VISHWANATHA SHETTY, J. ( 1 ) IN this application filed under Order VI, Rule 16 and Order VII, rule 11 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), read with Section 87 of the Representation of the people Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), the first respondent has made two prayers; firstly, he has prayed that paragraphs 4 to 13 of the petition may be struck off and secondly, the Election Petition may he dismissed with exemplary costs. ( 2 ) FEW facts, which may be relevant for the disposal of this application, may briefly be stated as follows: ( 3 ) IN the Election Petition, the petitioner, who had contested the election as a candidate of Bharatiya Janata Party in the election held to 162 - Shimoga Assembly Constituency, has called in question the election of the first respondent, who was a successful candidate in the election. Respondents 2 to 8 in the petition are other unsuccessful candidates who had contested the said election. The petitioner lost the election to the first respondent by a margin of around 6,503 votes. The elections both to the 162-Shimoga Assembly constituency and the 21st Shimoga Parliamentary Constituency were simultaneously held on 11th September 1999; and the result of the election of the 162-Shimoga Assembly Constituency was declared on 6th October 1999. ( 4 ) THE thrust of the grievance of the petitioner in the petition is that at the behest of the candidate for the Lok Sabha one sri S. Bangarappa, who is also a candidate from the Indian National congress, respondents 9 and 10, who are the Returning Officer and the District Election Officer respectively, were responsible for the substitution of the Ballot Boxes, and on account of that, the result of the Election has been materially affected. Therefore, the petitioner has prayed for a declaration of the Election of the first respondent as void in terms of Section 100 (b) and (d) of the Act and for a further declaration that he is the returned candidate in respect of 162-Shimoga Assembly Constituency in terms of Section 101 (b) of the Act. Therefore, the petitioner has prayed for a declaration of the Election of the first respondent as void in terms of Section 100 (b) and (d) of the Act and for a further declaration that he is the returned candidate in respect of 162-Shimoga Assembly Constituency in terms of Section 101 (b) of the Act. ( 5 ) THE first respondent had filed I. A. II seeking for dismissal of the petition on the ground that the petitioner has not complied with the provisions of Section 82 of the Act in as much as respondents 9 and 10, who are not proper and necessary parties, were made as parties to the petition. By means of order dated 25th October 2000, i had rejected the said application. Now, the first respondent has filed this application. ( 6 ) IT is the case of the first respondent that in paragraphs 1 to 14 of the Written Statement, he has raised preliminary objections with regard to the maintainability of the petition and the said preliminary objections are required to be considered at the threshold. According to the first respondent, since the petitioner has made allegations of corrupt practice and the said allegations do not set forth full particulars of such corrupt practice and "material facts" relating to the corrupt practice are not set out, the petition is liable to be rejected as not maintainable. It is his case that the averments made in the petition are either vague or bald or unnecessary or frivolous or vexatious or scandalous in nature inasmuch as the allegations of corrupt practice is stated to have been committed by sri Bangarappa; and there is no direct allegation made against the first respondent. lt is his further case that even if the entire pleadings are perused, there is no cause of action disclosed. ( 7 ) THE petitioner has filed his objections to the application-I. A. IV and seriously disputed the claim of the first respondent and contended that the petition is not liable to be dismissed on the grounds urged by the first respondent. ( 8 ) SRI Suman, learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent,in support of the prayers made in the application, made two submissions. ( 8 ) SRI Suman, learned Counsel appearing for the first respondent,in support of the prayers made in the application, made two submissions. Firstly, he submitted that the averments made in paragraphs 4 to 13 of the petition are liable to be struck off as the allegations made in the said paragraphs are vague, bald, frivolous, vexatious and scandalous and also on the ground that they do not disclose cause of action; and also on the ground that the affidavit filed verifying the allegations of corrupt practice does not conform to the requirement of Rule 94-A of the Conduct of the Elections Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") and Form No. 25; and therefore, the continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of this Court. It is his submission that since Section 87 of the Act makes the Code applicable, this Court should exercise its power under Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code and strike off the pleadings of the petition. Secondly, he submitted that this petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground that the petition does not disclose cause of action. Elaborating this submission, he made two- fold submissions. Firstly, he submitted that the substance of the grievance of the petitioner being that the candidate for the parliamentary Constituency, in collusion with respondents 9 and 10, indulged in corrupt practice inasmuch as he got the ballot boxes substituted, which materially affected the result of the election of the petitioner, it was imperative on the part of the petitioner to have furnished in detail the material facts relating to the corrupt practice alleged by the petitioner; and since that has not been done, the petition is liable to be dismissed for want of cause of action, in exercise of the power conferred on this Court under Order VII, Rule 11{a) of the Code read with Section 87 of the Act. Secondly, he submitted that since the verifying affidavit does not conform to the requirement of Rule 94-A of the Rules and Form 25, the aliegations regarding the corrupt practice cannot be considered by this Court on the ground that the affidavit filed is defective and consequently, the petition is liable to be dismissed for want of cause of action. Secondly, he submitted that since the verifying affidavit does not conform to the requirement of Rule 94-A of the Rules and Form 25, the aliegations regarding the corrupt practice cannot be considered by this Court on the ground that the affidavit filed is defective and consequently, the petition is liable to be dismissed for want of cause of action. It is, his submission that if, on the undisputed facts, on the basis of the allegations made in the petition even if accepted to be true, the petitioner cannot succeed, the petition is liable to be dismissed at the threshold itself without enquiry or trial. In support of his submission, he relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the cases of SAMANTH BALAKRishna vs FERNANDEZ mohan RAJ vs SURENDRA KUMAR TAPARIA AND OTHERS azhar HUSSAIN vs RAJIV GANDHI Dr. (Smt.) SHIPRA vs shanti LAL KOIWAL; V. NARAYANASWAMY vs thiru-NAVAKKARASU; UDHAVA SINGH vs MADHAVARAO SIDHA, shivajirao B. PATIL KAWEKAR vs VILASRAO D. DESHMUKH; r. P. MOIDUTTY vs P. T. KUNJU MOHAMMED; SUBHASH DESAI vs SHARAD J. RAO; V. S. ACHUTHANANDAN vs PJ. FRANCIS; dr. VIJAYALAKSHMI SADHO vs JAGADISH11; DHARTIPAKAR madan LAL AGARAWAL vs RAJIV GANDHI; and that of this Court in the case of S. R. MOREY vs BELLAD CHANDRAKANTH gurappa AND OTHERS. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, Sri Aravind Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, strongly countering each of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the first respondent, submitted that the averments made in paragraphs 4 to 13 of the petition cannot be struck off as the averments made in the said paragraphs are neither scandalous nor frivolous or vexatious or in any manner intend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the petition or continuance of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. It is his submission that the power conferred on the Court under Order VI, Rule 16 read with Section 87 of the act cannot be made applicable to strike off the pleadings of the petitioner. He further submitted that the petition also cannot be dismissed at threshold on the ground that the averments made in the petition do not disclose the cause of action. He further submitted that the petition also cannot be dismissed at threshold on the ground that the averments made in the petition do not disclose the cause of action. It is his submission that a distinction has to be made between "material facts" that is required to be pleaded under Section 81 (1) (a) of the Act and "material particulars" that is required to be set out as required under Section 83 (1) (b) of the Act. He pointed out that it is the case of the petitioner that the first respondent has committed corrupt practice within the meaning of sub-section (7) of Section 123 of the Act as he, in collusion with the Parliamentary candidate, had secured the assistance of respondents 9 and 10, who are Gazetted Officers of the State, for furtherance of the prospects of his election, inasmuch as respondents 9 and 10 have helped him to substitute ballot boxes, it must be held that the petitioner has pleaded material facts which are required to be stated in the petition in terms of Section 83 (1} of the Act. With regard to the submission of Sri Suman that the affidavit is defective, the learned Counsel pointed out that the affidavit filed is strictly in accordance with Form No. 25 of the Forms read with rule 94-A of the Rules and, therefore, the averments made in the petition regarding corrupt practice can neither be struck off nor the petition be dismissed on the ground of want of cause of action. He also submitted that since it is the case of the petitioner that respondents 9 and 10 have violated the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, and the said question being purely a question of law, the petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of want of cause of action. In support of his submission, he drew my attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of V. S. ACHUTHANANDAN vs P. J. FRANCIS; MAHENDRA PAL vs RAM dass MALANGER AND OTHERS; D. RAMACHANDRAN vs V. JANAKIRAMAN; Smt. LATA DEVI (MALATI) vs HARU RAJWAR16; arun KUMAR BOSE vs MOHD. In support of his submission, he drew my attention to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of V. S. ACHUTHANANDAN vs P. J. FRANCIS; MAHENDRA PAL vs RAM dass MALANGER AND OTHERS; D. RAMACHANDRAN vs V. JANAKIRAMAN; Smt. LATA DEVI (MALATI) vs HARU RAJWAR16; arun KUMAR BOSE vs MOHD. FURKAM ANSARI AND OTHERS; and SUBHASH DESAI vs SHARAD J. RAO, ( 10 ) IN the light of the rival contentions urged by the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, two questions that would arise for my consideration are - (I) Whether the pleadings in paragraphs 4 to 13 of the petition are required to be struck off in exercise of the power conferred on this Court under Order VI, Rule 16 read with Section 87 of the Act? (II) Whether the petition requires to be dismissed without trial for want of cause of action, in exercise of the power conferred on this Court under Order VII, Rule 11 (a) of the Code read with section 87 of the Act? ( 11 ) BEFORE proceeding to consider the questions, referred to above, it is useful to refer to the relevant portion of the averments made in paragraphs 4 to 13 of the petition, which are sought to be struck off. (a) In paragraph-4 of the petition, after stating that respondent-9 was the Returning Officer entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of conducting the election to 162-Shimoga Assembly constituency; and respondent-19, who was the Deputy Commissioner of the District, was appointed as the District Election Officer under section 20a of the Act and was also the Returning Officer of 21 shimoga Parliamentary Constituency, it is stated as follows, "4. . . . This 10th respondent who is the District Election-Officer (D. E. O.) appointed 9 Assistant