DEBIPRASAD SEENGUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THE present revisional application has been filed along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay. So the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is taken up first for disposal in presence of the learned Advocates of the respective parties. ( 2 ) IT appears that the present O. P. No. 2 who was a Sub-Assistant Engineer, was made accused in Kalyani P. S. Case No. 21/99 dated 1. 3. 99 under Sections 468/469/471/420/120-8, I. P. C. Allegation in the F. I. R. was that the present O. P. No. 2 taking advantage of his position as Sub-Assistant Engineer of Kalyani Municipality entered into a criminal conspiracy with his wife Chandana Chatterjee and committed forgery, cheating and preparation of false documents. ( 3 ) ON completion of investigation a charge-sheet was submitted by the police on 14. 2. 2000 against the accused Chandana Chatterjee under Section 468/469/471/474/420/120b of the Indian Penal Code. The investigating agency recommended discharge of the accused opposite party No. 2 Sambhunath Chatterjee on the ground that there was no direct evidence against the said accused. ( 4 ) THE aforesaid charge-sheet was submitted before the Court of learned S. D. J. M. , Kalyani on 3. 3. 2000 and on the same day the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence in respect of accused Chandana Chatterjee and discharged the accused Sambhunath Chatterjee, i. e. , the present O. P. No. 2. But, such order of discharge was passed without giving any opportunity of hearing to the present petitioner who is the de facto complainant in the present case. ( 5 ) THE present petitioner being the de facto complainant thereafter filed an application in the form of a Naraji petition on 5. 4. 2000 with a prayer for taking cognizance of offence against the accused Shambunath Chatterjee (present O. P. No. 2 ). The learned Magistrate by the impugned order dated 5. 4. 2000 rejected such petition only on the ground that since the cognizance of offence was taken and accused O. P. No. 2 was discharged by the learned S. D. J. M-in-Charge by his order dated 3. 3. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order dated 5. 4. 2000 rejected such petition only on the ground that since the cognizance of offence was taken and accused O. P. No. 2 was discharged by the learned S. D. J. M-in-Charge by his order dated 3. 3. 2000, the learned S. D. J. M. being on the same chair had no jurisdiction to alter, modify or set aside the said order of discharge by entertaining a Naraji petition filed by the de facto complainant. Challenging such order dated 5. 4. 2000 passed by the learned S. D. J. M. , Kalyani the present revisional application has been preferred in this Court with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. ( 6 ) MR. Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that in the present case the impugned order was passed on 5. 4. 2000. Certified copy of the said order was applied for on 6. 4. 2000, which was obtained on 17. 4. 2000. The learned Advocate of the petitioner further submits that being the Chairman of the Municipality the petitioner could not contract his lawyer due to forthcoming Municipal election which was held on 28th May, 2000. Apart from this, due to summer vacation this Court was closed for a period of two weeks from 22. 5. 2000 to 5. 6. 2000. Mr. Gupta, learned Advocate points out that being the Chairman of the Kalyani Municipality the petitioner was reelected as the New Chairman of the Board and he assumed his charge as the Chairman on 27th June, 2000. The learned Advocate further submits that the relevant papers along with the certified copy of the impugned order was handed over to the learned Advocate for setting the instant petition. But, unfortunately during the 2nd week of July, 2000 the certified copy of the impugned order dated 5. 4. 2000 which was necessary to accompany the instant application was misplaced from chamber of the learned lawyer. Such certified copy was subsequently found out on 29th July. 2000. Thereafter, the present revisional application was filed in this Court along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. 2000 which was necessary to accompany the instant application was misplaced from chamber of the learned lawyer. Such certified copy was subsequently found out on 29th July. 2000. Thereafter, the present revisional application was filed in this Court along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Although in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act it is stated that there has been a delay of 45 days, the learned Advocate by filing a supplementary affidavit points out that actually there is a delay of only 23 days. ( 7 ) MR. Gupta, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner relies on a judgment of the Honble Apex Court reported in Collector. Land Acquisition. Anantnag v. Mst. Katfji. Relying upon the said judgment the learned Advocate submits that the Court should be liberal in condoning the delay. The learned Counsel laid emphasis on the six factors recited in the said decision. The six factors are as follows:1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. Every dayts delay must be explainedt does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hourts delay, every seconds delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted, against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay, In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do 'i Relying upon the aforesaid judgment Mr. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay, In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do 'i Relying upon the aforesaid judgment Mr. Gupta submits that if the delay of 23 days is not condoned, it would result in injustice and would cause serious prejudice to the petitioner who is the de facto complainant of the case. ( 8 ) MR. Sekhar Basu, learned Advocate appearing for the accused opposite Party No. 2 submits that the delay has not been properly explained by the petitioner in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Mr. Bose submits that the question whether the delay is for a short period or a long period is immaterial. The only thing which is to be decided by this Court is whether the delay has been properly explained or not. If sufficient cause is shown a long delay can be condoned and if no cause is shown even a delay for a short period may not be condoned. ( 9 ) IN support of his contention Mr. Basu relies on ajudgment reported in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat. On a perusal of the said judgment it appears that before the Honble Apex Court it was urged that the High Court erred in condoning the delay in filing the appeal and it should have dismissed the appeal as barred by Limitation. It was held by the Honble Apex Court as follows: The truth appears to be that the appeal was not filed at first because the State Government saw no case on the merits for an appeal, and it was filed only because the High Court had observed, and that was long after limitation had expired, that the case was fit for appeal by the State Government. Now, it is true that a party is entitled to wait, until the last day bf limitation for filing an appeal. But, when It allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. But, when It allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may by events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But, that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. In the present case, there was no such cause, and