JUDGMENT Jawahar Lal Gupta, J. (Oral) - The petitioners in these seven cases impugn the notifications dated December 21, 1998 and December 20, 1999 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Copies of these notifications have been placed on the record of C.W.P. No. 6318 of 2001 as Annexures P-8 and P-11 respectively. 2. We have heard Mr. Shailendra Jain, learned Counsel for the petitioners in these cases. He has made a two-fold submission. Firstly, it has been contended that the public purpose as disclosed in the impugned notifications cannot be achieved as the land which had been acquired on earlier occasions for development of residential and commercial area was in fact available. The authorities had used it for a different purpose. It indicates that no land is needed for residential and commercial use. Secondly, it has been contended that the action of the respondents in not exempting the land of the petitioners is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as the land of Maruti Udyog (a service station) and certain other industrial units has been excluded from acquisition in the notification under Section 6 of the Act. On these two grounds, learned Counsel submits that the impugned notifications are liable to be set aside. 3. As for the first contention, it may be noticed at the outset that the counsel concedes that the earlier notifications have not been placed on record. There is nothing to indicate as to what was the public purpose for which the land had been acquired. There is nothing to indicate as to what was the location of the land and why was its user changed. The mere fact that the land acquired under an earlier notification was used for a purpose other than the declared one, cannot be a ground for the quashing of the notifications impugned in the present case. So far as these notifications are concerned, the land is being acquired for the purpose of developing commercial and residential areas. Normally, the competent authority is the judge of its needs. So far as these notifications are concerned, the land is being acquired for the purpose of developing commercial and residential areas. Normally, the competent authority is the judge of its needs. If on the basis of the factual position it comes to the conclusion that land is needed for construction of houses or commercial complexes, this court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the authority especially when nothing has been placed on record to conclusively show that there is no need for development of residential or commercial areas. In fact, shortage of residential accommodation is a known reality. If the Government is trying to develop areas for residential accommodation, it cannot be said that it is not serving a public purpose. Thus, the first contention is rejected. 4. Mr. Jain contends that the notifications suffer from the vice of discrimination. He contends that a strip of land belonging to Maruti Service Station has been excluded from the notifications. Similarly, he contends that the land belonging to M/s. Atam Surgical Centre which is manufacturing surgical equipment has been excluded. The action of the Government in not excluding the land of the petitioners, the counsel submit, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 5. It is the petitioners own case that they had filed objections to the notifications under Section 4 of the Act. It has not even been contended that those objections were not considered. Still further, if on consideration of the relevant material the authority finds it possible to accommodate certain owners of land and excludes their land from acquisition, the petitioners cannot complain of discrimination merely because the authority has not been able to exclude their land from acquisition. Various factors like location, the nature of construction, the purpose which the unit is serving, the cost which the Government may have to incur in respect of demolishing the existing structure have to be taken into consideration by the competent authority while taking a view in the matter. Nothing has been pointed out by the counsel to show that the small quarters constructed by the petitioners are at par with the Surgical Unit or the Maruti Service Station which have been excluded from acquisition. The petitioners have not shown that they are identically placed with those whose land has been exempted. They cannot complain of discrimination. 6. Mr. Nothing has been pointed out by the counsel to show that the small quarters constructed by the petitioners are at par with the Surgical Unit or the Maruti Service Station which have been excluded from acquisition. The petitioners have not shown that they are identically placed with those whose land has been exempted. They cannot complain of discrimination. 6. Mr. Jain contends that the respondents have taken action on account of extraneous considerations. The allegation is vague. No person who is alleged to have acted on extraneous considerations has been impleaded as a party. In the absence of a specific allegation we cannot permit the petitioners to put forth the allegation of extraneous considerations. Thus, we are unable to uphold the charge of discrimination. 7. Another fact which deserves notice is that the impugned notifications were issued in December 1998 and December 1999 respectively. The petitioners in all these cases have waited for more than 16 months before approaching this Court. No explanation for this delay has been given. At this stage, we consider it inappropriate to interfere even on account of delay. 8. No other point has been raised. In view of the above, we find no merit in these petitions. These are, consequently, dismissed in limine. Petitions dismissed.