Judgment :- V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. This judgment shall dispose of W.P. No. 1617 of 1998, etc. since all the writ petitions involve a common question regarding the "constitutional validity" of the "service tax" levied on the "taxable service" provided to a client by a "mandap-keeper" in relation to the use of a "mandap" for social, official or business functions and also the other allied services. 2.Petitioners herein are the owners of the premises which are rented out for holding various functions like marriage, business conference, etc. In all these writ petitions, the constitutional validity of Sec. 88 of the Amendment Act 32 of 1994 and Section 116 of the Amendment Act 32 of 1994 is being challenged. 3.By Finance Act, 1994, the "service sector" was brought under the tax- net for the first time. The said Act was amended from time to time to include the various services which were brought under tax-net. Under the scheme of the Act, the impost of the tax was against the persons who provided the services and they had collect and pay the same. Thus, this tax could be legitimately passed on to the customers and more particularly to the persons whom the services were being offered. 4.The "services" offered by the "mandap-keepers" were included for the first time by Chapter VI of the Finance Act, 1997. Some of the relevant provisions in that Chapter are as follows : "65(19) mandap means any immovable property as defined in section 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) and includes any furniture, fixtures, light fittings and floor coverings therein let out for consideration for organising any official, social or business function. 65(2) mandap-keeper means a person who allows temporary occupation of a mandap for consideration for organising any official, social or business function. 65(41)(p) taxable service means any service provided to a client, by a mandap-keeper in relation to the use of a mandap in any manner including the facilities provided to the client in relation to such use and also the services, if any, rendered as a caterer." 5.Section 65 underwent a change and by Finance Act 2 of 1998, which became effective from 16-10-1998, Sec. 65(19) was renumbered as Sec. 65(22) while Sec. 65(20) was renumbered as Sec. 65(23). So also, the section relating to "taxable service" was renumbered as Sec. 65(48)(m). So also, the section relating to "taxable service" was renumbered as Sec. 65(48)(m). The numbers alone changed under the amended Act but the language of the provisions remained the same. 6.It will be better to see Sec. 66(3), which provides that from 16th July, 1997, there shall be levied a tax at the rate of five per cent of the value of taxable services referred to in Sub-clause (1) of clause (48) of section 65. The valuation of taxable services for charging service tax is provided in Sec. 67. The relevant portion is as tinder: "67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax. - For the purposes of this Chapter, the value of taxable services, (i) in relation to service provided by a mandap-keeper to a client, shall be the gross amount charged by such keeper from the client for the use of mandap including the facilities provided to the client in relation to such use and also the charges for catering, if any." These provisions are challenged by the petitioners on various grounds. 7.The leading arguments were addressed by Mr. Venkatachalapathy, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Mohan Parasaran, learned Counsel and their arguments were adopted by the other learned Counsel. 8.For the sake of convenience, we will take the facts in W.P. No. 1617 of 1998, which writ petition is filed by Tamil Nadu Kalyana Mandapam Owners' Association, represented by its President Muktha V. Srinivasan. This is an association, registered under the Societies Registration Act and is an association of about 310 members who are all kalyana mandap owners. The word "kalyana mandap" means "marriage hall". It is a common case that the members of the petitioner association rent out their premises owned or possessed by them for holding ceremonies like marriage, etc or other social, official or business functions. 9.After the aforementioned provisions were produced providing for levying the tax"on the "services" provided by the mandap-keepers, two representations came to be made by the letters dated 29-3-1997 and 9-6-1997, respectively. In the first representation, it was pointed out that the tax would be "onerous" and the customers would not be ready to pay the tax. 9.After the aforementioned provisions were produced providing for levying the tax"on the "services" provided by the mandap-keepers, two representations came to be made by the letters dated 29-3-1997 and 9-6-1997, respectively. In the first representation, it was pointed out that the tax would be "onerous" and the customers would not be ready to pay the tax. By the second representation, it was pointed out that the tax could not be remitted immediately after every marriage or function when the mandap was rented out and, therefore, reasonable time should be granted from the date of rendering the services to make the payment of tax. 10.Shortly stated, the case of the petitioners before us is that this tax and the provisions therefor in Sections 65, 66 and 67 of the Finance Act are firstly beyond the "legislative competence" of the Union of India as, in fact, in pith and substance, this tax amounts to a "tax on land and buildings", which is covered by Entry 49 of the State List (List II) of Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel argue that presumably this legislation is under the "residuary entry", i.e. Entry 97 of Union List (List I) and, therefore, it could have been so legislated only if the subject of legislation was not covered by any of the entries in State List (List II) or the Concurrent List (List III). Learned Counsel further argue that in order to test as to whether the challenged provisions fall under Entry 49 of State List (List II) or any other entry of that List, the "pith and substance" of the legislation will have to be found and for that purpose such entry of State List (List II) will have to be given the "widest possible interpretation". 11.As a second limb of the above argument on "legislative competence", the learned Counsel point out that under Sec. 65(48)(m) of the Finance Act, in addition to the services offered in relation to the use of a mandap, the services rendered as a "caterer" is also included. It is then pointed out that where the mandap-keeper also provides the services as "caterer", the tax leviable on such mandap-keeper as was in excess of the amount of service tax calculated at 60% of the gross amount charged would be exempted by Notification dated 26-6- 1997. It is then pointed out that where the mandap-keeper also provides the services as "caterer", the tax leviable on such mandap-keeper as was in excess of the amount of service tax calculated at 60% of the gross amount charged would be exempted by Notification dated 26-6- 1997. The learned Counsel submit that in this tax, there would be an element of "tax on sale of goods" as covered by Art. 366(29A)(f), which reads as follows : "366. Definitions. - In this Constitution, unless the context otherwise requires, the following expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them, that is to say - (29A) "tax on the sale or purchase of goods includes- (f) a tax on the supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink (whether or not intoxicating), where such supply or service, is for cash, deferred payment or other valuable consideration, and such transfer, delivery or supply of any goods shall be deemed to be a sale of those goods by the person making the transfer, delivery or supply and a purchase of those goods by the person to whom such transfer, delivery or supply is made;" Learned Counsel explain that once this is held to be a "tax on sale of goods", it will also be covered under Entry 54 of the State List (List II), which reads as under : "54. Taxes on the sale or purchase of goods other than newspapers, subject to the provisions of Entry 92-A of List I." 12.The learned Counsel also suggest that since the definition of "mandap" means an immovable property described under Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tax for the "user of such a land" would be a tax on land itself and would also be covered by Entry 18 of the State List (List II), which reads as follows: "18. Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvement and agricultural loans; colonization." Learned Counsel suggest that this would be a "tax on land" and, therefore, would be integrally connected with the "tax on collection of rents" and for this reason also, the provisions are beyond the "legislative competence" of the Union because of the positive language of Art. 248(1) pertaining to the "residuary powers" enjoyed by the Parliament. 13.In so far as the other challenge is concerned, the learned Counsel argue that the definition of "mandap" suggests that an immovable property should have been let out for consideration for organising any official, social or business function. Learned Counsel point out that there is absolutely no guidelines in the Finance Act or Rules to suggest as to what is meant by "official, social or business function". According to the learned Counsel, the provision is vague and, therefore, it would be left to the "wild discretion" of the tax authorities to decide as to whether a particular function was a "social, official or business function" and as such taxable. Learned Counsel argue that in the absence of any guidelines as to what was precisely meant by a "official function", "social function" or "business function", an untrammelled discretion would lie in the taxing authority to classify any function as the above functions named in Sec. 65(22) or (23). Learned Counsel pointed out that there is no yardstick to measure the taxable amount on account of "service" or the taxable amount on account of "catering". Therefore, the whole provision of Sec. 67(m) is totally arbitrary when it is read with Sec 65(48)(m). 14.As against this, the learned Senior Counsel for the Department strongly relied on the provisions and contended that they were perfectly within the "legislative competence" of the Parliament. According to the Learned Counsel, the service tax cannot be deemed to be a tax on land and cannot be covered under Entry 18 of List II. He further points out that it cannot also come under Entry 49 of the State List (List II) as the tax covered under that entry has got nothing to do with the tax on the "user of the land and building". He further points out that it cannot also come under Entry 49 of the State List (List II) as the tax covered under that entry has got nothing to do with the tax on the "user of the land and building". According to the learned Counsel, there could be different aspects to the taxation even if it prima facie appeared to be the tax connected with the lands and buildings. The learned Counsel further contended that this could not be a tax on "sale of goods" and as such, was not coverable under Entry 54. As regards the challenge in relation to Art. 366(29A)(f) is concerned, according to the learned Counsel, because of the language of sub-clause (f) this could not be viewed to be a tax on "sale of goods". The learned Counsel then pointed out that at the term "service" in clause (f) has different connotation that the word "service" used in the Finance Act. 15.As regards the challenge to the Constitutionality of the impugned legislation on the grounds of "unreasonableness" and "arbitrariness", the learned Counsel contended that the terms themselves are more than clear and needed no guidance. According to the learned Counsel, these terms were to be understood in their common parlance and so understood, there could be no provision for any confusion. In short, the contention of the learned Counsel was that there was no "vice" attached to the challenged provisions either regarding the "lack of legislative competence" or regarding "arbitrariness" and "unreasonableness".. 15.Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners to begin with tried to argue that in pith and substance this tax was a "tax on land and building". Learned Counsel argue that the tax depends on the very existence of the land and /or building and is, therefore, integrally connected with that subject. It was argued that even if a playground is rented out for any social, official or business function even then, the service tax liability would arise. From this the learned Counsel argue that the impost of the tax is entirely depended upon the existence of the immovable property which may include the land and/or building and it is only for the "user of such land and/or building" that the tax is charged. From this the learned Counsel argue that the impost of the tax is entirely depended upon the existence of the immovable property which may include the land and/or building and it is only for the "user of such land and/or building" that the tax is charged. The learned Counsel argue that for the same reason even Entry 18 of List II can be brought into service and, therefore, further argues that once the item is found to be under any of these entries in List II, the Parliament would have no power to legislate with the help of Entry 97 of List I because of the positive language of Art. 248. 17.There could be no dispute about the proposition that the Parliament would have no right to legislate under Entry 97 of List I if in pith and substance the subject covered by the impugned legislation is covered under any of the entries of List II or List III. Time and again, the Apex Court has reiterated that position. It is also the consistent view of the Apex Court that for this purpose the courts have to give the widest possible scope to the interpretation of the entries which are claimed by the petitioners to be connected with or to be covering the impugned legislation. 18.Let us first consider the argument regarding Entry 18 and Entry 49 of List II. The thrust of the argument is that the "mandap" is defined in the Finance Act as an immovable property as defined in Sec. 3 of the Transfer of Property Act and included any furniture, fixture, light fittings and floor coverings therein, which property is let out for consideration for organising any official, social or business function. It was, therefore, pointed out that even any piece of open kind could be such immovable property when such piece of land "let out" for any official, social and business function. It was, therefore, pointed out that even any piece of open kind could be such immovable property when such piece of land "let out" for any official, social and business function. The learned Counsel, therefore, argue that this legislation would be in respect of the land, which will be totally covered by Entry 18 of List II, which reads as follows : "Land, that is to say, rights in or over land, land tenures including the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection of rents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land Improvement and agricultural loans, colonization." Even a plain reading of this entry would suggest that the present tax, which is purely on account of the "services" offered by a "mandap keeper", would be outside the topics mentioned in Entry 18. The legislation is not in respect of the lands nor is it concerned with the land tenure. Again, there is no question of the present tax depending upon the relationship of "landlord and tenant". It was tried to be suggested that the words "let out" used in Sec. 65(22) which signify the "rent" of the land. It is then pointed out that the language of Sec. 67(m) suggests that the valuation of "services" provided by the "mandap keeper" would be the "gross amount" charged by such keeper from the client for the use of the "mandap" and also the other facilities and also included the charge