the High Court erred in condoning the delay. ' ( 10 ) I have carefully gone through the judgment referred to above. From a reading of the said judgment it becomes evident that no just and sufficient cause could be shown before the Honble Apex Court justifying the delay in preferring the appeal before the High Court. The only explanation given was that the appeal could not be filed in time as the State Govt. was of the view that this was not a fit case for preferring appeal, and such appeal was filed after the expiry of the period of limitation only when the High Court had observed that this was a fit case in which the State Government should have preferred an appeal. Thereafter, the appeal was filed three months after the limitation had expired. The Honble Apex Court was of the view that the High Court erred in condoning the delay after accepting such an explanation. In my considered view the said judgment was delivered by the Honble Apex Court in the facts and circumstances of that particular case, which is completely different from the present one. The words 11sufficient cause11 is a question of fact. So, the question whether the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be allowed or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 11 ) THE next judgment relied upon by Mr. Basu is reported in Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Lal and Others. The words 11sufficient cause11 is a question of fact. So, the question whether the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is to be allowed or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 11 ) THE next judgment relied upon by Mr. Basu is reported in Lachhman Das Arora v. Ganeshi Lal and Others. I have gone through the said judgment and it appears that the only question which arose for consideration is whether Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 can apply in a case where the prescribed period of Limitation expires during the vacation of the High Court. The proviso to Section 10 makes the provision of Section 10 inapplicable to cases where the Indian Limitation Act applies and since Indian Limitation Act does not apply to election petitions filed under the Act, Section 10 of the General Clauses Act would apply to the filing of election petitions also. Considering the facts arid circumstances it was held by the Honble Apex Court that the High Court was justified in holding that the benefit of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act was not available to the election petitioner to save the period of limitation as the election petition was filed on reopening day of High Court after summer vacation, but after the expiry of the period of 45 days prescribed under Section 81 (1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, While delivering the said judgment it was held by the Honble Apex Court as follows: (Quoted from the Head Note): There is no quarrel with the proposition that it is the duty of the Courts to maintain the purity of election process but at the same time there is no gain saying that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party, but it has to be applied with all its vigour when the statute so prescribes, The Courts cannot extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds more particularly in the matter of filing of election petitions under the Act. ( 12 ) MR. Bose next relies on a judgment (Full Bench) of Gujarat High Court reported in Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Voltas Ltd. In the said. ( 12 ) MR. Bose next relies on a judgment (Full Bench) of Gujarat High Court reported in Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Voltas Ltd. In the said. Full Bench decision of Gujarat High Court the Majority view was as follows : (Quoted from Head Note (A) of the judgment): The phrase sufficient cause as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act pertains to the establishment of the appropriate facts before the Court to which the Court can apply its mind and arrive at a conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the cause or otherwise. In essence, therefore, the phrase sufficient cause is not a question of principle, but is question of fact. Hence, whether to condone the delay or not depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case as Tsufficient cause for condonation of delay depends only on the facts placed by the applicants before the Court. The principle in law only is that the Courts are required to take a liberal view while considering the facts constituting the sufficiency of the cause on the basis of which condonation of delay is sought. This does not necessarily amount to saying that all applications for condonation must be granted. This is necessarily within the discretionary jurisdiction of the Court, and the Court deciding the application for condonation would necessarily exercise its discretion judicially in the light of the well established principles as regards the appreciation of the relevant facts. ( 13 ) HOWEVER in the said judgment it was held by the Honble Justice H. L. Gokhale, differing from the majority view, as follows: For the reasons stated above. I beg to differ with my brothers. M. B. Shah, J. and Y. B. Bhatt, J. and answer the two issues framed in Paragraph 4 of this judgment as follows (a) Small delays in the filing of appeals and applications by public bodies should be generally condoned. (b) While considering an application for condonation of delay filed by a public body, the merits of the main matter should also be considered as a predominant factor. ' ( 14 ) I have heard the learned Advocates of the respective parties. I have also carefully gone through the judgments referred to above. (b) While considering an application for condonation of delay filed by a public body, the merits of the main matter should also be considered as a predominant factor. ' ( 14 ) I have heard the learned Advocates of the respective parties. I have also carefully gone through the judgments referred to above. The ratio of all those judgments is that taking a liberal view does not necessarily mean that all the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are to be allowed. To decide an application is necessarily within the discretionary jurisdiction of the Court and the Court should, exercise its discretion judicially to arrive at a finding regarding the sufficiency of cause. The words sufficient cause is a question of fact and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. ( 15 ) NOW, in the facts and circumstances of the present case it appears that the last date of filing the revisional application, against the order dated 5. 4. 2000 passed by the learned Magistrate, was on 16th July. 2000. Sufficient reason has been given in the present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act explaining the circumstances in which the revisional application could not be filed within the period of limitation. It has also been explained why after the period of limitation it could not be filed till 1st August, 2000. The reasons given by the petitioner is in my view, quite probable and the same should be accepted. ( 16 ) IN view of the discussion made above I am of the opinion that the explanation given by the petitioner in the present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is quite satisfactory and convincing. Accordingly the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed and the delay as aforesaid is hereby condoned. Let the revisional application be now placed for hearing in the next week. Application for delays condonation allowed.