ORDER S.C. Pandey, J. This revision, u/s 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is directed against the order dated 29-5-1999, passed by the Special Judge, Jabalpur, in Special Case No. 3 of 1999. The prosecution alleged that during the check period between July, 1973 to August, 1993, the petitioner was found to be in possession of assets worth Rs. 16,28,255.37. The total assets in the hands of the petitioner during this period, from known sources of his income, could not be more than Rs. 10,25,471.81. Thus, the petitioner was found to be in possession of the assets worth Rs. 6,02,783.56 which were in excess of the assets that could be derived from his known sources of income. Accordingly, he was liable to be charged and prosecuted for offences u/s 13(1)(e) read with section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 (henceforth 'the Act'). The petitioner was serving as Deputy General Manager/Deputy Chief Engineer (Civil) in Northern Coalfields Ltd., Jayant Project, Singrauli, District Sidhi (M.P.), during the relevant period. According to the case of the prosecution, the petitioner amassed wealth worth Rs. 6,02,783.56 by corrupt means for the reason this much income was in excess of the income which could be derived from his known sources of income. The Trial Judge, by the impugned order rejected the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was no case for proceeding with the trial as the petitioner has given an adequate explanation of his income during the check period and it should have been accepted by the investigating agency. The petitioner was entitled to satisfy the investigating agency that there was no case for launching a prosecution against him. The document Ex. D-9 gives the full details about the sources of so called excess of income. There was no good reason for the investigating agency to reject the explanation which it itself sought for. For all these reasons no charge could be framed against the petitioner. In this revision, Shri Rajendra Singh, Senior Counsel, appearing with Shri R.K. Nanhoria, Advocate, on behalf of the petitioner reiterated the arguments advanced before the Trial Court on the factual aspect of the case. As to the legality and propriety of the impugned order, the learned Senior Counsel argued that unlike other cases the investigating agency as well as the Trial Court should have accepted the explanation of the petitioner as reasonable. As to the legality and propriety of the impugned order, the learned Senior Counsel argued that unlike other cases the investigating agency as well as the Trial Court should have accepted the explanation of the petitioner as reasonable. It was emphasized that the petitioner was entitled to reveal to the investigating agency the legitimate sources of his income for satisfying it that nothing was in excess with him which would inculpate him for the offence of having more income that it was possible to eke out from his known sources of income. It was argued that in a situation like this, the petitioner could do no more than except pointing out to the sources of his extra income and file his own affidavit as well as that of the persons who had paid him the extra amounts. These documents should have been accepted by the prosecution as well as the Court-below without much fuss after verifying the probability of the income from the sources pointed out by the petitioner. The learned Trial Judge committed illegality and impropriety in passing the impugned order when he rejected these arguments. Its act was without any foundation in law. It was argued that the material placed on record did not suffice for framing a charge as the Trial Judge should have accepted the explanation in order to hold that no prima-facie inference could be drawn from the material on record that the petitioner is guilty of charges framed against him for offences u/s 13(1)(e) read with section 13(2) of the Act. A number of authorities were cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner. They are as follows:-- (1) Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2) State of Karnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, , (3) State of Bihar Vs. Ramesh Singh, (4) Union of India (UOI) Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal and Another, (5) State of Maharashtra vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijjaya and others AIR 1990 SC 1962 , (6) Satish Mehra Vs. Delhi Administration and Another, , (7) State of Maharashtra Vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj and Others, (8) Central Bureau of Investigation vs. V. C. Shukla and others AIR 1988 SC 1406, (9) Union of India and Others Vs. M.V. Valliappan and Others, , (10) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mohanlal Soni, , (11) State of M.P. Vs. S.B. Johari and Others, , (12) M. Krishna Reddy Vs. Priya Sharan Maharaj and Others, (8) Central Bureau of Investigation vs. V. C. Shukla and others AIR 1988 SC 1406, (9) Union of India and Others Vs. M.V. Valliappan and Others, , (10) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Mohanlal Soni, , (11) State of M.P. Vs. S.B. Johari and Others, , (12) M. Krishna Reddy Vs. State Deupty Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad, , (13) Janaki Ballav Patnaik Vs. State of Orissa, and (14) State of U.P. Thru CBI Vs . Dr. Sanjay Singh and Anr. The argument made on behalf of the petitioner was resisted by Shri R.S. Patel, learned counsel for the Union of India, who appeared in this revision to defend the order passed by the Court-below on behalf of the Central Bureau of Investigation. The learned counsel argued that the petitioner was entitled to show to the satisfaction of the investigating agency that alleged excess of income is from the known sources. This right should not be expanded to make it absolutely compulsory for the investigating agency to accept every or any explanation. The explanation should convince the investigating agency regarding the truthfulness of the explanation. The investigating agency could reject a palpably false explanation. The value of the