JUDGMENT D. K. Seth, J.: In this writ petition notices contained in annexure "P-7" to the writ application issued on 1st of August, 2001 and 10th of August, 2001 convening a meeting on 24th of August, 2001 for holding hearing of the application seeking permission to close down Mining & Allied Machinery Corporation Ltd., Durgapur, has since been challenged. 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. Mazumdar submits that in the present case, in the proceeding the Central Government, being the appropriate Government, had delegated its power under section 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act") to the State Government and, therefore, the State Government is the appropriate authority or Government before whom the application under section 25-O could be made. The proposal to close down is to be preceded by an Administrative Order, but it having not been done so, the proposal is non-est and a nullity and no hearing could be held even on it. He further contends that in view of the provisions contained in section 25-O of the said Act if no permission is granted within sixty days from the date of making the application, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted. Therefore, this will bring an anomalous situation if such a situation is brought about. Inasmuch as a reference has already been referred to the Tribunal by the State Government pursuant to the delegation under section 39 of the said Act with regard to the validity of the proposal for closure which is pending adjudication. If section 25-O of the said Act takes effect by default in that event reference would become infructuous. He relied in support of his contention, on several decisions to which reference would be made at appropriate stage. 3. Mr. Jayanta Mitra, learned Counsel, representing State, supported Mr. Mazumdar and adopted his submission and contended that before the B.I.F.R. the Central Government had taken a stand that it is not in a mood to assist revival of the company. Therefore, it has already made up its mind and had taken a decision. Therefore, the hearing is an empty formality and the Central Government would be a Judge in its own cause, as is apparent from the stand taken before the B.I.F.R. by the Central Government. Therefore, it has already made up its mind and had taken a decision. Therefore, the hearing is an empty formality and the Central Government would be a Judge in its own cause, as is apparent from the stand taken before the B.I.F.R. by the Central Government. Therefore, in the fitness of things, though according to him, the delegation creates parallel authority, the application under section 25-O should be dealt with by the State Government and not by the Central Government. He then contends that it is open to the petitioners to approach A.I.F.R. against the order passed by B.I.F.R. but some breathing time is necessary. If in the meantime the decision to close down is taken, in that event, the approach to A.I.F.R. would be infructuous. He also addressed the Court on the practical consequences that will ensue in the situation, to which the Court, according to him, should be alive. 4. The learned Counsel for the respondent company, on the other hand, contends that in view of the decision of this Court in R.I.C. Workers & Employees Union vs. Union of India, W.P.No. 128 of 2001, disposed of on 31st July, 2001 by this Court, this questions are no more open and are already decided. The assurance given by the State Government, as pointed out by Mr. Jayanta Mitra, having reference to the order passed by B.I.F.R., is an offer made too late after allowing the company to suffer all these debacles over a long period. The State Government had approached at a point time when the revival is a remote possibility. Be that as it may, so long there is an order by B.I.F.R. and no appeal having been preferred to A.I.F.R., these questions are out of place. 5. I have heard the respective Counsel at length. 6. So far as the question with regard to the jurisdiction of the Central Government as appropriate Government to consider the proposal for closure under section 25-O of the said Act is concerned, having regard to the delegation under section 39 of the said Act, is no more a res integra by reason of the decision in R.I.C. Workers & Employees Union (supra) where all these questions which have been advanced by Mr. Mazumdar were gone into and decided. Mr. Mazumdar were gone into and decided. Mr. Mazumdar had referred to certain decisions in order to contend that the said decision in R.I.C. Workers & Employees Union (supra) was rendered without considering the decisions in Raj Kumar Gupta vs. Lieutenant Governor, Delhi and Ors., 1997(1) L.L.J. 994 and Youan, India Cement Employees Union & Anr. vs. Mgt. of India Cements Ltd. & Ors., 1994(1) L.L.J. 920 . Therefore the said decision in R.I.C. Workers & Employees Union (supra) needs reconsideration. 7. In Raj Kumar Gupta (supra) the question involved was as to whether a person authorised under section 39 of the said Act could lodge a complaint under section 34 of the said Act or not. In the said decision it was held that unless the powers under section 34 of the said Act is delegated under section 39, a person authorised by the delegateor cannot lodge such complaint. This decision was not called upon to decide the question of delegation, as is involved in the present case, where all the powers exercisable under the Industrial Disputes Act have since been delegated also to the State Government on condition that whenever it may deem fit and proper, the delegation may also exercise such power. The effect of such delegation was dealt with in R.I.C. Workers & Employees Union (supra) which need no repetition. Therefore, the decision in Raj Kumar Gupta does not throw any light on the question as raised by Mr. Majumdar. Therefore, non-consideration of the said decision does not affect the decision in RIC. Workers & Employees Union (supra). 