Returning Officers to assist the election work. Shri M. Lakshminarayana was functioning as Deputy commissioner of Excise when Sri Bangarappa (who contested for 21 Shimoga Parliamentary Constituency, the election to which was simultaneously held along with this assembly constituency) was the Chief Minister of Karnataka. This Officer, along with certain others were involved in the Rectified Spirit Scandal. The state Government had taken a decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the D. E. O. And it is only because of bangarappa the D. E. O. is still continuing in service without any disciplinary action being taken against him by the State government. This Officer, along with certain others were involved in the Rectified Spirit Scandal. The state Government had taken a decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the D. E. O. And it is only because of bangarappa the D. E. O. is still continuing in service without any disciplinary action being taken against him by the State government. The D. E. O. is very closely associated with bangarappa for more than a decade. The D. E. O is therefore indebted to Bangarappa for certain favours bestowed on him by bangarappa, when he was in office as Chief Minister and also as Member of legislative Assembly and Member of Parliament. Sri Bangarappa, using this opportunity conspired with the D. E. O. to do all illegal improper and corrupt practices for the prospects and success of this election. The D. E. O. using his office, had directed the 9th respondent to do all these improper and illegal activities. The 9th respondent, who is subordinate to the D. E. O, and considering the powers vested with him has colluded to carry out all the instructions and oral orders, and became a conspirator to the electoral mal-practices and corrupt practices. Sri S. Bangarappa was interested in the winning of the 1st respondent as he was mainly responsible for the contesting of 1st respondent from Congress Party. Further, in view of simultaneous election of parliament and legislative assembly, Sri S. Bangarappa extended the domain of his illegal activities to the assembly constituency as any gain in vote in the assembly constituency also benefits the congress candidate in the parliamentary election. (b) At paragraph-5 of the petition, it is stated as follows : "5. . . . The counting commenced on 6. 10. 99. Much prior to the counting of votes, the petitioner had very reason to believe that respondent No. 1, in collusion with the 10th respondent and the other Assistant Returning Officer had planned to commit certain irregularities in the election process particularly in the matter of ballot boxes and counting of votes, so as to materially affect the result of the election. As such the petitioner approached the RO along with the Lok Sabha candidates cf the B. J. P. Sri Ayanur manjunath on 30. 09. 99 seeking for serial number of ballot boxes issued to different polling stations in the assembly constituency. As such the petitioner approached the RO along with the Lok Sabha candidates cf the B. J. P. Sri Ayanur manjunath on 30. 09. 99 seeking for serial number of ballot boxes issued to different polling stations in the assembly constituency. In response to this the D. E. O. furnished the serial number of ballot boxes held in stock vide letter dated 30. 9. 99 and a copy of the said letter is produced herewith Annexure-C. As per this list the details of the number of ballot boxes in stock with Tahsildar of Shimoga Assembly segments is as under: no. of Boxes belonging to election Commission of India 865 no. of Boxes belonging to state Election Commission 260 total 1125 the total ballot boxes which were required by the polling stations- was much less than what was available in stock. In fact, even after supplying the ballot box to ail the polling station a few hundreds would remain as surplus. At paragraph-6 of the petition, the petitioner has set out the procedure required to be followed by the Returning Officer and others, who are in-charge of conducting the elections and safeguards they are required to follow in the light of the guidelines laid down in the hand-Book of Instructions issued by the Election Commission of India with a view to prevent manipulation of ballot boxes. It is further stated in the said paragraph as follows: "6. . . . It is clear that only those boxes held in stock can be given to polling station for conducting of the poll. It is needless to say that it is very same ballot box, which should come to the counting hall. If these ballot boxes are not there in the counting hall then it is clear proof of the fact that the actual vote polled by the voters has not arrived at the counting hall. It is therefore clear that all precautions are taken to see that it is possible to identify the ballot box while it arrives at the counting hall so that a candidate can rest assure that it is the very same ballot box which has been used at the polling station (d) At paragraph-7, after stating the procedure adopted at the time of counting, the petitioner has stated as follows:"7. . . . . . . On the day of the counting the petitioner and the other assembly Constituency Candidate, belonging to Bharatiya Janatha party and their counting agents noticed that the serial number of the ballot boxes as intimated to them by the D. E. O, in his letter dated 30. 9. 99 did not tally with the ballot boxes which arrived at the counting hall. Immediately the counting agents of the petitioner objected the same before the counting supervisor in charge of the counting table. In fact, neither the ninth respondent nor his assistant Returning Officer i. e. Srri Ganapathy S. Bhat. Tahsildar, shimoga, had in their possession the details of the serial numbers of ballot boxes issued to the polling stations. The oral objections raised by the petitioner and his counting agents were not taken into account by the officers, stating that they are only bound by , the direction of the D. E. O. and they will not take cognizance of their complaint. The Election agent of. the petitioner approached the Returning Officer arid the D. E. O. and brought to their notice about the serious lapse. The D. E. O. was unable to clarify the situation. However, he assured that he would verify the matter immediately and inform them before the actual counting. The petitioner and his agents had blocked the counting till the confusion regarding ballot boxes are sorted out. The petitioner insisted that only the ballot boxes issued to the polling station should be taken up for counting. However, as the ninth and tenth respondent gave their assurance to look into (ho matter, the counting was allowed to go on. " (e) At paragraphs 8 and 9, it is stated as follows: "8. The ninth and tenth respondent and his Assistant Returning officer who had assured the petitioner and his agents about clarifying the matter immediately did not do so at all. It is therefore clear that the D. E. O. has not just bothered to examine such a serious lapse. Further, he went to the extent of stating in his press note that no complaint by any candidates has been received either by him or by any office officials. It is significant to note that the D. E. O. has failed to provide the list of ballot boxes issued to the polling station to the petitioner. Further, he went to the extent of stating in his press note that no complaint by any candidates has been received either by him or by any office officials. It is significant to note that the D. E. O. has failed to provide the list of ballot boxes issued to the polling station to the petitioner. When a specific request was made in this regard on 30. 9. 99, the D. E. O. instead of giving the said information, furnished the list of ballot boxes held in stock Assembly segment wise. After the counting was completed the petitioner once again approached the DEO for details of the serial number of ballot boxes issued to polling stations. The D. E. O. on coming to know of these serious lapses, appeared to have made an attempt in recording the seria! number of ballot boxes which came to the counting hall as the ballot boxes issued to polling stations and furnished the information accordingly to the petitioners. The petitioner and his election agents were absolutely kept in dark as to the reason for which the D. E. O. . is now going back on his own letter dated 30. 9. 99. The D. E. O. along with the r. O. of the Shimoga assembly segment has therefore adopted a systematic method by which they have manipulated the ballot boxes thereby seeing to it that the votes actually polled in the polling stations did not arrive in the counting hall. In its place a different set of ballot boxes had arrived and it is the votes in these ballot boxes which have been counted thereby leading to the victory of the first respondent. 9. The Returning Officer has prepared detailed statement containing information about the boxes and other materials issued to the polling stations. This statement initially did not contain any detail about the serial number of the ballot boxes. The ninth respondent and tenth respondent, after allegations were made by the petitioner and others in this regard, manipulated these records and inserted the serial number of ballot boxes, whjch actually arrived in the polling stations. The certified copy of this statement is produced herewith as Annexure-D. Even to the naked eye, it is clear that the document is a fabricated one. The certified copy of this statement is produced herewith as Annexure-D. Even to the naked eye, it is clear that the document is a fabricated one. On the basis of this entry, the 10th respondent is now making a feeble attempt to contend that the serial number of ballot boxes issued to the polling stations and the serial number of ballot boxes in the counting table tallies. The entire exercise of the 10th respondent leaves no doubt that he is indulging in fabrication/ manipulation and alteration of documents. Admittedly, even according to the 9th and 10th respondents either one of the details furnished by them is wrong and misleading. On becoming suspicious, on seeing the alteration and insertions made in the statements, the petitioner once again sought for details of boxes held in stock. The petitioner was informed by the ARO that no ballot box was imported from any other constituency and no ballot box was sent away to any other constituency from Shimoga assembly Segment. The endorsement issued by the ARO to this effect dated 30. 10. 99 is produced herewith and marked as annexure-E. In response to this the D. E. O. once again furnished the list of ballot boxes Assembly Segment wise. And it was the same copy of the statement earlier issued on 30,09. 99. This statement issued for 2nd time on 29. 10. 99 is marked and produced as Annexure-F. (f) At Paragraph-10, after asserting that the illegalities in the matter of conducting the elections did not stop only in the matter of manipulating and substituting ballot boxes, but it extended to further acts of commission and omission in the matter of actual counting also, it is stated as follows: "10. ,. . In the first stage the ballot papers were taken out of the ballot boxes and the total number of ballot papers in the box is ascertained and this is called the initial counting. For this purpose the ballots will be made into bundles, each bundle will be having 25 ballot papers. At this stage, while the ballot papers were so bundled, counting agents of the petitioners observed that in certain ballot papers the distinguishing mark of the polling station, and the signature of the presiding officer were absent on the back. For this purpose the ballots will be made into bundles, each bundle will be having 25 ballot papers. At this stage, while the ballot papers were so bundled, counting agents of the petitioners observed that in certain ballot papers the distinguishing mark of the polling station, and the signature of the presiding officer were absent on the back. Rule 38 (1) of the Conduct of Election 1962 clearly says that every ballot papers should have both the mark and signature and according to Rule 56 (2){h) the Returning Officer should reject the ballot paper if it does not have the mark and signature. The counting agents of the petitioner objected to the counting of these ballots. The counting officers mechanically overruled these objections and continued with the counting. (g) At paragraph-11 of the petition, which is the most important paragraph, it is alleged that systematic method of rigging had taken place at the instance of the first respondent. The said paragraph reads as follows: "11. The ninth and tenth respondents have therefore carried out a systematic method rigging at the instance of the first respondent from the stage of distribution of ballot boxes till the stage of counting thereby materially affecting the result of the election. If this kind of rigging had not happened, the petitioner would have definitely succeeded. The extent of rigging that has taken place in this election is in relation to 24 ballot box affecting the total of 11,994 votes in total almost 10% of the polled votes i. e. , 1,19,042 votes are found in unauthorised and fabricated boxes. The ninth respondent and the first respondent have colluded with each other to substitute the ballot boxes, thereby materially affecting the result of election. (h) At paragraphs-12 and 13, it is stated as follows:"12. These 24 ballot boxes did not pertain to the serial number of the ballot boxes held in stock. It is not clear as to how these boxes came to this assembly constituency. To illustrate the ballot box numbers 06548, 06903, 06532, 06511 said to be used, as polled boxes in the polling station Nos. 6, 13, 22 and 23 respectively of this assembly segment were not belonged to this constituency. 