O R D E R (Per the Hon’ble Mr.Chief Justice S.B. Sinha) 1. This writ petition is directed against the judgment dated 13.2.1998 passed by the A.P. State Administrative Tribunal in O.A.No.3394 of 1994 whereby and whereunder the Original Application filed by the petitioners herein was dismissed. In the said application filed by the petitioners prayed for regularization of their services. 2. The petitioners before the learned Tribunal contended that they were appointed as contingent staff for monthly salary of Rs.75/- in August, 1988 which was enhanced to Rs.l50/- and later on to Rs.250/- per month. The grievance of the petitioners appears to be that they were not paid the enhanced salary and that their services were not regularised. 3. Pursuant to and in furtherance of the order passed by the second respondent, their services were dispensed with. Aggrieved by it, the aforementioned Original Application was filed. The only question which has been raised in this application is as to whether their services should be regularized. The learned Tribunal arrived at a finding of fact that the petitioners were not appointed in the contingent establishment and their appointments were illegal being contrary to the directive issued by the state. It was held that the Collector alone was the competent authority to sanction the posts for appointment in contingent establishment and in the case of the petitioners, there had been no such sanction order issued by the Collector. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioners inter alia submitted that the services of the petitioners were’to be regularized in terms of G.O.Ms.No.212-dated 22.4.1994. The said G.O. has been issued as an exception to the A.P. (Regulation of Appointments to Public Services and Rationalisation of Staff Pattern and Pay Structure) Act No.2 of 1994. The said G.O. contemplates regularization of services subject to fulfilling the following conditions: 1) The persons appointed should possess the qualifications prescribed as per rules in force as on the date from which his/ her services have to be regularized. 2) They should be within the age limits as on the date of appointment as NMR/ Daily wage employees. 3) The rule of reservation wherever applicable will be followed and back log will be set off against future vacancies. 4) Sponsoring of candidates from employment exchange is relaxed. 2) They should be within the age limits as on the date of appointment as NMR/ Daily wage employees. 3) The rule of reservation wherever applicable will be followed and back log will be set off against future vacancies. 4) Sponsoring of candidates from employment exchange is relaxed. 5) Absorption shall be against clear vacancies of posts considered necessary to be continued as per work load excluding the vacancies already notified to the Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission/ District Selection Committee. 6) In the case of Work-charged Establishment, where thee will be no clear vacancies, because of the fact that the expenditure on work-charged is a fixed percentage of P.S. charges and as soon as the work is over, the services of work-charged establishment will have to be terminated, they shall be adjusted in the other departments. District Offices provided thee are clear vacancies of last grade service.” 5. In the instant case, apart from the fact that there had been no clear vacancies, the posts were also not sanctioned. The very fact that they were said to have been appointed in the contingent establishment clearly implies that there was no clear vacancy. Further more, their appointments being contrary to the Statute, was illegal. It may be noticed that according to the respondents they were required to perform only one hour’s duty per day. 6. A Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in TARAK CHOWDHURY v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL (1) held: It has not been disputed that the petitioner was appointed on ad hoc basis. At the time of his appointment, recruitment rules framed in terms of the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India had not been followed. The State while granting appointment to a person is not only bound to follow the recruitment rules made in terms of the proviso appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India but is also bound to give effect to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. No right, far less any enforceable right flows from such illegal appointments. The recruitment rules, inter alia, provide for grant of equal opportunity to be considered for appointment to all eligible candidates. A person who is appointed through backdoor cannot claim permanence only because he had been working for some time. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Dr. The recruitment rules, inter alia, provide for grant of equal opportunity to be considered for appointment to all eligible candidates. A person who is appointed through backdoor cannot claim permanence only because he had been working for some time. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Dr. Arundhati Ajit Pargaonkar vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in AIR 1995 SC 962 :1:1994(5) SLR 234 (SC)] and several decisions of the apex Court following the same. It is further well known in view of several decision of the apex Court that only an irregular appointment can be regularised and not an illegal appointment. It is further well settled that regularization cannot be a mode of recruitment (See R.N. Nanjundappa vs. T. Thimmiah reported in 1972(2) SCR 799 : [1972 SLR 94 (SC)] and B.N. Nagarajan vs. State of Karnataka reported in 1979(3) SCR 937 : [1979(3) SLR 116 (SC)] which decisions have been considered by the apex Court in V. Sreenivasa Reddy and Ors. vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. reported in AIR 1995 SC 586 : [1994(5) SLR 715 (SC)]. It is now also well settled in view of the recent decisions of the apex Court in State of M.P. and Ors. vs. Dharam Bir reported in 1998 (6) SCC 165 that the status of a person cannot be changed with the passage of time. A person who was appointed on temporary or ad hoc basis, thus cannot claim the status of a permanent servant only because he had worked for some time. The said decision along with other decisions had been considered by this Court in a large number of cases. Reference in this connection, however, may be made to Biman Ch. Karmakar vs. State of West Bengal reported in 1999 (2) CHN 289 and West Bengal Essential Commodities Supply Corporation Ltd., Vs. Md. Sarif reported in 2000(1) CHN 210: [2000(2) SLR 229 (Cal.)]. The afore-mentioned circular letter dated 3rd August, 1979 is not a statute. Even a policy decision cannot be adopted in derogation of statutory rules. Even the said purported memorandum dated 3rd August, 1979 is not an executive instruction within the meaning of Article 162 of the Constitution of India. 7. Once a finding of fact that the petitioners have not fulfilled the requisite conditions is arrived at by the Tribunal, the question of interference therewith would not arise. Even the said purported memorandum dated 3rd August, 1979 is not an executive instruction within the meaning of Article 162 of the Constitution of India. 7. Once a finding of fact that the petitioners have not fulfilled the requisite conditions is arrived at by the Tribunal, the question of interference therewith would not arise. In an unreported decision being W.P.ST.No-279 of 1999 the Calcutta High Court observed: The question as to whether the petitioners had fulfilled the essential condition for regularization or not, is essentially a question of fact. In law, nobody is entitled to claim regularization unless there exists any statutory provision in this regard. Only because a person has worked for more than 240 days. the same by itself would not be a ground for direction to regularise the service of the concerned employee. 8.In an another unreported decision being W.P.ST.No.133 of 2000 the Calcutta High Court observed: ... there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that a prolonged continuation of service by itself could not give right to an employee for being absorbed in service. 9. In KIRAN GUPTA v. STATE OF U.P. (2) Quadri, J speaking for a Division Bench of Apex Court, while considering the validity of Sections 9 and 10 of the U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Board Act, 1982, (U.P. Act 5 of 1982), which are in the following terms: Powers and duties of Commission:- The Commission shall have the following powers and duties, namely (a) to prepare guidelines on matters relating to the method of recruitment and promotion of such categories of teachers as are specified in the Schedule; (b)-(j) Procedure of selection of teachers specified in the Schedule:- (1) For the purposes of making appointment of a teacher specified in the Schedule, the management shall notify the vacancy to the Commission in such manner and through such officer or authority as may be prescribed. (2) The procedure of selection of candidates for appointment to the posts of such teachers shall be such as may be prescribed: Provided that the Commission shall, with a view to inviting talented persons, give wide publicity in the State to the vacancies notified under sub-section (1). held that the said provisions and the rules framed thereunder were valid in law. 10. held that the said provisions and the rules framed thereunder were valid in law. 10. A question as to whether the petitioners stood regularised under Section 33-A (I-A) read with Section 33-C of Act 5 of 1982 as amended in 1991 or not has also been considered by the Apex Court, thus: With regard to the claim based on Section 33-C (1) (a)(ii), on the basis that some of them Were appointed prior to 7-8-1993 and therefore they are entitled to be regularized, the High Court opined that the provisions of Section 33-C came into force on 20-4-1998 long after the vacancies were notified to the Commission and in respect of which the selection had already been completed by that date, therefore, in view of sub-section (6) of Section 33-C their claim did not survive. 11. Sections 33-A and 33-C of Act 5 of 1982, read thus: Regularisation of certain appointments.’