P. VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of india, the petitioner has called in question the correctness of the order dated 20th April, 1999 made in Revision No. 18 of 1998 by the 5th respondent-Karnataka Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') rejecting the revision petition filed by the petitioner under section 39 of the Karnataka Religious and Charitable Institutions act, 1927 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). ( 2 ) A few facts which may be relevant for the disposal of this petition may be stated as hereunder: the petitioner who was aggrieved by the order dated 17th July, 1996 passed by the 1st respondent, a copy of which has been produced as annexure-A filed an appeal before the 2nd respondent under Section 38 of the Act. Consequent upon the dismissal of the appeal by the 2nd respondent by means of his order dated 27th May, 1997, the petitioner challenged the said order by filing a second appeal before the 4th respondent- commissioner for Religious and Charitable Inams (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commissioner' ). The 4th respondent by means of order dated 27th December, 1997 while allowing the second appeal filed by the petitioner rejected certain claims of the petitioner. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner had filed a revision petition before the 5th respondent under Section 39 of the Act. The 5th respondent in the impugned order rejected the revision petition filed by the petitioner on the ground the revision petition is not maintainable. Aggrieved by the said order, as noticed by me earlier this petition is filed. ( 3 ) SRI Gopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the conclusion reached by the 5th respondent that the revision petition filed by the petitioner is not maintainable is totally erroneous in law. He submitted that the Tribunal on an erroneous interpretation placed on section 39 of the Act has failed to exercise jurisdiction conferred on it and therefore, the order impugned is liable to be quashed by this Court. He submitted that the Tribunal on an erroneous interpretation placed on section 39 of the Act has failed to exercise jurisdiction conferred on it and therefore, the order impugned is liable to be quashed by this Court. Elaborating this submission, he pointed out that a third appeal is provided against the order passed by the second Appellate Authority under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act and the third appeal is maintainable only on a point of law or usage having the force of law; and under these circumstances it is for the party aggrieved by the order passed by the Appellate Authority either to file a third appeal as provided under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act or to file a revision petition as provided under Section 39 of the Act. He submits so long as there is no limitation provided under Section 39 of the Act limiting the power of the authority not to entertain an appeal whenever a right of appeal is provided, it is not permissible for the revisional authority to entertain the revision petition filed by the party aggrieved by an order made in appeal. It is his submission that the Tribunal and the Courts will have to interpret the provisions of law as it is, so long as the language employed in a provision of law is clear and it is not ambiguous. The learned counsel pointed out that since the language employed under Section 39 of the Act is not ambiguous or vague and it being clear, the Tribunal has seriously erred in law in taking the view that the revision is not maintainable. In support of this plea he relied upon the decision of the Supreme court in the case of M/s. Doypack Systems Private Limited v union of India and Others. ( 4 ) HOWEVER, Sri Nagarajulu Naidu, learned Additional Government advocate appearing for respondents 1, 2, 4 and 5 and Sri Shankarnaray- ana Bhat, learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent strongly supported the impugned order. They submitted that since it cannot be disputed that the petitioner has a right of third appeal provided under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act, the revision filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. They submitted that since it cannot be disputed that the petitioner has a right of third appeal provided under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act, the revision filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. According to the learned Counsel, when a statutory third appeal is provided under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act, it must be held that the power of revision is taken away; and the power of revision must be understood as having confirmed on a revisional authority only in cases where an appeal is not provided. Therefore, they submit that Section 39 of the Act which confers revisional power must be read down to mean that the right of revision is provided only in cases where the right of appeal is not provided. ( 5 ) BEFORE, I proceed to consider the said question, it may be useful to refer to sub-section (2) of Sections 38 and 39 of the Act which will have a bearing to decide the question that has arisen for consideration. Sub-section (2) of Sections 38 and 39 of the Act read as follows:"38. (2) An appeal shall lie to the Government against every order passed by the Muzrai Commissioner provided that no such appeal shall lie to the Government from a appellate decision passed by the Muzrai Commissioner except on a point of a law or usage having the force of law. 39. Revision. The Government or the Muzrai Commissioner