BHANWAR SINGH, J. ( 1 ) SRI Satish Kumar Shukla, erstwhile constable of Central Reserve Police Force, has filed this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India praying for a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order of his termination dated 27. 3. 1998. He has also sought for another writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to allow the petitioner to work and discharge his duties as constable in C. R. P. F. , R. T. C.-4, Hammama, srinagar. ( 2 ) THE factual matrix of this case is that the petitioner was appointed as constable of the Central reserve Police Force (C. R. P. F. ). After the prescribed process of selection and the final test of physical fitness, he joined his service on 1. 1. 1997 and completed nine months training very sincerely and honestly and during the said period of training, his record was absolutely satisfactory, unblemished and meritorious. However, just before the completion of his refresher training, his services were terminated vide order dated 27. 3. 1998, without any rhyme or reason. No opportunity of hearing had been afforded to him nor any prior show-cause notice was served upon him. In the termination order even no reason was assigned for his termination. In this way, the termination of the petitioner was wholly discriminatory, arbitrary and in clear violation of the mandates of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and since no inquiry was held as provided under Article 311 of the Constitution, his termination was illegal. ( 3 ) THE opposite parties filed the counter-affidavit of Mohinder Singh, the Additional Deputy inspector General of Police. Sri Singh asserted that after conducting the prescribed recruitment test and medical examination, the petitioner was appointed as constable (Recruitment-G. D.)Force No. 971400123) in Group Centre. Central Reserve Police Force, Lucknow, with effect from 1. 1. 1997. While entering service, he was required to fill up a verification roll for verification of character and antecedents which he obtained on 18. 1. 1997 but suppressed factual information regarding a criminal case pending against him. In verification roll, a warning had been clearly incorporated that suppression of any factual information would be a disqualification for employment under the Government. While entering service, he was required to fill up a verification roll for verification of character and antecedents which he obtained on 18. 1. 1997 but suppressed factual information regarding a criminal case pending against him. In verification roll, a warning had been clearly incorporated that suppression of any factual information would be a disqualification for employment under the Government. A complaint was received in the office of Sri Mohinder singh with the allegation that a Criminal Case No. 90 of 1994 registered at P. S. Dalmau, under sections 323, 324, 325, 504 and 506, I. P. C. was pending in a criminal court at Rae Bareilly. On inquiry through protracted correspondence with the authorities concerned, it was found that the trial of the petitioner in that case culminated in his acquittal on the basis of a compromise on 7. 11. 1997 but on 18. 1. 1997, i. e. , at the time of furnishing of verification roll, the petitioner suppressed this factual information. In spite of a clear warning, the petitioner did not disclose the fact of the criminal trial in Col. 12 of the verification roll and this deliberate suppression of factual information amounted to a serious misconduct on his part. The conditions of service of temporary Government servants are governed by the provisions of "central Civil Services (Temporary Services) Rules, 1965". As per the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs o. M. No. 39/14/56-Estt (A) dated 22. 6. 1956, reasons for termination should not be mentioned in the termination order and on account of this direction, the termination order was issued as a simpliciter. There was a provision for appeal to the Head of the Department under Rule 5 (2) (a)of C. C. S. (T. S.) Rules, 1965, but the petitioner did not exhaust this alternative remedy. In view of all these facts and circumstances and the provisions of the Rules, the petitioners present writ petition is not maintainable and, therefore, deserves to be dismissed. ( 4 ) I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record. ( 5 ) THERE is no denying of the fact that the petitioner filled up the verification roll and answered in negative the question regarding pendency of any criminal case against him. ( 4 ) I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perused the record. ( 5 ) THERE is no denying of the fact that the petitioner filled up the verification roll and answered in negative the question regarding pendency of any criminal case against him. However, he has asserted in his rejoinder-affidavit that he belongs to a rural area where less educated persons reside and it was because of the rural background and there being personal enmity between his family and the family of the qomplainant that a criminal case was registered against him. However, when the complainant realised his mistake, an amicable settlement was arrived at between the parties, on the basis of which the petitioner was acquitted. He being hailing from rural area was not aware of any consequence of his ignorance. Since he considered that his involvement in the criminal case had been fabricated by his opponents on account of the family feud, the said information could not be got entered in the relevant column. Had an inquiry been ordered by the disciplinary authorities, the real facts would have come before them and as such, the respondents could not have passed the impugned order. These averments of the petitioner were not under the consideration of the opposite parties before he was sacked ; it was different that the respondents would have even arrived at the same conclusion. What is significant to note is that the petitioner has not been given an opportunity to explain his conduct about filling up the application form. As a matter of fact, a show cause notice should have been served upon him soliciting his explanation as to why he had not furnished the correct information. Learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that no useful purpose would have been served by