material placed by an accused along with explanation is not to be judged from the affidavits filed in support of the case of the petitioner, but from the intrinsic worth of the material placed before the Central Bureau of Investigation. If the investigating agency was not convinced by the material placed before it, then it could proceed to file a charge-sheet against the accused. As to the question of framing of charge is concerned, it was argued that it was well established that the Trial Judge was authorised to sift evidence for limited purpose for finding out if the applicant appeared to be prima facie guilty. It was argued that this exercise is done to find out if there be any grave suspicion against the accused person. Once the Court comes to this conclusion that there is such ground then it frames charges for the purpose of the case going to trial. Both the prosecution as well as defence, by the process of framing charges know the scope of the trial. Once the Court comes to this conclusion that there is such ground then it frames charges for the purpose of the case going to trial. Both the prosecution as well as defence, by the process of framing charges know the scope of the trial. The prosecution is informed about the nature of evidence to be adduced at trial and the fact that it shall be confined to the Court indicated by charges just as a tram is confined to tram-lines. The accused also knows in advance the case of the prosecution that he has to meet. It has been argued that this is the limited purpose of framing the charge. Once the Trial Judge was convinced about the prima facie case, there was a little scope for interference at the revisional stage. The discretionary order of framing the charges should not be lightly set aside in exercise of power u/s 397 read with section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The order could only be set aside if the learned Trial Judge had acted perversely. The learned counsel relied upon the two decisions of the Supreme Court in State by Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Shri S. Bangarappa, JT 2000 (Suppl. 3) SC 29 and in State of M.P. Vs. S.B. Johari and Others, The controversy raised by the learned counsel for the parties bears examination. Let us now consider generally, the nature of charge framed against the petitioner with reference to the relevant sections of the Act. Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act read as under:-- 13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.-- (1) A Public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,-- xxxxx xxxxx xxxxxx (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation:-- For the purpose of this section, "Known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. Explanation:-- For the purpose of this section, "Known sources of income" means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. It would be clear from the text of section 13(1)(e) of the Act as well as section 13(2) thereof, which are reproduced above after omitting the irrelevant material, that offence u/s 13(1)(e) of the Act involves, that:-- (i) Possession by a public servant or somebody on his behalf, (i) Pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to known sources of income of the public servant, (iii) At any time during the period of his office; (iv) For which he cannot satisfactorily account. The above rendering of the ingredients of the offence covered by section 13(1)(e) of the Act somewhat fluid but it does not affect its essence. Here, we are concerned with the fourth aspect of the matter, and whatever follows hereinafter would be written with the emphasis on that aspect. In essence, a public servant is prohibited from possessing money or property which could not be received by him from "known sources" of his income during a given period of his service. If he holds the aforesaid excess money or property, 'which he cannot satisfactorily account for' then he can be held liable u/s 13(2) of the Act. If he could satisfactorily account for the excess of the income or property in his hands, even though the other ingredients of the offence u/s 13(1)(e) of the Act are satisfied, he cannot be held guilty. In order to understand the nature of an explanation, the accused is required to give, it would be necessary to understand what is meant by 'known sources of his income'. In this connection, the aforesaid phrase is the 'referent' which is to be borne in mind for computing the excess. What is meant by 'known sources of his income'? To whom it should be disclosed? By adding an explanation to section 13(1)(e) of the Act the Legislature has made the definition of 'known sources of income technical'. In this connection, the aforesaid phrase is the 'referent' which is to be borne in mind for computing the excess. What is meant by 'known sources of his income'? To whom it should be disclosed? By adding an explanation to section 13(1)(e) of the Act the Legislature has made the definition of 'known sources of income technical'. The income from the 'known sources must be the income from lawful sources and it also provided further the receipt of such income must be intimated, in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or order for the time applicable to a public servant. Thus, even the receipt of extra means from the lawful sources would not be enough for the purpose of explanation. It must also be intimated as per rule, law etc. If this intimation is absent, the 'public servant' must be deemed to have held income or property acquired from other than the 'known sources of his income', which is disproportionate to his actual earnings as a public servant. However, the main part of section 13(1)(e) of the Act gives the opportunity to the accused to satisfactorily account for excess of money or property in his hands which is apparently, more than the known sources of his income. Thus, accounting for has to be done by the accused to the investigating agency. The question that arises for consideration is whether the investigating agency is bound to accept any or every explanation. The main