J U D G M E N T (per the Hon’ble Mr.Chief Justice S.B.Sinha) The short question involved in this writ petition is as to whether in a case where facts stand admitted and conclusions had been arrived at by the respondents-authorities on the same, is it necessary to direct compliance of the principles of natural justice? 2. The petitioner was appointed as cleaner in place of his maternal uncle Sri M.A. Gaffoor who was permitted to retire on medical invalidation in the year 1992. An order of reversion was, however, passed against him on 23.5.1992 and thereagainst he had filed an application before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal which was allowed. The services of the petitioner were terminated by the 2nd respondent herein, inter alia, on the ground that being the son-in-law of the said Gafoor, his appointment under the scheme of compassionate appointment is illegal. Aggrieved there against, the petitioner moved the A.P. Administrative Tribunal. The learned Tribunal held that the appointment of the petitioner is void ab initio. 3. Mr. Ramamohanrao, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, inter alia, submits that as admittedly, prior to the passing of the impugned order dated 23.9.1993, the principles of natural justice had not been complied with, the impugned order must be held to be non est in the eye of law. In support of the said contention, reliance has been placed on the decisions of the Supreme Court in STATE OF ORISSA V. BINAPANI DEI (1) U.P. AWAS EVAM VIKAS PARISHAD V, GYAN DEVI (2) and S. PAPI REDDY V. RAYALASEEMA FARMERS SERVICE COOP. SOCIETY LTD., (3). 4.The scheme of appointment on compassionate ground is an exception to Clause (2) of Article 16 of the Constitution of India. In terms of the exception provided under Article 16, appointment on compassionate.ground to the next of kin of a deceased employee viz., son or an unmarried daughter may be given provided that such persons fulfil the requisite conditions prescribed therefor. The State has extended the said scheme also in case of persons who retire on medical invalidation. 5. It is not in dispute that a son-in-law or a sister’s son of an employee who retired on medical invalidation is not entitled to any appointment in terms of the aforementioned scheme. The State has extended the said scheme also in case of persons who retire on medical invalidation. 5. It is not in dispute that a son-in-law or a sister’s son of an employee who retired on medical invalidation is not entitled to any appointment in terms of the aforementioned scheme. In such a situation, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the appointment of the petitioner being contrary to the scheme and the recruitment rules, the same must be held to be a nullity. 6. The principles of natural justice is no unruly horse. It’s applicability must depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The doctrine of natural justice should be invoked only to secure justice and not to .take undue advantage of an illegality. No straight jacket formulae can be applied in invoking the principles of natural justice. It does not provide for an inflexible rule and while applying the said doctrine, the totality of the situation ought to be taken note of. 7. In a case of this nature, where the facts are admitted, in our considered opinion, the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with, not only because the said principles are not applicable .but also on the ground that even if the principles of natural justice are directed to be complied with, the same would not yield any different result. 8. In MALLOCH V. ABERDEEN CORPORATION(4), Lord Willbeforce stated: “ a breach of procedure whether called a failure of natural justice, or an essential administrative fault cannot give a remedy in the courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The Court does not act in vain.” 9. Yet again in R. V. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT PARTE GWENT COUNTRY COUNCIL (5) it has been held that the test of prejudice should be applied in a case of enhancement of toll charges over a bridge. Although in that case, the statute provided for a public hearing before effecting increase in toll charges over a bridge, the Court of Appeal held that unless prejudice is established to have resulted from the procedural impropriety, no interference was called for. 10. Although in that case, the statute provided for a public hearing before effecting increase in toll charges over a bridge, the Court of Appeal held that unless prejudice is established to have resulted from the procedural impropriety, no interference was called for. 10. In JANKINATH SARANGI V. STATE OF ORISSA(6) while holding that the principles of natural justice are violated, the Apex Court observed that in the facts and circumstances of the case, no prejudice was caused to the appellant by not examining the two retired Superintending Engineers who were cited as witnesses. Hidyatullah, CJ, observed: There is no doubt that if the principles of natural justice are violated and there is a gross case this Court would interfere by striking down the order of dismissal; but, there are cases and cases. We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of all particular right..” 11. Reference in this connection may also be made to K.L. TRIPATHI V. STATE BANK OF INDIA(7). 12. In STATE BANK OF PATIALA V. S.K. SHARMA(8) the Apex Court referring to RIDGE V. BALDWIN(9) and keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee enunciated, inter alia, the following principles: (a) An order passed imposing a punishment on an employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental enquiry, in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory provisions governing such enquires should not set aside automatically. (b) A substantive provision has normally to be complied with and the theory of substantive compliance or the test of prejudice would not be applicable in such a case. (c) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, it is to be seen whether it falls under ‘no notice’, ‘no opportunity’ and ‘no hearing’ category. Except cases falling under ‘no notice’, ‘no opportunity’ and ‘no hearing’ categories, the complaint of violation of procedural provision should be examined from the point of view of prejudice. If it is found that a delinquent employee has been prejudiced, appropriate orders have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of punishment. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, no interference is called for. There may, however, be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation by itself is proof of prejudice. If no prejudice is established to have resulted therefrom, no interference is called for. There may, however, be certain procedural provisions which are of a fundamental character, whose violation by itself is proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on proof of prejudice in such cases. (d) In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of substantive compliance. The order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee. (e) In the case of violation of a procedural provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in the interest of the person proceeded against or in public interest. If it is found to be former, then it must be seen whether the delinquent employee has waived that requirement, either expressly or by his conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the delinquent employee has not waived it, then the Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions including the setting aside of the order of punishment. (f) Where the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice, the Court, or the tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet of the said rule. In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid or one may call it “void” or a nullity. But, in the latter the effect of violation has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice.” 13. Krishna lyer, J, in The Chairman, BOARD OF MINING EXAMINATION & CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MINES V. RAMJEE(10), opined: “....natural justice is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cureall. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. 14. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against, the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of. 14. The aforementioned principles came up for consideration recently before a Division Bench of this Court in Ch. Anitha v. State of A.P. (11). The Division Bench upon noticing a large number of decisions held that in a case of this nature, the petitioner has to show that he has been prejudiced by reason of non-compliance of the principles of natural justice. The Division Bench therein took into consideration the decision of the Apex Court in Kumaon MANDAL VIKAR NIGAM LTD. V. GIRJA SHANKAR PANT (12). 15.The decisions relied upon by Mr. Ramamohan Rao are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. ln all the aforementioned cases, wherein the facts are not admitted, the Court came to the conclusion that the petitioners therein had been denied an opportunity of being heard before passing the orders adverse to their interest. Herein it is not a case where the facts are disputed. The fact that the petitioner sought for appointment under the scheme of compassionate employment is evident from the admitted facts. The said scheme admittedly does not apply to the case of the petitioner. It is, therefore, a case where even if the principles of natural justice are directed to be complied with, no difference would arise. 16. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out warranting interference by us with the impugned judgment passed by the Tribunal. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. --X—