for "catering services". From this, the learned Counsel argue that it was obvious that what was being charged was the rent earned by the landlord over the piece of land which was let out for the user of the client by way of holding a social, official or business function. The argument is clearly incorrect. Here the basic fallacy in the argument is that the nature of the tax is being judged from the "measure of the tax". Merely because the tax is charged on the amount charged by the "mandap keeper" on account of his having let out the premises, it would not mean that the tax is wholly and integrally connected with such charges and, therefore, amounts to a tax regarding the rent of such a land or pertains to the collection of rents of that land. That would be clearly incorrect approach which has been shunned by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 1480 (Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan). There, the Supreme Court was considering as to whether the State in the guise of taxing passengers and goods under Entry 56 of List II was in pith and substance and in reality tax the income of the stage carriage operators or at any rate was taxing the fares and freights, both of which were outside its powers. It was argued that operators were required to pay the tax calculated at the rate related to the value of the fare and freight. The Apex Court observed : "We do not agree that the Act in its pith and substance levies the tax upon the income and not upon the passengers and goods. Sec. 3 in terms speaks of the charge of the tax in respect of all passengers carried and goods transported by motor vehicles and though the measure of the tax is furnished by the amount of fare and freight charges, it does not cease to be a tax on passengers and goods." 19.The Supreme Court also observed in the decision reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 1637 (Federation of Hotels and Restaurants v. Union of India) as follows : "The subject of a tax is different from the measure of the levy. The measure of the tax is not determinative of its essential character or of the competence of the legislature." The Supreme Court then went on to approve the aforementioned decision of the Sainik Motors's case, cited supra. It is, therefore, clear that what is being argued that the lack of legislative competence is on the back of the measure of tax and, therefore, such challenge would not be available in respect of Entry 18. 20.We then proceed to consider the argument that the service tax is in pith and substance a tax on land and/or building as covered in Entry 49 of List II. We have already pointed out that this tax could not be said to be a tax on land and/or building while considering the language of Entry 18. It is essentially a tax not on the land and/or building but a service offered with the use of the land and/or building. The impost of the tax is on a person who provides that service. It is essentially a tax not on the land and/or building but a service offered with the use of the land and/or building. The impost of the tax is on a person who provides that service. The tax is charged in entirely virgin sector. It is that element of service alone which is the subject of tax and even applying the theory of pith and substance it cannot be said that it would amount to a tax on land and/or building. There could be no dispute that the tax is integrally connected with the land and/or building but, it does not mean that it is a tax on land and/or building. In our opinion, the tax on land and/or building is charged because such land and/or building exist irrespective of the fact whether they are used or not. Their very existence is taxable whereas, it is the "user of the immovable property in a particular manner which amounts to a service given which has been made taxable under the present provisions". These two are entirely different aspects. Therefore, when we apply the theory of pith and substance to the present tax, it does not in any way come near the barred border line of Entry 18 or Entry 49 of List II let apart its entry into that barred territory. 21.It will be seen that impost of the tax under Entry 49 of List II would essentially be vis-a-vis the land and/or building as the case may be whereby such tax under Entry 49 would be essentially connected with the proprietary or ownership rights in the said land and /or building. Following observations 'of Hidayarullah, J. in the decision reported in AIR 1970 S.C. 999 (Second Gift Tax Officer v. Nazareth) are extremely relevant in this behalf. They are : "Since entry 49 of the State List contemplated a tax directly levied by reason of the general ownership of lands and buildings, it cannot include the gift tax as levied by Parliament." (Emphasis supplied) When we consider the definition of "mandap keeper" on whom alone is the impost of service tax, it is obvious that such person need not be having any proprietary or ownership rights in respect of the immovable property. Any person allowing the user of the immovable property for the purposes mentioned in Sec. 65(22) or (23) whether he is the owner or not when provides a service for consideration, the tax is attracted. This is again an essential feature which gives a totally different colour to this tax than the one under Entry 49 of List II. 22.It will be better at this juncture refer to the celebrated decision reported in AIR 1972 SC 1061 (H.S. Dhillon's case) wherein, the aforementioned decision was approved by a Larger Bench of the Apex Court. There, while explaining the requisites of tax under Entry 49 of List II, the Apex Court, in paragraph 65, observed as follows : "The requisites of a tax under Entry 49, List II may be summarised thus : (1)It must be a tax on units, that is lands and buildings separately as units. (2)The tax cannot be a tax on totality, i.e. it is not a composite tax on the value of all lands and buildings. (3)The tax is not concerned with the division of interest in the building or land. In other words, it is not concerned whether one person owns or occupies it or two or more persons own or occupy it. In short, the tax under entry 49 List II is not a personal tax but a tax on property." 23.Even the following observations in the decision reported in AIR 1969 S.C. 59 (Sudhir Chandra Nawn v. Wealth Tax Officer) came to be approved in this decision. They are : "Again entry 49 List II of the Seventh Schedule contemplates the levy of tax on lands and buildings or both as units. It is normally not concerned with the division of interest or ownership in the units of lands or buildings which are brought to tax. Tax on land and buildings is directly imposed on lands and buildings and bears a definite relation to it. " To the similar effect were the observations by the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1970 S.C. 169 (Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax v. The Bucingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd.) which also came to be approved.. 24.The real import of Entry 49 of List II is aptly decided in H.S. Dhil lon's case, cited supra, where the earlier decisions in respect of that entry have been considered and approved as shown by us above. Ltd.) which also came to be approved.. 24.The real import of Entry 49 of List II is aptly decided in H.S. Dhil lon's case, cited supra, where the earlier decisions in respect of that entry have been considered and approved as shown by us above. Once we see the real import of Entry 49 of List II, it is clear that the present challenged legislation cannot and does not come within the scope of that entry. The present legislation is clearly in respect of the "services" which area was totally untapped till the advent of the "service tax". 