part of the aforesaid section is that accounting must be done satisfactorily. Now, the question is satisfactorily to whom? Obviously, it is to the investigating agency. If the investigating agency calls for an explanation, it must consider the material before it along with the explanation given by the accused. In this case, the explanation given by the petitioner was not accepted by the investigating agency. Now, it is argued before this Court that the Trial Court should have considered this aspect of the matter if the investigating agency could reject the explanation without any rhyme or reason. A Court of law deals with 'reason', but rarely does it come across a 'rhyme'. The Greek goddess of wisdom, Athene, (Roman Minerva) never conferred any power out of the ordinary upon human beings who are condemned by her to act as judges. A Court of law deals with 'reason', but rarely does it come across a 'rhyme'. The Greek goddess of wisdom, Athene, (Roman Minerva) never conferred any power out of the ordinary upon human beings who are condemned by her to act as judges. Some judges and advocates may have seen themselves as and felt that they are part and parcel of a divine scheme. This may be entirely an emotive or personal approach. It is bound to fall apart on a rigorous analysis of reason. The kings of the ancient and medieval times claimed divine rights and powers to rule. This theory of divine hereditary rights of a King has fallen into disuse. In those days power of imparting justice was an adjunct to the sovereign powers of the King. This power must have been initially transferred to Judges, when the Kings could no longer deal with cases on account of their sheer numbers and may be, due to other complexities which they were not trained to deal with. It appears that with the transfer of power to impart justice the theory of divine powers of king to do justice, inter alia, must have been smuggled in by those who wanted to glorify themselves in the name of divine powers. However, the power to do justice is merely mundane power and, therefore, it is amenable to the touchstone of reason. A Court of law is an institution made for solving problems of the litigants. The lawyers and judges are not expected to exercise their power of reasoning for the sake of reason. They employ their power of reason which is tinged with common sense. But giving the reason for a particular conclusion is the dominating factor in a judgment or order. In order to find out which is the better reason for coming to a particular conclusion it is often necessary to wear the spectacles of first party and see his point of view, then wear the spectacles of the opposite party so to see and then examine the case from its point of view. Then only the Court exercises its judgment for choosing one against the other and give what it considers to be the better reason for its judgment. The judges cannot be absolute masters of themselves. Then only the Court exercises its judgment for choosing one against the other and give what it considers to be the better reason for its judgment. The judges cannot be absolute masters of themselves. Their conscious exercise of choice of one of the several alternatives in shape of a judgment could be due to general, subconscious, glandular or other factors. In fact, there is universe within all of us which is unfathomed. How far these intimate factors influence an individual in his conscious judgment is unknown. That apart, there is history in the making of each man. The acquired habits since birth have great say in life of a person. Indeed, a man may be behaviourist's delight when exclusively, seen from the point of view of behaviourists' psychology. However, the modem science has recognized that many complex factors rule the life of a person and it is difficult to point finger to any school of psychology, sociology, philosophy or any other branch of knowledge for an answer. To revert to the argument after little detour in other branches of knowledge, we must descend to the pragmatic field of law. Without burdening themselves with the real source of their reason, the judges of yore have consciously or unconsciously applied the test of a reasonable man. Call it common sense view, call it pragmetic view or give it any other name. It is only working tool and no more. It does not aspire for perfection being a rough and ready instrument. The Court, however, records in this order the fact that this Court has sifted the documents placed on record in order to impress upon its mind to their impact. The impression formed from the affidavits and explanation is that the investigating officer is probably right in filing the F.I.R. It is not necessary to form any firm conclusion at this stage. The necessary degree of doubt required by law is at present put away to an extent. It shall be required only when this Court required to consider the case on merits in an appeal. Moreover, this Court is of the view that the learned Trial Judge as well as this Court cannot brush aside the explanation to section 13(1)(e) of the Act. The case of M. Krishna Reddy Vs. It shall be required only when this Court required to consider the case on merits in an appeal. Moreover, this Court is of the view that the learned Trial Judge as well as this Court cannot brush aside the explanation to section 13(1)(e) of the Act. The case of M. Krishna Reddy Vs. State Deupty Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad, may be an authority for the proposition that the Court can consider the totality of circumstances for finding out if the income of the accused exceeded to the income which could be derived from the known sources of his income. This decision was rendered by the Supreme Court in appeal after conviction. It is not helpful for deciding the controversy at the stage of framing the charge. The entire picture shall be clear after the trial of the case is over. At this preliminary stage all that a Court can do is to examine the explanation given by the petitioner from the point of view of the petitioner as well as that of the prosecution. If we hop into