay Re-organisation Act, 1960, a separate High Court for the State of Gujarat was established. Under section 28(1) of the 1960 Act, a separate High Court for the State of Gujarat known as "the High Court of Gujarat" was established and the High Court of Bombay became the High Court for the State of Maharashtra. Under section 30 of the 1960 Act, it was provided that the High Court of Gujarat shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included in the State of Gujarat, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day was exercisable by the High Court of Bombay. Under section 30 of the 1960 Act, it was provided that the High Court of Gujarat shall have, in respect of any part of the territories included in the State of Gujarat, all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as under the law in force immediately before the appointed day was exercisable by the High Court of Bombay. Section 37 provided for transfer of proceedings from the High Court of Bombay to the High Court of Gujarat. Section 37(1) in terms says, "Except as hereinafter provided, the High Court at Bombay shall, as from the appointed day, have no jurisdiction in respect of the transferred territory. (f) It was urged and accepted by the learned Single Judge that the material available on record clearly established that Kandla Port is a part of District of Kutch in the State of Gujarat; the map of Kutch District and the Notification issued by the Revenue Department of Government of Gujarat dated 14th November, 1967 shows that Kandla (old and new) is a part of Anjar Taluka of District Kutch in the State of Gujarat. (g) As a corollary, the learned Single Judge rightly entertained no doubt that the Kandla Port is in the Kutch District of the State of Gujarat. He rightly held that the first defendant vessel on the date of the filing of the suit was anchored at No. 2 mooring buoy of Kandla Port, that is within the limits of Kandla Port in Kutch District of State of Gujarat. Hence, the learned Single Judge, was right in holding that the vessel was lying at Kandla Port in Kutch District of State of Gujarat on the material date. 96. Placing reliance on Articles 214, 225 and 226, it was contended by Mr. Vyas that the jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court was co-terminus with the territorial limits of the State of Maharashtra for which it was constituted High Court under the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960. Conversely, it was urged that section 37 of the 1960 Act provides that the High Court has no jurisdiction, power or authority in respect of any area included within the State of Gujarat as a consequence of the Bombay Re-organisation Act, 1960. Conversely, it was urged that section 37 of the 1960 Act provides that the High Court has no jurisdiction, power or authority in respect of any area included within the State of Gujarat as a consequence of the Bombay Re-organisation Act, 1960. Hence, it is contended that the learned Single Judge rightly held that the powers under Clause 32 of the Letters Patent had to be read subject to the constitutional provisions, the provisions of the State Re-organisation Act, 1956 and the Bombay Reorganisation Act, 1960. Consequently, the admiralty jurisdiction exercisable by every High Court, which it possess in it plenary powers as the Court of Record and Superior Court, cannot extend beyond its territorial limits. Further, it being a trite principle in Admiralty law that the vessel must be within the jurisdiction of the Court for being arrested, the view was rightly taken that the Bombay High Court had no jurisdiction to arrest the first defendant vessel. The learned Single Judge has found indirect support to his conclusions from the observations of the Supreme Court in M.V. Elizabeth (supra) and quoted several passages from the said judgment. The learned Single Judge was conscious that the Supreme Court had no occasion to expressly advert to the territorial limits of the Admiralty jurisdiction, but there are several passages in the judgment which would go to show that the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court can only be exercised with the limits of territorial jurisdiction of that Court in exercise of its appellate powers. 97. Mr. Mukharjee, learned Counsel for the plaintiffs, strongly urged that the reasoning of the learned Single Judge, even on the second issue, is flawed. In the first place, he contends that the jurisdictional issue had been raised by the defendants and, unless it was clearly admitted, the burden always lay on them to establish the facts necessary to buttress the contention based on jurisdiction. All that had been admitted in the plaint was that the ship was anchored at Kandla Port. Mr. Mukharjee contends that there was no admission whatsoever that the ship was situated within the District of Kutch or the State of Gujarat. 98. Turning to the material placed on record, Mr. Mukharjee contends that the map produced by the defendants does not show that Kandla Port as such falls within Anjar Taluka of the District of Kutch, as contended. Mukharjee contends that there was no admission whatsoever that the ship was situated within the District of Kutch or the State of Gujarat. 