ORDER D.K. Seth, J.: By consent of the parties let this application be treated as on the day's list along with the execution application which is in the list. 2. After hearing the respective parties, it appears that an appeal is pending. But the fact remains that there is no order of stay restraining the execution. In the circumstances it is alleged that there is a fraud on the part of the decree holder in obtaining the decree. Mr. Jayanta Mitra, learned Senior Advocate, has vehemently opposed the execution of the decree and pointed out that even under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure the question of fraud can be alleged so as to contend that the decree is not executable as against the judgment debtor. I am afraid that such a question can be gone into by this Court in view of the pendency of the appeal where such a question has been raised, pursuant to which permission was granted to adduce additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 26 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The said appeal is pending where all these questions would be gone into. The executing court is not supposed to enter into such question. 3. A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree. It must take the decree according to its tenor and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts as between the parties or their representatives, as was held in Basudev vs. Rajabhai, AIR 1970 SC 1475 . It cannot go into the question whether the decree was obtained by fraud as was laid down in the decisions in Viswamvar vs. Aparnar, 39 CWN 490 FB; Dattatraya vs. Purshattam, ILR 46 Bombay 635 FB; Sudhindra vs. Budan, ILR 9 Madras 80; Dhaniram vs. Luchmeswar, ILR 23 Calcutta 639. The executing Court has to have the decree as it stands. It cannot question its legality or correctness or validity. It was so held in Kalipada vs. Hari, ILR 44 Calcutta 627; Kali vs. Bibhuti, 36 CWN 1120; Tripati vs. Bisweswar, 55 CLJ 114; Lakshmi Bai vs. Ravji, AIR 1929 Bombay 217; Muttiar vs.Virammal, ILR 10 Madras 283; Jat.. The executing Court has to have the decree as it stands. It cannot question its legality or correctness or validity. It was so held in Kalipada vs. Hari, ILR 44 Calcutta 627; Kali vs. Bibhuti, 36 CWN 1120; Tripati vs. Bisweswar, 55 CLJ 114; Lakshmi Bai vs. Ravji, AIR 1929 Bombay 217; Muttiar vs.Virammal, ILR 10 Madras 283; Jat.. vs. Ambika AIR 1946 Patna 214; Revur vs. Jurijala, AIR 1948 Madras 397; Bank of Bihar Ltd. vs. Sarangdhar, AIR 75 Indian Appeal 300 : AIR 1949 PC 8; Kuver Bank Ltd. vs. S, 63 CWN 21; Topanmal vs. Kundamal, AIR 1960 SC 388 . The only exception that applies to the executing Court is that it has a duty to find out the true effect if the decree. It has to find out the meaning of the words employed in a decree, the Court often has to ascertain the circumstances under which the words came to be used, as was held in Bhavan vs. Solanki, AIR 1972 SC 1371 . The other exception as laid down by the Privy Council decision in 1933, which is now a settled law, is that the Executing Court can look into the question as to whether the decree passed by a Court without inherent jurisdiction and is incapable of execution (Jnanendra vs. Rabindra, AIR 1933 PC 61). Same has been declared as law by the Supreme Court. It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings (Kiran vs. Chamen, AIR 1954 SC 340 ). The Executing Court is competent to enquire whether the Court which had passed the decree had or had not inherent jurisdiction to pass it (Abdul Ghani vs. Anjuman, AIR 1942 Lahore 237). There is no doubt that if a decree in execution is shown to be a nullity the Executing Court can refuse to execute it (Bombay Gas Company vs. Gopal, AIR 1964 SC 752 , 755; Basudev vs. Rajabhai, AIR 1970 SC 1475 ; Chandrika vs. Bhaiyalal, AIR 1973 SC 2391 ). There is no doubt that if a decree in execution is shown to be a nullity the Executing Court can refuse to execute it (Bombay Gas Company vs. Gopal, AIR 1964 SC 752 , 755; Basudev vs. Rajabhai, AIR 1970 SC 1475 ; Chandrika vs. Bhaiyalal, AIR 1973 SC 2391 ). However nullity on the ground of lack of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court passing the decree cannot be entertained by the Executing Court in view of sections 21 and 93 - C.P.C. and section 11 of Suits Valuation Act. The validity of a decree can be challenged in execution only on the ground rendering the Court entirely lacking in inherent jurisdiction: (i) in respect of subject matter of the suit namely when it could not be in cessin of the case the subject matter being wholely foreign to its jurisdiction, or (ii) over the parties to it namely the defendant was dead at the time the suit had been instituted or decree passed, without bringing the legal representative on record, or a decree against an alleged minor, who was really major at the time, or when a personal decree is passed against the legal representative of deceased debtor. As provided in section 47 an objection to execution with regard to nullity of a decree is available to the extent as indicated above namely that the decree was passed without jurisdiction. In Basudeva vs. Rajabhai, AIR 1970 SC 1475 , it was held that an objection as to a decree being without jurisdiction or otherwise a nullity may be raised in execution proceedings, and that if it is raised, an Executing Court which otherwise cannot go behind the decree, has jurisdiction or is competent to entertain such an objection but this competency is limited to only when the objection appears on the face of the record where the decree is passed without jurisdiction. 