13. The petitioner submitted a detailed representation to the election Commission of India on 4. 11. To illustrate the ballot box numbers 06548, 06903, 06532, 06511 said to be used, as polled boxes in the polling station Nos. 6, 13, 22 and 23 respectively of this assembly segment were not belonged to this constituency. 13. The petitioner submitted a detailed representation to the election Commission of India on 4. 11. 99 bringing to their notice about the serious lapses in the matter of conducting election process in Shimoga Assembly constituency. The representation submitted by the petitioner to the Election Commission is produced herewith as Annexure-G. The petitioner also submitted a press release on 11. 11. 99 highlighting the irregularities and illegalities, which have taken place during the election process. A copy of the press note is produced herewith as Annexure-H. In response to this press release the D. E. O. issued a press note on 13. 11. 99 and a copy of the press note is produced herewith as Annexure-K. There is no clarification about the points raised by the petitioner. The D. E. O. states that he or his staff members have not received any complaint about the conducting of election, failing to note about the complaints made by the petitioner and his agents at the time of counting itself. The press note is a further proof of the involvement of the D. E. O. and the ninth respondent in the entire mismanagement and manipulation of records for benefiting the first respondent. " ( 12 ) NO doubt, the first respondent has denied the averments made in the petition. However, at this stage of the proceedings, the court is required to consider both for the purpose of considering the prayer for striking off the pleadings and also the prayer for the rejection of the petition for want of cause of action, the pleadings in the petition only. ( 13 ) LET me now briefly refer to the salient features of the Act which will have bearing for the disposal of the questions that have arisen for consideration in this petition. ( 14 ) SECTION 80 of the Act provides that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Part-V of the Act. Section 80-A of the Act confers jurisdiction to try an election petition. ( 14 ) SECTION 80 of the Act provides that no election shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in accordance with the provisions of Part-V of the Act. Section 80-A of the Act confers jurisdiction to try an election petition. Section 81 of the Act provides that an election petition calling in question any election may be presented on one or more of the grounds specified in subsection (1) of Section 100 and Section 101 by any candidate at such election or any elector. Section 82 of the Act provides as to who shall join as respondents to the petition. Section 83 of the Act provides for the relief that may be claimed by the petitioner. Section 86 of the Act provides for the trial of the election petition by the court and also the steps required to be taken by the Court as soon as the petition is presented. Sub-section (1) of Section 86 of the Act mandates the Court to dismiss ah election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act. Sub-section (5) thereof empowers the Court upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged to be amended or amplified in such manner as may in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the election petition. However, the same provision provides that such amendment shall not be permitted which will have the effect of" introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. Section 87 of the Act, subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, makes the Code applicable as far as possible while trying the petition. Section 100 of the Act provides for the grounds for declaring an election to be void; Section 101 of the Act provides for the grounds for which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected. Section 123 of the Act lays down as to which should be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purpose of the Act. ( 15 ) LET me now proceed to consider the questions that have arisen for consideration in this petition. Section 123 of the Act lays down as to which should be deemed to be corrupt practices for the purpose of the Act. ( 15 ) LET me now proceed to consider the questions that have arisen for consideration in this petition. Re: Question (1): ( 16 ) AS noticed by me earlier, Section 87 of the Act provides that subject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, every election petition should be tried by the Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code. It is also now well settled by the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme court that the provisions of Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code can be made applicable and the pleadings can be struck off. However, that can be done provided that the conditions set out in Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code exist which alone enables the Court to strike off the pleadings. It is useful to refer to Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code, which reads as hereunder: "rule 16. Striking out pleadings.- The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading- fa) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous and vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. ( 17 ) THE Supreme Court, in the case of D. Ramachandran (supra), while considering the circumstances under which the Court is entitled to strike off pleadings, at paragraph-9, has observed thus:"9. Under Order VI, Rule 16, the Court is enabled to strike out a pleading (a) which may be necessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious or (b) which may tend to prejudice. , embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit; or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. We have already pointed out that it is not the case of the first respondent that the pleading in the election petition is vitiated by all or any one of the aforesaid defects mentioned in the rule. Hence striking out party of the pleading in this case was not at all justified. We have already pointed out that it is not the case of the first respondent that the pleading in the election petition is vitiated by all or any one of the aforesaid defects mentioned in the rule. Hence striking out party of the pleading in this case was not at all justified. "while considering this question, the Court should keep in mind the distinction between the provisions contained in Order VI, Rule 16, and Order VII, Rule 11 (a) of the Code. May be, in certain cases, if the pleadings are struck off in exercise of the power under Order vi, Rule 16, the petition may have to be dismissed on the ground that the petition does not disclose the cause of action and continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. But, in my view, in the light of the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of d. Ramachandran (supra), want of cause of action cannot be a ground to strike off the pleadings though it may be a ground to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action in exercise of the power conferred on this Court under Order VII Rule 11 (a) of the Code. Therefore, the question that is required to be considered is, whether the pleadings in paragraphs 4 to 13 of the petition are required to be struck off? ( 18 ) FROM the careful reading of the pleadings in the petition, I find it difficult to take the view that the averments made in the petition are either unnecessary or scandalous or frivolous or vexatious or likely to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the petition or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. The petitioner has set out his grievance, may be true or not, which is required to be tested at a later stage of the proceedings. Such averments, as noticed by me earlier, cannot be a ground for striking off the pleadings in exercise of the power either under Clause (a) or Clause (b) of order VI, Rule 16, of the Code. Now, the only question is, if the averments in the petition do not disclose the cause of action, will it not amount to abuse of the process of the Court if the proceedings are allowed to continue? Now, the only question is, if the averments in the petition do not disclose the cause of action, will it not amount to abuse of the process of the Court if the proceedings are allowed to continue? It may be so, but in the background of order VIl, Rule 11 (a) of the Code, in my view, Clause (c) of Order vi, Rule 16 of the Code has to be read down as one which does not empower the Court to strike off the pleadings on the ground that the pleadings do not reveal a cause of action. If the pleadings in a petition do not disclose a cause of action, the petition can be rejected in exercise of the power conferred under Order VII, Rule 11 (a) of the Code. Therefore, Clause (c) of Order VI, Rule 16 of the Code, which provides for striking of the pleadings on the ground that the averments made in the petition, is the abuse of the process of the court, must be understood as such pleadings or averments in the petition which, if it is not struck off, would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. For example, if the averment in the petition discloses that the very case set out by the petitioner was earlier considered and rejected by the Court and if he is repeating the same grievance over and again, it may be a case where the pleadings are required to be struck off or otherwise the averments in the petition, if allowed to stand, would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore, the only question that remains to be considered is whether the pleadings in this case are required to be struck off on the ground that the affidavit filed supporting the allegations of corrupt practice not being in the prescribed form and defective, the averments relating to corrupt practice are required to be struck off? Rule 94-A of the Rules provides that the affidavit referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act should be on oath and it shall be in Form No. 25. Form No. 25 of the forms consists of two parts. Rule 94-A of the Rules provides that the affidavit referred to in the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act should be on oath and it shall be in Form No. 25. Form No. 25 of the forms consists of two parts. Clause (a) of Form No. 25 requires such of those averments made in the petition which relates to the commission of corrupt practice and the particulars of which are within the personal knowledge of the election petitioner, should be referred to as true to his knowledge; and Clause (b) of the Form requires that the commission of corrupt practice and particulars of such corrupt practice which the