DATTU, J. ( 1 ) PETITION was an Officer holding permanent commission in the regular army. He was holding a substantive rank of Lieutenant Col. (time scale) with effect from 31. 7. 1984. This promotion came to be cancelled while Court Martial Proceedings was in progress and was reverted back to the rank of Major. In this petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, petitioner calls in -question the correctness or otherwise of the sentence imposed by General Court martial in dismissing him from service and the order made by Chief of the Army Staff in confirming the sentence imposed by the General court Martial. ( 2 ) THE brief facts are:while petitioner was working as Accounts Officer of Depot battalion, Madras Engineering Group and Centre with effect from 1. 11. 1983 to 12. 11. 1983 and 21. 11. 1983 to 19. 12. 1983, the General officer Commanding, Andhra Pradesh, Tamilnadu, Karnataka, and kerala Area, had passed an order dated 19. 10. 1986 convening for the assembly of General Court Martial to try certain offences said to have been committed by him. The Judge, Advocate and Prosecutor was also named for the purpose of trying the petitioner by the Court martial. The General Court Martial has power to try any person subject to the Army Act for any offence punishable therein and award any sentence authorised thereby. After following the initial procedure before the trial by Court Martial the General Court Martial had prepared a document, which contained the issues to be tried by the court Martial. In Military Law, this document is normally known as charge sheet or charge memo and this contained three charges and each charge is divided into two parts, namely, (I) Statement of the offence and (II) Statement of the particulars of the act, neglect or omission constituting the offence. The charge memo so framed is as under: (I) An omission prejudicial to good order and Military discipline in that he, at Bangalore between 1. 11. 1983 and 12. 11. 1983, while the Accounts Officer of Depot Battalion, Madras Engineer Group and Centre, and responsible for the correct maintenance of imprest account No. 1749 of Depot Battalion, Madras Engineering group and Centre, improperly omitted to exercise proper supervision and control over the maintenance of the said Imprest account, thereby causing loss to the Government to the tune of rs. 2. 500/ -. 2. 500/ -. (ii) an omission prejudicial to good order and military Discipline in that he at Bangalore between 21. 11. 1983 and 19. 12. 1983 while the Accounts Officer of Depot Battalion. Madras Engineer Group and Centre, and responsible for the correct maintenance of imprest Account fund No. 1749 of Depot Battalion Madras engineer Group and Centre, Bangalore; improperly omitted to exercise proper supervision and control over the maintenance of the said Imprest Account, thereby causing loss to the Government to the tune of Rs. 31,934-15ps. only. (iii) Absenting himself without leave in that he at Longa, on 23. 4. 1985 having been given movement order by Rajasthan composite (Technical) Company NCC (Bikaner) on 20. 4. 1985 to report to Madras Engineer Group and Centre, Bangalore absented himself without leave until reported voluntarily to the said centre on 18. 5. 1985". ( 3 ) THE first two charges come within the provisions of Section63 of the Army Act and the third charge falls under Section 39 (a) of the Act. Before the Genera) Court Martial, certain witnesses were examined in support of the allegations made in the charge memo and the accused Army Officer had examined two witnesses. The general Court Martial after conclusion of its proceedings, has recorded a finding which reads as under: findings'the Court find that the accused IC-19778n Lt. Col. (TS) Savant purushotham Vithal Rao, 1 Raj. R and V Sqn. NCC Bikaner, attached Madras Engineer Group and; Centre Bangalore is guilty of the first and third charges and guilty of the second charge with variation that figures and words Rs. 31,934. 15 "rupees Thirty one thousand nine hundred thirty four and paise fifteen only' shall read as Rs. 31,334. 15 Rupees Thirty one thousand three hundred thirty four and ps. Fifteen only. " ( 4 ) THE findings of the General Court Martial is interlocutory andinchoate until it is confirmed as provided by the Act. Accordingly, the findings are confirmed by the Chief of the Army Staff by his order dated 2. 1. 1988. The same is as under:"b/03816/ag/dv-5 minute gcm:ic-19778n LT COL (TS) SAVANT PURSHOTTAM VITHAL rao OF N0. 1 RAJASTHAN COMPOSITE (TECHNICAL company NCC. BJKANER, ATTACHED TO MADRAS engineer GROUP AND CENTRE, BANGALORE. confirm the findings and sentence of the Court. Signed at New Delhi on this Second day of January, 1988. sd/- (K. Sundarji) general chief of the Army Staff. 1988. The same is as under:"b/03816/ag/dv-5 minute gcm:ic-19778n LT COL (TS) SAVANT PURSHOTTAM VITHAL rao OF N0. 1 RAJASTHAN COMPOSITE (TECHNICAL company NCC. BJKANER, ATTACHED TO MADRAS engineer GROUP AND CENTRE, BANGALORE. confirm the findings and sentence of the Court. Signed at New Delhi on this Second day of January, 1988. sd/- (K. Sundarji) general chief of the Army Staff. " ( 5 ) THE charge memo, finding and sentence together with theconfirmation of the proceedings are promulgated to the accused on 32. 