4. Order 41 Rule 5 sub-rule 1 provides that appeal doesn't operate as a stay of proceedings under a decree or order appealed from, except in a case where the Appeal Court grants stay of execution upon sufficient cause. The Court which has passed the decree may by reason of sub-rule 2 stay the execution on sufficient cause being shown to it. The Court which has passed the decree may by reason of sub-rule 2 stay the execution on sufficient cause being shown to it. However, sub-rule 3 prescribes that no stay can be granted either under sub-rule 1 or under sub-rule 2 unless security has been given by an applicant for the due performance of such decree or order as may ultimately be binding upon him. Thus, the question of security comes in, when the Appeal Court deals with the question of stay of execution. So far as the Executing Court is concerned it can direct furnishing of security if it is shown that the judgment debtor is removing or wasting or dissipating the properties or other assets, in order to abstract the satisfaction of the decree. But it can not do so as a condition for staying of the decree. In any event the Executing Court has not been given any power to stay execution. Either the Court which passes the decree may stay the execution or the Appeal Court which can stay the execution. Power to stay execution has never been conferred by the Code upon the Executing Court. Therefore, there cannot be any question of staying execution upon furnishing security or in other words to require furnishing of security as a condition for stay of execution. Therefore, I refrain from making any observation with regard thereto. 5. In the present case there is no stay on the execution. Mere filing of the appeal cannot operate as stay by reason of Rule 5 Order 41 of the Code. At the same time, the question of security is relevant as discussed above, when the execution of the decree is stayed by the appeal court. While a decree is executed unless there is any allegation of dissipation of the property there is no question of the Executing Court to require the judgment debtor to furnish security. No such allegation is made in this case. Therefore, there is no question of furnishing security at this stage. On the other hand, in the absence of any stay the execution should proceed. At the same time, the order dated September 22, 1997 passed by the Division Bench directed the execution to proceed and which should be encouraged. 6. No such allegation is made in this case. Therefore, there is no question of furnishing security at this stage. On the other hand, in the absence of any stay the execution should proceed. At the same time, the order dated September 22, 1997 passed by the Division Bench directed the execution to proceed and which should be encouraged. 6. In the facts and circumstances of the case, as it appears from the application filed by the judgment debtor identifying a particular property alleging to be un-encumbered (in paragraph 17) supported by affidavit, in my opinion, the execution proceedings should proceed with regard to the said property. 7. Therefore, Anjana Ghosh (Mukherjee), an advocate of this Court is appointed Receiver in respect of the said property. The Receiver shall publish notice of auction in 'The Statesman', 'The Telegraph', 'Times of India', and the leading English and vernacular newspapers circulated in the cities of Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay, Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad and. Hindi in 'Sanmarg' and 'Vishwamitra' and Bengali in 'Anandabazar' and 'Bartaman' fixing a date of receiving tender in sealed cover. The advertisement is to be published within a period off our weeks from date. After the tenders are received the same may be filed before the court to be opened on a date to be fixed by the Court, upon being mentioned either by the Receiver or by any of the parties. The cost of such publication at the first instance shall be borne by the decree holder. The remuneration of the Receiver is assessed at 300 Gms. at the first instance to be borne by the decree holder. Such expenses shall be reimbursed out of the sale proceeds after the sale is complete. The judgment debtor and the decree holder shall cooperate with the Receiver in the matter of putting up the property in sale. The Receiver will issue notice to the judgment debtor for production of the relevant documents including the title deeds for inspection and furnishing copies thereof. The judgement debtor shall also cooperate with the Receiver for the purpose of inspection of the property by the intending purchasers. It will also be open to the judgment debtor to find out a prospective buyer and put in the tender through such intending purchasers. The Receiver shall submit her report along with the sealed tender on 20th March, 2001. 8. It will also be open to the judgment debtor to find out a prospective buyer and put in the tender through such intending purchasers. The Receiver shall submit her report along with the sealed tender on 20th March, 2001. 8. Let this matter appear on 20th March, 2001 along with other matters. 9. All parties including the Receiver are to act on a signed xerox copy of this order on the usual undertaking.