petitioner has acquired by means of information, must be referred to as true to his information. In the affidavit sworn to by the petitioner, the petitioner has stated that the particulars of corrupt practice mentioned in paragraphs 3 to 13 of the petition are true to his knowledge. Further, he has slated that the statements made in paragraphs 14 to 19 of the petition about the corrupt practice of obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtaining or procured by him for furtherance of the prospects of his election, are true to his information. The reading of Clauses (a) and (b) of the affidavit filed supporting the averments made in the petition, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, to some extent, indicates that there is variation in verifying the same facts both on "personal knowledge" and "information received", being self-contradictory, as some of the averments made in the petition in paragraphs 4 to 13 and 14 to 19 are inter mixed and connected with one another. However, while considering the similar question, in the case of Dr. Vijayalakshmi Sadho (supra), three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after following its earlier three Judge bench decision in the case of F. A. SAPA AND OTHERS vs singora and others and also a decision of its Division Bench in the case of H. D. Revanna (supra), took the view that an election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the Act on the ground that the affidavit filed is defective. It is useful to refer to the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraphs-9, 10 and 11 of the judgment, which read as hereunder "9. It is useful to refer to the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraphs-9, 10 and 11 of the judgment, which read as hereunder "9. An election petition is liable to be dismissed in limine under section 86 (1) of the Act only if the election petition does not comply with either the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or section 107 of the Act. The requirement of filing an affidavit along with an election petition, in the prescribed form, in support of allegations of corrupt practice is contained in Section 83 (1) of the Act. Thus an election petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine under Section 86 of the Act, for alleged non-compliance with provisions of Section 83 (1) of the Act or of its proviso. What other consequences, if any, may follow frort; an allegedly 'defective' affidavit, is to be judged at the trial of an election petition but Section 86 (1) of the Act in terms cannot be attracted to such a case. 10. In F. A. Sapa and others vs Singora and others, a three Judge bench of this Court specifically dealt with an issue concerning defects in the verification of an election petition as well as of defects in the affidavit accompanying an election petition wherein allegations of corrupt practice are made. 10. In F. A. Sapa and others vs Singora and others, a three Judge bench of this Court specifically dealt with an issue concerning defects in the verification of an election petition as well as of defects in the affidavit accompanying an election petition wherein allegations of corrupt practice are made. After considering the provisions of Sections 83 and 86 of the Act, as also the requirements of Form No. 25 prescribed by Rule 94-A of the Rules and relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held: 'from the text'of the relevant provisions of the R. P. Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desires better particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured. . . ' this judgment was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in h. D. Revanna vs G, Puttaswamy Gowda and Others. 11. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in f. A. Sapa's case (supra) and in view of settled law the conclusion becomes irresistible that defect in verification of an affidavit is curable and does not merit dismissal of an election petition in limine under Section 86 (1) of the Act. . . 11. We are in respectful agreement with the view expressed in f. A. Sapa's case (supra) and in view of settled law the conclusion becomes irresistible that defect in verification of an affidavit is curable and does not merit dismissal of an election petition in limine under Section 86 (1) of the Act. . . " (Emphasis supplied) therefore, if the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken the view that the petition is not liable to be dismissed in limine on the ground that the affidavit is defective, for the same reasoning it follows that the averments in the petition relating to corrupt practice is not liable to be struck off on the ground that it is not supported by a proper affidavit as prescribed under the proviso given to Section 83 (1) of the Act read with Rule 94-A of the Rules and Form No. 25. For the same reason, I am unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent that since the affidavit verifying the election petition does not make a reference to annexures appended to the election petition and state whether the contents referred to in the affidavit are true to his knowledge or true to his information, the averments made in the petition are required to be struck off on the ground that the same is not supported by a proper affidavit. Therefore, in the light of the discussion made above, I am of the view that the averments made in paragraphs 4 to 13 of the petition are not liable to be struck off. Re: Question (ii): ( 19 ) IN so far as this question is concerned, as noticed by meearlier, the learned Counsel for the first respondent while contending that the averments in the petition do not disclose any cause of action, made two-fold submission. Before I proceed to consider the first contention, it is useful to first deal with the second contention i. e. , the affidavit filed in support of the petition relating to corrupt practice not being in the form prescribed and defective in law, the petition is required to be dismissed on the ground of want of cause of action. Before I proceed to consider the first contention, it is useful to first deal with the second contention i. e. , the affidavit filed in support of the petition relating to corrupt practice not being in the form prescribed and defective in law, the petition is required to be dismissed on the ground of want of cause of action. While considering the question whether the pleadings in the petition relating to corrupt practice require to be struck off on the ground that the affidavit supporting the petition is defective, I have taken the view that in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court, referred to above, that cannot be done. The Hon'ble Supreme court, in the cases of Dr. Vijayalakshmi Sadho (supra), F. A. Sapa (supra) and H. D. Revanna (supra), has taken the view that the petition cannot be dismissed in limine on the ground that the affidavit is defective, as the defect in the affidavit is a curable one. Therefore, in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to above, I am of the view that there is no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the first respondent that the observation made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 of the decision in the case of R. P. Mohidutty vs P. T. Kunju Mohammed (Supra) has to be applied and the petition is required to be dismissed at the threshold on the ground that the statement made is inconsistent anti contradictory and does not make any sense in so far as it relates to corrupt practice. It is necessary to point out that in the case of r. P. Mohidutty (supra), the matter came up for consideration before the Supreme Court after the conclusion of the trial and in that background, it is no doubt true that an observation was made by the Supreme Court that the said case should have been rejected at the threshold for not complying with the mandatory provisions of the law as to the pleadings. However, the decision in the case of dr. Vijayalakshmt Sadho (supra) and two other cases, referred to above, directly deals with the question whether a petition is required to be dismissed at the threshold on the ground that the affidavit is defective. However, the decision in the case of dr. Vijayalakshmt Sadho (supra) and two other cases, referred to above, directly deals with the question whether a petition is required to be dismissed at the threshold on the ground that the affidavit is defective. Under these circumstances, 1 am of the view that the decision, referred to above, is binding on me and I am required to follow the said decision. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petition is liable to be rejected on the ground that the affidavit tiled supporting the petition is defective. ( 20 ) NOW, the only contention that remains to be considered is whether the petition is liable to be rejected on the ground that the petitioner has failed to set out the 'material facts' as required under clause (a) of Section 83 (1} of the Act. Before the said question is considered, it is useful to refer to Section 83 of the Act, which reads as hereunder:"83. Contents of Petition - (1) An election petition- (a) shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies; (b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleged including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice; and (c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) for the verification of pleadings. Provided that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. "clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act mandates the election petitioner to make a concise statement of the material facts which he relies. (2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. "clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act mandates the election petitioner to make a concise statement of the material facts which he relies. Clause (b) of the said provision requires the petitioner where an allegation of corrupt practice is made, to set forth full particulars of such corrupt practice including as full a statement as possible, all the names of the parties alleged to have committed such practice and the date and place of the. commission of each such practice. Clause (c) of the said Section requires that the petitioner should verify the petition in the manner laid down in the code for the verification of the pleadings. However, the proviso given to the said clause further provides that where the petitioner alleges any corrupt practice, the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in the form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. Sub-section (2) of Section 83 of the Act further requires that any schedule or annexure to be petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition. As noticed by me earlier, section 100 of the Act provides for grounds for declaring an election to be void. It is useful to extract Clauses (b) and (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 100 of the which, which is relevant for the purpose of the disposal of this petition, which read as follows:"100. Grounds for declaring election to be void. (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2) if the High Court is of opinion (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by a returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of returned candidate or his election agent; or (c ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected - (i) by the improper acceptance or any nomination, or (ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the returned candidate by an agent other than his election agent, or (iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, or (iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of the Constitution or of this Act or of any rules or orders made under this Act, the High Court shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. "further, as noticed by me earlier, Section 123 of the Act lays down as to what is deemed as "corrupt practice" for the purpose of the act. Sub-section (7) of Section 123, which is relevant, states as follows: "123. Corrupt Practice.- The following shrill he deemed to be corrupt practices for the purpose of this Act.