JUDGMENT Ms. Kamlesh Sharma, J—The appellant in this appeal is the plaintiff, whereas, respondents are the defendants but respondent No. 1 is the contesting defendant, who felt aggrieved by the decree and judgment dated 30.6.1990 passed by Sub Judge 1st Class, Dalhousie and preferred an appeal against them before the District Judge, Chamba Division Chamba, who has accepted his appeal vide judgment and decree dated 31.7.1993 and set aside the decree and judgment dated 30.6.1990 of Sub Judge 1st Class with the result the suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed, whereas it was decreed by Sub Judge 1st Class and the partition order dated 21.9.1983 and mutation entry No. 467 dated 21.2.1986 were declared illegal and void and not binding on his rights. Sub Judge 1st Class had also restrained the defendants by decree of permanent prohibitory injunction from interfering in the possession of the plaintiff in Khasra Nos. 1632/406, 1636/407, 425 and 1646/472, Kita 4 Khata Khatauni No. 69/98 min, situate in Mohal Gola, Pargana Bhatti Tikri. Hence the present regular second appeal under Section 100, Code of Civil Procedure. 2. This Court has heard learned Counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 3. The following substantial questions of law arise in the present appeal : 1. Whether the first appellate Court has erred in holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the civil suit of the plaintiff in the absence of any such preliminary objection taken by defendant No, 1 Chamelo in his written statement, issue framed, evidence adduced during trial and ground taken in the appeal? 2. Whether the first appellate Court has misread and mis-interpreted the pleadings and evidence on record, oral as well as documentary to come to the conclusion that the land in dispute was not partitioned as alleged by the plaintiff? 3. Whether the first appellate Court has misread and mis-interpreted the order dated 21.9.1983, Ex. PC, to come to the conclusion that it was rightly passed ex parte against the plaintiff as he had failed to put in appearance in the partition proceedings before Assistant Collector 1st Grade? 4. 3. Whether the first appellate Court has misread and mis-interpreted the order dated 21.9.1983, Ex. PC, to come to the conclusion that it was rightly passed ex parte against the plaintiff as he had failed to put in appearance in the partition proceedings before Assistant Collector 1st Grade? 4. So far bar of Civil Court jurisdiction is concerned, it is purely a question of law which could be agitated before the first appellate Court and there is no substance in the submission made by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that in the absence of pleadings, issue, evidence and even the ground of appeal the first appellate Court could not consider it. Now, the question arises whether he has decided it erroneously? The answer is in positive. No doubt, Section 171(2) (xvii) of H.P. Land Revenue Act, 1953, puts a bar that Civil Court shall not exercise jurisdiction over any claim of partition of an estate, holding or tenancy, or any question connected with, or arising out of proceedings for partition, but qualifies that a question as to title should not be involved in any of the property of which partition is sought. From the provision, it is clear that there is no absolute bar and the moment the question of title is raised, the Civil Court gets the jurisdiction. 5. In catena of judgments of the Supreme Court, guidelines have been laid down for deciding the question of Civil Courts jurisdiction. In Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another, AIR 1969 SC 78, the basic judgment of the Constitution Bench, the learned Judges after reviewing the case law on the question of maintainability of civil suit, have laid down seven propositions, out of which two relevant propositions are as under:— "(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not." 6. In Katikara Chintamani Dora and others v. Guatraddi Annamanaidu and others, AIR 1974 SC 1069, the learned Judges have observed in para 33 that:— ".....It was pertinently added that this exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be subject to two limitations. First, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. The second is as regards the exact extent to which the powers of statutory tribunals are exclusive. The question as to whether any particular case falls under the first or the second of the above categories would depend on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in conjunction with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal set up and other relevant factors." 7, In Vatticherukuru Village Panchayat v. Nori Venkatarama Deekshithulu and others, 1991 Supp (2) SCC 228, the learned Judges have further elaborated the guidelines in paragraphs 22 and 23 of the judgment:— "22. Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 provides that whenever a question arises before the Civil Court whether its jurisdiction is excluded expressly or by necessary implication, the court naturally feels inclined to consider whether remedy afforded by an alternative provision prescribed by special statute is sufficient or adequate. In cases where exclusion of the Civil Courts jurisdiction is expressly provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of the statute in question and the adequacy or sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be relevant, but cannot be decisive. Where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication such consideration would be very important and in conceivable circumstances might become even decisive. 23. The jurisdiction of a tribunal created under statute may depend upon the fulfillment of some condition precedent or upon existence of some particular fact. Such a fact is collateral to the actual matter which the tribunal has to try and the determination whether it existed or not is logically temporary prior to the determination of the actual question which the tribunal has to consider. At the inception of an enquiry by a tribunal of limited jurisdiction, when a challenge is made to is jurisdiction, the tribunal has to consider as the collateral fact whether it*would act or not and for that purpose to arrive at some decision as to whether it has jurisdiction or not. There may be tribunal which by virtue of the law constituting it has the power to determine finally, even the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its jurisdiction depends; but subject to that, the tribunal cannot by a wrong decision with regard to collateral fact, give itself a jurisdiction which it would not otherwise have had. Except such tribunals of limited jurisdiction, when the statute not only empowers to enquire into jurisdictional facts but also the rights and controversy finally it is entitled to enter on the enquiry and reach a decision rightly or wrongly. If it has jurisdiction to do right, it has jurisdiction to do wrong. It may be irregular or illegal which could be corrected in appeal or revision subject to that the order would become final......” The learned Judges have also quoted with approval the propositions laid down in Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another (supra). 8. If it has jurisdiction to do right, it has jurisdiction to do wrong. It may be irregular or illegal which could be corrected in appeal or revision subject to that the order would become final......” The learned Judges have also quoted with approval the propositions laid down in Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another (supra). 