25.We have already referred to the background of the "service tax". In this behalf, it will be better to see that the concept of "service tax" is a totally novel concept, which was introduced for the first time in the year 1994. The learned Counsel for the respondent heavily relied on the speech of the then Finance Minister on the floor of the House while introducing the service tax for the first time. In paragraph 87 of his speech, the then Hon'ble Finance Minister has referred to the fact that the "service sector" which accounts for 40% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was not subjected to the relaxation and that there was a need to widen the base for Domestic indirect taxes. The Finance Minister argued that there was no sound reason for exempting the service sector from taxation when "goods" are taxed and that in many countries "goods" and "services" were treated alike for the tax purposes. A reference was also made to the report of the Taxation Reforms Committee suggesting tax on "services" for broadening the base of the indirect taxes. That is how the "services" offered to begin with by telephones, non-life insurance and stock brokers came to be charged at the rate of 5% of tax. Eventually, number of other services came to be included which services were hitherto untaxed. 26. This speech can be used by us to see the "object of the service tax" which would help us to understand the real nature thereof. In this behalf, the observations of the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1981 S.C. 1922 (K.P.Varghese v. I.T. Officer, Ernakulam) are apposite. The Apex Court has approved the reference to the speech of the mover of the bill to ascertain the object behind the legislation. In this behalf, the observations of the Apex Court in the decision reported in AIR 1981 S.C. 1922 (K.P.Varghese v. I.T. Officer, Ernakulam) are apposite. The Apex Court has approved the reference to the speech of the mover of the bill to ascertain the object behind the legislation. The relevant observations are found in paragraph 8 of the judgment, which are as under : "Now in this connection the speech made by the Finance Minister while moving the amendment introducing sub-section (2) is extremely relevant, as it throws considerable light on the object and purpose of the enactment of sub-section (2). The Finance Minister explained the reason for introducing sub-section (2) in the following words : Now it is true that the speeches made by the Members of the Legislature on the floor of the House when a Bill for enacting a statutory provision is being debated are inadmissible for the purpose of interpreting the statutory provision but the speech made by the Mover of the Bill explaining the reason for the introduction of the Bill can certainly be referred to for the purpose of ascertaining the mischief sought to be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for which the legislation is enacted. This is in accord with the recent trend in juristic thought not only in Western countries but also in India that interpretation of a statute being an exercise in the ascertainment of the meaning, everything which is logically relevant, should be admissible. In fact there are at least three decisions of this court, one in Loka Shikshana Trust v. Commissioner of Income-Tax ( AIR 1976 S.C. 10 ), the other in Indian Chamber of Commerce v. Commissioner of Income-Tax ( AIR 1976 S.C. 348 ) and the third in Addl. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association ( AIR 1980 S.C. 387 ) where the speech made by the Finance Minister while introducing the exclusionary clause in Section 2, Clause (15) of the Act was relied upon by the Court for the purpose of ascertaining what was the reason for introducing that clause." Be that as it may, it is clear that this is a tax on service and is entirely independent of and different from the existing taxes covered by the taxes provided in List II. That itself would suggest that this cannot come within the arena of Entry 49 of List II also. 27. In the decision reported in AIR 1990 S.C. 85 (India Cements Ltd. v. State of TamilNadu) when the Apex Court was considering the legality and constitutional validity of the cess on royalty on mineral rights again the scope of Entry 49 of List II came to be considered. The Supreme Court held that cess on royalty could not be sustained under Entry 49 of List II as being a tax on land. It was further held that royalty on mineral rights was not a tax on land but a payment for the "user" of the land. It would mean that the Apex Court has pointed out a "subtle distinction" between the "tax on the land" and the "tax for the user of the land". The case of the "mandap keepers", from the very language of the provisions, would be clearly covered by the law laid down in this case regarding the "user of the land". In the present case, the tax is on the "user" of the "mandap", which is provided as a "service" by the "mandap keeper". Therefore, in our opinion, the argument that the impugned legislation is covered by Entry 49 List II has to be rejected. 28. Yet third limb of argument on "legislative competence" was addressed by Mr. Mohan Parasaran. This was on account of the language of Sec. 65(48)(m) of the Finance Act. We will quote the said provision even at the cost repetition. "65. Definitions. (48) "taxable service" means any service provided, (m) to a client, by a mandap keeper in relation to the use of a mandap in any manner including the facilities provided to the client in relation to such use and also the services, if any, rendered as a caterer; (Emphasis ours) Learned Counsel then takes us to Sec. 67, which defines the "valuation of the taxable services" in Sec. 68(1). Again, at the cost of repetition, we quote Sec. 68(1): "67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax. Again, at the cost of repetition, we quote Sec. 68(1): "67. Valuation of taxable services for charging service tax. For the purposes of this Chapter, the value of taxable service, (1) in relation to service provided by a mandap keeper to a client shall be the gross amount charged by such keeper from the client for the use of mandap including the facilities provided to the client in relation to such use and also the charges for catering, if any;" (Emphasis ours) The thrust is again on the emphasised portion. The learned Counsel says that from this it is clear that when a "mandap keeper" provides the "catering service", even that service is charged. The learned Counsel then invited our attention to the definition of the word "caterer", which is defined in Sec. 65(10) of the Finance Act, which reads as under : '"caterer" means any person who supplies, either directly or indirectly, any food, edible preparations, alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages or crockery and similar articles or accoutrements for any purpose or occasion";' According to the learned Counsel from the conjoint leading or Sec. 65(10) and Sec. 65(m) of the Finance Act, it is clear that when the "mandap keeper" while providing the services of user of the "mandap" also supplies directly or indirectly food or beverages then, such services would be included in the "taxable service". According to the learned Counsel, the inclusion of the service rendered as a "caterer" is clearly beyond the "legislative competence" of the Parliament as that subject is covered in Entry 54 of List II, which we have quoted already. In support of the argument, the learned Counsel heavily relies on the provisions of Art. 366(29A)(f) of the Constitution, which we have already quoted in the earlier part of this Judgment. The contention is that if the service of catering by a mandap keeper is included in the "services" provided by the "mandap keeper" then, it would amount to a tax on "sale or purchase of goods" as it would be totally covered under clause (f) of Art. 366(29A). Under clause (f) of Art. 366(29A), a tax on the supply by way of or a part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever of food or any other article for human consumption or any drink, intoxicating or otherwise, will be included in the tax on sale or purchase of goods. Under clause (f) of Art. 366(29A), a tax on the supply by way of or a part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever of food or any other article for human consumption or any drink, intoxicating or otherwise, will be included in the tax on sale or purchase of goods. The learned Counsel argues that this tax is directly covered by Entry 54 as such the supply of food is deemed to be a sale thereof by the person making the supply by way of a service. The argument is extremely attractive. 