Judgment :- T. Meenakumari, J. Since the facts in both the writ petitions are one and the same, the following common order is passed. In Writ Petition No. 18502 of 1993, the petitioner seeks writ of certiorified mandamus to call for the records of the second respondent relating to the proceedings in RC. No. A/37087/82, dated 28.11.1981 and the show cause notice in RC. No. A9/35792/91, dated 21.9.1993 and quash the same and further direct the respondents to award all consequential benefits arising thereto. In Writ Petition No. 14652 of 1994 the petitioner seeks writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records in RC No. G1/121578/91, dated 16.6.1994 on the file of the second respondent herein confirming the orders of the third respondent made in ROC.A9/37087/82, dated 23.11.1991 and quash the order dated 16.9.1994. The facts of the present cases on hand are as follows : The writ petitioner was appointed as a bill clerk in the respondent/Corporation, namely, Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., on 30.11.1974 and was promoted as Junior Assistant on 31.12.1980. After working in various places, she was posted as Junior Assistant in the Mint Godown on 5.1.1981. While so, the petitioner was placed under suspension by the second respondent by proceedings No. A.1/37087/82, dated 28.1.1983 on the charges of misappropriation. The second respondent also preferred a criminal complaint against the petitioner and all other staff of Mint Godown, which was numbered as Calendar Case Nos. 5964 to 5967 of 1986 on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras. An enquiry has been conducted by the Enquiry Officer and based on the enquiry report, the Disciplinary Authority, namely, the Senior Regional Manager, has passed the final order on 28.11.1991 on the charges of misappropriation removing the petitioner from service with immediate effect without prejudice to the recovery proceedings to be initiated against her. Against the said order dated 28.11.1991, the petitioner filed an appeal before the second respondent on 30.12.1991. Since no orders were passed, she filed Writ Petition No. 18502 of 1993 questioning the order of removal. Against the said order dated 28.11.1991, the petitioner filed an appeal before the second respondent on 30.12.1991. Since no orders were passed, she filed Writ Petition No. 18502 of 1993 questioning the order of removal. As the Appellate Authority, namely, the Joint Managing Director, by his proceedings dated 16.6.1994 confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority, the petitioner has chosen to file Writ Petition No. 14652 of 1994.In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is stated that the punishment of removal from service was inflicted only after careful consideration of the Enquiry Officer's findings with the connected records; that the entire disciplinary and enquiry proceedings were made as per the procedures laid down in the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. Employees Service Regulations; that the appeal preferred by the petitioner with the second respondent had been carefully examined with connected records and the order passed by the third respondent was confirmed by rejecting the appeal; and that the authorities have passed the orders only after verifying the connected records and satisfying themselves that the punishment of removal from service of the petitioner is proportionate to the charges. Mr. M. S. Soundararajan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner vehemently contends that the charges framed against the petitioner are vague; that the petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to defend her case effectively; and that even though the punishing authority as well as the appellate authority accepted the case of the petitioner that she had not committed any misappropriation, since she had failed to obtain proper acknowledgement from the responsible person which facilitated to the said misappropriation, they wrongly came to a conclusion and removed her from service. The learned counsel for the petitioner further argues that the Enquiry Officer did not apply his mind to the evidence; that the Disciplinary Authority did not assign any reason for coming to the conclusion that charge Nos. 2 and 4 were partly proved and that the Disciplinary Authority did not assign any reason why the evidence produced by the petitioner did not appeal to him and was considered not credit-worthy and that therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. 2 and 4 were partly proved and that the Disciplinary Authority did not assign any reason why the evidence produced by the petitioner did not appeal to him and was considered not credit-worthy and that therefore, the impugned orders are liable to be quashed. To substantiate his contention that the order of termination based on a report containing conclusions without reasons, is unsustainable, the learned counsel for the petitioner cited the decision reported in Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and Ors., wherein the Apex Court held as follows : "We have extracted the charges framed against the appellant. We have also pointed out in clear terms the report of the Enquiry Officer. It is well settled that a disciplinary enquiry has to be a quasi-judicial enquiry held according to the principles of natural justice and the Enquiry Officer has a duty to act judicially. The Enquiry Officer did not apply his mind to the evidence. Save setting out the names of the witnesses, he did not discuss the evidence. He merely recorded his ipso dixit that the charges are proved. He did not assign a single reason why the evidence produced by the appellant did not appeal to him and was considered not credit-worthy. He did not permit a peep into his mind as to why the evidence produced by the management appealed to him in preference to the evidence produced by the appellant. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipso dixit of the Enquiry Officer. It has to be a speaking order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, this Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this only safeguard. Similarly in Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, this Court reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that appealed to the authority. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. It should all the more be so where the quasi-judicial enquiry may result in deprivation of livelihood or attach a stigma to the character. In this case, the enquiry report is an order-sheet which merely produces the stage through which the enquiry passed. It clearly disclosed a total non-application of mind and it is this report on which the General Manager acted in terminating the service of the appellant. There could not have been gross case of non-application of mind and it is such an enquiry which has found favour with the Labour Court and the High Court.Where a disciplinary enquiry affects the livelihood and is likely to cast a stigma and it has to be held in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the minimum expectation is that the report must be reasoned one. The Court then may not enter into the adequacy or sufficiency of evidence. But where the evidence is annexed to an order-sheet and no correlation is established between the two showing application of mind, we are constrained to observe that it is not an enquiry report at all. Therefore, there was no enquiry in this case worth the name and the order of termination based on such proceeding disclosing non-application of mind would be unsustainable." I have carefully considered the submissions of both sides. The learned counsel for the petitioner brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner had filed Writ Petition No. 1337 of 1984 questioning the order of suspension. This Court, by order dated 11.12.1991, set aside the order suspending the petitioner and directed the respondent to reinstate her on duty and insofar as the payment of benefits is concerned, the question was left open. The learned counsel further submits that subsequently, the petitioner filed a representation before the respondents for payment of benefits and accordingly, on a direction from this Court, the payments were made to her. The second respondent issued a show-cause notice dated 21.9.1993 directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 34, 436.85 and recovered the same from the amount payable to the petitioner. The petitioner was charge-sheeted on 16.2.1984. The second respondent issued a show-cause notice dated 21.9.1993 directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 34, 436.85 and recovered the same from the amount payable to the petitioner. The petitioner was charge-sheeted on 16.2.1984. The charges framed against the petitioner are as follows : (1) that the staff of Mint (Godown) failed to maintain the prescribed records for the issue of stocks from the godown and neglected her primary duty.(2) that she neglected her primary duty as the staff of the Mint Godown and issued the stocks from the Godown in a highly irresponsible and objectionable manner to the ADS Mint without insisting for the proper acknowledgement from persons responsible and thus indulged in the fraudulent practices and swindled the Corporation money in connivance with the ADS staff. (3) that she failed to safeguard the Corporation stock and property and acted in an irresponsible manner by having direct collusion with the ADS Mint staff and swallowed the Corporation accounts and money for their personal benefits. (4) that she proved herself to be an irresponsible, unreliable and untrustworthy employee of the Corporation. After conducting an enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report on 14.6.1991 wherein the Enquiry Officer has held that charge Nos. 1 and 3 were not proved and charge Nos. 2 and 4 were partly proved. The findings of the Enquiry Officer are as follows : (1) With regard to charge No. 1, the Enquiry Officer has held that this charge was not proved. (2) With regard to charge No. 2, I hold that the charge is partly proved to the extent of the liability to get the acknowledgement for all the 7 issue memos from the responsible person i.e., Chief Bill Clerk of the Amudham Departmental Store concerned. (3) With regard to charge No. 3, I verified the issues and receipts of the godown and the Amudham Departmental Store respectively and there are evidences that the stocks