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2001 DIGILAW 554 (AP)

Kamarsu Manikyala Rao v. Kamarsu Nagabhushanam

2001-06-08

BILAL NAZKI, V.ESWARAIAH

body2001
BILAL NAZKI, J. ( 1 ) THESE are two Letters Patent Appeals. Both the appeals arise out of the judgment of trial Court in one suit being O. S. No. 89/80. For the sake of convenience the parties will be referred to as Plaintiff and Defendant. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff and the defendants both filed appeals against the judgment of trial Court. The plaintiff had claimed properties covered by Ex. B6 and B9. His claim covered by Ex. B9 was decreed. Therefore, the defendants filed appeal against that decree to that extent. The plaintiff s claim covered by Ex. B6 was dismissed. Therefore, the plaintiff filed appeal against the decree to that extent. Unfortunately these appeals bearing A. S. No. 607/88 and 941/88 were decided separately by two learned single Judges of this Court. A. S. No. 607/88 was decided as early as on 30th day of October, 1991 whereas appeal A. S. No. 941/88 was decided on 2/02/1998. The judgments in both the appeals have been challenged by these Letters Patent Appeals. ( 3 ) THE facts leading to the controversy are summarised as below. The plaintiff s case was that he entrusted the palint a schedule property to the first defendant who is his paternal uncle to look after the cultivation and hand over the income to the plaintiff after deducting the expenses as the plaintiff was student then. He also stated that first defendant was inducted into the house described as item 6 of plaint a schedule as a licensee to live therein. As the first defendant failed to render account and deliver the property when demanded the plaintiff filed the suit. The properties were entrusted in 1976. The defendant did not render account from the income realised by him in the year 1978-79. The plaintiff before filing the suit issued registered notice through Advocate on 20/10/1979 demanding rendering of accounts and delivery of possession of the property. The first defendant issued a reply on 1-11-79 with false allegations. The plaintiff never entered into any agreement said to have been executed by the 4th defendant in favour of defendants 2 and 3. Agreement dated 25-1-64 was not valid. The natural father of the plaintiff who is 4th defendant has no authority to execute any agreement on his behalf or sell the property in favour of anybody. The said agreement was void. Agreement dated 25-1-64 was not valid. The natural father of the plaintiff who is 4th defendant has no authority to execute any agreement on his behalf or sell the property in favour of anybody. The said agreement was void. The plaintiff had not executed any agreement on 14-3-78 and the agreement was a forged document. The first defendant had no capacity to advance an amount of Rs. 14,000. 00 to the plaintiff. First defendant and his sons defendants 2 and 3 had no money or capacity to purchase the property. The defendants 1 to 3 filed their common written statement. They stated that the suit was not maintainable. They denied that plaintiff had entrusted the property mentioned in plaint a schedule to the first defendant to look after the cultivation. They also denied that the plaintiff had permitted the first defendant to use his house mentioned in Schedule a . The plaintiff in his minority had been adopted by Smt. K. Suramma. Adoption deed was executed. She executed a Will on 9-7-61 whereby she bequeathed plaint a schedule property. She also appointed the 4th defendant who is father of the plaintiff as plaintiff s testamentary guardian as plaintiff was a minor. 4th defendant was given power to discharge the liabilities by selling the whole or any portion of plaint a schedule properties. Said Will executed by Suramma was registered after her death. The adoption deed was not registered by the District Registrar as it was opposed by a reversioner. Consequently suits were filed being O. S. No. 58/64 and 20/65 before Sub-Court, Eluru. The plaintiff s natural father i. e. , 4th defendant executed an agreement of sale on 23/01/1964 for Rs. 11,500. 00 on behalf of the plaintiff in favour of defendants 2 and 3 under which half of items 1 to 5 of plaint schedule properties were sold. Thus an extent of 2. 26 acres of wet land and an extent of 168-4-72 sq. yards of the house property covered under the said agreement and both the properties were to be in possession of defendants 2 and 3. With the sale consideration provided by defendants 2 and 3 the liabilities of K. Suramma mentioned in b schedule of her Will were discharged and the pronotes were obtained from her creditors as vouchers. yards of the house property covered under the said agreement and both the properties were to be in possession of defendants 2 and 3. With the sale consideration provided by defendants 2 and 3 the liabilities of K. Suramma mentioned in b schedule of her Will were discharged and the pronotes were obtained from her creditors as vouchers. When the said agreement was executed the enquiry regarding the registration of adoption deed was