-(1) * * * (I-A) Every teacher appointed by promotion, on ad hoc basis against a substantive vacancy in accordance with paragraph 2 of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 1981, as amended from time to time, who possesses the qualifications prescribed under, or is exempted from such qualifications in accordance with the provisions of, the Intermediate Education Act, 1921 shall, with effect from the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission and Selection Boards (Amendment) Act, 1991, be deemed to have been appointed in a substantive capacity provided such teacher has been continuously serving the institution from the date of such ad hoc appointment to the date of such commencement. * * * 33-C (1) Any teacher who,” ---- (a) (i) * * * (ii) was appointed by promotion on or after 31-7-1988 but not later than 6-8-1993 on ad hoc basis against a substantive vacancy in the post of a Principal or Headmaster in accordance with Section 18; (b) * * * * (c) has been continuously serving the institution from the date of such appointment up to the date of the commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary Education Services Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 1998; (d) * * * shall be given substantive appointment by the management. (2)-(5) * * * (6) Nothing in this section shall be construed to entitle any teacher to substantive appointment, if on the date of commencement of the Ordinance referred to in clause (c) of sub-section (1) such vacancy had already been filled or selection for such vacancy has already been made in accordance with this Act.” 12. It was observed: As constitutional validity of Section 33-C (6) has been challenged in the High Court, we do not propose to go into it here. However, we deem it proper to observe that the regularization of the candidates under Section 33-C (1) (a) (ii) is made to depend on a mere chance of a substantive vacancy either being filled in or the selection for that vacancy being completed. There may still be cases where the posts of Principals/Headmasters may be lying vacant either because the selected candidates did not join or because the incumbents having obtained posting of their choice vacated the posts or for any other reason the posts might have fallen vacant. In all such cases the benefit of Section 33-C (1)(a)(ii) has to be given to the ad hoc appointees. We issue a similar direction as issued above in cases of claims based under Section 33-A (I-A) of the said Act. 13. We may also notice that a circular letter issued by the State of West Bengal by Memorandum dated 28.8.1980 and 13.3.1996, which provide for regularization subject to fulfillment of certain conditions came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in SRI RANJIT KUMAR v STATE OF W.B. & ORS (WPST.NoS.362, 452 AND 453 of 1999) and in its judgment dated 29.9.2000, a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court noticing various decisions including RAJENDRA & ORS v STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS(3), RAMA DUTTA & ANR v STATE OF WEST BENGAL (4) SURAJ PARKASH GUPTA v STATE OF J & K(5) STATE OF ORISSA v SUKANTI MOHAPATRA(6) DR M.A.HAQUE v UNION OF INDIA(7) J & K PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION v DR NARINDER MOHAN(8) and various other decisions held: The word ‘appointment’ is of wide amplitude but it is immaterial in service jurisprudence whether a person engaged for a particular purpose is in law appointed or not. Service jurisprudence envisages an appointment by the State to be one which is done upon complying with the statutory rules or executive instructions having force of law laid down therefor. The circular letter issued by State which is not a statutory rule and the same has to be construed in the light of the provision contained in Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Back door appointment is not encouraged. Recruitment upon compliance of the provisions of the statutory rules would be in conformity with the underlying objects of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Clause (2) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India in no uncertain terms states that no citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect of, any employment or office under the State. Only in relation to certain matters like appointment of compassionate ground granted in favour of the widow, son or unmarried daughter has been held to be an exception to the aforementioned provision on the ground that the State being a welfare state should protect those who had become destitute by reason of sudden death of the bread-winners of the family. Furthermore, when a recruitment rule is framed in terms of the provision prohibited under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the same must strictly be complied with. Any appointment made in violation of such a ‘statutory duty rule would be void. See Dr. Meera Massey vs. Dr. S.R. Mehrotra reported in 1998(3) SCC 88 . If a person is engaged by Officer of the State through back door without following the procedures laid down for a recruitment in a Government service, the same cannot be encouraged. This aspect of the matter has been considered in State of U.P. & Ors vs. U.P. State Law Officers Assn. & Ors. reported in 1994(2) SCC 204 when the Apex Court held that those who come by back door must go by that door. The Courts of law dispensing justice cannot also shut its eyes as regard growing unemployment in the country. Those who are favoured few can get an entry in service through the handiwork of some officers either as an ad hoc employee or daily-rated employee and after sometime claim themselves to be entitled to a regular appointment. The Courts of law dispensing justice cannot also shut its eyes as regard growing unemployment in the country. Those who are favoured few can get an entry in service through the handiwork of some officers either as an ad hoc employee or daily-rated employee and after sometime claim themselves to be entitled to a regular appointment. It is now well recognized that recruitment to unwanted persons are given by some officers of the State are irrelevant and extraneous considerations including money consideration. 