Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 519 (MP)

Hukum Singh Yadav v. State of M. P.

2001-07-19

R.B.DIXIT, S.P.SRIVASTAVA

body2001
ORDER S.P. Srivastava, J. 1. The petitioner who was posted as Station House Officer, Police Station, Sheopur, is facing disciplinary proceedings which had commenced with the service of the charge sheet against him. The Superintendent of Police, Sheopur passed an order on dated 30-6-2001 relieving him of the charge of the post of Station House Officer temporarily until further orders and attached him with which the Police Lines, Sheopur. This arrangement was made as indicated in the aforesaid order on account of the pendency of the departmental proceedings against the petitioner. 2. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order challenged the same by approaching Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Gwalior. The Tribunal vide its judgment and order dated 5-7-2001 dismissed his application filed under section 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Administrative Tribunal Act holding that the impugned action could not be said to be arbitrary or a mala fide action, and it was clear that the said order had been issued pursuant to a clearly defined policy. It was also observed that the petitioner had not alleged that he was being singled out for the implementation of the policy as disclosed in the GOP issued by the Director General of Police vide the circular dated 25-4-1995. 3. The petitioner has now approached this Court by filing the present writ petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India, seeking redress praying for quashing of the impugned orders. 4. We have heard the teamed counsel for the petitioner and the learned Government Advocate representing the respondent/State and have carefully perused the record. 5. It may be noticed that the Director General of Police had issued the aforesaid circular superseding all the previous instructions covering the various matters mentioned therein and issuing new directions which included the directions that those Inspectors against whom departmental proceedings or criminal cases are pending, shall not be posted in the regular District Police Force, and in case major punishment was imposed on them, they will not be entitled to a posting at a police station for a period of one year, wherever on evaluation of the record if considered appropriate, they could be granted such a posting. 6. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that although the Superintendent of Police is the disciplinary authority so far as the petitioner was concerned but as provided under Regulation 221 of the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulations, he was not vested with any such power which could authorise him to relieve the petitioner from the charge of the post of Station House Officer and attach him in the Police Lines. 7. A perusal of Regulation 221 of the M.P. Police Regulations indicates that its operation is confined to the disciplinary proceedings relating the Sub- Inspectors and Assistant Sub-Inspectors only. 8. A perusal of Regulation 221 of the aforesaid Regulations indicates that its operation is confined to the exercise of the powers of punishment specified thereunder on Head Constables and Constables, Sub-Inspectors, Assistant Sub-Inspectors including the punishment of censure on inspectors as well as the powers to suspend any non-gazetted officer of police pending inquiry against his conduct. 9. The powers of punishment with which a Deputy Inspector-General of Police is vested are enumerated in the regulation 222 of the Regulations which can be imposed on Head Constables, Constables, Assistant Sub- Inspectors, Sub-Inspectors and officers of equivalent ranks as well as Subedar, Assistant Police Prosecutors, Police Prosecutors, Inspectors and officers of equivalent ranks. The Deputy Inspector-General also stands vested to suspend any non-gazetted police officers pending enquiry into their conduct. 10. So far as the Inspector-General of Police is concerned, his powers are defined/enumerated in Regulation 223 of the Regulations which included the power to suspend any non-gazetted police officers pending enquiry into their conduct and the power to inflict any of the punishments specified therein on Head Constables, Constables and on all ranks of non-gazetted police officers. 11. In the present case, the learned Government Advocate has pointed out that the impugned order had been passed exercising the jurisdiction vested under Regulation 32 of the M.P. Police Regulations. This provision authorises the Superintendent of Police who is the Head of the police force of his district to ensure that all the orders issued by the Courts or other competent authority are promptly carried out. He is further responsible for the internal economy of the police force and its management and also efficiency and discipline, and the proper performance of its duties. 12. He is further responsible for the internal economy of the police force and its management and also efficiency and discipline, and the proper performance of its duties. 12. What has been contended by the learned Government Advocate is that since it is not disputed that the Director General of Police was a competent authority to issue the GOP and as the directions contained in the GOP dated 25-4-1995 had to be carried out by the Superintendent of Police of the district, the order relieving the petitioner from the post, and attaching him in the Police Lines did not amount to a disciplinary action as envisaged under Regulation 222 or 223 of the Police Regulations, the impugned action taken by the Superintendent of Police taking into consideration the gravity of the situation and the discipline which was required to be maintained cannot be held to be without jurisdiction. 13. It may be noticed that the relieving of an inspector from the charge of the post of the Station House Officer and attaching him in the police Lines cannot by any stretch of imagination be taken to be an order of punishment. Such an order does not visit the concerned member of the police force with any evil consequences. In such a circumstance it cannot be held that the impugned action was such an action which could be taken to be falling within the ambit of the provision relating to punishment or suspension as envisaged under Regulation 222 or 223 of the M.P. Police Regulations. 14. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not at all acceptable. 15. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strenuously urged that in the Writ Petition No. 852/2000, R, C. Birthare vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others vide the interim order dated 29-6-2000, in similar circumstances this Court had stayed the operation of the order relieving the petitioner in that case from the charge of the post of Station House Officer held by him. 16. The contention is that the petitioner in writ petition No. 852/2000, stood at par with the present petitioner, and therefore a similar order should have been issued by the Tribunal. 17. 16. The contention is that the petitioner in writ petition No. 852/2000, stood at par with the present petitioner, and therefore a similar order should have been issued by the Tribunal. 