pending before the District Registrar, therefore, it was decided that sale deeds could be registered after the adoption deed was registered. Suit O. S. No. 58/64 and O. S. No. 20/65 were meanwhile tried together after transfer to Sub-Court, Tanuku. On 4-10-69 the adoption was negatived but on appeal the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in A. S. Nos. 168/71 and 169/71 reversed the judgment of the trial Court by judgment dated 15-12-72. This judgment was confirmed in L. P. A. on 2-12-75. The plaintiff after attaining majority made an endorsement on the agreement of sale dated 21-5-64 and accepted the said transaction and ratified it on 23-2-77 promising to execute and register the sale deed. The said endorsement was scribed by natural father of the plaintiff and attested by V. Venkatapathi Raju, the village Munsif of Kasipadu where the plaintiff s natural father was working as Village Karnam. Defendants 2 and 3 came to possession of the property sold under the sale agreement dated 25-1-64. The defendants also claimed that the first defendant along with defendants 2 and 3 were residing in the plaint schedule house referable to the sale agreement dated 25-1-64. The house was completely renovated and nearly Rs. 20,000. 00 was spent on it. Several improvements were made on it and the house that was in existence does not bear any resemblance to the house that was in existence by the date of death of K. Suramma. The lands were also properly levelled. The defendants 1 to 3 were dealing with the respective properties purchased by them as their own property. The 4th defendant was being financed by the first defendant from time to time and thus a sum of Rs. 14,000. 00 was utilised by 4th defendant on behalf of the plaintiff. Since the 4th defendant needed money for protecting the property of the plaintiff, therefore, Rs. 14,000. The 4th defendant was being financed by the first defendant from time to time and thus a sum of Rs. 14,000. 00 was utilised by 4th defendant on behalf of the plaintiff. Since the 4th defendant needed money for protecting the property of the plaintiff, therefore, Rs. 14,000. 00 were advanced to him and an agreement was arrived at between plaintiff and first defendant on 14-3-78. By this agreement plaintiff promised to pay Rs. 14,000. 00 within a period of six months and if he could not make the payment the plaintiff agreed to sell the remaining extent of land not covered by sale agreement dated 25-1-64 for a sum of Rs. 25,000. 00. Rs. 14,000. 00 advanced were to be deducted from the same and balance of Rs. 11,000. 00 had to be paid to the plaintiff on execution of the sale deed. Land covered under this agreement was till then under the lease to the first defendant and the first defendant had paid maktha for the year 1977-78. Said agreement was signed by first defendant and the plaintiff. The plaintiff delivered all the material records pertaining to the land at the time of agreement dated 14-3-78. The first defendant has always been willing and ready to perform his part of the contract. The first defendant had requested the plaintiff to come and execute and register the sale deed. He continued to have possession of the land as a lessee. The defendants had the capacity to pay the amounts. The defendants had also advanced Rs. 14,000. 00 to the plaintiff for meeting his litigation expenses. They have got 40 acres of land at Palvancha village of Kothagudem. They are getting income from the lands. Second defendant s wife had also got landed property. Second defendant is employee in Andhra Sugars and drawing salary of Rs. 5,00. 00. First defendant already realised an amount of Rs. 8,000. 00 in pursuance of a decree. ( 4 ) ON the pleadings the trial Court framed 16 issues but the issues which are relevant for the purpose of these appeals are only reproduced, they are issue Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9. 1. Whether the discharge of pronote debts by the defendants 2 and 3 is true and if so, whether the said discharge is valid against the plaintiff?2. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9. 1. Whether the discharge of pronote debts by the defendants 2 and 3 is true and if so, whether the said discharge is valid against the plaintiff?2. WHETHER the alienation made by the natural father of the plaintiff to defendants 2 and 3 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff?3. WHETHER the ratification of sale entered into by the natural father of the plaintiff by making an endorsement on the sale agreement by the plaintiff is true and if so, whether the said endorsement is not valid and binding on the plaintiff?4. WHETHER the sale agreement dated 14-3-78 is true and if so, whether it is valid?whether the 1st defendant is residing in the house property as a licensee and if so, whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property?whether the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the plaint schedule property?the two agreements to which reference has been made hereinabove were Ex. B6 and Ex. B9. Basically these are the agreements which are in controversy. The trial