1988, according to the custom of the service and in accordance with Rule 71 of the Army Rules and Para 473 of the Regulations of the Army. The promulgation Certificate issued is as under:"promulgation CERTIFICATE general COURT MARTIAL - 1c - 19778n LT COL (TS) SAVANT purushottam VITHAL RAO OF NO. 1 RAJASTHAN composite (TECHNICAL) COMPANY NCC. BIKANER attached TO MADRAS ENGINEER GROUP AND CENTRE, bangalore. Promulgated and extracts taken at Bangalore this third day of February. 1988. Station:bangalore dated: 3. 2. 1988 sd- (Surjit Singh) brigadier commander. " ( 6 ) STRANGELY in the present case, petitioner though aggrieved bythe order made by the Court Martial did not present any petition to the Officer or authority empowered to confirm any finding or sentence of such Court Martial, but has filed this petition for the reliefs indicated by me earlier. ( 7 ) RESPONDENTS have filed their detailed statement of objectionsresisting the reliefs sought for by the petitioner. In that, they justify the procedure followed in convening the General Court Martial by the General Officer Commanding of the Area dated 19. 10. 1986, and the findings thereon. They also state that, there is enormous delay in filing the Writ Petition from the date of confirmation of sentence by the chief of the Army staff and the promulgation made pursuant to such confirmation on 3. 2. 1988. ( 8 ) SRI K. S. Desai, learned Counsel appearing for the petitionerstates that, convening of the General Court Martial is contrary to rule 37 of the Army Rules,1944. In that, he states, the convening of the General Court Martial is not ordered by the General Officer commanding and it is done only by the Colonel and therefore, the entire proceedings are bad and illegal. In that, he states, the convening of the General Court Martial is not ordered by the General Officer commanding and it is done only by the Colonel and therefore, the entire proceedings are bad and illegal. In support of that statement, learned Counsel relies upon the observations made by the Apex court in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS vs HARI8h chandra GOSWAMI. The second assertion made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, the findings of the General Court martial are not supported by any reasons whatsoever and therefore, the findings cannot be the basis for imposing any punishment much less, dismissal from service. In support of that contention, the learned counsel relies upon the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER vs CHARANJIT s. GILL AND OTHERS. Thirdly, the learned Counsel contends that the impugned order is not signed by all the members of the General court Martial. Therefore, it should be presumed that there is a total non-application of mind. Lastly, the learned Counsel contends that section 39 (a) and Section 63 of the Army Act provides for the maximum punishment that could be imposed if there is an offence and finding of guilt under those two provisions. According to the learned Counsel, for an offence under Section 39 (a) of the Army act, the maximum punishment that could be imposed is three years and if it is under Section 63 of the Act, it could be only. 7 years and at any rate, the authorities could not have imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. ( 9 ) IN so far as the delay and laches on the part of the petitionerin approaching this Court nearly after three and half years from the date of confirmation of sentence by the Chief of the Army staff, the learned Counsel would contend that the General Court Martial on 10. 4. 1987 passed an order subject to the confirmation by the Chiefof the Army Staff and that confirmation was done only on 2. 1. 1988. According to the learned Counsel, the promulgation and the confirmation order made by the Chief of the Army Staff was communicated to the petitioner only on 21. 3. 4. 1987 passed an order subject to the confirmation by the Chiefof the Army Staff and that confirmation was done only on 2. 1. 1988. According to the learned Counsel, the promulgation and the confirmation order made by the Chief of the Army Staff was communicated to the petitioner only on 21. 3. 1992 and therefore, there is no delay or laches on the part of the petitioner in approaching this Court after the communication of the confirmation of the. orders by the Army Staff. In support of that contention. , the learned Counsel relies upon the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of state OF PUNJAB vs AMARSINGH HARIKA and the observations of this Court in the case of M/s VYALIKAVAL HOUSE BUILDING co-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, BANGALORE vs SMT. PUTTAMMA AND others. ( 10 ) I do not intend to reject the petition on delay and laches, since this matter is pending before this Court from last eight years. ( 11 ) LET me take the minor issues canvassed by the leamedcounsel for the petitioner first. The learned Counsel states that, the general Court Martial's findings are not supported by any reasons whatsoever. Therefore, based on the findings which is not supported by any reason, the Chief of the Army Staff could not have confirmed the findings