98. Turning to the material placed on record, Mr. Mukharjee contends that the map produced by the defendants does not show that Kandla Port as such falls within Anjar Taluka of the District of Kutch, as contended. A reference to the map produced by the defendants and the legends on the map does not evidence that Kandla falls within the Taluka boundary of Anjar Taluka or that it falls within the District boundary of Kutch District. Indeed, it could not have been so. 99. In any event, Mr. Mukharjee contends that the material date is 11th March, 1997, on which date the ship was arrested. The certificate produced by the Deputy Conservator of the Port of Kandla does not indicate where the ship was on that date when it was arrested and there is no light thrown on the situs of the ship of the material date. He also urges that a sea going vessel, sailing to foreign ports, can hardly be moored between the high tide level and the low tide level. The expression "high tide line" and "low tide line" have been sufficiently explained in the Coastal Regulation Zone Notifications issued under the Environment Protection Act, 1986. These respectively mean the maximum and minimum water shed marks at the highest spring tide and the lowest ebb. Between the high tide line and low tide line, the land gets exposed to sun during the low tide. It is obvious, therefore, that a ship could not have been moored between the high tide line and low tide line, as it would require at least 20 to 30 feet of depth of water for being moored. That under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, only the land upto the low tide mark comes within the revenue jurisdiction of the District. The ship could never have ridden at anchor between the high tide and low tide lines. The ship, at best, could have been anchored at a depth of 20 to 30 feet in deep waters beyond low tide lines, which could neither form part of Anjar Taluka, nor form part of Kandla District in State of Gujarat, in the submission of Mr. Mukharjee. 100. In our view, the contention of Mr. Mukharjee appears sound and must prevail. Mukharjee. 100. In our view, the contention of Mr. Mukharjee appears sound and must prevail. Nothing more than common sense is required to accept the contention that a ship cannot be moored at anchor between high tide and low tide marks. The material on record does not even clearly indicate as to where the ship was on 11th March, 1997 when it was arrested. Assuming that the ship was riding at anchor, somewhere off the Port of Kandla, at sufficient depth of water, we do not think that spot could have been within the revenue jurisdiction of the limits of Anjar Taluka of the District of Kutch. The Maharashtra Land Revenue Code extends only to land under sea to the limits of the low tide level and not beyond. Unless the ship is brought on land for dry docking, a ship obviously cannot be anchored on the landward side of the low tide mark. The jurisdiction of the District ceases on the seaward side of the low tide mark. Considered from all points of view, therefore, we are of the view that the material on record does not establish the fact that on the material date when the ship was arrested (i.e. 11th March, 1997), the ship was within the territorial jurisdiction of the Gujarat High Court within the Taluka of Anjar and the District of Kutch. The conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge on these aspects are purely speculative and unsupported by the evidence on record. Hence, this contention too of Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the defendants, must fall. Epilogue 101. Before we part with the judgment, we have some concluding observations to make. We have before us the case of a young man, in the prime of his life, snatched away by cruel fate, leaving destitute his old parents justly due. For them, all arguments of forensic finesse as to jurisdiction are of little moment. Driving them to start a fresh round of litigation in another Court would be as cruel a blow to them as the one delivered by fate. It may suit the defendants to raise technical objections as to jurisdiction and Counsel, with their erudition, to support them. The call of justice is higher than legal logomachy. Driving them to start a fresh round of litigation in another Court would be as cruel a blow to them as the one delivered by fate. It may suit the defendants to raise technical objections as to jurisdiction and Counsel, with their erudition, to support them. The call of justice is higher than legal logomachy. Unless compelled by clear words of statute, or binding precedent, we would be failing in our duty to accede to the argument that this Court has no jurisdiction. It is trite law that the jurisdiction of a superior Court is presumed, unless ousted by clear words of statute or binding judicial precedent. We have found neither. Our judicial conscience also does not permit us to uphold the jurisdictional objection of the defendants, based on observations of the Supreme Court, made in an altogether different context, to prevail. Order 102. On this parting note, we allow the appeal, reverse the judgment and set aside the order under appeal. We hold that this Court has jurisdiction in Admiralty to arrest the first defendant vessel and has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit of the plaintiffs. First and second defendants to pay Rs. 50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand only) as costs to the plaintiffs. 103. Parties to act on an ordinary copy of this judgment duly authenticated by the Personal Secretary of this Court. 104. Issuance of certified copy expedited. Appeal allowed. -----