serving the petitioner with a notice, as he could not have even justified the wrong information he submitted. In support of his argument, he has referred to the citation Anjula v. Joint Director of education, Saharanpur and others, (1999) 2 UPLBEC 869 . The principle of law laid down in the said case is not attracted to the case of the petitioner in hand. In support of his argument, he has referred to the citation Anjula v. Joint Director of education, Saharanpur and others, (1999) 2 UPLBEC 869 . The principle of law laid down in the said case is not attracted to the case of the petitioner in hand. Smt. Anjula of the aforesaid case was appointed on the post of lecturer In civics although she did not possess the requisite qualification of being M. A. in Civics which was the standard qualification for the said post. It was on the ground of the said lecturer being not possessed of the requisite qualification that this court had ruled that even if an opportunity had been granted, she would not have fulfilled the criteria of the requisite qualification. The said citation is, therefore, not applicable here as the issue of qualification is not involved in the present case. ( 6 ) LEARNED standing counsel then referred to the citation of the Honble Supreme Court as in 1997 (2) ESC 924 (SC ). In that case, the appellant was recruited as a Nursing Assistant/m. E. R. (Tech.) in the Army Medical College. After the selection, he was required to fill up enrolment form in which he while replying to a question regarding pendency of any civil or criminal case against him, concealed the correct information. Whereas he was facing a criminal case, he answered the question in negative. The facts of the said case obviously seem to be similar to that of the present case but since different Rules are applicable in both the cases, they have to be scrutinised on different footings. One distinctive feature between the two is that the respondents of the aforesaid case when came to learn about the pendency of a criminal case against the appellant, served the latter with a show cause notice and asked him to submit a reply as to why he should not be discharged from service on account of having furnished a false answer. After considering the appellants reply, the appellant was discharged from service under Rule 13 (3) (iv) of the Army Rules, as his services were no longer required. Obviously thus the formalities required to complete the procedure to either discharge or terminate a Government employee from service were complete in that case but it was not so in the case of the petitioner before this court. Obviously thus the formalities required to complete the procedure to either discharge or terminate a Government employee from service were complete in that case but it was not so in the case of the petitioner before this court. He was neither served with a show cause notice nor any opportunity of hearing was extended to him. He was taken by surprise with the impugned termination notice. Had the said procedure been adopted, the principle of law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court would have been clearly applicable and the petitioner would have hardly any chance in that event to succeed in his mission but since the inherent defect of there being no a show cause notice or an opportunity of hearing subsists, as observed earlier, the principle of law laid down by the honble Supreme Court is not squarely attracted. Moreover, the Army Rules are not applicable to the petitioner, instead the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965, have been relied upon by the opposite parties and the impugned termination order has been passed under sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of the said Rules. The termination notice does not refer to any show cause notice, which would have been served earlier. He was at the verge of having completed his refresher training and resume his service. It would certainly have been in the fitness of affairs if the petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing by serving upon him a show cause notice. He was said to have furnished a wrong information about the pendency of the criminal case in the application form which he got filled up before he appeared in the interview. In the application form. there was a warning that furnishing of a wrong information could disqualify the applicant. In view of the provision of the said warning the petitioner deserved to be disqualified but again and again the same question would arise as to why he was not asked to submit his reply explaining the circumstances under which he had not furnished the correct information. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has, in support of his contention, placed reliance upon the honble Supreme Courts decision in Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu University and Ors, AIR 1998 SC 3261 . ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner has, in support of his contention, placed reliance upon the honble Supreme Courts decision in Basudeo Tiwary v. Sido Kanhu University and Ors, AIR 1998 SC 3261 . Although the facts of that case were different from the one in hand, yet the guiding principle that before terminating the service of the appellant, it was necessary to record a finding that the appellants appointment was not in consonance with the Rules, would come to the rescue of the petitioner. The warning recorded at the outset of the application form which the petitioner before this Court was required to fill up could disqualify him if he had furnished a wrong information. The opposite parties were competent to take a decision on the basis of a finding that the petitioner disqualified himself by concealing a fact pertaining to a criminal case pending against him but the opposite parties did not record any such finding nor served the petitioner of any such finding ; meaning thereby that the petitioner was not declared to be disqualified by virtue of an order which could be passed by a competent authority. ( 8 ) MOREOVER, it being an omission about furnishing the requisite information was not an Inherent disqualification, as the case was before this Court in the citation Anjula v. Joint Director of education, Saharanpur and Ors, (1999) 2 UPLBEC 869 (supra ). There is distinction between omission and