29.By way of a reply, the learned Senior Counsel for the Department, however, suggested that Art. 366(29A)(f) will have no application as the concept of service envisaged in that clause is entirely different from the concept of service, which is covered by Sec. 65(m), the valuation of which is provided in Sec. 67(1). The learned Senior Counsel argues that clause (29A) was introduced by way of the forty-sixth constitutional amendment. The learned counsel, therefore refers to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Forty-Sixth Amendment and argues that sub-clause (f) of clause (29A) was clearly brought in because of the two earlier decisions by the Supreme Court, the decision reported in AIR 1972 S.C. 1131 (Associated Hotels of India case) as also the decision reported AIR 1978 S.C. 1591 [Northern India Carterers (India) Ltd v. Governor, Delhi]. In the earlier referred case, the Supreme Court had held that there is no "sale" involved in the supply of food and drink by a hotelier to a person lodged in the hotel and that the State have been proceeding on the basis of that case that this rule does not apply to the food served in hotel, restaurant to customer who was not necessarily staying in the hotel. However, in Northern India Caterers case, the Supreme Court while overruling a decision of the Delhi High Court held that service of meals even in a hotel, restaurant does not constitute a sale of food for the purpose of levy of sales-tax but must be regarded as the rendering of a service in satisfaction of a human need or mastering to the bodily wants of human beings. The Supreme Court further held that it would not make any difference whether the visitor to the restaurant was charged for the mean as a whole or according to the each dish separately. From this, the learned Counsel argues that the Government wanted this supply of food by the hotel to the residents as also to the nonresident guests under the tax-net for the sales-tax and it is in that light that clause (f) should be read. He points out that the "service" by a "mandap keeper" providing the food along with the service of "user of mandap" is of entirely a different nature and, therefore, cannot be viewed to be covered under Art. 366(29A)(f). The learned Counsel again relied upon Federation of Hotels and Restaurants case, cited supra. The learned Counsel points out that in this case also, the question of "legislative competence" of the Parliament in enacting the "Expenditure Tax Act" was involved and the term "chargeable expenditure" in that Act included the expenditure incurred in or payments made to a hotel in connection with the provisions of (a) ... (not relevant) ... and (b) food or drink by the hotel whether at the hotel or outside or by any other person at hotel. The learned Counsel further argues that entry 54 of List II fell directly for consideration, which would be clear from the references to it in paragraphs 10, 11, 13 and 19 of the Apex Court's judgment. While the references in paragraphs 10 and 11 pertain to the contentions raised, in paragraphs 13 and 19, the Supreme Court discusses the aspect of sale of goods. While the references in paragraphs 10 and 11 pertain to the contentions raised, in paragraphs 13 and 19, the Supreme Court discusses the aspect of sale of goods. In paragraph 13, the Supreme Court says : "The crucial questions, therefore, are whether the economists concept of such a tax qualifies and conditions the legislative power and, more importantly, whether "expenditure" laid out on what may be assumed to be "luxuries" or on the purchase of goods admits of being isolated and identified as a distinct aspect susceptible of recognition as a distinct field of tax legislation."(Emphasis supplied) In paragraph 19, the Court records the finding in the following words : "The submissions of the learned Attorney General that the tax is essentially a tax on expenditure and not on luxuries or sale of goods falling within the State power must in our opinion, be accepted."(Emphasis supplied) From all this, the learned Counsel argues that the Supreme Court treated the aspect of expenditure as a separate field for taxation distinct from the sale of goods. Similarly, in the present legislation also, the field of service has to be treated as distinct from the field of sale of goods, which would be covered by entry 54 of the State List. 30.However, the above argument was tried to be countered by the learned Counsel for the petitioners by showing that there is not even a distant reference to Art. 366(29A)(f) and, therefore, it was tried to be urged that the aforesaid decision was without reference to the constitutional provision. 31.In our opinion, the submission is wholly incorrect and, therefore, not binding. We will consider this aspect of binding nature first. There can be no question that the Supreme Court decisions are wholly binding on us. 31.In our opinion, the submission is wholly incorrect and, therefore, not binding. We will consider this aspect of binding nature first. There can be no question that the Supreme Court decisions are wholly binding on us. The binding nature of the Supreme Court decisions was considered in a recent Apex Court decision reported in (1997) 8 SCC 176 (Mahesh Kumar Saharia v. State of Nagaland), wherein the Apex Court has specifically held and approved the earlier observations to the following effect: "The binding effect of a decision does not depend upon whether a particular argument was considered therein or not, provided that the point with reference to which an argument was subsequently advanced was actually decided." Again in the decision reported in 1970 (2) SCC 267 (R.M. Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, Malkapur), in paragraph 4 the Supreme Court has specifically cautioned against such a course being adopted by the High Court. We would, therefore, not venture to comment upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the manner the petitioners would want us to do. The contention by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is therefore, clearly incorrect. It is quite apparent as to why no reference was made to Art. 366(29A)(f) as the argument in that case was that the aspect of expenditure was a distinct and separate aspect from the aspect of taxability on account of sale of goods or on account of its being the luxuries Art. 366(29A) (f) as the argument in that case was that the aspect of expenditure was a "distinct and separate" aspect from the aspect of taxability on account of the sale of goods or on account of its being luxuries. We can safely take same logic and point out that in the present matters also, the aspect of service is totally "independent of" and "distinct" from the aspect of "supply of food or drink" as the case may be. In the Federation of Hotels and Restaurants case, cited supra, also the question which fell for consideration was as to whether the tax on "expenditure" was validly imposed by the Parliament when the said expenditure pertained to food or drink supplied by the hotel whether at the hotel or outside or by any other person at the hotel. Mr. In the Federation of Hotels and Restaurants case, cited supra, also the question which fell for consideration was as to whether the tax on "expenditure" was validly imposed by the Parliament when the said expenditure pertained to food or drink supplied by the hotel whether at the hotel or outside or by any other person at the hotel. Mr. Chandrasekharan argues very forcefully that in spite of the striking similarity of the language in between Sec. 5 of the Expenditure Act and clause (f) of Art. 366(29A), there