or any Muzrai Officer may call for and examine the records of any enquiry or the proceeding of any officer subordinate to it or him for the purpose of satisfying as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to regularity or proceeding of such officer. If in any case it shall appear to the Government or to such officer as aforesaid that any decision or order or proceedings should be modified, annulled or reversed, the Government or such officer may pass such order thereon as may be deemed fit". ( 6 ) IN the light of the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, the only question that would arise for consideration in this petition is as to whether the power of revision conferred under Section 39 of the Act can be exercised by the revisional authority in cases where a right of appeal is provided. It is not in dispute that the appellate and the revisional power conferred under sub-section (2) of sections 38 and 39 of the Act have now been delegated to the Tribunal. Therefore, the petitioner had a right of third appeal provided under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act to the Tribunal on a question of law or usage having the force of law. Now, the question is merely because a right of appeal including a third appeal is provided under Section 38 of the Act can it be said the revisional authority is deprived of its power of revision provided under Section 39 of the Act? Section 39 of the act as rightly pointed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner does not impose any restriction on the power of the revisional authority to exercise the revisional jurisdiction. It does not state that the power of the revision could be exercised only in cases where a remedy of appeal is not provided under the Act. For that matter the said provision does not state even if the party has availed of the right of third appeal before the tribunal, the power of revision cannot be exercised by the Tribunal over and again. Since the right of third appeal and the power of revision is conferred on the same authority i. e. , the Tribunal, I am of the view that it is reasonable and appropriate to hold and take a view that the power of revision may be exercised by the revisional authority only in a case where the party has not availed of the right of third appeal provided under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act. In all other cases, I am of the view the language of Section 39 of the Act does not permit the revisional Authority to refuse to exercise its revisional jurisdiction only on the ground that the right of appeal including the third appeal is provided under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act. In all other cases, I am of the view the language of Section 39 of the Act does not permit the revisional Authority to refuse to exercise its revisional jurisdiction only on the ground that the right of appeal including the third appeal is provided under sub-section (2) of Section 38 of the Act. It is necessary to point out that the revisional power conferred under Section 39 of the Act is a suo motu power where the Tribunal could call for records and examine the records of any enquiry or the proceeding of any officer subordinate to it or him for the purpose of satisfying as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed and as to regularity or proceeding of such officer. So far as the parties who are aggrieved by the order passed by the Muzrai Commissioner/officer, it must be held that it is left to the discretion of the parties either to choose the right of appeal provided under Section 38 of the Act or the right of revision provided under Section 39 of the Act. However, it is necessary to point out if a power of revision under Section 39 is availed of by a party, it would not be permissible for such a party to avail of the right of appeal. The decision in the case of Mis. Doypack Systems Private Limited, supra, relied upon by Sri Gopal, learned Counsel for the petitioner lays down that when the language employed in the provisions of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the Court to give full meaning and effect to the language employed in the provision of law. Therefore, if the language employed in Section 39 of the Act is so read and understood, in my view there is no escape for me to come to the conclusion except holding that the power of revision is not taken away merely because a right of appeal is provided to the party under Section 38 of the Act. Therefore, if the language employed in Section 39 of the Act is so read and understood, in my view there is no escape for me to come to the conclusion except holding that the power of revision is not taken away merely because a right of appeal is provided to the party under Section 38 of the Act. Having regard to the language employed in Section 39 of the Act, the right to invoke the revisional jurisdiction must be understood to be concurrent with the right of appeal provided under Section 38 of the Act, however, subject to the limitation, as noticed by me earlier that the party aggrieved by an order should either file a third appeal or a revision but not both. In this connection, it is relevant to refer to the observation of the Supreme Court made in the case of Shankar Ramchandra abhyankar v Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat, wherein the Supreme Court while considering the question as to whether the writ jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India could be invoked by a party who has availed of revisional jurisdiction at paragraphs 5 and 6 which reads as hereunder:"such a right was one of entering a superior Court and invoking its aid and interposition to redress the error of the Court below. Two things which were required to constitute appellate jurisdiction were the existence of the relation of superior and inferior Courts and the power on the part of the former to review decisions of the latter. 