JUDGMENT Pratap Kr. Ray, J. This Revisional Application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the plaintiff decree-holders assailing the order No.37 dated 15th September, 1998 passed by learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Second Court at Diamond Harbour, 24-Parganas (S) in Misc. Case No. 15/98 arose out of an application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the judgment debtors in Title Execution Case No. 13/94 whereby and whereunder said title execution case and the relief therein as prayed for by the decree-holders were dismissed allowing the application under section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code filed by the judgment debtors upon holding, inter alia, that the relief under section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act as crystallized to the judgment and decree of the Court became in executable in view of change circumstances namely transfer of the suit property by the judgment debtor Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of judgment debtor No.3 who was originally owner of the joint property by registered deed of sale after the decree was passed. 2. The petitioner decree-holders has assailed this order on several grounds namely (1) the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not maintainable to pass the impugned order as the Executing Court is bound by the decree unless and until the decree is satisfied by proper certificate issued by the Court in terms of Order 21 Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, (2) the impugned transaction namely the alleged sale deed executed by judgment debtor Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of judgment debtor No.3 transferring the property after the decree since was subject to "the doctrine of lis pendens" and since squarely attracted in tenns of section 52 of Transfer of Property Act, the consideration of such deed by the Executing Court was illegal, (3) that "doctrine of estoppel" would be applicable in the instant case, which has vitiated the impugned decision since in the suit, the judgment debtor Nos.1 and 2 categorically deposed that the portion of the joint property which was a suit property, was purchased by them by out and out sale deed and even in appeal as preferred against the judgment and decree as passed in the suit relating to cause of action under section 44 of Transfer of Property Act, was confirmed and accordingly subsequent conduct during pendency of the, suit at the execution stage on the alleged contention that there was an oral agreement to retransfer the property by the concerned deed as was accepted by the learned Court below was required to be rejected and (4) lastly on the ground that once joint property being a dwelling house is sold to a stranger and a decree is passed granting such relief to the other joint owners of the property by any subsequent sale deed retransferring the said property to the previous owner it cannot restore the position of jointness of the property automatically. 3. 3. The learned Advocate of the opposite party has supported the impugned order passed by the learned Executing Court below holding that the decree was in executable was within the jurisdiction of the learned Court below by entertaining the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that once the property has been retransferred by the judgment debtor Nos.1 and 2 in favour of the judgment debtor No.3 the decree has been satisfied and accordingly there was no scope for proceeding with the decree, that the Executing Court can consider such subsequent events under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that point of applicability of doctrine of lis pendens and doctrine of estoppel as urged herein though was taken in the objection filed by the decree-holder with reference to the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the judgment debtor No.3 but same was never urged before the learned Court below as would appear from the impugned order and accordingly such points cannot be taken herein in the revisional jurisdiction before this Court applying the "doctrine of abandons". 4. For adjudication of the rival contentions, the factual matrix in brief is required to be considered. 5. Title Suit No.312 of 1985 was filed by the decree-holders present petitioned herein praying necessary relief in respect of the suit property under section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act on the grievance that suit property being a joint dwelling house of Hindu undivided family, in terms of section 44 of Transfer of Property Act, the sale deed executed in favour of defendant judgment debtor Nos.1 and 2 by defendant judgment debtor No.3 a joint owner of the property did not allow the purchaser of the property belonging to the Muslim community to possess jointly the dwelling house and to construct houses therein. On such grievances the relief prayed for eviction of defendants judgment debtor Nos.1 and 2 from the suit property on eviction and demolition of the structures and rooms as made therein. Suit was decreed in favoun of the decree-holders declaring the property as a joint property and the stranger purchasers accordingly were restrained from enjoying the property and necessary decree was passed for eviction of them and demolition of the structures. Suit was decreed in favoun of the decree-holders declaring the property as a joint property and the stranger purchasers accordingly were restrained from enjoying the property and necessary decree was passed for eviction of them and demolition of the structures. By the judgment and decree dated 5th September, 1994 in the suit it was deposed by the stranger purchasers, the judgment debtor Nos. 1 and 2 that they purchased the property by registered deed of sale executed and registered by judgment debtor No.3 and the sale being an out and out sale deed since the purchase, they were enjoying and possessing the property by constructing the structures therein. 