MOHAMED ANWAR, J. ( 1 ) HEARD both sides. ( 2 ) BY this Writ Petition, petitioner seeks issuance of a writ of mandamus against respondent Corporation to immediately reinstate him in his original post in the Corporation with continuity of service and other consequential benefits alongwith interest at 24% on the arrears, pursuant to the judgment and decree of the City Civil Court, bangalore, passed in O. S. No. 3210/1995 dated 1. 1. 1998 vide annexure-A. ( 3 ) FACTS not in disputepetitioner having been appointed as Manager of respondent corporation on 16. 1. 1986 had been working as such in the corporation and in due course of his service, he was promoted to the next higher cadre as Deputy Chief Manager (Finance ). While he was so working, on 11. 8. 1994, he was placed under suspension as disciplinary enquiry was initiated against him on certain charges of misconduct. Finally that enquiry resulted in the order of his dismissal bearing No. KSIMC:per:5:95 dated 12. 5. 1995 by the respondent disciplinary authority. That order of dismissal was challenged by the petitioner before the City Civil Court in O. S. No. 3210/1995. The relief prayed by him in that suit was for a decree declaring the enquiry report dated 7. 4. 1995 of the enquiry officer in the said disciplinary proceeding and the said dismissal order dated 12. 5. 1995 of the disciplinary authority passed pursuant thereto, null and void. That suit was contested by respondent who was defendant therein. On respective pleadings of the parties, necessary issues were raised by the Trial Court. Both parties had let in their considerable evidence, both oral and documentary, in support of their respective cases at the trial. On merits of the evidence, petitioner's suit viz. , o. S. No. 3210/1995, came to be decreed in part by judgment dated 1. 1. 1998 of the Trial Court in the following terms: "order the suit is decreed in part. The order dated 12-5-1995 issued by the I defendant Board dismissing the plaintiff from service is null and void and the same is hereby set aside. However, the I defendant is hereby directed to give an opportunity to the plaintiff to have his say and make representation with regard to charges 6, 8, 11 and 14 and also before imposing any penalty on the plaintiff. However, the I defendant is hereby directed to give an opportunity to the plaintiff to have his say and make representation with regard to charges 6, 8, 11 and 14 and also before imposing any penalty on the plaintiff. In the circumstances of the case, there is no order as to costs. ( 4 ) ADMITTEDLY, the aforesaid decree of the Trial Court was not challenged by the petitioner-defendant and the same was accepted by it. . ( 5 ) THEREAFTER, petitioner gave his letter dated 8. 1. 1998 vide Annexure B to the respondent stating that pursuant to the said decree of the Trial Court declaring its said dismissal order null and void, he was reporting for duty at 10 a. m. on 8. 1. 1998. Thereupon, respondent sent a letter dated 15. 1. 1998, vide Annexure-C, by RPAD to the petitioner stating that: "the matter is being examined on all aspects and we will revert back to you in-due course", while acknowledging receipt of petitioner's report at Annexure-B. Subsequently, about two and half months later, Annexure-B was followed by another detailed letter dated 28. 3. 1998, vide Anneure-D, of respondent reiterating therein its proceeding which had resulted in the aid dismissal order dated 12. 5. 1995, and calling upon petitioner to make further representation before 15. 4. 1998, if any, in respect of the findings of the enquiry officer on charge Nos. 6, 8, 11 and 14 which were recorded in his said enquiry report dated 7. 4. 1995. ( 6 ) IT was submitted at the Bar that in response to Annexure-D of respondent, petitioner had promptly given his representation with his explanation to the Corporation (respondent ). Thereafter, indisputably as could be gathered from the objection statement of respondent aswell, there has been a complete lull in the matter of further proceeding against petitioner by the respondent Disciplinary Authority. It is also an admitted fact that subsequent to the Trial Court's said decree dated 1. 1. 1998, petitioner has not been placed under suspension by it and also that despite his fepeated request and representation dated 11. 5. 1999, vide Annexure-F, he is not formally reinstated in his official position as Deputy Chief Manager (Finance) in the Corporation. ( 7 ) AS rightly argued by the learned Counsel representing petitioner Mr. V. S. Naik, the direct legal consequence of the Trial Court's decree dated 1. 1. 5. 1999, vide Annexure-F, he is not formally reinstated in his official position as Deputy Chief Manager (Finance) in the Corporation. ( 7 ) AS rightly argued by the learned Counsel representing petitioner Mr. V. S. Naik, the direct legal consequence of the Trial Court's decree dated 1. 1. 1998, by which the respondent's said order of dismissal dated 12. 5. 