Court held that Ex. B6 was a genuine transaction and it was held by the trial Court that defendants 2 and 3 had purchsed the house of the schedule property and also the house mentioned in item 6 of plaint a" schedule. Ex. B9 was held to be false and invalid. Thereafter both the parties filed appeals as has been mentioned hereinabove. The learned single Judge in the plaintiffs appeal A. S. No. 607/88 agreed with the trial Court and held that Ex. B6 was a genuine document. The appeal A. S. No. 941/88 with respect to finding on Ex. B9 was dismissed. The net result is that the judgment of the trial Court in toto has been confirmed by learned single Judges in two different appeals. Both the judgments delivered in the appeals by the learned single Judges are subject matter of these Letter Patent Appeals. ( 5 ) COMING to the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the plaintiff, it was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff that the agreement Ex. B6 was void and in any case it was not executable. Both the judgments delivered in the appeals by the learned single Judges are subject matter of these Letter Patent Appeals. ( 5 ) COMING to the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the plaintiff, it was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff that the agreement Ex. B6 was void and in any case it was not executable. Dilating on this argument he contended that this agreement which has been held to be binding on the plaintiff was as a matter of fact not an agreement in the eye of law for the following reasons, (a) the 4th defendant, natural father of the plaintiff, had no authority to dispose of the property of the plaintiff during his minority either as natural guardian or as testamentary guardian in view of the fact that the Will on the basis of which he claimed right to it had not been proved to be genuine by two Courts including the High Court, (b) even if it is contended that D4 was a testamentary guardian even then he could not alienate the property in terms of S. 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. It is contended that after the plaintiff was adopted on 9-7-61 an adoption deed was executed, immediately thereafter a Will was also executed by K. Suramma appointing defendant No. 4 as testamentary guardian of the plaintiff. The Will as well as the adoption deed became subject-matter of litigation. The detail facts relating to that litigation are not required to be mentioned but it is sufficient to say that the trial Court dismissed the claim of plaintiff on both i. e. , on Will as well as on adoption deed. Appeals were taken before the High Court. The learned single Judge in A. S. No. 168 and 169/71 held, "the Will was also not registered by immediately calling the Sub-Registrar to register it at Duvva. On account of these suspicious circumstances which have not been dispelled by the oral evidence let in this case, it is to be held that the execution of the Will has not been properly proved. For the above reasons, I agree with the finding of the learned Subordinate, Judge on issue No. 3 and hold against the Will. On account of these suspicious circumstances which have not been dispelled by the oral evidence let in this case, it is to be held that the execution of the Will has not been properly proved. For the above reasons, I agree with the finding of the learned Subordinate, Judge on issue No. 3 and hold against the Will. " With respect to the adoption deed the learned single Judge said; "as already discussed by me, in the principle of law enunciated above, what is most important is the actual act of giving and taking. The Court must first address itself to that question and consider the surrounding circumstances only in the light of that principal act. In this case I do not find the learned Judge has addressed himself to a consideration of this question of adoption in the light of well known principles laid down in Hindu Law. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the finding given by the learned subordinate Judge on issue No. 2, I therefore, hold that defendants 1 and 2 have established that the adoption of first defendant by late Suramma on 7-7-1961 is true and valid. " The findings of learned single Judge were challenged in Letters Patent Appeals being L. P. A. Nos. 143 and 144/73. The appellate Court agreed with the findings of the learned single Judge with respect to the execution of the adoption deed but with regard to Will the learned Judges stated, "for the above reasons, we agree with our learned brother that the adoption and the execution of Ex. B6 have been duly proved by the defendants. In view of our finding on this issue, it is not necessary to go into the truth or otherwise of the Will Ex. B5 which has been rejected both by the trial Court and our learned brother. "in the light of this history with regard to execution of Will and the adoption deed the learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that, since execution of Will had not been proved, therefore, it should be presumed that there is no Will in existence. As the trial Court, learned