Judgment :- The prayer in this original petition is to call for the records in CC. No. 63 of 1983 on the file of the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Economic Offences No. 1, Egmore and quash the same. The petitioner had been arrayed as an accused by the respondent complainant for the alleged offences under Section 6 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947 and Section 120(B) IPC read with Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act and also under Section 5 of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947. The case has been filed otherwise than on police report and it is a warrant case. The petition filed by the petitioner in MP No. 1447 of 1983 for furnishing copies of the report of the Superintendent of Police and the First Information Report was dismissed and was confirmed by the High Court in Crl. R.C. No. 658 of 1983. There is no progress of the case even after the receipt of the case papers from the High Court and after a lapse of one and a half years, the trial started. In the year 1992, PW-1 alone was examined and in the year 1993, no witness was examined. In 1994, PWs 2 to 4 were examined and thereafter in the year 1995 and 1996, no witness was examined. In the year 1997, PW-7 was examined and in the year 1998, PWs 8 to 13 were examined. In 1999, PWs 14 to 16 were examined. 33 witnesses are yet to be examined by the prosecution. The case is pending against the petitioner for the past 17 years. The petitioner admits that a delay of seven years have been caused by him due to the order of stay obtained by him in Crl. R.C. No. 658 of 1983. The proceedings against the petitioner is a clear violation of his fundamental right, provided under Article 25 of the Constitution of India, as abnormal delay has been caused in completing the trial and therefore, the entire proceedings is liable to be quashedIt is submitted by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that he is entitled to speedy trial as per Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Though the case has been filed in the year 1983, till the year 1999 only 16 witnesses were examined by the prosecution and 33 witnesses are yet to be examined. Though the case has been filed in the year 1983, till the year 1999 only 16 witnesses were examined by the prosecution and 33 witnesses are yet to be examined. It is pointed out a case has been filed otherwise than on police report and therefore, on the completion of the witnesses on the side of the prosecution the learned Magistrate has to frame charges, if there are sufficient grounds, and thereafter, again the witnesses have to be examined which will take a long time. Already 17 years have lapsed from the date of the filing of the case and if the prosecution is allowed to have its own way of examining the witnesses, it will take many years to complete the trial, and it is against the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is also submitted that most of the allegations are only against the second accused and the witnesses so far examined have not implicated or said anything implicating the petitioner, the third accused. According to the petitioner, the prosecution launched against him is only an abuse of process of the court and is in violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and therefore, the proceedings against him are liable to be quashed. The learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI cases produced a copy of the diary extract of this case and submitted that the delay in completing the trial was not caused entirely by the prosecution but by the petitioner and the other accused. According to him, on many occasions, some of the accused including the petitioner absconded and non-bailable warrants have to be issued against them and it took a long time to execute warrant, arrest and produce them before the Court. According to the Public Prosecutor delay of seven years in the trial of the case has been caused because of the Crl. R.C. 658 of 1983 filed by him in the High Court. As the petitioner is guilty of lapses and is very much responsible for the delay in completing the trial of the case, it is not open to him to plead before this court that delay had occurred only due to the lapse of the prosecution and the petition has to be dismissedThe learned Counsel for the petitioner relying mainly on the decision of the Supreme Court of India reported in 1998 LW Crl. 734 (Raj Deo Sharma v. The State of Bihar) submitted, under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the accused person is entitled to speedy trial from the date of registration of the case and if the trial is prolonged inordinately without sufficient reasons, that itself is a ground for quashing the proceedings. In the above decision, the Supreme Court after laying five guidelines for speedy trial, had made the following observation which is very relevant and is extracted below, "However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive proof of prejudice. In this context, the fact of incarceration of accused will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case." It is important to notice in this case that already 19 witnesses have been examined and only two more witnesses are yet to be examined on the side of the prosecution for framing charge against the petitioner and others. It is true after framing the charge, the accused persons have a right to cross-examine the witnesses, if they desire and it will take some time to finish the trial. The right to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses is a right conferred on every citizen and accused and it is for him to use that right or not and making accusation against the prosecution that after framing charge it will take some more time to finish the trial and that is a ground for quashing the proceedings, in my view does not appear to be just or acceptable. It is pointed by the Special Public Prosecutor for CBI cases, the petitioner has not suffered incarceration except that after arrest, he had been let out on bail after some days and he continues on bail throughout and therefore, it cannot be said that the accused had suffered physically or mentally. A careful