1995 was declared null and void, was that the petitioner became entitled to be reinstated forthwith in his original position of deputy Chief Manager (Finance) in the respondent Corporation and the latter was under a corresponding legal obligation to reinstate him in his original official position; subject, of course, to the exercise of option by respondent to revive its disciplinary action against petitioner in terms of the said decree. But, as of now, it is a matter of record that petitioner has been illegally prevented by the respondent from discharging his official duty from 11. 8. 1994 (on which date he was suspended) till this day. With his entitlement to reinstatement by virtue of the said decree, he shall be deemed to have been in continuous service for this period and till the date when he is actually reinstated by the respondent. Thus, the salary and other monetary benefits to which he is entitled for this period are wilfully and wrongly withheld by the respondent. It augurs well for any Disciplinary Authority to always bear in mind that the process of any domestic enquiry once set in motion by it against any employee, the enquiry must be get concluded one way or the other with utmost despatch and within a reasonable time to ensure a fair deal to the delinquent on the one hand and to instill the sense of discipline and duty in the other members of the staff of the concerned department. Any avoidable and unreasonable delay in this process would undoubtedly tend to develop an impression in the minds of all the concerned that the disciplinary action initiated against so called delinquent is probably vindictive in nature, which impression would then be a sad commentary on the administrative morale of the establishment as a whole. In this case, though a period of three years has elapsed since passing of the said decree by the Trial court, the respondent has been maintaining indiscreet silence in the matter and has deliberately failed to reinstate the petitioner. In this case, though a period of three years has elapsed since passing of the said decree by the Trial court, the respondent has been maintaining indiscreet silence in the matter and has deliberately failed to reinstate the petitioner. This is a clear indication of the fact that it is an irresponsible conduct of respondent - Disciplinary Authority, which smacks of utterly malafide intention on its part. The respondent will have no such power muchless legal authority whatever, as the Disciplinary Authority to place the petitioner in such an unwarranted predicament and subject him to untold misery and mental torture on the pretence of pendency of some domestic enquiry which is left in a suspended animation. No Disciplinary Authority could be allowed in law to act in such a despotic and autocratic manner in fagrant violation of all the canons of law, justice, fair play and good conscience. In that view of the matter, the petition deserves to be allowed in the ends of justice. ( 8 ) IT was contended by Mr. Ramesh that the petition is, per se, not main tainable, in that, the relief sought therein by the petitioner amounts to execution of the Trial Court's said decree which he has to seek from Trial Court itself. I am unable to accede to this contention of Mr. Ramesh in the light of the terms of the decree extracted herein above. They are self-speaking. They disclose that the only relief for which the suit was filed by the petitioner was for the relief of declaration that the said enquiry report and dismissal order of the Corporation were null and void. No further relief in the suit was sought by the petitioner for his reinstatement in the original post with consequential monetary benefits from the date of his suspension. Nor such a relief was expressly granted by the Trial court to him under the said decree. In view of the terms of the decree, the contention of Mr. Ramesh that the relief prayed by the petitioner in the present Writ Petition is the relief of execution of the said decree falls short of the true import of execution of a decree. In view of the terms of the decree, the contention of Mr. Ramesh that the relief prayed by the petitioner in the present Writ Petition is the relief of execution of the said decree falls short of the true import of execution of a decree. In that view of the matter, I find that the present Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking enforcement of consequential reliefs flowing from the Trial Court's decree is maintainable and the same cannot be treated as the mere execution petition made for execution of the said decree. ( 9 ) FOR the reasons aforesaid, the petition is allowed with a direction to the respondent to reinstate the petitioner forthwith to his original Official position in the Corporation i. e. , Deputy Chief Manager (Finance) with all consequential service and monetary benefits and that the petitioner shall be entitled to get monetary benefits from the corporation from the date of his said suspension i. e. , 11. 8. 1994 till the date of his reinstatement in his original official position, with interest at 12% per annum on the amount payable to him. A copy of this order shall be made available to the learned counsel for respondent immediately on his making an application therefor and on payment of requisite fee. --- *** --- .