could be simply no question of the said tax being covered under entry 54 of the State List (List II) for the simple reason, the Supreme Court had found that the aspect of expenditure was "distinct and separate". In the same manner, the learned Counsel points out that the aspect of service is totally "distinct and separate" in the present case. 32.We feel that the aspect of service is extremely important and can be viewed as a "distinct and independent aspect" from the very language of Sec.65(48)(m). That provision spells out the "taxable service" and, therefore, can legitimately be read as fixing the tax liability along with Sec 66. Under Sec. 65(48) (m) what is taxed is taxable service to a client by a "mandap keeper" in relation to the use of a "mandap" in any manner and includes the facilities provided to the clients in relation to such use. The last words are extremely important and they are: "and also the services, if any, rendered as a caterer" What is, therefore, to be taxed is the "service" given by the "mandap keeper", which would mean the "user of the mandap" and the "facilities provided therein", which "facilities" would be in relation to the "user" and also the services rendered by the "mandap keeper" as a "caterer". Therefore, the last words of the provision clearly bring out a position that it is the service provided by the "mandap keeper" as a "caterer", which is taxable and not the supply made by him of food, drink, etc. 33. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, however, claimed attention to Sec. 67, which provides the "valuation of taxable service". Sub-section (1) of Sec. 67 contains the words "and also the charges for catering, if any" as the concluding words of the provision. 33. Mr. Mohan Parasaran, however, claimed attention to Sec. 67, which provides the "valuation of taxable service". Sub-section (1) of Sec. 67 contains the words "and also the charges for catering, if any" as the concluding words of the provision. The learned Counsel says that this itself suggests that in "pith and substance", what is being taken as the basis of the tax is the "gross amount" charged by the "mandap keeper", which includes the charges for the use of the mandap, other facilities and also the charges for catering and, therefore, it is clear that in effect, the "mandap keeper" is being taxed for the food that he has supplied by way of a service and, therefore, such service of food, drink, etc. must be understood as a "sale of goods" as per clause (f) of Art. 366(29A). The basic fallacy in this logic is that the nature of the tax is being tried to be decided on the basis of "measure thereof". There can be no dispute that S. 67(1) is nothing but the "measure of the tax", which cannot be considered while considering the true nature of the tax. Even at the cost of repetition, we may point out that in Federation of Hotels and Restaurants case, cited supra, in para 17 of the judgment of Venkatachaliah, ., as his Lordship then was, the Court says: "The subject of a tax is different from the measure of the levy. The measure of the tax is not determinative of its essential character or of the competence of the legislature. In Sainik Motors v. State of Rajasthan (1962) 1 SCR 517 : AIR 1961 S.C. 1480 , the provisions of a State law levying a tax on passengers and goods under entry 56 of List were assailed on the ground that the State was in the guise of taxing passengers and goods, in substance and reality taxing the income of the stage carriage operators, or, at any rate, was taxing the "fares and freights", both outside of its powers. It was pointed out that the operators were required to pay the tax calculated at a rate related to the value of the fare and freight. Repelling the contention, Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court, said (at p.1484 of AIR 1961 S.C.): "... It was pointed out that the operators were required to pay the tax calculated at a rate related to the value of the fare and freight. Repelling the contention, Hidayatullah, J. speaking for the Court, said (at p.1484 of AIR 1961 S.C.): "... we do not agree that the Act in its pith and substance, lays the tax upon income and not upon passengers and goods. Section 3, in respect of all passengers carried and goods transported by motor vehicles and though the measure of the tax is furnished by the amount of fare and freight charged, it does not cease to be a tax on passengers and goods..." We have already pointed out that the majority judgment in paragraph 19 has specifically held as follows : "The submissions of the learned Attorney General that the tax is essentially a tax on expenditure and not on luxuries or sale of goods falling within the State power, must, in our opinion, be accepted. As contended by the learned Attorney General, the distinct aspect namely, 'the expenditure' aspect of the transaction falling with the Union power must be distinguished and the legislative competence to impose a tax thereon sustained. Contention (a) is, in our opinion, unsubstantial and, accordingly, fails.". In the same manner, Ranganathan, ]., also observed after referring to the decisions reported in AIR 1948 PC 98 (Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons); 1978 (2) E.L.T. (J 272) (F.C) = AIR 1942 FC 33 (G.G. in-Council v. Province of Madras); and AIR 1939 FC l(In re : Central Provinces & Bearer Act XIV of 1953) as under: "In the light of these legislative entries the two different activities could properly be regarded as two different matters for taxation and the relevant legislation was held to be one concerned with 'sale' and not with 'manufacture'. In other words, there could be two enactments "each in one aspect conferring the power to impose a tax upon goods". The legislation was held not to be vitiated merely because there was an element of overlapping in that both excise duty and by reference to the same sale price when the first sale after manufacture occurs, one by reference to the 'manufacture' aspect and the other by reference to the 'sales' aspect. The legislation was held not to be vitiated merely because there was an element of overlapping in that both excise duty and by reference to the same sale price when the first sale after manufacture occurs, one by reference to the 'manufacture' aspect and the other by reference to the 'sales' aspect. This bifurcation of the two different aspects pertaining to goods was justified by the language of the legislative entries themselves which referred separately to the different set of activities and put them down in different legislative lists. Again, on the same principle, the manufacture of electricity may attract excise duty at the point of its captive consumption (under entry 84 of List I) and also a tax on the consumption or sale of electricity (referable to entry 53 of List II)". This should put an end to the argument. However, Mr. Mohan Parasaran again pointed out that there would be "double taxation", i.e. firstly the "mandap keeper" would have to pay "sales tax" on the food, drink, etc. which he supplies and secondly, such supply of food, drink, etc. would also attract the "service tax" because the charges thereof would be included in the 'gross amount' which he charges from the customers for the "user of the mandap". The Apex Court has, on more than one occasions, pointed out that there could be two levies by two separate enactments and that by itself would not be a vitiating factor. 34.There is one more reason why we say that this "service" is "distinct and separate". It will be seen that in the definition of "caterer", which we have already quoted above, provides that it means "any person who supplies, either directly or indirectly, any food, edible preparations, alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages or crockery and similar articles or accoutrements for any purpose or occasion". It can, therefore, be said that "catering service" could be given even with out the supply of food, drink, etc. because even if a "mandap keeper" provides the services by supplying the crockery and similar articles or accoutrements and does not choose to supply food, drink, etc., which the customer may arrange himself, the "service" which has been given by the "mandap keeper" would still be that of a "caterer". Therefore, it is not necessary that every catering service must include the supply of food, drink, etc. Therefore, it is not necessary that every catering service must include the supply of food, drink, etc. and the charges for catering would be the price of food, drink, etc. supplied by the caterer. 