- {7} The obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure by a candidate or his agent or, by any other person with the consent of a candidate or his election agent, any assistance (other than the giving of vote) Sor the furtherance of the prospects of that candidate's election, from any person in the service of the Government and belonging to any of the following classes, namely: (a) gazetted officers; order VII, Rule 11{a) of the Code provides for rejection of the plaint. The said provision reads as follows: "rule 11 Rejection of plaint - The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases. (a) where it does not disclose a cause of action. It is well settled by the law laid down by the Apex Court that in view of Section 87 of the Act; the said provision can be made applicable to the petition filed under the provisions of the Act calling in question an election of the returned candidate and the petition can be rejected for non-disclosure of cause of action. It is well settled by the law laid down by the Apex Court that in view of Section 87 of the Act; the said provision can be made applicable to the petition filed under the provisions of the Act calling in question an election of the returned candidate and the petition can be rejected for non-disclosure of cause of action. Further, sub-section (5) of section 86 of the Act confers power on the High Court upon certain terms, to permit the party to amend the petition or amplify the petition in such manner as the Court may deem fit for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, subject to certain terms and conditions. In the background of these statutory provisions, the Court is required to examine whether the averments made in the petition do disclose a cause of action? ( 21 ) WHILE the law laid down by the Apex Court makes it clear that a petition, which does not contain concise statement of 'material facts' on which the petitioner relies in support of the plea that the election of the returned candidate requires to be set aside in terms of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act, shall be dismissed at the threshold and without trial for want of cause of action; however, the Court has held that such a petition cannot be dismissed for lack of 'full particulars of the facts' which are required to be stated in terms of Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act. However, before proceeding to consider the case of the parties on merits, I find it appropriate to refer to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which will have a bearing to decide the question that has arisen for consideration in this petition. (a) In the case of Samanth Balakrishna (supra), at paragraph 29, the Supreme Court has observed as follows:"section 83 is mandatory and requires the election petition to contain first a concise statement of material facts and then requires the fullest possible particulars. The word material' shows that the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The word material' shows that the facts necessary to formulate a complete cause of action must be stated. Omission of a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. The function of particulars is to present as full a picture of the cause of action with such further information in details as to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. There may be some overlapping between material facts and particulars but the two are quite distinct. The material facts will show the ground of corrupt practice and the complete cause of action and the particulars will give the necessary information to present a full picture of the cause of action. In stating the material fact it will not do merely to quote the words. of the section because then the efficacy of the words 'material facts' will be lost. The fact which constitutes the corrupt practice must be stated and the fact must be correlated to one of the heads of corrupt practice. An election petition without the material facts relating to a corrupt practice is no election petition at all. A petition, which merely cites the sections, cannot be said to disclose a cause of action where the allegation is the making of a false statement. That statement must appear and the particulars must be full as to the person making the statement and the necessary information. " (Emphasis supplied) (b) In the case of Udav Singh (supra), the Supreme Court, at paragraphs 37 and 38, has observed thus: "37. Like the Code of Civil Procedure, this section also envisages a distinction between 'material facts' and 'material particulars'. Clause (a) of sub section (1) corresponds to Order 6, Rule 2, while Clause (b) is analogous to Order 6, Rules 4 and 6 of the Code. The distinction between "material facts" and "material particulars" is important because different consequences may flow from a deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleading. Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a charge are liable to be struck off under Order 6, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure. Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a charge are liable to be struck off under Order 6, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure. If the petition is based solely on those allegations which suffer from lack of material facts, the petition is liable to be summarily rejected for want of a cause of action. In the case of a petition suffering from a deficiency of material particulars, the Court has discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after the expiry of the limitation. 38. All the primary facts, which must bo proved at the trial by a party to establish the existence of a cause of action or his defence, are "material facts". In the context of a charge of corrupt practice "material facts" would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the particular corrupt practice alleged, which the petitioner is bound to substantiate before he can succeed on that charge. Whether in an election petition, a particular fact is material or not, and as such required io be pleaded is a question which depends on the nature of the charge levelled, the ground relied upon and the special circumstances of the case. In short, all those facts which are essential to clothe the petitioner with a complete cause of action, are "material facts" which must be pleaded, and failure to plead even a single material fact amounts to disobedience of the mandate of Section 83 (1) (a) (Emphasis supplied) (c) In the case of Azhar Hussain (supra), the Supreme Court, while taking the view that the Code applies to the trial of the election petition by virtue of Section 87 of the Act, has held that, the Court trying the election petition can, in exercise of the powers of the court including Order VII, Rule 11 (a) of the Code, summarily dismiss an election petition if the election petitioner does not furnish cause of action. It is further held in the said decision that the omission of the single material fact would lead to an incomplete cause of action and that an election petition without the material facts relating to corrupt practice is not an election petition at all It is useful to refer to the observations made by the Supreme Court at paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment, which read as hereunder; "9. The fact that Section 83 does not find a place ir, Section 86 of the Act does not mean that powers under the CPG cannot be exercised. 10. There is thus no substance in this point which is already concluded against the appellant in Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh, (1972)2 SCR 742 ; ( AIR 1972 SC 515 ) wherein this Court has in terms negatived this very plea in the context of the situation that material facts and particulars relating to the corrupt practice alleged by the election petitioner were not incorporated in the election petition as will be evident from the following passage extracted from the judgment of A. N. Ray, J,. who spoke for the three-judge Bench: the allegations in paragraph 16 of the election petition do not amount to any statement of material fact of corrupt practice. It is not stated as to which kind or form of assistance was obtained or procured or attempted to obtain or procure. It is not stated from whom the particular type of assistance was obtained or procured or attempted to obtain or procure. It is not stated in what manner the assistance was for the furtherance of the prospects of the election. The gravamen of the charge of corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 (7) of the Act is obtaining or procuring or abetting or attempting to obtain or procure any assistance other than the giving of vote. In the absence of anv suggestion as to what that assistance was the election is lacking in the most vital and essential material fact to furnish a cause of action. Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that an election petition could not be dismissed by reason of want of material facts because section 86 of the Act conferred power on the High Court to dismiss the election petition which did not comply with the provisions of Section 81, or Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act. Counsel on behalf of the respondent submitted that an election petition could not be dismissed by reason of want of material facts because section 86 of the Act conferred power on the High Court to dismiss the election petition which did not comply with the provisions of Section 81, or Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act. It was emphasized that Section 83 did not find place in Section 86. Under Section 37 of the Act every election petition shall be tried by the High Court as nearly as may be in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to the trial of the suits. A suit which does not furnish cause of action can be dismissed. " further, at paragraph-12 of the same judgment, the Supreme Court has observed thus. "12. . . . . The Courts in exercise of the powers under the Code of civil Procedure can also treat any point going to the root of the matter such as one pertaining to jurisdiction or maintainability as a preliminary point and can dismiss a suit without proceeding to record evidence and hear elaborate arguments in the context of such evidence, if the Court is satisfied that the action would terminate in view of the merits of the preliminary point of objection. The contention that even if the election petition is liable to be dismissed ultimately it should be so dismissed only after recording evidence is a thoroughly misconceived and untenable argument. The powers in this behalf are meant to be exercised to serve the purpose for which the same have been conferred on the competent Court so that the litigation comes to an end at the earliest and the concerned litigants are relieved of the psychological burden of the litigation so as to be free to follow their ordinary pursuits and discharge their duties. And so that they can adjust their affairs on the footing that the litigation will not make demands on their time or resources, will not impede their future work, and they are free to undertake and fulfil other commitments. Such being the position in regard to matters pertaining to ordinary Civil litigation there is greater reason for taking the same view in regard to manors pertaining to elections. Such being the position in regard to matters pertaining to ordinary Civil litigation there is greater reason for taking the same view in regard to manors pertaining to elections. So long as the sword of Damocles of the election petition remains hanging an elected member of the Leglslature would not feel sufficiently free to devote his whole hearted attention to matters of public importance which clamor for his attention in his capacity as an elected representative of the concerned constituency. . . " (Emphasis suppfied) in the same paragraph, the Court has further observed thus:"under the circumstances, there is greater reason why in a democratic set-up, in regard to a matter pertaining to an elected representative of the people which is likely to inhibit him in the discharge of his duties towards the Nation, the controversy is set at rest at the earliest if the facts of the case and the law so warrant. Since the Court has the power to act at the threshold the power must be exercised at the threshold itself in