8. The decision in Youan, India Cements Employees Union & Anr. (supra), on the other hand, supports the view that I have taken in RIC. Workers & Employees Union (supra). Inasmuch as the said decision was also based on a delegation under section 39 which used identical expression as was used in the delegation involved in RIC. Workers & Employees Union (supra). Having regard to such delegation it was observed in Yovan, India Cements Employees Union & Anr.(supra) that both the Central Government and the State Government are appropriate Government under the Act in view of the delegation under section 39 as referred to therein. Thus these two decisions do not provide any basis for reconsideration of the decision in RIC. Workers & Employees Union (supra). 9. In order to support the other contention raised by Mr. Thus these two decisions do not provide any basis for reconsideration of the decision in RIC. Workers & Employees Union (supra). 9. In order to support the other contention raised by Mr. Mazumdar, he had relied upon a decision in the case of State of Haryana and Anr. vs. Hitkari Potteries Ltd. & Anr., 2001(2) L.L.J. 425 . In the said decision it was held that if an application is made under section 25-O of the said Act, in that event by reason of sub-section(3) thereof on the expiry of 60 days, the permission shall be deemed to have been granted if the application is not disposed of within the said period. But this question is not relevant for our present purpose since it is only a notice of hearing on the application under section 25-O. Therefore, the question that has been sought to be raised by Mr. Mazumdar appears to be premature. The Central Government mayor may not grant permission. This Court is not supposed to presume any state of affairs at this stage. It is only a question as to whether such an application is maintainable before the Central Government, which is under consideration. This question will follow the ratio decided in R.I.C. Workers & Employees Union (supra). 10. Mr. Mazumdar had also relied on a decision in Dayakar Reddy vs. Md. Allwyn Auto Ltd. and Ors., (2000)9 SCC 247 . But this decision is also not relevant for our present purpose for the same reason with which the decision in Hitkari Potteries Ltd., (supra) is dealt with. 11. It appears from Annexure "P-7" that it was at the stage of notice of hearing. Mr. Mazumdar had contended that in case they participate in the proceedings, in that event, they will be prejudiced with regard to their contentions in the pending reference since been referred to by the State Government pursuant to the delegation with regard to proposal for closure, where they will be taking the ground that appropriate Government is the State Government and not the Central Government. In view of the decision in R.I.C. Workers Employees Union (supra) as well as the other decisions in Yovan, India Cements Employees Union & Anr, (supra), this question will not pose any prejudice to the petitioners. This question will still remain open to the petitioners. In view of the decision in R.I.C. Workers Employees Union (supra) as well as the other decisions in Yovan, India Cements Employees Union & Anr, (supra), this question will not pose any prejudice to the petitioners. This question will still remain open to the petitioners. No doubt, by reason of the delegation the State Government is also the appropriate Government to make the reference and such the competence of the State Government, as appropriate Government, to make the reference, cannot be questioned. 12. In any event, the participation of the petitioners pursuant to the notice contained in annexure "P-7" to the writ application will not prejudice the petitioners or the State Government in respect of their contentions before the Tribunal on the question of reference as well as before the A.I.F.R., as the case may be. All such points shall remain open to the parties to be adjudicated before the appropriate forum, as the case may be. 13.The contention that if the closure takes effect, then it will brought a finality to the situation, is not a question for this Court to be answered at this stage, when it is only a notice to consider a proposal which is an administrative one. The decision thereon would be a quasi judicial decision which will take into account all relevant factors that might be placed before it. It will be open to the petitioner to agitate all matters/factors it may deem fit and proper before the Central Government pursuant to the notice contained in annexure "P7" to the writ application and the Central Government is expected to consider appeal with the same in accordance with law in exercise of its quasi-judicial function having regard to all factors without being influenced by any stand it might have taken before the B.I.F.R. or elsewhere and may also take note of the statements that might have been made in the Parliament on behalf of the Ministry of Industries, of which reference was made by Mr. Mazumdar being annexure "P" to this petition. 