35.It was tried to be argued by Mr. Mohan Parasaran that the term used in clause (f) of the Art. 366 (29A) is "... supply, by way of or as part of any service or in any other manner whatsoever, of goods, being food or any other article for human consumption or any drink .". We have absolutely no difficulty with the word 'service' because even it we consider that "service" to be the "service" to be governed by that entry and termed to be a "sale of goods" even then, the aspect of the taxability of the services offered by the "mandap keeper" as a "caterer" would, in our opinion, be a "distinct and separate" aspect. We, therefore, need not interpret the term "service" in Article 366(29A)(f). 36.Our attention was also invited by the decision reported in (2001 1 SCC 521) (Damodar Naidu & Bros. v. State of TamilNadu and others) wherein, the provisions of Art. 366 (29A)(f) came to considered. It was pointed out that in the TamilNadu General Sales Tax Act, a provision was introduced by way of an amendment in 1984 wherein the term "sale" specifically included the exact phraseology of clause (f) of Article 366(29A). So also, the definition of "dealer"was expanded under the Act. It was pointed out by the learned Counsel that, therefore, the supply by the "mandap keeper" of the food, drink, etc. would certainly invite the "sales tax". We have absolutely no difficulty of that but, we have already pointed out that the present tax is not on the "sales" but it is on the "service" and that aspect is well explained in Federation of Hotels and Restaurants case, cited supra. In this case also in paragraph 9 when this aspect of service was pointed out to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court has held that it is the supply of food, which is the subject of levy though it may be a part of that service that he renders by providing good furniture, furnishing and fixtures, linen, crockery and cutlery, music, a dance floor and floor show, is what is the subject of levy. The Supreme Court says that the customer pays for the supply and it is on that payment that the restaurant-owners must be taxed. The argument raised by the restaurant-owners that the bills should be split was not accepted in paragraph 8 in that case. This reiterates our finding that even it there is a tax on the "sale of food" that is a "separate aspect" by itself which would have no concern with this "distinct aspect" of "service". 36.A reference came to be made to the decisions reported in JT 2000 (1) S.C. 498 (M/s. Rainbow Colour Lab. v. State of Madhya Pradesh) and 2001 (128) E.L.T. 21 (S.C.)=JT 2001 (2) S.C. 141 (M/s. Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs). Both the decisions and more particularly the decision in Associated Cement Companies case would be really of no consequence as all that it provides is that after the introduction of the Forty-sixth Amendment, there cannot be a splitting of the works contract. The Apex Court holds in paragraphs 24, 25 and 26 that the conclusion arrived at in Rainbow Colour Lab case runs counter to the express provision contained in Art. 366(29A) as also of the Constitution Bench decision in Builders Association of India case, cited supra. We are not concerned with the splitting of any works contract here. We have no hesitation in holding that the supply of food, drink, etc. by the mandap keeper may attract "sales tax". We do not say that such supply will not attract "sales tax" because it is a "service" of a different kind. On the other hand, we say that though it may attract the "sales tax", it would also attract the "service tax" and, at any rate, the provision of service tax against such supply is not outside the legislative competence of the Parliament. We have already referred to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Forty-sixth Amendment to know precisely as to why the said amendment was introduced. In this view, we must hold that even the third argument of Mr. Mohan Parasaran has to be rejected. 38.Lastly, Mr. Mohan Parasaran urged that the impugned provisions and more particularly Section 65(23) is vague and there is no way of knowing for any mandap keeper as to whether a function for which he allows the user of the mandap is social, official or business. Mohan Parasaran has to be rejected. 38.Lastly, Mr. Mohan Parasaran urged that the impugned provisions and more particularly Section 65(23) is vague and there is no way of knowing for any mandap keeper as to whether a function for which he allows the user of the mandap is social, official or business. He points out that there are no guidelines provided in the whole machinery of the Act to suggest what is precisely meant by an "official function", "social function" or "business function". The learned Counsel further argued that even as regards the "gross charges", which are referred to in the "valuation of taxable service", there is no guidelines as to what part of such "gross charge" is to be taxed and what part is not to be taxed. The learned Counsel heavily relied on the decision reported in 2000 (1) SCC 524 (Da-modarasamy Naidu & Bros, case) and points out that there the Supreme Court has taken particular steps in that case. As against this, the learned Senior Counsel for the Department points out that it is not necessary that each and every term used in the Act should be specifically explained or the guidelines should be provided therefor. The learned Counsel argues that this being a "taxing statute" and, therefore, ordinarily there should be enough scope for "discretion and play" in this statute as observed by the Supreme Court in Federation of Hotels and Restaurants case, cited supra. The learned Counsel further argues that it was not necessary that there has to be rules and guidelines in every provision. According to the learned Counsel, the only test is that there should not be any vice of arbitrariness attached to any of the provisions which are in challenge. 39.Our attention was invited to the decisions reported in 1995 Suppl. (I) SCC 235 (Benilal v. State of Maharashtra); 1997 (89) E.L.T. 247 (S.C.) = 1997 (5) SCC 536 (Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India) and AIR 1979 S.C. 478 (In re : Special Courts Bill). Before going to these case-laws, it will be better to consider the language of Sections 65(22) and (23) of the Finance Act. 40.The objection by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that there is no guidance as to which kind of function would be "social", "official" or "business", which would come in the dragnet of the Finance Act. Before going to these case-laws, it will be better to consider the language of Sections 65(22) and (23) of the Finance Act. 40.The objection by the learned Counsel for the petitioners is that there is no guidance as to which kind of function would be "social", "official" or "business", which would come in the dragnet of the Finance Act. In fact, according to us, there is nothing confusing in the sections which requires any explanation. When any provision is to by understood, the first rule is that it has to be understood by its reference to the language. The terms given in the provisions clearly are to be understood by their plain meaning which are understood ordinarily. We do not think there is any difficulty about understanding as to what kind of function would be the "official function", "social function" or "business function". Again, there is a complete machinery given in the Act to decide the nature of the function. If a "mandap keeper" seeks any exemption or contends that the function for which he has provided the service of the user of the mandap is not of the nature covered by sub-sections (22) or (23), it would be for the as- sessee to claim any exemption and it would be for the authorities to decide. There are provision of appeal within the machinery of the Act. Therefore, in our opinion, it is not necessary to further elaborate as to what kinds of function would be the social, official or business function. 