case the court is satisfied that it is a fit case for the exercise of such power and that exercise of such power is warranted under the relevant provisions of law. To wind up the dialogue, to contend that the powers to dismiss or reject an election petition or pass appropriate orders should not be exercised except at the stage of final judgment after recording the evidence even if the facts of the case warrant exercise of such powers, at the threshold, is to contend that the legislature conferred these powers without point or purpose, and we must close our mental eye to the presence of the powers which should be treated as non-existent. The Court cannot accede to such a proposition. The submission urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this behalf must therefore be firmly repelled. "further, at paragraph-14 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme court has observed as follows: "14. The Court cannot accede to such a proposition. The submission urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in this behalf must therefore be firmly repelled. "further, at paragraph-14 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme court has observed as follows: "14. Before we deal with these grounds seriatim, we consider it appropriate to restate the settled position of law as it emerges from the numerous decisions of this Court which have been cited before us in regard to the question as to what exactly is the content of the expression 'material facts and particulars', which the election petitioner shall incorporate in his petition by virtue of section 83 (1) of the Act. (1) What are material facts and particulars? material facts are facts which if established would give the petitioner the relief asked for. The test required to be answered is whether the Court could have given a direct verdict in favour of the election petitioner in case the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis of the facts pleaded in the petition. [ (1969)3 SCR 217 - AIR 1969 SC 734 ] manubhai Nandlal Amarsey vs Poptlal Manilal Joshio. . (2) In regard to the alleged corrupt practice pertaining to the assistance obtained from a Government servant, the following facts are essential to clothe the petition with a cause of action which will call for an answer from the returned candidate and must therefore be pleaded: [ (1972) 2 SCR 742 : ( AIR 1972 SC 515 ) - Hardwari Lal vs Kanwal Singh] a) mode of assistance; b) measure of assistance; and c) all various forms of facts pertaining to the assistance. 3) In the context of an allegation as regards procuring, obtaining, abetting or attempting to obtain or procure the assistance of government servants in election it is absolutely essential to plead the following: a) kind or form of assistance obtained or procured, b) in what manner the assistance was obtained or procured or attempted to be obtained or procured by the election-candidate for promoting the prospects of his election. ( AIR 1972 SC 515 ). ( AIR 1972 SC 515 ). 4) The returned candidate must be told as to what assistance he was supposed to have sought, the type of assistance, the manner of assistance, the time of assistance, the persons from whom the actual and specific assistance was procured ( AIR 1972 SC 515 ). 5) There must also be a statement in the election petition describing the manner in which the prospects of the election was furthered and the way in which the assistance was rendered. ( AIR 1972 SC 515 ) (supra) 6) The election petitioner must state with exactness the time of assistance, the manner of assistance, the persons from whom assistance was obtained or procured, the time and date of the same, all these will have to be set out in the particulars. ( AIR 1972 SC 515 ). " (Emphasis supplied) (d) In the case of V. Narayanaswamy (supra), after referring to large number of decisions, the three Judge Bench of the Supreme court has, at paragraphs 24, 27 and 28, observed thus: "24. It will be thus seen that an election petition is based on the rights, which are purely the creature of statute, and if the statute renders any particular requirement mandatory, the Court cannot exercise dispensing powers to waive non-compliance. For the purpose of considering a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the election petition the avernents in the petition should be assumed to be true and the Court has to find out whether these averments disclose a cause of action or a triable issue as such. Sections 31, 83 (1) (c) and 86 read with Rule 94-A of the Rules and Form 25 are to be read conjointly as an integral scheme. When so read if the Court finds non-compliance it has to uphold the preliminary objection and has no option except to dismiss the petition. There is difference between "material facts" and "material particulars". While the failure to plead material facts is fatal to the election petition the absence of material particulars can be cured at a later stage by an appropriate amendment. "material facts" mean the entire bundle of facts, which would constitute a complete cause of action and these must be concisely stated in the election petition i. e. , Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83. "material facts" mean the entire bundle of facts, which would constitute a complete cause of action and these must be concisely stated in the election petition i. e. , Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83. Then under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 the election petition must contain full particulars of any corrupt practice. These particulars are obviously different from material facts on which the petition is founded. A petition levelling a charge of corrupt practice is required by law to be supported by an affidavit and the election petition is obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of corrupt practice. He must state which of the allegations are true to his knowledge and which to his belief on information received and believed by him to be true. It is not the 3 form of the affidavit but its substance that matters. To plead corrupt practice as contemplated by law it has to be specifically alleged that the corrupt practices were committed with the consent of the candidate and that a particular electoral right of a person was affected. It cannot be left to time, chance of conjecture for the Court to draw inference by adopting an involved process of reasoning. Where the alleged corrupt practice is open to two equal possible inferences the pleadings of corrupt practice must fail. Where several paragraphs of the election petition alleging corrupt practices remain unaffirrned under the verification, clause as well as affidavit, the unsworn allegation so could have no legal existence and the Court could not take cognizance thereof. Charge of corrupt practice being quasi-criminal in nature the Court must always insist on strict compliance with the provisions of law. In such a case it is equally essential that the particulars of the charge of allegations are clearly and precisely stated in the petition. It is the violation of the provisions of Section 81 of the Act which can attract the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance. The defect of the type provided in Section 83 of the Act on the other hand, can be dealt with under the doctrine of curability, on the principles contained in the code of Civil Procedure. It is the violation of the provisions of Section 81 of the Act which can attract the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance. The defect of the type provided in Section 83 of the Act on the other hand, can be dealt with under the doctrine of curability, on the principles contained in the code of Civil Procedure. Non-compliance with the provisions of section 83 may lead to dismissal of the petition if the matter falls within the scope of the Order 6, Rule 16 and Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where neither the verification in the petition nor the affidavit gives any indication of the sources of information of the petitioner as to the facts stated in the petition which are not to his knowledge and the petitioner persists that the verification is correct and affidavit in the form prescribed does not suffer from any defect the allegations of corrupt practices cannot be inquired and tried at all. In such a case petition has to be rejected on the threshold for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law as to pleadings, it is no part of duty of the Court suo moto even to direct furnishing of better particulars when objection is raised by other side. Where the petition does not disclose any cause of action it has to be rejected. Court, however, cannot dissect the pleadings into several parts and consider whether each one of them discioses a cause of action. Petition has to be considered as a whoie. There cannot be a partial rejection, of the petition. " 27. Material facts and material particulars certainly connote two different things. Material facts are those facts which constitute the cause of action. In a petition on the allegation of corrupt practices cause of action cannot be equated with the cause of action as is normally understood because of the consequences that follow in a petition based on the allegations of corrupt practices. An election petition seeking a challenge to the election of a candidate on the allegation of corrupt practices is a serious matter, if proved not only that the candidate suffers ignominy, he also suffers disqualification from standing for election for a period that may extend to six years. Reference in this connection may be made to Section 8a of the Act. 8a. Reference in this connection may be made to Section 8a of the Act. 8a. Disqualification on ground of corrupt practices.- (1) The case of every person found guilty of a corrupt practice by an order under Section 99 shall be submitted as soon as may be after such order takes effect by such authority as the Central government may specify in this behalf to the President for determination of the question as to whether such person shall be disqualified and if so, for what period: provided that the period for which any person may be disqualified under this sub-section shall in no case exceed six years from the date on which the order made in relation to him under Section 99 takes effect. (2) Any person who stands disqualified under Section 8a of this act as it stood immediately before the commencement of the election Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975 (40 of 1975), may, if the period of such disqualification has not expired, submit a petition to the President for the removal of such disqualification for the unexpired portion of the said period. 3) Before giving his decision on any question mentioned in subsection (1) or on any petition submitted under sub-section (2) the President shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission on such question or petition and shall act according to such opinion. ' it was for this purpose that proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 83 was inserted by Act 40 of 1961 (w. e. f September 20, 1961) requiring filing of the affidavit in the prescribed form where there are allegations of corrupt practice in the election petition. Filing of the affidavit as required is not a mere formality. By naming a document as an affidavit it does not become an affidavit. To be an affidavit it has to conform not only to the form prescribed in substance but has also to contain particulars as required by the rules. 28. It is contended by Mr. Bhandare that all the material facts have been stated in the election petition and that for lack of material particulars, the petition could not have been thrown out at the threshold. He said opportunity should have been given to the appellant to supply the material particulars. It is really of strange proposition to advance. 