single Judge and the Division Bench held that the execution of the Will had not been proved, no rights much less any enforceable rights would accrue to the defendant No. 4 under the said Will. As the trial Court, learned single Judge and the Division Bench held that the execution of the Will had not been proved, no rights much less any enforceable rights would accrue to the defendant No. 4 under the said Will. He submits that the trial Court and the learned single Judge were emphatical in their view that the execution of Will had not been proved and as a matter of fact the Division Bench had not rejected this finding. Pursuing his argument further the learned counsel contends that although it will not be a matter of res judicata because the defendants were not parties in the earlier litigation but it could be a judicial precedent which would bind everybody. He submits that the judgment of the High Court is a precedent, therefore, it binds anybody and everybody for all times to come if it has assumed finality. In this connection he relies on a judgment of Supreme Court in Sahu Madho Das v. Mukand Ram, AIR 1955 SC 481 . In this judgment the Supreme Court was construing a document which again incidentally was a Will. This Will had been construed earlier by the Privy Council. The Supreme Court while referring to the Privy Council s decision held;"mukund Ram was not a party to that litigation and the decision does not bind him but it operates as a judicial precedent about the construction of that document, a precedent with which we respectfully agree. "going by these observations of the Supreme Court one does not feel that on questions of fact a conclusion arrived at by the Court in a proceeding finally becomes a precedent in a subsequent proceeding where parties are different, where parties are same there would not be any difficulty because it would be a case of res judicata. But, in our view which is further cemented by the Supreme Court, the findings on fact such as construing of a document like Will would not be a precedent in itself but it could be an important pointer towards the legality, nature and executability of the document because when Supreme Court said that the decision would bind as a judicial precedent about the construing of a document it further qualified it by saying that, "a precedent with which we respectfully agree. "therefore, construing of a document by any Court in an earlier proceeding would be an important factor but the Court in subsequent proceedings would be well within its rights to construe it afresh keeping in view the earlier precedent. Therefore, we cannot agree with the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the claim of the plaintiff had to be accepted on the ground that the execution of the Will had not been proved in earlier proceedings. ( 6 ) NOW coming to the facts of the case again, the earlier suit in which registration of the Will was sought was filed by D4 the father of the plaintiff. This suit failed. In appeal also the learned single Judge did not believe that the Will had been executed. Letters Patent Bench remarked,"for the above reasons, we agree with our learned Brother that the adoption and the execution of Ex. B6 have been duly proved by the defendants. In view of our finding on this issue, it is not necessary to go into the truth or otherwise of the Will Ex. B5 which has been rejected both by the trial Court and our learned Brother. "these remarks suggest, although the Division Bench did not give a finding of its own about the execution of the Will but it remarked that both the trial Court and the learned single Judge had held that the execution of this document was not proved. Although the learned counsel for the defendants submits that the observations made by the Division Bench have kept the issue of execution of Will open and has relied on various judgments to suggest that the issue of execution of Will had been kept open by the Division Bench, and though the learned counsel for the plaintiff relied on many judgments to show that the High Court finally decided that the Will had not been executed, in view of what we are going to say presently we do not want to go into this question as to whether High Court had finally held in earlier revision that the Will was executed, or not. Let us assume that the High Court had not finally decided the question of execution of Will. Then, the Will had to be proved by the party claiming benefit out of it. There is nothing in evidence to show that the defendants proved this Will. Let us assume that the High Court had not finally decided the question of execution of Will. Then, the Will had to be proved by the party claiming benefit out of it. There is nothing in evidence to show that the defendants proved this Will. The learned counsel for the defendants further submits that there was no need to prove because of the fact that Will had been set up by the plaintiff himself in the earlier proceedings, therefore it was a case of acquisance. Once the plaintiff set up a Will in order to grab the property he could not deny the execution of the Will. This is