6. However, judgment debtor No.3 feebly contested the matter contending inter alia, that the sale deed therein was not an absolute sale deed but there was a condition of retransfer orally but such contention was rejected by the Trial Court. Appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court being Title Appeal No.120/94 before the learned Assistant District Judge, Diamond Harbour unsuccessfully by the appellants, the judgment debtors even urging the same point namely the transaction was not out and out sale but there was a condition of retransfer of property orally. Challenging the judgment passed in First Appeal, Second Appeal was preferred registered as SAT No.2286/97 and the same was dismissed under Order 41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Division Bench of this Court holding inter alia, that there• was no special question of law involved. The decree holders thereafter placed the decree for execution registered as Title Execution Case No. 13/94. 7. To resist the decree, the judgment debtor No.3 filed an application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure contending inter alia, that the suit property under decree has already been retransferred by judgment debtor Nos.1 and 2 on the basis of the oral agreement for such retransfer as the judgment debtor No.3 sold the property upon taking loan and earlier deed was not out and out sale deed. Such application was registered as Misc. Case No. 15/98 of the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Second Court at Diamond Harbour. Such application was registered as Misc. Case No. 15/98 of the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) Second Court at Diamond Harbour. The present petitioners that is the decree-holders filed an objection upon taking different points namely that judgment debtors in the suit in which the judgment and decree was passed and which reached its finality even by rejection of second appeal took the same point that concerned transaction was a lone transaction and not out and out sale but such contention was rejected and accordingly the judgment debtors are estopped from raising the said plea in the application under section 47 of the Code. Further it was contended that "doctrine of lis pendens" is applicable in terms of section 52 of Transfer of Property Act since the purported sale as has been brought to the notice of the Court by the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the judgment debtor No.3 was subject to the decree in terms of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act namely by application of doctrine of lis pendens and further contending inter alia, that the transaction was for collateral purpose to frustrate the decree as passed in favour of the judgment debtors. It was further urged that the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the matter under section 47 of the said Code and Executing Court was bound to execute the decree. 8. Though the application was filed under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the judgment debtor No.3 but he did not depose in support of this application. Judgment debtor Nos.1 and 2 came and exhibited the sale deed in support of the contention raised in the said application that suit property since was already retransferred in favour of the judgment debtor No.3, the decree was not executable and further contending that in the event of execution of the decree the judgment debtor Nos.1 and 2 would not be prejudiced as they had already left the suit premises. 9. Considering the rival contention of the parties learned Executing Court, however, allowed the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the judgment debtor No.3 holding inter alia, that decree became in executable, which is now the impugned order in this revisional application. 10. 9. Considering the rival contention of the parties learned Executing Court, however, allowed the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the judgment debtor No.3 holding inter alia, that decree became in executable, which is now the impugned order in this revisional application. 10. At the very beginning the point whether the learned Executing Court had the jurisdiction to decide the question in the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure when admittedly there is no order certifying the satisfaction of the decree in terms of Order 21 Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure is being considered first. The relevant provisions namely the section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Order 21 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code being relevant statutes in this field accordingly are read in extenso here-in-below:- "Section 47. (1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit. (2) [Omitted by Amendment Act, 1976]. (3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court. [Explanation I: For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit. Explanation II : (a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property of a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section.] Order XXI Rule 2. (1) Where any money payable under a decree of any kind is paid out of Court [or a decree of any kind is otherwise adjusted] in whole or in part to the satisfaction of the decree- holder, the decree-holder shall certify such payment or adjustment to the Court whose duty it is to execute the decree, and the Court shall record the same accordingly. (2) The judgment-debtor [or any person who has become surety for the judgment-debtor] also may inform the court of such payment or adjustment, and apply to the Court to issue a notice to the decree-holder to show cause, on a day to be fixed by the Court, why such payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified; and if, after service of such notice, the decree holder fails to show cause why the payment or adjustment should not be recorded as certified, the Court shall record the same accordingly. [(2A) No payment or adjustment shall be recorded at the instance of the judgment-debtor unless- (a) the payment is made in the manner, provided in rule 1; or (b) the payment or adjustment is proved by documentary evidence; or (c) the payment• or adjustment is admitted by, or on behalf of, the decree holder in his reply to the notice given under sub- rule (2) of rule 1, or before the Court.] (3) A payment or adjustment, which has not been certified or recorded as aforesaid, shall not be recognized by any Court executing the decree." 