commission of acts and wrongs. In the commission of an act, the extent of gravity lies more as compared to the omission. Mere omission cannot be termed to be an Inherent disqualification and further more, use of power on the basis of disqualification unless of course it is inherent, can be made either before a particular point of time or within a reasonable period therefrom. For example, in the case in hand, the disqualification based on omission could be acted upon before the petitioner resumed his training or within a reasonable period therefrom. Once he was established in service, omission based on disqualification could not have operated as an obstacle in further march of his career, particularly when the omission did not involve moral turpitude. ( 9 ) FURTHER, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a decision of Punjab and Haryana High court in B. Venugopal Reddy v. Union of India and Ors, 1991 (1) SLR 222. ( 9 ) FURTHER, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a decision of Punjab and Haryana High court in B. Venugopal Reddy v. Union of India and Ors, 1991 (1) SLR 222. This decision seems to be exactly on the same facts as have been pleaded by the parties before this Court. In that case, the appellant was appointed as constable in the Central Reserved Police Force. After he was posted in 29 Battalion, C. R. P. F. , Fatehabad, Punjab, his services were terminated as he had suppressed the factual position regarding his involvement in a criminal case prior to his recruitment in the C. R. P. F. The criminal case was about causing hurt in a dispute to a neighbour, which did not Involve moral turpitude on the part of the petitioner. The Punjab and Haryana high Court arrived at a conclusion that since the appellant of that case was not involved in a case of moral turpitude and further since he had not been convicted of any criminal offence on the date of his recruitment, he was under no obligation to narrate all these facts and his omission to do so does not amount to suppression or concealment of any material particulars. The relevant part of the said judgment may be quoted as below : "we have gone through the aforesaid judgment and find that firstly, the offence was under section 324/34, Indian Penal Code, that is, causing hurt in a dispute among neighbours, which did not involve moral turpitude on the part of the petitioner, and secondly, when the petitioner was recruited, he had not been convicted of any criminal offence by any Court. Only the criminal case stood registered against him and its trial had not even commenced. Therefore, there was no legal obligation on the part of the petitioner to narrate all these facts and his omission to do so does not amount to suppression or concealment of any material particulars at the time of his recruitment to service. Moreover, the learned Judicial Magistrate has found the petitioner not guilty of the offence and he was fully exonerated. Therefore, there was no stigma whatsoever on the past career of the petitioner, much less indelible, disqualifying him for Government service. " ( 10 ) EXACTLY similar are the facts of the present case before this Court. Moreover, the learned Judicial Magistrate has found the petitioner not guilty of the offence and he was fully exonerated. Therefore, there was no stigma whatsoever on the past career of the petitioner, much less indelible, disqualifying him for Government service. " ( 10 ) EXACTLY similar are the facts of the present case before this Court. A criminal complaint had been filed against the petitioner by his neighbour under Section 323/324/ 325/504/506, I. P. C. It was a simple case of marpit between the two neighbours and as stated by the petitioner, the complainant being Inimical to his family roped in his family members with a view to wreck vengeance and when he realised his mistake, he compromised with the petitioner and other accused persons. The petitioner was acquitted on the basis of the said compromise. Obviously, he was not an accused of the moral turpitude nor was he convicted before he joined his service. As talks regarding compromise might be in the offing, the petitioner would not have considered appropriate to mention it in the application form. He would not have been alive of the warning regarding disqualification about his eligibility mentioned in the beginning of the application form. As observed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the decision quoted above, he may not have thought it just and proper to furnish correct information. Further, the petitioner could have apprehended that probability of his selection would have been marred with the furnishing of the said information. In these hard days of unemployment under which the masses of young people in our society are reeling in, the petitioners apprehension may, to some extent, be justified but certainly the Court of Law cannot approve of wilful and deliberate concealment of a factual information. However, if asked for, the petitioner could narrate the circumstances and the opposite parties might have taken a different decision looking into the entire facts and circumstances of the case. In the chaotic conditions prevailing in our society, very often false and frivolous complaints are filed by some unscrupulous persons against their opponents and possibility of the same situation being there in the case of the petitioner and his neighbour cannot be ruled out. In the chaotic conditions prevailing in our society, very often false and frivolous complaints are filed by some unscrupulous persons against their opponents and possibility of the same situation being there in the case of the petitioner and his neighbour cannot be ruled out. Keeping all these aspects of the matter in view, it may be observed that the impugned order terminating the petitioners services without serving a show cause notice and giving him an opportunity of hearing cannot be justified. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY this writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed, The impugned termination order (Annexure-1) is quashed. A writ of certiorari is issued to this effect. The petitioner will be reinstated in service without arrears of salary but the period of absence will be reckoned for continuity. ( 12 ) THERE would be no order as to costs.