not correct. The plaintiff had never set up the Will and as a matter of fact no rights accrued to the plaintiff under the Will. Therefore, even the Division Bench did not decide the issue in earlier litigation. The plaintiff s rights flow from the adoption. Once the adoption was proved by him the Division Bench thought it unnecessary to decide the Will. Will was set up by defendant No. 4, father of the plaintiff, and rights to the father of the plaintiff flow from that Will. He claimed to be a testamentary guardian of the plaintiff. Therefore, he was interested in setting up the Will in order to exercise his rights as testamentary guardian. Whether the High Court finally decided the earlier litigation that the Will was executed, or not, is a question of academic interest because in the present litigation also nobody has proved the execution of the Will. ( 7 ) THEN comes the question which is raised by the learned counsel for the defendants, that in the absence of challenge to the agreement of sale i. e. , Ex. B6 the plaintiff could not succeed. It is true that specifically Ex. B6 was not challenged but the plaintiff sought possession of the suit property on the premise that he was the owner thereof and the property had been handed over to the defendant as a licensee. There is certain evidence and it is held to be proved by the trial Court and upheld by learned single Judge that it was not a case of licence or permissive possession. Was it necessary for the plaintiff to challenge the agreement of sale? There is certain evidence and it is held to be proved by the trial Court and upheld by learned single Judge that it was not a case of licence or permissive possession. Was it necessary for the plaintiff to challenge the agreement of sale? This question came up before Kerala High Court in Maniyamkandi Kunhiraman v. Machil Parambath Vanaja, AIR 1998 Kerala 24. ( 8 ) COMING to the rival contentions of the parties, it is contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the agreements entered into were void in view of the mandate of S. 8 (2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act and, therefore, while filing a suit and claiming possession over the suit property which had changed hands through an agreement arrived at by the guardian without the permission of the Court there was no necessity to challenge the sale agreements as such. The learned counsel for the defendants submits that this provision says that the contracts arrived at by the natural guardian without the prior permission of the Court with respect to disposal of the property of a minor are not void but are voidable at the instance of the minor. Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is reproduced;"8. Powers of natural guardian : (1) The natural guardian of a Hindu minor has power, subject to the provisions of this section, to do all acts which are necessary or reasonable and proper for the benefit of the minor or for the realization, protection or benefit of the minor s estate, but the guardian can in no case bind the minor by a personal covenant. (2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the Court - (a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise, any part of the immovable property of the minor, or (b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term extending (exceeding) more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority. (3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. (3) Any disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian, in contravention of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him. (4) No Court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to the minor. (5) The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 shall apply to and in respect of an application for obtaining the permission of the Court under sub-section (2) in all respects as if it were an application for obtaining the permission of the Court under S. 29 of that Act, and in particular - (a) proceedings in connection with the application shall be deemed to be proceedings under that Act within the meaning of S. 4-A thereof; (b) the Court shall observe the procedure and have the powers specified in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4) of S. 31 of that Act; and (c) an appeal shall lie from an order of the Court refusing permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts mentioned in sub-section (2) of this section to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the decisions of that Court. (6) In this section, "court" means the city civil Court or a District Court or a Court empowered under S. 4 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the immovable property in respect of which the application is made is situate, and where the immovable property is situate within the jurisdiction of more than one such Court, means the Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situate. "the Kerala High Court in the judgment supra after a long discussion held :"in the face of S. 8 (1) of the Act, we feel that there is no scope for tracing the power of the guardian to any