11. From the, aforesaid provisions of the Civil Procedure Code [hereinafter refer to as the said Code] it is clear that though by general language by incorporating the general provision under section 47 of the said Code, the Executing Court has been vested with the power to decide the questions relating to the execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree but there is a special provision under Order 21 Rule 2 as well as in sub-rule 3 prohibiting the Executing Court from recognizing any payments or adjustments which has not been certified and not recorded under Order 21 Rule 2. It may appear apparently there is conflict in between the two provisions namely Order 21 Rule 2 including sub rule 3 qua section 47 of the said Code but applying the test for construction of the different provisions in a statute and the principles and theory laid down under the theory of such interpretation of statute, the point to be answered that there was no conflicting situation in the jurisdictional matter vested to the Executing Court under the said two provisions. 12. It is now a settled legal position by pronouncement of different judgments of Apex Court as well as the Courts in England that every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statute relating to the subject matter. Reliance is placed to the judgments passed in Canada Sugar Refining Company vs. R, reported in (1898) AC 735, wherein the aforesaid observation was made by Lord Davy. The Apex Court also considered that principle in the case of Philips India Limited vs. Labour Court, reported in 1985(3) SCC 103 at 112, in the case of Osmania University Teachers Association vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr., reported in AIR 1987 SC 2034 at 2042, in the case of Captain Subash Kumar vs. Principal Officer, Mercantile Marine Deptt. Madras, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1632 at page 1638 and in the case of Mohan Kumar Singhania & Ors. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in AIR 1992 SC 1 at page 29 holding inter alia, that "it is a rule now firmly established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as well. It is the rule which has been-referred to as an "Elementary Rule" by VISCOUNT SIMONDS in the case of Attorney General vs. H.R.H. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanouer, reported in (1957)1 ALL E R 49 at page 55 (HL). Said view has been reiterated by putting the word "Settled Rule" by B.K. Mukherjee, J in the case of Poppatlal Shah vs. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1953 SC 274 at page 276. Said view has been reiterated by putting the word "Settled Rule" by B.K. Mukherjee, J in the case of Poppatlal Shah vs. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1953 SC 274 at page 276. This principle also is spoken of construction "Ex Visceribus Actus" as appearing in the judgments of the Apex Court passed in the case of Newspapers Limited vs. Industrial Tribunal U.P. & Ors., reported in AIR 1957 SC 532 at page 536, in the case of Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs to Govt. of West Bengal vs. Abani Maity, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1029 at page 1032, in the case of Mohan Kumar Singhania & Ors. vs. Union ofb1dia & Ors., reported in AIR 1992 SC 1 at page 20 and in the case of Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain, reported in AIR 1997 SC 1006 at pages 1009, 1010. Chief Justice Sinha also held in a decision in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1241 at page 1265 to this effect "the Court must ascertain the intention of the legislature by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs". 13. Further for appreciation of the true spirit and purpose of enactment of a general provision under section 47 of the said Code and a special contingency relating to the provisions attracted under Order 21 Rule 2 "Animus Imponentis" that is the intention of the law maker also is a relevant consideration as can be said in the language of Sir John Nichol as pronounced in the case of Brett vs. Brett, reported in (1826)3 ADD 210 at page 216 "The Key to the opening of every law is the reason and the spirit of the law -it is the "Animus Imponentis", the intention of the law maker, expressed in the law itself, taken as a whole. Hence, to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute, that particular phrase is not to be viewed detached from the context-meaning by this as well the title and the preamble as the purview or enacting part of the statute". 14. Hence, to arrive at the true meaning of any particular phrase in a statute, that particular phrase is not to be viewed detached from the context-meaning by this as well the title and the preamble as the purview or enacting part of the statute". 