14. A Division bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.526 of 1999 disposed of on 25.1.2001 observed: It is a well settled principle of law that in terms of Article 16 of the Constitution of India, before any appointment is made by a State, all eligible candidates to hold such post, must be considered therefor. Article 16, which is an extension to the principle of equality, as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India is required to be read conjointly. It is also not in dispute that by appointing the appellant, all norms applicable for making appointments to public posts, was given a go by. The appellant was appointed as Lecturer on the basis of personal choice made by the afore-mentioned Prof. Kakarla Subba Rao. Neither any advertisement was issued nor any application was called for from the eligible candidates for filling up the vacancy, and thus excluding consideration of the cases of other eligible candidates, and to top it all, there did not exist any vacant post. It is not possible for this Court to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appointment of appellant at best can be said to be an irregular one, which may be directed to be to be regularized having regard to the doctrines of Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel. It is now a well settled principle of law that any appointment made in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of India or a statute or the rules framed thereunder, would be a nullity. The appellant has no right, far less, any legal right, to be appointed as Lecturer, and hold/continue to hold such post. No right can be conferred upon a person, who has gained entry through backdoor. The appellant has no right, far less, any legal right, to be appointed as Lecturer, and hold/continue to hold such post. No right can be conferred upon a person, who has gained entry through backdoor. In other words, before a person becomes legally entitled to hold/continue in a civil post, the appointment must be made in terms of the provisions of the Constitution as also the recruitment rules framed with regard thereto. 15. It also rejected the contentions that in such an event the doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel would be applicable holding: So far as the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the doctrines of Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel would apply, suffice it to point out that unless a person establishes a legal right in himself or pleads and proves violation of any statutory rules and the provisions of the Constitution of India, no justiciable right by applying the doctrines of Legitimate Expectation, accrues. It is also well settled that there cannot be any estoppel against a statute, far less the provisions of the Constitution of India. Before the doctrines of Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel can be given effect to, the Court must have sufficient materials before it to come to a definite conclusion that a promise had been made by a person competent therefor, and whereupon the appellant relied upon and changed his position. Such is not the position in the instant case. Admittedly, at a point of time, when the purported offer was made to the appellant, the Director did not have any authority to make such an offer in view of the fact that an advertisement for filling of the said post was issued, and in terms whereof the names of all eligible candidates were also called for from employment Exchange. The Director had the requisite knowledge that for the purpose of creation of post, approval of the Executive Committee as well as the Governing Council is necessary, which is reflected from the letter dated 16-9-1997 written by the Director to the appellant. Even the post of Clinical Assistant was to be filled up through a process of selection in terms of the advertisement issued in regard thereto. Even the post of Clinical Assistant was to be filled up through a process of selection in terms of the advertisement issued in regard thereto. As indicated previously, in the instant case, the appellant was appointed on the basis of private negotiations, which is alien and unknown in law, and that too even before the expiry of the last date for filing such applications by the eligible candidates. It is really surprising that an illegality committed by the State authority did not stop there, but went on till the appellant was invited to hold the post of Lecturer, which was neither in existence nor was sanctioned. 16. In view of the afore-mentioned authoritative pronouncements, we are of the opinion that the impugned order is unassailable. 17. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in the writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs. --X--