existing rule of Hindu Law. Thus a transaction in violation of S. 8 (2) of the Act has necessarily to be treated as a transaction in violation of a statute and consequently void. We do not think that S. 8 (3) of the Act in any manner whittles down the scope or operation of S. 8 (2) of the Act. Thus a transaction in violation of S. 8 (2) of the Act has necessarily to be treated as a transaction in violation of a statute and consequently void. We do not think that S. 8 (3) of the Act in any manner whittles down the scope or operation of S. 8 (2) of the Act. Section 8 (3) of the Act only clarifies that the person who is entitled to treat the transaction as void is only the minor or any person claiming under him. According to us, Section 8 (3) only indicates that the guardian who had sold his own interest along with that of the minor without the consent of the Court or any other alienor who was sui juris, would not be in a position to turn round and contend that the sale effected by him of his own interest or share is also void or invalid. The object of S. 8 (3) of the Act, according to us, is not to whittle down the scope of Section 8 (2) of the Act but only to clarify that the right to treat the transaction as void is available only to the minor whose property is sold by the natural guardian without permission of the Court or to a person who is claiming under that minor. Thus understood, S. 8 (3) cannot be relied on to hold that a transaction in contravention of the mandate of S. 8 (2) of the Act, is only voidable and not void. "with respects, we are not in agreement with the law laid down by the Division Bench of Kerala High Court. If one looks at S. 8 of the Act in its entirety on first principle one comes to a conclusion that what it lays down is that a guardian could not enter into an agreement with respect to a property for the purposes mentioned in sub-section 2 (a) (b) of S. 8 without the previous permission of the Court. What sub-section (3) lays down is, if such a thing has been laid down it would be an enforceable contract unless avoided by the minor. So, such contract has been made voidable. The meaning attributed to sub-section (3) by the Kerala High Court judgment, that sub-section (3) applies only to those properties which were disposed of and which belong to the minor and the guardian himself, does not appeal. So, such contract has been made voidable. The meaning attributed to sub-section (3) by the Kerala High Court judgment, that sub-section (3) applies only to those properties which were disposed of and which belong to the minor and the guardian himself, does not appeal. But, this judgment is important for another purpose where it says, where minor claims property without challenging the void agreement would maintainable (sic ). In the present case as has been pointed out hereinabove, the person who entered into an agreement was a stranger. The Will had not been proved at any stage. Therefore, he was not testamentary guardian of the minor. Secondly, that he was father of the plaintiff but in terms of S. 7 of the Minority and Guardianship Act after the adoption he ceases to be natural guardian. Therefore, as natural father also he could have not acted as guardian. Therefore, the agreement was void ab initio. By claiming the property the plaintiff was as a matter of fact asserting that the agreement was void and in fact in the plaint he had stated in express terms that these agreements were not binding on him. In para 5 of the plaint, he stated that, "the plaintiff believes that the first defendant in collusion with and with connivance of the 4th defendant might have brought into existence the alleged sale agreement dated 25-1-64 and the alleged endorsement on 23-2-77 and the alleged sale agreement dated 14-7-78. . . . . . . . . . " In para 6, he stated,"as the alleged sale agreements are forged and void documents the plaintiff is treating them as non-existent and filed this suit for possession of the property, without asking for the cancellation of the said documents". Therefore, in our view, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to challenge those documents which were void ab initio and with respect to which the plaintiff had categorically stated that those agreements were void. In no case the father of the plaintiff could have acted as guardian. His appointment as testamentary guardian under S. 9 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is not proved. He could not be a natural guardian because he was the father of the plaintiff, his right to guardianship of his minor son had on adoption passed on to his adoptive mother under S. 7 of the Act which lays down;"7. His appointment as testamentary guardian under S. 9 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act is not proved. He could not be a natural guardian because he was the father of the plaintiff, his right to guardianship of his minor son had on adoption passed on to his adoptive mother under S. 7 of the Act which lays down;"7. Natural guardianship of adopted son - The natural guardianship of an adopted son who is a minor passes, on adoption, to