6. Now when the aid of the High Court is invoked on the revisional side it is done because it is a superior Court and it can interfere for the purpose of rectifying the error of the Court below. Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure circumscribes the limits of that jurisdiction which is being exercised is a part of the general appellate jurisdiction of the High Court as a superior Court. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the high Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. It is only one of the modes of exercising power conferred by the Statute; basically and fundamentally it is the appellate jurisdiction of the high Court which is being invoked and exercised in a wider and larger sense. We do not therefore, consider that the principle of merger of orders of inferior Courts in those of superior Courts would be affected or would become inapplicable by making a distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal". ( 7 ) THE principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision referred to above, fully supports the view I have taken above that once a party avails of a right of third appeal under sub-section (2) of section 38 of the Act cannot avail of the right of revision and also the party who invokes the revisional jurisdiction under Section 39 of the Act cannot avail of the right of appeal. Further, while considering the scope of revisional jurisdiction under Section 56 of the Karnataka Land Revenue act; and whether it could be availed of when a right of appeal is provided under Section 49 of the Act, the Supreme Court in the case of puttahonnamma v C. Gangadhara Murthy , at paragraph 7 has observed thus:"7. It is seen that against the order passed by any of the enumerated officers, the remedy of first appeal has been provided under Section 49. Against the appellate orders under Section 49, section 50 gives right of second appeal. Section 56 envisages that the Tribunal, any Revenue Officer not inferior in rank to an assistant Commissioner. . . may call for and examine the record of any enquiry or the proceedings of any subordinate officer under the Act or under Section 54 of the Civil Procedure Code for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself, as the case may be, as to the legality or propriety of the proceedings of such officer. Sub-section (3) provides that no application power of revision shall be exercised against any order in respect of which an appeal under this chapter "has been preferred" and no application for revision shall be entertained unless such applications presented within a period of four months from the date of such order. Sub-section (3) provides that no application power of revision shall be exercised against any order in respect of which an appeal under this chapter "has been preferred" and no application for revision shall be entertained unless such applications presented within a period of four months from the date of such order. Two limitations have been prescribed for exercising the revisional power under section 56 (1), namely, the application which seeks revision of the appellate order under Section 49 has not preferred any second appeal as provided under Section 50 of the Act; since Section 50 falls under that chapter, the application shall be filed within a period of four months from the date of appellate order. In other words, if the aggrieved party has availed of the remedy of second appeal under Section 50, he has been precluded to again avail the revisional remedy under Section 56. It does not follow that the party who had not availed the second appellate remedy under section 50 is also prohibited to file the revision under Section 56. It would be clear under the scheme of the Act that the hierarchy of remedial forums prescribed are the appeal under Section 49, second appeal under Section 50 and only a revision under Section 56 of the Act and choice to avail of remedy of second appeal or a revision under Section 50 or 56 is left to the aggrieved party. The further scheme is that the revisional authority has power to suo motu correct legality or propriety of the proceedings of any subordinate officers specially and obviously when it touches the interest of the State". (emphasis supplied) the Supreme Court in the said case has made it clear that in cases where both right of appeal and a revision is provided, it is for the party to choose one of the remedies available to it. I am of the view that the observation made in the said decision would also support the view I have taken above. ( 8 ) IN the light of the discussion made above, I am of the view that order Annexure-D, dated 20th April, 1999 is required to be quashed. Accordingly, it is quashed. The matter is required to be remitted to the tribunal to consider the revision petition filed by the petitioner in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made above. Accordingly, it is quashed. The matter is required to be remitted to the tribunal to consider the revision petition filed by the petitioner in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made above. In terms stated above, this petition is disposed of. Rule is issued and made absolute. ( 9 ) SRI G. Nagarajulu Naidu, learned Additional Government Advocate is given four weeks time to file his memo of appearance. --- *** --- .