28. It is contended by Mr. Bhandare that all the material facts have been stated in the election petition and that for lack of material particulars, the petition could not have been thrown out at the threshold. He said opportunity should have been given to the appellant to supply the material particulars. It is really of strange proposition to advance. Till the date of the impugned judgment appellant had persisted that the petition did not lack material particulars and that the verification was in accordance with the Code and the affidavit in support of the corrupt practice in the form prescribed. Admittedly, the petition lacked material particulars, verification to the petition was not in accordance with the Code and the affidavit did not conform to the form prescribed. At the first opportunity, the respondent raise objection that the petition lacked both material facts and the material particulars and that the verification to the petition and the affidavit were in not in accordance with law. This was repeated in the miscellaneous application (Original Application No. 298/98 ). In the counter affidavit and in the reply to the miscellaneous application, the appellant persisted in his stand and termed the objections raised by the respondent as irrelevant. It is not that the appellant did not have opportunity to correct his mistake which he could have easily done in the rejoinder filed by him to the counter affidavit of the respondent or even his reply to the miscellaneous application (O. A. No. 298/98 ). He had every opportunity even at that stage to supply the material particulars which admittedly were lacking and also to amend the verification and to file the affidavit in the form prescribed but for the reasons best known to him, he failed to do so. The existence of material facts, material particulars, correct verification and the affidavit are relevant and important when the petition is based on the allegation of corrupt practice and in the absence of those the Court has jurisdiction to dismiss the petition. The existence of material facts, material particulars, correct verification and the affidavit are relevant and important when the petition is based on the allegation of corrupt practice and in the absence of those the Court has jurisdiction to dismiss the petition. High Court has undoubtedly the power to permit amendment of the petition for supply of better material particulars and also to require amendment of the verification and filing of the required affidavit but there is no duty cast on the high Court to direct suo moto the furnishing of better particulars and requiring amendment of petition for the purpose of verification and filing of proper affidavit. In a matter of this kind the primary responsibility for furnishing full particulars of the alleged corrupt practices and to file a petition in full compliance with the provisions of law is on the petition. (See in this connection Constitution bench decision in Bhikaji Keshao Joshi vs Brijlal Nandlal Biyani ( AIR 1955 SC 610 1955) 2 SCR 423 (444) ). " (e) In the case of Mahendra Pal (supra), at paragraph-7, the three Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows : "section 83 (1) (g) of the Act mandates that in order to constitute a cause of action, all material facts, that is. the basic and preliminary facts which the petitioner is bound under the law to substantiate in order to succeed, have to be pleaded in an election petition. Whether in an election petition, a particular fact is material or not and as such required to be pleaded is a question which depends upon the nature of the charge levelled and the facts and circumstances of each case. The distinction between 'material facts' and 'particulars' has been explained by this Court in a large number of cases and we need not refer to all chose decided cases. Facts which are essential to disclose a complete cause of action are material facts and are essentially required to be pleaded. On the other hand "particulars" are details of the case set up by the party and are such pleas which are necessary to amplify, refine or explain material facts. The function of particulars is, thus, to present a full picture of the cause of action to make the opposite party understand the case that has been set up against him and which he is required to meet. The function of particulars is, thus, to present a full picture of the cause of action to make the opposite party understand the case that has been set up against him and which he is required to meet. The distinction between 'material facts' and 'material particulars' is indeed important because different consequences follow from a deficiency of such facts or particulars in the pleadings. Failure to plead even a single material fact leads to an incomplete cause of action and incomplete allegations of such a charge are liable to be struck off under Order 6, Rule 16, Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of a petition suffering from deficiency of material particulars the Court has the discretion to allow the petitioner to supply the required particulars even after the expiry of limitation. Thus, whereas it may be permissible for a party to furnish particulars even after the period of limitation for filing an election petition has expired, with permission of the Court, no material fact unless already pleaded, can he permitted to be introduced, after the expiry of the period of limitation. " (f) In the case of D. Ramachandran (supra), while taking the view on the facts and circumstances of the case that the rejection of the election petition at the threshold without trial was not justified, at paragraph- 10, the Supreme Court has observed thus: "10. . . . . . The election petition as such does disclose a cause of action which if unrebutted could void the election and the provisions of Order VIl, Rule 11 (a) C. P. C. cannot therefore be invoked in this case. There is no merit in the contention that some of the allegations are bereft of material facts and as such do not disclose a cause of action. It is elementary that under order VII, Rule 11 (a) CPC. , the Court cannot dissect the pleading into several parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action. Under the rule, there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint or petition. See: Roop Lal Sathi vs nachhattar Singh Gill (1982) 3 SCC 487 : Alr 1982 SC 1559 ). We are satisfied that the election petition in this case could not have been rejected in limine without a trial. Under the rule, there cannot be a partial rejection of the plaint or petition. See: Roop Lal Sathi vs nachhattar Singh Gill (1982) 3 SCC 487 : Alr 1982 SC 1559 ). We are satisfied that the election petition in this case could not have been rejected in limine without a trial. " (g) In the case of Subhash Desai (supra), the Supreme Court, while taking the view that even if the Court is satisfied that in respect of one of the corrupt practices alleged, material facts and full particulars thereof have not been stated, still the election petition cannot be dismissed if, in respect of another corrupt practice, material facts and full particulars have been stated in accordance with the requirements of Section 83 (1) of the Act, at paragraph-11 of the judgment, has observed thus: "11. Section 86 vests power in the High Court to dismiss an election petition which has not been properly presented as required by Section 81; or where there has been non-compliance of Section 82 i. e. non-joinder of the necessary parties to the election petition; or for non-compliance of Section 117 i. e. , non-deposit of the required amount as security for the costs of the election petition. Section 86 does not contemplate dismissal of the election for non-compliance of the requirements of Section 83 of the Act. But, Section 83 enjoins that an election petition shall contain concise statement of material facts, and shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, which should be verified and supported by affidavit, so far the allegations of corrupt practices are concerned. This, provision is not only procedural, but has an object behind it; so. . that a person declared to have been elected is not dragged to court to defend and support the validity of his election, on allegations of corrupt practice which are not precise and details whereof have not been supported by a proper affidavit. Apart from that, unless the corrupt practices are set forth properly in the election petition, the person whose election is challenged is bound to be prejudiced in defending himself of the charges, which have been levelled against him. Apart from that, unless the corrupt practices are set forth properly in the election petition, the person whose election is challenged is bound to be prejudiced in defending himself of the charges, which have been levelled against him. In view of the repeated pronouncements of this Court, that the charge of corrupt practice is quasicriminal in nature, the person challenging an election on the ground of corrupt practice, cannot take liberty of making any vague or reckless allegations, without taking the responsibility about the correctness thereof. Before the Court proceeds to investigate such allegations, the Court must be satisfied, that the material facts have been stated along with the full particulars of the corrupt practice, alleged by the petitioner, which have been duly supported by an affidavit. In cases where the Court finds that neither material facts have been stated, nor full particulars of the corrupt practice, as required by Section 83 have been furnished in the election petition, the election petition can be dismissed, not under Section 86, but under the provisions of the code of Civil Procedure, which are applicable, read with Section 83 (1) of the Act, saying that it does not disclose a cause of action. This aspect has been examined by this Court in detail in the case of Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi, (1986) 2 SCR 782 : (AIR 1986 SC 1253); Hardwari Lal v. Kanwal Singh ( AIR 1972 sc 515 ). " ( 22 ) FROM the discussion of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, referred to above, it follows that an election petition can be dismissed in limine or at the threshold and without trial if the petition does not disclose the cause of action. If the petition, which challenges the election of the returned candidate, does not contain material facts in terms of Section 83 (1) (a) of the Act, the petition can be dismissed on the ground of want of cause of action. What is the material facts, depends upon the facts of each case and the nature of the charge levelled. If the petition, which challenges the election of the returned candidate, does not contain material facts in terms of Section 83 (1) (a) of the Act, the petition can be dismissed on the ground of want of cause of action. What is the material facts, depends upon the facts of each case and the nature of the charge levelled. The test that is required to be applied to decide a particular fact as a material fact, is if the facts pleaded remains unrebutted and if the returned candidate had not appeared to oppose the election petition on the basis of the facts pleaded in the election petition, whether the petitioner would be entitled for the relief and the verdict could be given in favour of the election petitioner. With this background of legal position; let me now examine whether the statement made in the petition sets out material facts which gives cause of action to the petitioner to call in question the election of the first respondent. ( 23 ) NOW, let me examine the averments made in the petition which set out the material facts disclosing the cause of action for the petition. 