the adoptive father and after him to the adoptive mother. " ( 9 ) FOR all these reasons we come to the conclusion that the plaintiff would not be bound by the agreement Ex. B6 as it had been entered into by a stranger who was neither a testamentary guardian nor a natural guardian of the plaintiff. But, there would be another hurdle to the plaintiff to cross before he is able to get the decree with respect to execution of Ex. B6 (a) the endorsement on agreement dated 23-2-77 when he admittedly become major. Issue No. 3 was framed by the trial Court in respect of this aspect of the case. That was not decided in view of his findings on other issues. The learned single Judge also did not go to this question. The learned single Judge, however, stated that endorsement Ex. B6 (a) was not proved by any specific evidence. The ratification has not been proved. The plaintiff denied the document. Scribe of the endorsement is said to be K. Rajaiah who is 4th defendant and natural father of the plaintiff. He remained ex parte. He was not examined as witness. The endorsement is said to have been attested by one K. Venkatapathi Raju. According to the learned single Judge s finding, it was said that he had died. Except the evidence of D. W. 1 there was no evidence to prove the execution of endorsement Ex. B6 (a ). Therefore, this endorsement has not been proved. ( 10 ) FOR these reasons, we hold that the agreement entered into i. e. , Ex. B6 was void and a nullity. Therefore, the judgment of the trial Court as well as of the learned single Judge is set aside and a decree is passed for possession of Schedule a property the description of which is also contained in Ex. B6. B6 was void and a nullity. Therefore, the judgment of the trial Court as well as of the learned single Judge is set aside and a decree is passed for possession of Schedule a property the description of which is also contained in Ex. B6. The appeal filed by the plaintiff i. e. , L. P. A. No. 70/92 is accordingly allowed. In the circumstances of the case no costs. L. P. A. No. 167/98 ( 11 ) NOW coming to the appeal LPA No. 167/98, filed by the defendants with respect to suit schedule property, the suit with respect to this property is based on an agreement to sale i. e. , Ex. B9. This agreement was held to be not proved by the trial Court. An appeal was taken by the defendants. The learned single Judge also agreed with the conclusions of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Therefore, this finding has been challenged in this Letters Patent Appeal. Facts have been narrated hereinabove because there was only one judgment of the trial Court which became subject-matter of two appeals and appeals have been decided separately by two learned single Judges, therefore, it will not be necessary for us to again mention the facts, but briefly stating; it is the execution of Ex. B9 dated 14-3-78 which is an agreement of sale that was subject-matter of the proceedings. Admittedly, this agreement came into existence when the plaintiff had become major. Ex. B9 is not attested by any person. Except the oral testimony of the first defendant as D. W. 1 there is nothing to prove the execution of Ex. B9 by the plaintiff. The defendants did not take any steps to send the agreement to an expert for comparison of the alleged signature of the plaintiff with the admitted signature. Therefore, the trial Court came to the conclusion that there was no material before the Court to conclude whether Ex. B9 was a genuine document, or not. This agreement was on an ordinary paper not even a stamp paper was used. Then, on comparison of signatures by the trial Court he found that the signature was not of the plaintiff. Since there was no evidence, therefore, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the document had not been proved. B9 was a genuine document, or not. This agreement was on an ordinary paper not even a stamp paper was used. Then, on comparison of signatures by the trial Court he found that the signature was not of the plaintiff. Since there was no evidence, therefore, the trial Court came to the conclusion that the document had not been proved. The first Appellate Court i. e. , the learned single Judge also recorded that the trial Court in terms of S. 73 of the Evidence Act obtained thirty five specimen signatures of the plaintiff in open Court and compared them with the disputed signature on Ex. B9 and then found and came to the conclusion that the signatures on Ex. B9 was not of the plaintiff. Since there is no evidence to show that signature on Ex. B9 was of the plaintiff, therefore, there was no question of going any further in the matter. A plea had been raised before the learned single Judge that the defendants were tenants before the alleged sale agreement was executed, therefore, they could continue with the possession as tenants, but tenancy was also not proved. Therefore, no interference is called for in the judgment of the trial Court or the learned single Judge with respect to the property mentioned in Ex. B9. The appeal L. P. A. No. 167/98 is accordingly dismissed. Order accordingly.