14. Considering the matter in the aforesaid angle it appears that section 47 of the Code to be looked into so far as vesting the power to decide the question relating to the "satisfaction" of the decree by harmonious construction with. Order 21 Rule 3 which provides an embargo to the Executing Court by using the word 'Shall' namely shall not entertain payment or adjustments of decree unless certified or recorded in terms of Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Beside such applying the maxim, Generalia Specialibus, nonderogant and generialiabus specialibus derogant, the apparent conflict as it appears vanishes by application of the said maxim which is a settled legal proposition with age old sanction that a general provision will yield to special provision. 15. Reference is made about application of such 'maxim' in harmonizing C09struction of different provisions of a statute namely the judgment of Apex Court in the case of South India Corporation (P) Ltd. vs. Secretary, Board of Revenue, Trivandum, reported in AIR 1964 SC 207 at page 215, wherein applying the same rule it was held by the Apex Court that general provision under Article 372 of Constitution of India regarding continuance of existing laws is subject to Article 277 of the Constitution of India, which is a special provision relating to taxes, duties, cesses or fees lawfully levied at the commencement of the Constitution. Similarly, applying such test in the Evidence Act, 1872 relating to the sections 123 and 162 of the said Act regarding privilege documents relating to affairs of the State was answered by the Apex Court by harmonizing the aforesaid sections in the case in State of U.P. vs. Rajnarain & Ors., reported in AIR 1975 BC 865 and also in the decision of R.K. Jain vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1993 BC 1769. Even in respect of construction of provisions of subordinate legislations, same principle was applied by the Apex Court in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Even in respect of construction of provisions of subordinate legislations, same principle was applied by the Apex Court in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., reported in AIR 1961 BC 1170, herein this principle was applied in resolving 1 conflict between clause 5(a) and clause 23 of the Government Order of 1948 passed under the D.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, by holding that special provision made in clause 3 relating. to discharge or dismissal of workmen pending an enquiry or appeal was outside the more general provision of clause 5(a) which related to all Industrial Disputes in general. 'Further applying such test relating to the conflict of a provision in Forest Act, 1927 qua sale of Goods Act, the Apex Court resolved the conflict holding that sections 82 and 83 of the Forest Act, 1927 are special provisions which prevail over the sale of Goods Act in the case Jogindralal Saha vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1991 BC 1148 at page 1149. 16. Hence, it is now a settled legal position that conflict in between different section under a statute and/or order and/or conflict between the different section of different statutes as well as the conflict in the provisions in the Constitutional Law in different Articles would be resolved by giving a harmonious meaning so that no provision under the statute is stamped as a "dead" letter and/or 'useless lumber' in the language of the Apex Court as held in the case of J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) and Calcutta Gas Company (Propriety) Limited vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1962 BC 1044, respectively as well as the decision of the Apex Court further in the case of Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain, reported in AIR 1997 BC 1006 at pages 1009 and 1010. 17. Ltd. (supra) and Calcutta Gas Company (Propriety) Limited vs. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1962 BC 1044, respectively as well as the decision of the Apex Court further in the case of Sultana Begum vs. Prem Chand Jain, reported in AIR 1997 BC 1006 at pages 1009 and 1010. 17. The identical question cropped up in the Suhana Begum's case aforesaid regarding harmonious construction of Order 47 relating to the power of the Executing Court to consider the question of satisfaction of the decree qua special provision Order 21 Rule 2 and particularly sub-rule 3 whereby an embargo was made divesting such power of consideration of the matter of satisfaction of decree under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Executing Court by incorporating a mandatory provision using the language 'shall' that Executing Court would not be entitled to discharge such question of satisfaction of the decree unless certification of such decree under Order 21 Rule 2, hence, point is not at all res integra and is settled position now. 18. Applying the said doctrine and relying upon the aforesaid judgment of the Ap1x Court, I am holding that learned Court below committed gross illegality by entertaining the application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure while passing the impugned order in this revision application and thereby granted relief to the judgment debtors holding the decree was satisfied and the decree became non- executable. Learned Court below had no jurisdiction to decide such question of satisfaction of the decree and thereby to pass the order "non-executability of the decree" in the application filed under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure by judgment debtors relying upon a transaction in between a judgment debtor qua another judgment debtors but not in between a judgment debtor and the decree holder. Order 21 Rule 2 is the provision by which satisfaction of such decree was required to be certified for entertaining such point by the Executing Court. Admittedly, there is no such certification regarding satisfaction of the decree by any Court as would empower the Executing Court to decide the question. Order 21 Rule 2 is the provision by which satisfaction of such decree was required to be certified for entertaining such point by the Executing Court. Admittedly, there is no such certification regarding satisfaction of the decree by any