17. In the aforesaid connection, suffice it to say that the writ petition No. 852/2000 had been dismissed though on a different ground of its having been rendered infructuous but the nature of the order dated 29-6-2000, was only that of an interim order. An interim order cannot be taken to be a binding precedent specially when the writ petition, wherein such an order had been passed had ultimately been dismissed though not on merits. 18. The petitioner cannot derive any advantage out of the interim order relied upon by him in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 19. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the Tribunal itself had in another case of Shri Bal Krishna Arya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others O.A. No. 444/98 decided on dated 16-2-1999 had quashed the order of attachment passed against an Inspector relieving him from the charge of the post of Station House Officer simply on the ground that he was facing disciplinary proceedings. The Tribunal in its order dated 16-2-1999 had quashed the order holding the same to be stigmatic. 20. The contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that once the Tribunal itself vide its final order dated 16-2-1999 had come to the conclusion that an order of the nature as impugned in the present case was to be taken to be stigmatic and liable to be quashed, it was not open to the learned single member of the Tribunal who had passed the order challenged in the present writ petition to ignore the order of another single member of the Tribunal dated 16-2-1999. It has been urged that in case, the single member of the Tribunal disagrees with the view expressed by another single member, he ought to have made a reference instead of dismissing the application. 21. It has been urged that in case, the single member of the Tribunal disagrees with the view expressed by another single member, he ought to have made a reference instead of dismissing the application. 21. On the aforesaid aspect, the single member of the Tribunal who had passed the order challenged in the present case had observed that the earlier order dated 16-2-1999 passed by another member had not taken into consideration the implications arising under the GOP issued by the Director General of police, and the said decision had to be considered as per incuriam. At this stage, it may be noticed that in the order dated 16-2-1999 the implications of the directions arising under the GOP issued by the Director General of Police and the implication arising under provision of Regulation 32 of the M.P. Police Regulations had not been taken notice of at all. The single member had straight away reached to the conclusion without giving any reasons that such an order was liable to be taken as stigmatic and therefore quashed on that account. 22. As has already been indicated hereinabove, the order as in question cannot be taken to be stigmatic and it cannot be taken to visit the officer with any evil consequences. It was open to the Superintendent of Police specially in view of the directions issued by the competent authority/the Director General of Police and pass appropriate orders for the management of the police force in his district and for maintaining efficiency and discipline and ensure that the members of the police perform their duties properly. We do not approve the judgment and order of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 444/98, Shri Bal Krishan Arya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others decided on 16-2- 1999 which has been strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 23. We do not approve the judgment and order of the Tribunal in O.A. No. 444/98, Shri Bal Krishan Arya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others decided on 16-2- 1999 which has been strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 23. The learned counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the impugned order has to be taken to be in the nature of an order of transfer, and in that view of the matter it had to be passed complying with the transfer policy of the State Government for the year 1999-2000 in respect whereof, a circular was issued on dated 14-6-1999 and since the State Government itself vide the order dated 18-1-2000 had taken a decision that all attachments be terminated forthwith it was not open to the superintendent of police to pass the order of attachment contrary to the order dated 18-1-2000 issued by the State Government. 24. In the aforesaid connection, it may be noticed that in the circular dated 14-6-1999, the State Government had issued a transfer policy for the year 1999-2000. This transfer policy which was for a particular year cannot override the statutory provisions contained in the M.P. Police Regulations and in the order issued by the competent authority in exercising of the powers vested in it under those regulations. 25. The order dated 18-1-2000, heavily relied upon by the petitioner itself indicates that no transfer was to be made during the period from 1st January, 2000 to 1st April, 2001. But during the period from 1-4-2000 to 31-5-2000 relaxation in the matter of transfer was granted in respect of some departments which did not include Police Department. The impugned order had been passed on 30th June, 2001 i.e. after the ban period. 26. The impugned order in any view of the matter could not be treated to be an order of transfer. 27. It may be observed that the directions contained in the circulars issued by the State Government laying down a policy regarding the transfers for a particular year by themselves did not vest any enforceable right or indefeasible right in favour of the officials affected by their transfers. In fact, such directions are not justiciable having been issued after taking into consideration the various administrative exigencies. In fact, such directions are not justiciable having been issued after taking into consideration the various administrative exigencies. Further, it cannot be overlooked that a transfer is an incident of service and unless the order is demonstrated to be clearly without jurisdiction or issued with a mala fide intention or with a purpose of victimization it is not liable to be interfered with in the proceedings under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. In any view of the matter, such directions cannot override or nullify a provision having statutory force or the force of law. 28. The transfer policy relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner. 29. This Court in its decision in the case of Director General of Police M.P. and another vs. Ravi Shankar Vishwanath Singh and others rendered by Division Bench reported in 1987 MPU 780 had clearly indicated that the provisions contained in the M.P. Police Regulations have statutory force. Taking notice of the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P. vs. Babu Ram, AIR 1961 SC 751 and in the case of Govind vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 1975 SC 1 S78, it was clearly held that the M.P. Police Regulations had the force of law. 30. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances as brought on record no ground has been made out for any interference in the ultimate order passed by the respondent Tribunal. 31. This writ petition in the circumstances is dismissed.