14. So far as the contention of Mr. Mitra is concerned, the Court might have sympathy for the applicant with regard to the consequence apprehended to ensue, but the Court being a creature of Statute, cannot travel beyond the law. Neither it can create law nor it can act in excess of law. It has to act within the jurisdiction conferred on it. Mitra is concerned, the Court might have sympathy for the applicant with regard to the consequence apprehended to ensue, but the Court being a creature of Statute, cannot travel beyond the law. Neither it can create law nor it can act in excess of law. It has to act within the jurisdiction conferred on it. The question that was raised by Mr. Mitra is that while considering the question of granting permission for closure, the Central Government, according to Mr. Mitra, appears to be predetermined and is a Judge in its own cause, in view of the stand taken by it before the B.I.F.R. But this question finds an answer in the decision by the Apex Court in Dayakar Reddy (supra), where such a question have been raised. The Apex Court had observed as follows: " It was contended by Mr. P.S. Mishra, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that in this case the State had suggested that the Company should be closed down and it was the same State which then decided under section 25-O to grant permission for closure. In a case where the company is a State Government Undertaking, such a situation may arise. It has to take an administrative decision first and then a quasi judicial decision under section 25-O. What we find is that while exercising its power under section 25-O it did follow the proper procedure and consider all the relevant aspects. It is not possible to find any fault with the decision of the State Government. Moreover, by the time the Government took the decision out of 1800 workers, 1200 workers had shown their willingness to accept the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. G.O. dated 16-6-97 clearly disclosed the reasons why the Company had become unable and why it was not able to carry on its activities any further. The reasons appear to be genuine and adequate and therefore, the Government was justified in granting permission for closure of the Company. The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed." 15. So far as the decision to hear, the proposal is an administrative decision and the statements made before the B.I.F.R. are also administrative decision. Administrative decision or stand is altogether different from quasi judicial decision. While considering the said proposal, the Government has to discharge its quasi-judicial function when it is expected to exercise its discretion judiciously. So far as the decision to hear, the proposal is an administrative decision and the statements made before the B.I.F.R. are also administrative decision. Administrative decision or stand is altogether different from quasi judicial decision. While considering the said proposal, the Government has to discharge its quasi-judicial function when it is expected to exercise its discretion judiciously. Such an apprehension cannot be presumed particularly in view of the fact that the delegation had created parallel authority, as was held in R.I.C. Workers & Employees Union (supra). 16. Mr. Mitra supported by Mr. Majumdar had prayed that the proceedings under section 25-0 be directed to be dealt with by the State Government as an appropriate Government by reason of the delegation since they have apprehension against the Central Government. 17. The prayer for demanding the jurisdiction of Central Government and conferring the same on the State Government cannot be entertained in view of the fact that both Central and State Government having parallel jurisdiction, the Court cannot take away such jurisdiction. It was alternatively prayed by him that if this court is not inclined to do so then the proceedings under section 25-O be stayed in order to give some breathing time. It will be open to him to make such submission before the Central Government in the hearing or it may also approach A.I.F.R. and obtain appropriate order with regard to the stay or such other decision. It may also approach through some other source in view of the reference made to the speech made in the Parliament Contained in Annexure-P to this writ petition through which it can achieve its purpose. 18. The Court, being a creature of Statute, it can neither exceed its jurisdiction nor stretch the law nor bend the law, so much so to help the petitioners to the extent Mr. Mitra and Mr. Majumdar had suggested. It would be stretching the law too far. 19. Mr. Gorai, learned Counsel for the Union of India, had also pointed out that there is no apprehension on the part of the petitioner with regard to the stand taken by the Central Government. That will not affect its function which it has to perform judiciously in discharge of its quasi-judicial exercise of power. 20. For all these reasons, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. 21. That will not affect its function which it has to perform judiciously in discharge of its quasi-judicial exercise of power. 20. For all these reasons, the writ petition fails and is, accordingly, dismissed. 21. However, this order will not prevent the authority concerned to take into consideration all the factors as are advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties in this case as well as that might be placed before the authority concerned in course of hearing. 22. There will be no order as to costs. 23. Let xerox plain copies of this order, duly countersigned by the Assistant Registrar (Court) be made available to the parties upon their undertaking to apply for and obtain certified copy thereof on payment of usual charges. Writ Petition dismissed.