Court as would empower the Executing Court to decide the question. Since the language under Order 21 Rule 2 sub-rule 3 is in a mandatory negative form by using the word "shall not entertain" the question of satisfaction of the decree unless certified under Order 21 Rule 2, the learned Court committed a gross illegality by not taking care of such mandatory provision while adjudicating the application under section 47 of the said Code. In that view of the matter, there is a gross jurisdictional error committed by the Court and the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. In this context another settled legal position can be applied to test the illegality of the impugned order namely that Executing Court cannot go beyond the decree. In the instant case, Executing Court without having the specific order of satisfaction of the decree by way of certification of such by Order 21 Rule 2 had gone to decide the matter and travelled beyond the decree which is not permissible under the law. Reliance is placed to the judgment Sultana Begum (supra), judgment in the case of Bhawarlal Bhandari vs. Universal Heavy Mechanical Lifting Enterprises, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 558 (paragraphs 9 and 10). Further reliance is placed to the judgment of the 3 Judge Bench of the Apex Court as pronounced in the case of Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi vs. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman & Ors., reported in 1970(1) SCC 670 , wherein in paragraphs 6 and 7, the Apex Court held as follows: "6. A Court executing a decree cannot go behind the decree: between the parties or their representatives it must take the decree according to its tenor, and cannot entertain any objection that the decree was incorrect in law or on facts. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7. Until it is set aside by an appropriate proceeding in appeal or revision, a decree even if it be erroneous is still binding between the parties. 7. When a decree which is a nullity, for instance, where it is passed without bringing the legal representative on the record of a person who was dead at the date of the decree, or against a ruling prince without a certificate, is sought to be executed an objection in that behalf may be raised in a proceeding for execution. Again, when the decree is made by a Court which has no inherent jurisdiction to make objection as to its validity may be raised in an execution proceeding if the objection appears on the face of the record: where .the objection as to the jurisdiction of the Court to pass the decree does not appear on the face of the record and requires examination of the questions raised and decided at the trial or which could have been but have not been raised, the Executing Court will have no jurisdiction to entertain an objection as to the validity of the decree even on the ground of absence of jurisdiction. In Jnanendra Mohan Bhaduri & Anr. vs. Rabindra Nath Chakravarti, the Judicial Committee held that where a decree was passed upon an award made under the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, an objection in the course of the execution proceeding that the decree was made without jurisdiction, since under the Indian Arbitration Act, 1899, there is no provision for making a decree upon an award, was competent. That was a case in which the decree was on the face of the record without jurisdiction." 19. Reliance is placed further on a judgment of this Court on that issue in the case of Nirmal Kumar Chakroborty, reported in Calcutta Law Times 1994(2) H.C. 214, where Bijitendra Mohan Mitra, J. considering the different judgments held "subsequent events cannot be looked into by the Executing Court unless they come within the parameter of Order 21 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure read with sub-rule 3 thereof." 20. Hence, impugned order passed by the learned Court below absolutely is of without jurisdiction by entertaining a subsequent event as alleged by the judgment debtors by filling application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, since learned Court below being the Executing Court had no power and jurisdiction to travel beyond the decree save and except consideration of satisfaction of any decree being duly certified within the parameters of Order 21 Rule 2 and sub-rule 3 of the said provision. Since impugned order is of without jurisdiction, though argument has been advanced regarding other propositions namely applicability of "doctrine of lis pendens" in terms of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and the "doctrine of estoppel", this Court is not considering those matter in depth though doctrine of "lis pendens" also is applicable herein in the instant case in terms of section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. The alleged transaction by retransfer of the suit property by another registered deed of sale is controlled and guided and subject to section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, hence, same is also subject to decree. 21. Learned Advocate of opposite party has advanced arguments to resist applicability of said doctrine on other forms namely jurisdiction of this Court to consider those as not urged in the Court below but the Court is not adjudicating said issue. Since this Court is of the view that impugned order was passed without jurisdiction by the learned Court below upon giving a go bye of mandatory provision Order 21 Rule 2 sub-rule 3. Accordingly it is held that the impugned order has been passed without jurisdiction, hence, same is set aside and quashed. The Executing Court below is directed to execute the decree forthwith. This revisional application is accordingly allowed but no order as to costs. Later: 31.8.2001 22. Xerox certified copy of the order, if applied for, be supplied expeditiously. Revisional application allowed.