of the General Court Martial. Therefore, the entire proceedings are vitiated. In support of this contention, the learned counsel takes me through the findings of the General Court Martial which is annexed as Annexure-A to the Writ Petition. In support of that contention, as I have already stated, the learned Counsel relies upon the observations made by the Apex Court in the case of UNION of INDIA AND ANOTHER vs CHARANJIT S. GILL AND OTHERS (supra) wherein it is stated as under:"despite the lapse of two decades neither Parliament nor the central Government appears to have realised their constitutional obligations, as were expected by this Court, except amending rule 62 providing that after recording the finding in each charge the Court shall give brief reasons in support thereof. The Judge advocate has been obliged to record or caused to be recorded brief reasons in the proceedings. " ( 12 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel, the findings of the Generalcourt Martial should be supported by sufficient reasons. The Judge advocate has been obliged to record or caused to be recorded brief reasons in the proceedings. " ( 12 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel, the findings of the Generalcourt Martial should be supported by sufficient reasons. In the absence of the same, it will be extremely difficult for the Apex Court to find out whether there was any application of mind by the General court Martial before finding the accused guilty of the charges alleged in the charge sheet. According to the learned Counsel, since the findings of the General Court Martial is not supported by any reason whatsoever, the same cannot be sustained in view of the law declared by the Apex Court in Charanjit S. Gill's case. ( 13 ) THIS contention of the learned Counsel is answered by therespondents learned Counsel by stating that the observations made by the Apex Court in CHARANJIT S. GILL's case is prospective and it cannot be applied to those proceedings which are already completed and finalised. In support of that statement, the learned counsel draws my attention to the observations made by the Apex court in the said decision itself, where the Apex Court has clarified that the observations made in the order will not be governed by the principles of "defacto doctrine". In view of this, in my opinion, the second contention canvassed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner has no merit. Accordingly, it is rejected. ( 14 ) THE learned Counsel submits that, the impugned order madeby the General Court Martial is not signed by all the members of the General Court martial and therefore, it should be presumed that there is total non-application of mind. In my opinion, even this contention cannot be accepted. Rule 161 of the Army Rules provides for the finding and sentence. Rule 162 of the Army Rules provides for signed and transmission of proceedings. The said Rule reads as under:"upon the Court arriving at a finding of "not guilty", or awarding the sentence in case of having arrived at a finding of "guilty", the presiding officer shall date and sign the finding or sentence, as the case may be. The signature shall authenticate the whole of the proceedings and the proceedings upon being signed by the judge-advocate, if any, shall at once be transmitted to the confirming officer, for confirmation. The signature shall authenticate the whole of the proceedings and the proceedings upon being signed by the judge-advocate, if any, shall at once be transmitted to the confirming officer, for confirmation. " ( 15 ) A reading of the aforesaid Rules would clearly indiate that, itis the Presiding Officer and the Judge-Advocate, who are the people who would sign the proceedings of the General Court Martial nowhere in the Rule, it is stated that all the members of the General court Martial should sign the proceedings. In view of that,it cannot be said that there was non-application of mind by the Member of the General Court Martial while giving a finding that the petitioner is guilty of the charges. ( 16 ) A perusal of the findings of the General Court Martial wouldindicate that the same is signed by the Presiding Officer as well as the Judge-Advocate and thus would satisfy the requirements of Rule 161 of the Rules. Therefore, the contention canvassed that it is not signed by all the Members who participated in the General Court martial and therefore, should be presumed that there is total nonapplication of mind is rejected. ( 17 ) THE fourth issue can passed by the learned Counsel for thepetitioner is that, Section 39 (a) of the Act envisages that, any person subject to the Army Act absents himself without leave, shall on conviction by Court. Martial be liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or such less punishment as mentioned in the Act, and secondly, if an officer is found guilty of section 63 of the Act, on conviction by a General Court, Martial, he is liable to suffer imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years or such less punishment as in this Act mentioned. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner states that the General Court martial could not have imposed punishment of dismissal from service. To answer this stand of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, respondents learned Counsel has invited my attention to Section 71 and 72 of the Army Act. Therefore, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner states that the General Court martial could not have imposed punishment of dismissal from service. To answer this stand of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, respondents learned Counsel has invited my attention to Section 71 and 72 of the Army Act. Section 72 of the Act provides for alternative punishments that Could be imposed by a Court Martial, which says subject to the provision of this Act, a Court Martial may, on convicting a person subject to this Act of the offences specified in Sections 34 to 68 inclusive, award either the particular punishment with which the offence is stated in the said Section to be punishable, or, in lieu thereof, any one of the punishments lower in the scale set out in section 71, regard being had to the nature and degree of the offence. Section 71 of the Act provides for punishment that could be imposed by the Court Martial. One of the punishment that is indicated under section 71 of the Act is dismissal from service. ( 18 ) THE frame work of lengthy authorised punishments of themilitary Justice System is some what more complicated than that prevailing in most Civilian Penal Systems. The basic jurisdiction to punish is prescribed in the Act as an integral part of each of the military offences or punitive section within the maximum punishment prescribed by the section. The Court Martial has a discretionary power to apportion punishment according to the degree of guilt of the party convicted. Those convicted of offences in relation to the enemy, mutiny or desertion on active service or when under orders for active service shall suffer death or such less punishment as is prescribed in the Act. All the other offences are punishable either with imprisonment, or eashiering or dismissal from the service or such less punishments as prescribed in the Act. Punishments awardable by Court Martial in respect of offences committed by persons subject to the Army Act are enumerated under Section 71 of the Army Act. A Court Martial may, on convicting a person subject to this Act of any of the service offences award either the particular punishment prescribed by the Section or in lieu therefor, any one of the punishments lower in the scale set out in Section 71 of the Act, regard being had to. be nature and degree of the offence. A Court Martial may, on convicting a person subject to this Act of any of the service offences award either the particular punishment prescribed by the Section or in lieu therefor, any one of the punishments lower in the scale set out in Section 71 of the Act, regard being had to. be nature and degree of the offence. A sentence of a Court Martial may award in addition to or without any punishment specified in Clause (d) or Clause (e) of Section 71 and any one or more of the punishment specified in Clauses (f) to (i) of that Section. Section 72 of the Act provides for alternative punishment awardable by Court Martial. The section authorises the Court Martial, on convicting a person subject to the provisions of the Act, any of the offences specified in Sections 34 to 68, to award either the particular punishment with which the offence is stated in the said sections or in lieu thereof, any one, of the punishments lower in the scale set out in Section 71, regard being had to the nature and degree of the offence, Section 73 of the Act provides for combination of punishments namely, dismissal from service along with the imprisonment for a term which a Court Martial may award as a punishment in addition. It will be apparent from the foregoing that a court Martial may on convicting a person subject to the Army Act award either particular punishment prescribed by the Section or in. lieu thereof any one of the punishments set out in Section 71 of the act. In view of these specific provisions, the learned Counsel may not be justified in saying that the General Court Martial could not have imposed a punishment of dismissal from service, for service offences under Section 39 (a) and Section 63 of the Act. ( 19 ) LASTLY, we come to the primary contention canvassed by thelearned Counsel for the petitioner with regard to convening of the general Court Martial in the present case. According to learned counsel, the Court Martial that was convened to try the service offences said to have been committed by the petitioner, who is subject to Army Act is in clear violation of Rule 37 of the Army rules and further the law declared by the Apex Court in the case of union OF INDIA AND OTHERS vs HAR1sh CHANDRA GOSWAMI. According to the learned Counsel, the personnel of the Court Martial was appointed by Colonel and none else and therefore, the findings of the Court Martial which was not constituted in accordance with: the Statutory Rules is nullity in the eye of law and therefore, the; chief of the Army Staff could not have confirmed the findings of the' court Martial. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents apart from bringing tomy notice Note-i of Rule 37 (3) of Army Rules, and the observations made by Apex Court in MAJOR G. S. SODHI vs UNION OF INDIA, produces before me an order made by the Major General, General officer Commanding Andhra Tamil Nadu Karnataka and Kerala area dated 3. 5. 1986 which reads as under:"appendix 'b' TO NOTES ON INDIAN MILITARY AND AIR force LAW, PARA 83) djag hq Southern Command pune-1 i forward herewith application for a General Court Martial for the trial of IC-19778n Lt Col PV Savant of 1 Rajasthan Tech compo NCC Bikaner attached to MEG and Centre. 2. I consider trial should be by General Court Martial under the provisions of Para 432, Regulations for the Army, 1962. 3. The charges have been checked and found to be framed in accordance with the specimen shown in the MIML I have no comments to make on the charges. 4. I forward herewith the following papers;- (a) Manuscript and one typed copy of Summary of Evidence. (b) Two typed copies of charge sheet. (c) LAFD - 905 (d) LAFF - 3013 (e) Appendix'a'to AO 70/84. Station: Madras-9 dated 3. 5. 1986 (MA Zaki) major Gen general Officer general Officer Commanding andhra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Kerala Area. " ( 21 ) BEFORE I advert to the rival contentions canvassed by thelearned Counsel for the parties to the lis, let me notice the observations made by the Apex Court in HARISH CHANDRA goswami's case. It is as under:"admittedly there is no record whatever in the file to show that the personnel of the Court Martial were appointed by or nominated by the Lt. General. The order for the Assembly of a general Court Martial did not contain either the signature or the initial of the Lt. General. It was signed only by the Colonel and none else. General. The order for the Assembly of a general Court Martial did not contain either the signature or the initial of the Lt. General. It was signed only by the Colonel and none else. In the circumstances, the said order cannot be considered to be an order evidencing the appointment of personnel of the Court Martial by the Lt. General. There is no dispute before us that under Rule 37, the Commanding Officer has to apply his mind to satisfy himself that the charge to be tried by the Court are for offences within the meaning of the Act and that evidence justifies the trial of those charges. It is also admitted that the Commanding Officer has also to satisfy himself that the case is a proper one to be tried by the kind of Court martial which he proposes to convene. However, learned Counsel for the appellants contends that sub-rule (3) of Rule 37 is only procedure in nature and there is no need for the application of mind by the Commanding Officer in the matter of appointment of the personnel of Court Martial. That contention loses its relevance in the present case in view of the categorical stand taken by the appellant, that there was an order by the Commanding Officer appointing or detailing the officers to form the Court Martial. According to the learned Counsel as. stated earlier, the form for assembly of Court Martial is the only relevant form and when it is signed by an officer on behalf of the Lt. General, that is sufficient proof of the appointment of the personnel of the Court martial by the Lt. General. We are unable to accept this contention in view of the fact that the said form does not contain either the signature or the initial of the Lt. General: Even assuming that the it. General passed an oral order, there is no record of any kind whatever to prove it. The form for Assembly of Court Martial was not contemporaneous to such oral order, if any. In the absence of any record whatever to show that the appointment of the personnel of the Court Martial was by the Lt. General, we are not persuaded to accept the contention of the appellants that the requirements of Rule 37 we're fully satisfied. The form for Assembly of Court Martial was not contemporaneous to such oral order, if any. In the absence of any record whatever to show that the appointment of the personnel of the Court Martial was by the Lt. General, we are not persuaded to accept the contention of the appellants that the requirements of Rule 37 we're fully satisfied. If is unnecessary for us to consider whether sub-rule (3) of Rule 37 requires an order in writing or not in view of the specific stand taken by the learned Counsel for the appellants in this case that there was an order in writing and the said order was nothing else but the form for Assembly of the Court Martial. " ( 22 ) RULE 37 of the Army Rules provides for convening of Generaland District Court Martial. It is as under:"37: Convening of General and District Court Martial: (1) An Officer before convening a general or district Court martial shall first satisfy himself that the charges to be tried by the Court are for offences within the meaning of the Act, and that the evidence justifies a trial on those charges, and if not so satisfied, shall order the release of the accused, or refer the case to superior authority. (2) He shall also satisfy himself that the case is a proper one to be tried by the kind of Court Martial which he proposes to convene. (3) The officer convening a Court Martial shall appoint or detail the officers