8. The observations made in Katikara Chintamani Dora and others v. Guatraddi Annamanaidu and others (supra) were further reiterated in Shiv Kumar Chadha v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and others^ (1993) 3 SCC 161. In Vankamamidi Venkata Subba Rao v. Chatlapalli Seetharamaratna Ranganayakamma, (1997) 5 SCC 460, the bar of Civil Courts jurisdiction is summed up as under:— "......It is settled legal position that if a tribunal with limited jurisdiction cannot assume jurisdiction and decide for itself the dispute conclusively, in such a situation, it is the court that is required to decide whether the tribunal with limited jurisdiction has correctly assumed jurisdiction and decided the dispute within its limits. It is also equally settled that when jurisdiction is conferred on a tribunal, the courts examine whether the essential principles of jurisdiction have been followed and decided by the tribunals leaving the decision on merits to the tribunal. It is also an equally settled legal position that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special tribunal, the Civil Courts jurisdiction must be held to be excluded, if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Court would normally do in a suit. Such a provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. When there is an express bar of jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the enquiry may be decisive. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the enquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary that the statute creates a special right or liability and provides procedure for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right or liability shall be determined by the tribunal so constituted and whether remedies are normally associated with the action in civil courts or prescribed by the statutes or not......” 9. In State of Rajasthan v. Harphool Singh (dead) through his LRs, (2000) 5 SCC 652, the learned Judges after referring to Dhulabhai etc. v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another (stipra) and other judgments have reiterated in para 11 that, "questions relating to disputed claims of parties for title to an immovable property could be decided only by the competent Civil Court and that in the absence of a machinery in the special enactment to determine disputes relating to title between two rival claimants, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court cannot be said to have been ousted." 10. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (D) by L.Rs. and others, AIR 2000 SC 2000, it is reiterated:— "5. The normal rule of law is that Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognizance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislature intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislature intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1968) 3 SCR 662, it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the special Tribunals jurisdiction of the civil courts must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." (Also see : Kaka Ram alias Ram Lai v. Financial Commissioner, H.P. and others, 1984 Sim. L.C. 154 and Shri Lajpat Rai (deceased) through his L.Rs. Smt. Maya Devi and others v. Smt Taro Devi and others, 1999 (1) SLJ 511. 11. Therefore, in the light of settled legal position this Court has no hesitation to hold that in the facts and circumstances of the present case the Civil Court had the jurisdiction, as question of title was raised by the plaintiff by making; allegations that the land in dispute stood partitioned long back, ^s £ result of which he was holding the land comprised of four Khasra numbers (1632/ 406, 1636/407, 425 and 1646/472) allotted to him, to the exclusion of other co-sharers. There was additional reason for invoking the jurisdiction of the Civil Court on the allegations that the impugned order dated 21.9.1983 partitioning the land in dispute was passed ex parte without proper service on the plaintiff; in violation of the principles of natural justice and without following the procedure laid down under H.P. Land Revenue Act. In this view of the matter, the findings of the first appellate Court that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the plaintiff are set aside and substantial question of law No. l is answered accordingly. 12. In this view of the matter, the findings of the first appellate Court that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit of the plaintiff are set aside and substantial question of law No. l is answered accordingly. 12. So far second substantial question of law is concerned, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has taken this Court through the pleadings and evidence on record, oral as well as documentary, but has not been able to show that any part thereof has been misread and misinterpreted by the first appellate Court to come to the conclusion that the land in dispute stood already partitioned. In para 7 of the plaint there is mention of family settlement without giving further particulars thereof, whereas, the oral evidence pertains to partition, which is not supported by the revenue record produced by the plaintiff. Partition, whether by way of family settlement or family arrangement or by the Revenue Officer by giving effect to the family partition or settlement by metes and bounds should be such which may conclusively establish the respective shares of the parties so as to stop further dispute in between them. Vague assertions in regard to the share of one party and that too which is not proved from the evidence, cannot be said to be sufficient to hold that a partition had taken place. Further, mere arrangement in regard to cultivation of the land cannot be termed as partition though such arrangement at the time of final partition by the Revenue Officer should be given due consideration in order to maintain possession of the parties intact. Therefore, the first appellate Court has rightly set aside the findings of the trial Court to hold that the land in dispute was not partitioned as alleged by the plaintiff. The Substantial Question of Law No. 2 is answered accordingly. 13. After perusing the order dated 21.9.1983 Ex.PC this Court finds that the first appellate Court has rightly held that in the partition proceedings the plaintiff did not appear despite service on him, hence ex parte order was passed against him. It is stated in this order that on receipt of report and proposal for mode of partition, the notices were issued to the parties in response whereof only the applicant-defendant No. 1 was present and the non-applicants including the plaintiff, were not present and ex parte proceedings were held against them. It is stated in this order that on receipt of report and proposal for mode of partition, the notices were issued to the parties in response whereof only the applicant-defendant No. 1 was present and the non-applicants including the plaintiff, were not present and ex parte proceedings were held against them. This statement of fact made in the quasi judicial order is liable to be accepted as correct on its face value unless it is proved to be incorrect. Except the bald statement of the. plaintiff, there is nothing on record to controvert this statement of fact. Therefore, this Court is in agreement with the finding of the first appellate Court that order dated 21.9.1983 Ex. PC was rightly passed ex parte against the plaintiff. Substantial Question of Law No. 3 is decided accordingly. 14. The result of above discussion is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed. There is no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed. -