Chunta Nayak and fifty v. State of Orissa, represented by Collector, Kendrapara and five
2001-12-14
R.K.PATRA
body2001
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT P. K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, C.J.— This suit was filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), Kendrapara after complying with the requirements of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Proce¬dure, 1908 (in short, the ‘Code’). The suit was one for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from constructing the primary school building over the ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule lands or any other lands, and to direct the plaintiffs to construct school building in the plaint ‘A’ schedule land. In that suit, it is seen that on notice being published in terms of Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code, a number of villages got themselves impleaded. The appellants before us, filed an application under Order 1, Rule 10 of the Code seeking to get themselves impleaded in the suit. The trial Court dismissed that application. A revision was carried before the learned Additional District Judge, Kendrapara under Section 115 of the Code. The learned Additional District Judge refused to interfere with the order of the trial Court to exer¬cise of his revisional jurisdiction. The appellants thereupon filed O.J.C. No. 11849 of 2000 before this Court purporting to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Single Judge interfered with the order of the district Court to the extent of permitting one of the 52 petitioners, the Secretary of their Association, to get himself impleaded as a defendant and to particcipate in the trial of the suit from the stage at which his impleading was ordered. The learned Single Judge also ordered that the said defendant shall adopt the written statement which was already filed by defendants 1 to 4 in the suit and was free to put for¬ward his contentions, but was not entitled to have the suit reopened as a whole and start afresh with the filing of a fresh written statement. This was in view of the fact that the learned Judge took note of the fact that evidence was already closed and the suit actually stood posted for arguments. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge, the appellants have preferred this Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 2. It is settled that the question of impleading is not a matter of initial jurisdiction, but is one of judicial discre¬tion.
Feeling aggrieved by the said order of the learned Single Judge, the appellants have preferred this Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. 2. It is settled that the question of impleading is not a matter of initial jurisdiction, but is one of judicial discre¬tion. The trial Court in exercise of its discretion refused the prayer and the District Court confirmed the same in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge in exercise of his power, presumably under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, took the view that at least one of the petitioners before the trial Court could be added as a party and given the opportu¬nity to put forward his contentions. The discretion cannot be said to have been exercised unreasonably or perversely. Strictly speaking, therefore, there would be no scope for the Bench to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 3. There is another aspect. It is now settled in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra : AIR 1967 SC 1 , that no writ of certi¬orari lies against the Civil Court. Here obviously, the order of the trial Court refusing the prayer for impleading the petition¬ers was confirmed by the District Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code. Therefore, the learned Single Judge, in our view, could have, if at all, exer¬cised jurisdiction, only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is only a supervisory jurisdiction and no appeal lies against exercise of such juris¬diction by a learned Single Judge before a Division Bench. The High Courts of Calcutta. Madras, Allahabad, Punjab and Haryana, Kerala and Jammu and Kashmir have taken this view. Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Orissa is seen to be in pari materia with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Courts of Calcutta and Madras. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Ratnagiri District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Watve and others : 1993 Supp (1) Supreme Court Cases 9 and in M/s. Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shankarprasad : AIR 1999 SC 2423 support the above view. We have, therefore, consid¬erable doubt whether this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is maintainable at all.
We have, therefore, consid¬erable doubt whether this appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent is maintainable at all. But, we do not think it necessary to rest our decision in this case on that point, especially since that point was not argued in full before us. 4. No person who seeks himself to be impleaded in a suit instituted invoking Order 1, Rule 8 of the Code is entitled to get himself impleaded at his leisure and seek to have the suit reopened as a whole so as to start from scratch afresh. In the case on hand, the learned Single Judge has directed that one of the petitioners be impleaded in the suit and he is to take part in the suit the stage at which his prayer for impleading was allowed by this Court. This direction of the learned Single Judge is perfectly consonant with procedure, and in that view of the matter, we find no justification for interference in exercise of our appellate jurisdiction. We must remember that the appellate jurisdiction under Letters Patent is really a corrective juris¬diction and it is used really only to correct errors if any made. 5. Thus, on a consideration of the submissions of learned counsel for the appellants, we are not satisfied that this appeal deserves to be admitted. The A.H.O. is hence dismissed. R. K. PATRA, J. I agree. A.H.O. dismissed.