41.It is further argued though haltingly that only these three kinds of functions are made taxable while the others are not, which are, for example, religious functions, political functions, family functions, etc. We only say, relying on the observations made in Federation of Hotels and Restaurants case, cited supra, in paragraph 20, that though taxing laws are not outside Article 14, however, having regard to the wide variety of diverse economic criteria that go into the formulation of a fiscal-policy legislature enjoys a wide latitude in the matter of selection of persons, subject-matter, events, etc. for taxation. The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are, accordingly, less rigorous. In examining the allegations of a hostile, discriminatory treatment what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. 42. for taxation. The tests of the vice of discrimination in a taxing law are, accordingly, less rigorous. In examining the allegations of a hostile, discriminatory treatment what is looked into is not its phraseology, but the real effect of its provisions. 42. In the decision reported in 1997 (89) E.L.T. 247 (S.C.) = 1997 (5) SCC 536 (Mafatlal Industries case), also the Apex Court has approved the "theory of discretion" in the legislature. There, the observations in the reported decision of R.K. Garg v. Union of India [ 1981 (4) SCC 675 ] have been approved in paragraph 87. The observations are : "Laws relating to economic activities should be viewed with greater latitude than laws touching civil rights such as freedom of speech, religion, etc. It has been said by no less a person than Holmes, J. that the legislature should be allowed some play in the joints, because it has to deal with complex problems which do not admit of solution through any doctrinaire or strait-jacket formula and this is particularly true in case of legislation dealing with economic matters, where, having regard to the nature of the problems required to be dealt with, greater play in the joints has to be allowed to the legislature. The court should feel more inclined to give judicial deference to legislative judgment in the field of economic regulation that in other areas where fundamental human rights are involved. The Court must always remember that legislation is directed to practical problems that the economic mechanism is highly sensitive and complex, that many problems are singular and contingent, that laws are not abstract propositions and do not relate to abstract units and are not to be measured by abstract symmetry; that exact wisdom and nice adaptation of remedy are not always possible and that judgment is largely a prophecy based on meagre and uninterrupted experience." Similarly, in the same decision, the following observations in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [ 1973 (4) SCC 225 ] were also approved. The observations are quoted in paragraph 88 of the judgment. They are : "In exercising the power of judicial review, the Courts cannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the government. The door has to be left open for trial and error. Constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some chances. The observations are quoted in paragraph 88 of the judgment. They are : "In exercising the power of judicial review, the Courts cannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the government. The door has to be left open for trial and error. Constitutional law like other mortal contrivances has to take some chances. Opportunity must be allowed for vindicating reasonable belief by experience." We do not, therefore, find that the legislature has done anything wrong in bringing the "social function", "official function" and "business function" alone in the dragnet of service tax while leaving other kinds of functions, if any. 42A. As regards the contention of the "language" of the provisions, let us now consider the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1995 Suppl. (I) S.C. 235. A complaint was made against the C.P. & Berar Regulation of Letting of Accommodation Act, 1964 as also the C.P. & Berar Letting of House and Rent Control Order, 1949 especially clause 13(3)(ii). It was complained that the words habitually in arrears are vague and are indefinite. The presumption was that those words should have been defined but that was not done and its construction is varied on subjective decision of the court and can vary from court to court. Therefore, the words habitually in arrears being vague and indefinite, and exercise of the power having been entrusted to an officer not judicially trained to construe the provision of the Act, it would lead to unbridled exercise of power without guidelines, offending Article 14 of Constitution. The Supreme Court held : "It is well settled that the legislative scheme may employ words of generality conveying its policy and intention to achieve the object set out therein. Every word need not be defined. It may be a matter of judicial construction of such words or phrases. Mere fact that a particular word or phrase has not been defined is not a ground to declare the provisions of the Act itself or the order as unconstitutional. The word "habitual" cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. It is a matter of judicial construction and always depends upon the given facts and circumstances in each case." We do not think that the above contention raised by Mr. Mohan Parasaran deserves any merit as such for the reasons stated above. Mr. The word "habitual" cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. It is a matter of judicial construction and always depends upon the given facts and circumstances in each case." We do not think that the above contention raised by Mr. Mohan Parasaran deserves any merit as such for the reasons stated above. Mr. Mohan Parasaran also contended that there is no guideline in the provisions as to which part is to be taxed and which part not to be taxed. We do not think that there is any such deformity in the provisions. The provisions are clear that the "gross charges" are to be taken into consideration while assessing the "service tax". The contention is, therefore, rejected. Mr. Mohan Parasaran asked us to follow the course that the Supreme Court followed in respect of Maharashtra Hotel Owners. There, the question was regarding the "residential hotels" and the charges was also to be a "composite charge". Such is not the situation here. The charge which has to be paid by the assessee is to be fully covered by the "gross charges" in respect of the service provided. The distinctions in the two kinds of services made are apparent from the express language of Sec. 67(1) and, therefore, we do not think that the provisions suffer from the vice of arbitrariness. 43.We have dealt with all the writ petitions in this category, which have been argued before us. Besides the above writ petitions, the following writ petitions, viz. W.P. Nos.: 12316, 16223, 16501, 16651, 13048, 15131, 15990, 10405, 17116 and 20729 of 1998, 1049, 3883, 269, 9042, 1601, 9267, 15650 and 54 of 1999, 13081 and 13082 of 2000, 2810, 10347 and 12888 of 2000 and 46 to 59 of 2001, are in the group and shown in the list, for which no arguments were advanced. We, therefore, dispose of these writ petitions also by the present judgment. 44.We see no merit in the writ petitions. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed and are, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.