of Maida delivered from the godown in the above 7 Issue Memos and they have been accounted for in the Amudham Departmental Store and deliberately scored out. Hence, I hold that charge No. 3 as not proved. Hence, I hold that charge No. 3 as not proved. (4) With regard to charge No. 4 as charge No. 2 is partly proved, I hold that this charge also partly proved to the extent of her failure to get the acknowledgement from the Chief Bill Clerk of Amudham Departmental Store.A reading of the enquiry report itself shows that the Enquiry Officer did not adduce any reason to arrive for a conclusion that charges 2 and 4 were partly proved and apply his mind to evidence at all. He did not even discuss the evidence. He merely endorsed that charges 2 and 4 were partly proved. Hence, I am of the view that the decision of the Apex Court in Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and Ors., following the decisions in Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India and Mahabir Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. In this case, the punishing authority without hearing the petitioner/appellant, simply based on the enquiry report, passed the impugned order dated 28.11.1991, removing her from service and the Appellate Authority also, without giving sufficient opportunity to the petitioner, confirmed the order of the punishing authority. A Division Bench of this Court in Rathinammal v. Superintending Engineer, 1996 (2) ILR(Mad) 161, has held that the Appellate Authority, while deciding the appeal, has to function as a quasi-judicial authority and he cannot decide the appeal, without giving a personal hearing to the appellant. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows : When an appeal is provided under the Statute, the appellate authority in deciding the appeal functions as a quasi-judicial authority, as such, he cannot decide the appeal, without giving a personal hearing to the appellant. Deciding the appeal on perusal of the records, without giving personal hearing by a quasi-judicial authority cannot be the same as deciding the appeal on personal hearing and each makes a world of difference. Certain things which may not occur to the Appellate Authority, on perusing the records, may be brought to the notice of the authority, during the course of personal hearing. It would be more so, when the appeal is directed both on facts and on law. It is also requested by the appellant in the memorandum of appeal that he should be given a personal hearing either in person or through his authorised representatives. It would be more so, when the appeal is directed both on facts and on law. It is also requested by the appellant in the memorandum of appeal that he should be given a personal hearing either in person or through his authorised representatives. Therefore, we are not of the view that the order of the learned single Judge cannot be upheld.The criminal case filed against the petitioner in Calendar Case Nos. 5964 to 5967 of 1986 on the file of the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Egmore, Madras, has ended in acquittal. The said order has become final. As the petitioner was acquitted of the criminal case and the same has become final, the said order is binding on the respondents, since only on identical set of facts, the departmental enquiry was conducted and the impugned orders were passed and hence, the impugned orders passed by the respondents are liable to be set aside, as held by the Apex Court in M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. 1999 I CLR 1032 S.C. The Senior Regional Manager, passed the impugned order dated 28.11.1991 removing the petitioner from service, based on the Enquiry Officer's Report dated 11.6.1991 and the explanation given by the petitioner on 22.6.1991, but without adducing any reason came to the said conclusion. Similarly, the Joint Managing Director, by his order dated 16.6.1994, confirmed the order of removal, without assigning any reason for his conclusion. Hence, I am of the considered opinion that both the orders impugned in these writ petitions as well as the show-cause notice dated 21.9.1993 are liable to be set aside. Taking into consideration the above facts and circumstances of the case and the decisions cited above, the impugned order dated 28.11.1991 passed by the Senior Regional Manager, removing the petitioner from service and the show-cause notice dated 21.9.1993 directing the petitioner to pay a sum of Rs. 34, 436.85 are set aside and Writ Petition No. 18502 of 1993 is allowed. As the Disciplinary Authority's order dated 28.11.1991 is set aside, the consequential order dated 16.6.1994 passed by the Appellate Authority, namely, the Joint Managing Director (second respondent) is also liable to be set aside and accordingly, it is set aside and Writ Petition No. 14652 of 1994 is also allowed. Consequently, there shall be a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits. Consequently, there shall be a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner into service with all consequential benefits. With the abovesaid direction, these writ petitions are allowed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. No. 28876 of 1993 is closed.Writ Petitions allowed.