23a. Paragraph-4 of the petition, referred to above, only asserts that respondent-10 is a close associate of the candidate for the parliament Sri Bangarappa and, therefore, Sri Bangarappa using that opportunity, conspired with respondent- 10 "to do all illegal, improper and corrupt practices for the prospects and success of the election". The further averment made in the said paragraph also shows that the Parliamentary candidate "sri S. Bangarappa was interested in the winning of the first respondent as he was mainly responsible for the contesting of the first respondent from Congress Party" and at the instance of Bangarappa, respondent-to had directed respondent-9 to do several improper and illegal acts. The material facts relating to improper and illegal acts alleged in that paragraph, have not been set out. Further, there is no averment in the said paragraph that all the illegalities attributed either to respondent-9 or to respondent-10 were committed either with the consent of the first respondent or with the consent of his Election Agent or by the Parliamentary candidate with his consent. Further, there is no averment in the said paragraph that all the illegalities attributed either to respondent-9 or to respondent-10 were committed either with the consent of the first respondent or with the consent of his Election Agent or by the Parliamentary candidate with his consent. Therefore, the averments made in paragraph-4 even if it remains unrebutted by the first respondent and even if he fails to appear in the trial, the petitioner would not be entitled for the relief of setting aside the election of the first respondent. Similar is the position in respect of the averments made in respect of the averments made in the entire petition except paragraphs 11 and 17 of the petition where the illegalities or the corrupt practices in the matter of either distribution of ballot boxes or counting of votes has been done at the instance or with the consent of the first respondent or his Election Agent. The only averments that is referred to in the petition with regard to the manipulations or rigging stated to have been committed by respondents 9 and 10 at the instance of the first respondent, is at paragraphs 11 and 17 of the petition wherein in paragraph-11 it is stated that "the ninth and tenth respondents have therefore carried out a systematic method (of) rigging at the instance of the first respondent from the stage of distribution of ballot boxes till the stage of counting thereby materially affecting the result of the election" and at paragraph-17 it is stated that "the 1st resopndent and the 9th respondent have jointly devised an elaborate scheme by which the ballot boxes are rigged, and altering/fabricating election records. It is therefore clear that the 1st respondent as the returned candidate has committed corrupt practice in as much as the 9th respondent has committed above mentioned acts of corrupt practice with the help of D. E. O. The corrupt practice relates to the 1st respondent procuring the assistance of the D. E. O. , and the 9th respondent and the other Assistance Returning Officer functioning under him to further the prospects of the election of the 1st respondent. As already stated there is close contact, affinity and a feeling of gratitude between the respondent No. 1 and D. E. O. and naturally with the 9th respondent, which has made the 9th respondent to offer all possible assistance to the 1st respondent for further in his election prospects". The material facts relating to the alleged substitution of the ballot boxes as to how it has been done, has not been set out. In my view, when the petitioner's case is that there has been a substitution of ballot boxes and the same has been done with the connivance of respondents 9 and 10, who are Gazetted Officers of the State, and as such, it amounts to corrupt practice within the meaning of subsection (7) of Section 123 of the Act, it was mandatory and the minimum requirement of law was, to have stated as to when the boxes were substituted, who exactlly was responsible for the substitution of the ballot boxes, in which Polling Stations the boxes were substituted, on account of such substitution, how many votes polled in favour of the petitioner in which of the Polling Stations, came to be reduced and how many votes in which of the Polling stations and in which of the ballot boxes, came to be added to the account of the first respondent. In my view, the averment made in the petition with regard to the substitution of ballot boxes and violation of the Rules and the Hand Book of Instructions issued by the Election commission of India, is only in the nature of surmises without setting out the material facts. Therefore, I am of the view that the averments made in paragraphs-4 to 19 of the petition do not disclose 'material facts' which are required to be stated to lay the foundation to call in question the election of the first respondent on the basis of the corrupt practice alleged to have been committed in the election. The allegations made in the said paragraphs are vague, ambiguous and lack material facts. The averments made in the said paragraphs, in my view, cannot be treated as disclosing material facts within the meaning of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act. The allegations made in the said paragraphs are vague, ambiguous and lack material facts. The averments made in the said paragraphs, in my view, cannot be treated as disclosing material facts within the meaning of Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act. On the basis of the said averments, in my considered view, even if the returned candidate were to fail to appear and contest the claim of the petitioner, the petitioner would not be entitled for relief and the petition is liable to be dismissed. In the case of Azhar Hussain (supra), the Supreme Court fairly under similar set of averments made, took the view that the petition is liable to be rejected for lack of pleading material facts and non-disclosure of cause of action. Mere allegation that there is violation of the provisions of the law and the Rules framed thereunder and instructions given in the hand-Book of Instructions issued by the Election Commission of India, or the allegations that "the 1st respondent and the 9th respondent have jointly devised an elaborate scheme by which the ballot boxes are rigged" will not satisfy the requirement of the allegations regarding 'material facts' which are required to be set out in an election petition in terms of Section 83 (1) (a) of the Act. A careful consideration of the pleadings in the petition, in my view, does not disclose material facts as contemplated under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act. In my considered view, the law enunciated by the hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Hardware Lal (supra), Azhar hussain (supra), V. Narayanaswamy (supra ). Ravindra Singh (supra), shivajirao B. Patil Kawekar (supra) and R. P. Moidutty (supra), would squarely apply to the facts of the present case, in the light of the said conclusion, I am unable to acceded to the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petition discloses the material facts and if at all, what is lacking is only material particulars as contemplated under Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 83 of the Act, which could be made up in the course of the trial of the proceedings. In my view, the decisions of the Hcn'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Subhash Desai (supra), H. D. Revanna (supra) V. S. Achuthanandan (supra), Dr. In my view, the decisions of the Hcn'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Subhash Desai (supra), H. D. Revanna (supra) V. S. Achuthanandan (supra), Dr. Vijayalakshmi Sadho (supra), have no application to the facts of the present case. The decision of the supreme Court in the case of Hardwari Lal (supra) V. Narayanaswamy (supra) and R. P. Moidutty (supra) were rendered by three- Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Further, in the case of Ravinder Singh (supra), V. Narayanaswamy (supra), shivajirao B. Patil Kawekar (supra) and R. P. Moidutty (supra), the hon'ble Supreme Court has reviewed the law on the subject after referring to its earlier decisions. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Subhash Desai (supra) relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, in my view, cannot be of any assistance to the petitioner as, in the said case, the Hon'ble Supreme court took the view that the material facts were pleaded and what was lacking was only the material particulars, which could be furnished at a later stage. Therefore, the decision in the said case turned on the basis of the averments made in the petition filed in the said case. However, in the instant case, the petitioner has nowhere pleaded - (1) the mode of assistance; (2) measure of assistance; (3) various forms and facts pertaining to the assistance obtained by the first respondent from respondents 9 and 10; (4) kind or form of assistance obtained or procured; (5) in what manner the assistance was obtained or procured or attempted to be obtained or procured by the first respondent for promoting the prospects of the election. The petition is also bald with regard to the time of assistance and the date on which the ballot boxes came to be substituted or the assistance obtained by the first respondent from respondents 9 and 10. There is also no pleading except the bald statement that respondents 9 and 10 were responsible for substitution of the ballot boxes; who are the other Officers or persons who carried out the instructions and directions, if any, given by respondents 9 and 10. There is also no pleading except the bald statement that respondents 9 and 10 were responsible for substitution of the ballot boxes; who are the other Officers or persons who carried out the instructions and directions, if any, given by respondents 9 and 10. There is no averment in the petition that the ballot papers which were cast in favour of the petitioner, were removed or the ballot papers were so manipulated showing as they were cast in favour of the first respondent and came to be inserted or substituted in the ballot boxes which are alleged to have been substituted. The averment in the petition lacks 'material facts' on this aspect of the matter. The substitution of ballot boxes is inter-linked and has a direct bearing with regard to the substitution of bahot papers. In the absence of material facts pleaded regarding the substitution of ballot papers, the mode, the method adopted, the assistance secured, the officers connived in the substitution of the ballot papers and it has been done either with the consent of the first respondent or his election Agent, it must be held that the petition is liable to be rejected on the ground of lack of pleadings regarding material facts. It is now settled by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that failure to plead even a single material fact is fatal to the election petition [see: Azhar Hussain's case (supra)]. ( 24 ) IT is also necessary to advert to one other aspect of the matter. Even in respect of 'material particulars' which is lacking with regard to the alleged corrupt practice, in spite of the objections raised regarding lack of pleading material facts and material particulars, no effort has been made till today even to set out the material particulars, which are required to be pleaded. While it is the duty of the Court to see that the just and legitimate grievance of the petitioner is not turned down at the threshold of the proceedings on an erroneous understanding as to 'what is meant by material facte and 'what is material particulars' in my considered view, if the Court on a careful consideration of the pleadings is satisfied that the petition lacks pleading regarding material facts, which are required to be set out in the petition, it is the duty of the Court to dismiss the petition at the threshold itself. Apart from the fact that the continuance of a petition, which is not certainly going to give fruitful result even after the trial of the petition, to the petitioner, would not only affect the rights of all the parties to the proceedings and put them to lot of inconvenience and hardship, but also it would eat away the precious court time, which is meant for the bonafide litigant public. Under these circumstances, in my view, when the petition does not disclose 'material facts' and 'cause of action, there is absclute no justification to proceed with the trial of the petition. ( 25 ) IN the light of the above conclusion, I am of the view that I. A. IV filed by the first respondent seeking dismissal of the election petition is required to be allowed and consequently, the election petition is also liable to be rejected for want of cause of action, in exercise of the power conferred on me under Order VI Rule 11 (a) of the code read with Section 87 of the Act. ( 26 ) HOWEVER, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and since the petition is rejected at the preliminary stage without trial, I am of the view that the interest of justice would be met if the parties are directed to bear their own costs. Accordingly, it is ordered. --- *** --- .