to form the Court and, may also appoint or detail such waiting officers as he thinks expedient, he may also, where he considers the services of an interpreter to be necessary, appoint or detail an interpreter to the Court. " ( 23 ) AN analysis of Rule 37 indicates that, an Officer empoweredunder the Act to convene a Court Martial is called the Convening officer or the Convening authority. He holds the necessary warrant empowering him to convene the particular description of Court Martial. Before convening the Court Martial, the Act requires number of duties to be performed by him. He shall before convening the General court Martial first satisfy himself that the charges to be tried by court Martial are for the offences within the meaning of the Act and that the evidence justifies the trial on those charges. Before convening the Court Martial, the Act requires number of duties to be performed by him. He shall before convening the General court Martial first satisfy himself that the charges to be tried by court Martial are for the offences within the meaning of the Act and that the evidence justifies the trial on those charges. He shall also satisfy himself that the case is a proper one to be tried by the kind of Court Martial, which he proposes to convene. The Convening officer then appoints or details the Officers to form the Court and may also appoint or detail such spare or waiting Officers as he thinks expedient. The Officers appointed or detailed should be qualified to serve on the Court. Apart from, other requirements, the Convening officer must send to the Senior member i. e. the Presiding Officer of the Court Martial, the convening order duly signed by him or by an officer of his staff authorised by usage of the service to sign his orders, charge sheet on which the accused is to be tried. The order for trial at the foot of the charge sheet is signed by the convening officer or by an Officer or his staff signing 'for' him. ( 24 ) KEEPING in view the possible construction that could be placedon Rule 37 of the Army Rules, let me consider the submission of the learned Counsel for petitioner and the documentary evidence produced and placed on record by the respondents. The learned counsel Sri Desai vehemently contends that, the conyening of general Court Martial is not by General Officer Commanding but by the Colonel. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel primarily relies upon the "form of proceedings of the General Court martial dated 25. 10. 1986", which he has produced as Annexure 'a' to the Writ Petition. The caption of the proceedings shows that the proceedings are convened at the instance of Maj. Gen. Nirmal sondhi, AVSM, General officer Commanding, Andhra, Tamilnadu, karnataka and Kerala Area, but the proceedings are sighed by Col. Sangha Hardev Singh, who is nominated as Presiding officer. According to the learned Counsel, it is the Colonel and the commanding Officer of the unit, who has convened the General court Martial. In my opinion, this assertion cannot be accepted in view of the documentary evidence produced by respondents, which i have extracted earlier. Sangha Hardev Singh, who is nominated as Presiding officer. According to the learned Counsel, it is the Colonel and the commanding Officer of the unit, who has convened the General court Martial. In my opinion, this assertion cannot be accepted in view of the documentary evidence produced by respondents, which i have extracted earlier. That document is dated 3. 5. 1986, wherein general Officer Commanding of the Area one Maj. Gen. MA Zaki, after being satisfied that the offences alleged against the petitioner should be tried by General Court Martial, forwards a copy of it to djag, Hq. Southern Command, Pune, and while doing so, forwards the two typed copies of charge sheet and other relevant documents. To me it appears, after his transfer from the unit, General Sodhi is posted as General Officer Commanding of the Area and therefore, the name General Sodhi appears in the notings made by Col. Sangha hardev Singh, who is appointed as Presiding Judge at Annexure 'a', which the petitioner has produced along with the Writ Petition papers. In view of this, it can safely be said that it was General officer Commanding of the Area who after being satisfied that the matter requires to be tried by General Court Martial had convened the General Court Martial. In View of this, in my opinion; the law declared by the Apex Court in Goswami's case may not assist the petitioner in any manner whatsoever. ( 25 ) THESE are the only contentions canvassed by the learnedcounsel for the petitioner. Since, I have negatived all of them, petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought in the Writ Petition. Accordingly, petition requires to be rejected. Therefore, the following: orderi. Writ Petition is dismissed. Rule discharged. II. Before parting with the case, I should place on record my deep appreciation to the efforts of Col. Bhupinder Singh (Retd.), who took all pains to assist me in effectively disposing off this matter, at my request. III. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are directed to bear their own costs. Ordered accordingly. --- *** --- .