perusal of the diary extract produced by the prosecution would show that all the accused were present on all the hearings. On the other hand, on many occasions, the petitioner was absent and NBW has to be issued and it took some time to execute the warrant, arrest and produce him before the court. A careful perusal of the diary extract produced by the prosecution would show that all the accused were present on all the hearings. On the other hand, on many occasions, the petitioner was absent and NBW has to be issued and it took some time to execute the warrant, arrest and produce him before the court. In this process, it is noticed long time has been consumed and therefore, I find it difficult to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was always ready and willing to face the trial and the entire fault is only on the prosecution in not producing the witnesses on time for examination by the CourtAt this juncture, the learned Special Public Prosecutor invited the attention of this court to the decision reported in 2000 (6) Scale 516 (P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka) and submitted the correctness of the ruling reported in 1998 2 LW Crl. 734, relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has been doubted by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court itself and the matter has been referred to a Constitution Bench. In paragraphs 4 and 5 of the said decision, we find the following observations. 4. The question is whether the earlier judgments of this Court, principally, in Common Cause v. Union of India, Common Cause v. Union of India, Raj Deo Sharma v. State of Bihar, would apply to prosecutions under the Prevention of Corruption Act and other economic offences. 5. Having perused the judgments aforementioned, we are of the view that these appeals should be heard by a Constitution Bench. We take this view because we think that it may be necessary to synthesis the various guidelines and directions issued in these judgments. We are also of the view that a Constitution Bench should consider whether time limits of the nature mentioned in some of these judgments can, under the law, be laid down. "In the above circumstances, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI cases prayed this court to exercise restraint in liberally applying the inherent power embodied under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings, especially considering the fact that trial had already started and 19 witnesses have been examined and only two more witnesses are yet to be examined. "In the above circumstances, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for CBI cases prayed this court to exercise restraint in liberally applying the inherent power embodied under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. for quashing the proceedings, especially considering the fact that trial had already started and 19 witnesses have been examined and only two more witnesses are yet to be examined. In my view, the prayer made by the Special Public Prosecutor for CBI cases appears to be reasonable and it cannot be termed as unreasonable or not wholly acceptableIn the other decision relied on by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, reported in (Santhosh De v. Archana Guha and others) in paragraph 6, it has been held even though the prosecution was pending for 14 years, not a single witness was examined and that when the delay cannot be attributed to the accused, proceedings have to be quashed. In the present case, the position is different. As already stated, 19 witnesses have already been examined by the prosecution and only two more witnesses are yet to be examined and therefore, I am of the view that the principle of law laid down in the above decision is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In (Mangilal Vyas v. State of Rajasthan), it has been held in paragraph 4, by the Supreme Court as follows :-" 4. We do not consider it necessary to narrate the detailed facts leading to the present appeals except to state that the trial in the pending cases has been unduly protracted due to various causes. It is no doubt regrettable feature, but having regard to the nature of the allegations made and the availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings at this stage, on account of lapse of time alone, by invoking the inherent power of the court. It is no doubt regrettable feature, but having regard to the nature of the allegations made and the availability of evidence in support of the prosecution, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings at this stage, on account of lapse of time alone, by invoking the inherent power of the court. We think that the circumstances of the case only call for appropriate directions for the expeditious disposal of the pending proceedings and the law has to be allowed to take its own course the prevent miscarriage of justice." In this case also considering the nature of the allegations made and the availability of the evidence in support of the prosecution, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings at this stage, namely after 19 witnesses have been examined, on account of delay, as the delay is not entirely on the prosecution, but the petitioner and the other accused are also equally responsible for the delay and therefore, I am unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the proceedings against the petitioner has become persecution and therefore, it is not expedient to terminate the proceedings against the petitioner invoking the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and that certain directions for speedy disposal of the pending trial would be sufficient to meet the ends of justice and to prevent miscarriage of justiceIn the result, the trial court is directed to proceed with the case against the petitioner and the other accused on day to day basis and finish the same as expeditiously as possible and that the trial court shall dispose of the case within a period not exceeding four months from the date of the receipt of the copy of this order. The petition is dismissed accordingly, subject to the above direction. Consequently, Crl. M.P. No. 10886 of 1999 is closed.