shoes of the imaginary reasonable man, we shall find that the explanation regarding receipt of Rs. 5 Lakhs for the son of the petitioner is absolutely unpalatable. However, a brilliant student a person may be it not often found that Rs. 5 lakhs are offered by his relatives for his further studies? The man in the street would call for proof of it. That is what the investigating officer has done. Similar would be the fate of alleged agricultural income of the petitioner, especially, when it was never disclosed to by him to the authorities. The affidavits filed by the petitioner, are still to be tested by cross-examination. Similarly, the explanation of income of his wife towards the gifts amounting to Rupees 53,000/- is also required to be examined after recording the evidence in the case. It is difficult to accept it prima facie without calling for proof of it. The real thing that may be seen by the Trial Judge at that stage is that the material placed on record is so absurd that a reasonable man would reject it. Here finding may be that the investigating agency is persecuting the accused and not prosecuting him. That is a word of difference between the two acts. The real thing that may be seen by the Trial Judge at that stage is that the material placed on record is so absurd that a reasonable man would reject it. Here finding may be that the investigating agency is persecuting the accused and not prosecuting him. That is a word of difference between the two acts. The former originates in atrocious conduct of a person on account of vendetta or extreme callousness. The latter is founded on the call of duty to get the guilty punished. The scope of examination at this stage is so narrow and limited that it could only be judged by degree. Such subtle shades and supple variations have to be weighed in a rough and ready balance. In the opinion of this Court at this stage, the petitioner must show that he was being treated by the investigating agency in a manner without any regard to the truth of the matter. In other words, nothing short atrocity of the investigating agency apparent from material placed on record shall help the case of the petitioner. The petitioner's counsel has cited the decision of Orissa High Court in Janaki Ballav Patnaik Vs. State of Orissa, . This was a case of callous disregard of facts. In that case, the Chief Minister, J.B. Patnaik was able to place material on record that the investigating agency had conveniently ignored the income of his wife Smt. Jayanti Patnaik received by her as allowances granted to her as a Member of Parliament. This case is distinguishable because authentic material was placed on record by the Chief Minister, J.B. Patnaik. The decision of Supreme Court in State of U.P. Thru CBI Vs . Dr. Sanjay Singh and Anr. , also does not help the petitioner. In that case, the Supreme Court pointed out that a person cannot be charged of an offence merely because he had motive to commit it. The suspect motive could not be a substitute for cogent material, occular or circumstantial, for convicting a person charged with murder. This case too does not help the petitioner as is distinguishable on facts. In that case, the Supreme Court pointed out that a person cannot be charged of an offence merely because he had motive to commit it. The suspect motive could not be a substitute for cogent material, occular or circumstantial, for convicting a person charged with murder. This case too does not help the petitioner as is distinguishable on facts. On the other hand, the attention of this Court was drawn by the counsel for the respondent to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State by Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Shri S. Bangarappa, reported in JT 2000 (Suppl.) 3 SC 29 (supra), paragraph 21 of which reads as under:-- 21. Time and again this Court has pointed out that at the stage of framing charge the Court should not enter upon a process of evaluating the evidence by deciding its worth or credibility. The limited exercise during that stage is to find out whether the materials offered by the prosecution to be adduced as evidence are sufficient for the Court to proceed further. In paragraph 23 their Lordships have quoted with approval the following passage from their earlier decision in the case of State of Maharashtra and others Vs. Ishwar Piraji Kalpatri and others, :-- The opportunity which is to be afforded to the delinquent officer u/s 5(1)(e) of the Act (corresponding to section 13(1)(e) of 1988 Act) of satisfactorily explaining about his assets and resources is before the Court when the trial commences, and not at an earlier stage. If this be the law, the petitioner has no case. However, we may further elaborate the law in next paragraph. In the case of Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi and Others Vs. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja and others, , it was held by the Supreme Court in paragraph 7, at page 1967 as follows:-- From the above discussion, it seems well settled that at the sections 227-228 stage the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may for this limited purpose sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. Applying the test laid down above, it is clear to this Court, that the Court-below did not commit any illegality or impropriety in framing the charges against the petitioner by the impugned order dated 29-5-1999. There is substance in the allegation that the petitioner may be guilty of having disproportionate income than that he could earn from the known sources between the period July, 1973 to August, 1993. However, at the stage of framing charges, nothing more than prima facie case is to be made out The task of the prosecution is to prove its case and that of the petitioner is to defend it as best as he can. The ultimate result could be either way, depending upon the evidence led by the parties. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court does not find any merit in this revision. The revision fails and it is hereby dismissed accordingly. Final Result : Dismissed