JUDGMENT Gurusharan Sharma, J. 1. Plaintiff filed a suit for eviction under Section 14 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 against defendants in respect of the suit premises, which was a shop, measuring 20 x 38 . Plaintiff claimed the suit premises for his personal use and occupation for the purpose of residence as also for the purpose of starting electric goods business and repairs by his eldest son. 2. Earlier plaintiff had filed Eviction Suit No. 164 of 1973 for eviction of the defendant on the ground of personal necessity and default in payment of rent. The said suit was decreed on the ground on default in payment of rent and plaintiffs claim for personal necessity as negatived. Ultimately, the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 2279 of 1984 rejected the plaintiffs claim for eviction of the defendant on the ground of default. Hence, the Eviction Suit No. 164 of 1973 was dismissed. Plaintiff thereafter filed the present unit on the aforesaid grounds, which has been decreed by impugned judgment dated 31-8-1998. 3. In the present suit, a copy of the Judgment passed in Title Appeal No. 13 of 1975, which had arisen out of Title Suit No. 164 of 1973, wherein plaintiffs claim of personal requirement of the suit premises was negatived, was brought on record and marked Exhibit E/I. 4. On the basis of the finding recorded therein, in respect of claim of personal requirement, Mr. N.K. Prasad, Senior Counsel for petitioner, submitted that once it was found that other suitable accommodations were available to the plaintiff for residential use, there was no occasion for the Court below to record a finding that plaintiff in the present suit established his claim for requirement of the suit premises to be used as residence. 5. A perusal of Exhibit E/I reveals that besides the present suit house bearing Holding No. 88, plaintiff possessed one another house, having Holding No. 146 and in the earlier litigation between the parties, it was found that in view of space available to the plaintiff in Holding No. 146, his requirement of the present suit premises, Holding No.88 was not reasonable and bonafide. 6. 6. In the present case, trial Court found that meanwhile partition took place between three brothers in the year 1977 and in Holding No. 146 business was running in the name and style of Singhania brothers, which was joint business of plaintiff alongwith his uncle. It was. therefore, established that Holding No. 146 was ancestral property of plaintiff and his brothers. It has come in evidence that plaintiff was accommodated by one of the brothers, but now he is pressing him to vacate the said room. So far as holding No 146 is concerned, it was in possession of Mohanlal Sharma, wherein he was doing ornament business and that was the reason why the plaintiff had to purchase the suit premises to accommodate himself. 7. In the foresaid circumstance, the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that it cannot be said that plaintiff had alternative accommodation. 8. It has come in evidence that plaintiffs eldest brother got braining in electric equipment repairing and wanted to start business of electric equipments in the suit premises, for which he had also taken loan from the bank. 9. Mr. N.K. Prasad, in course of his argup1 ments put stress on the pleadings of the plaintiff in paragraph 10, wherein it was stated that plaintiff was waiting for disposal of the eviction mater in the Apex Court and filed this present suit immediately after the matter was disposed of there. From the pleading, it was submitted that it can be inferred that the plaintiff had no such bona-fide, reasonable and urgent requirement and, therefore, the present suit was filed simply to continue the litigation even after disposal of the earlier eviction matter by the Apex Court. 10. I do not find any substance in the submission of Mr. N.K. Prasad for the reason that the plaintiff had already obtained a decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent and unless the said decree was set aside, there was no occasion for him to the another suit, even if on account of subsequent event, he required the premises for his personal use and occupation. N.K. Prasad for the reason that the plaintiff had already obtained a decree for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent and unless the said decree was set aside, there was no occasion for him to the another suit, even if on account of subsequent event, he required the premises for his personal use and occupation. This subsequent event was also not been brought on record by way of amendment because the plea of personal necessity in the earlier suit was already negatived and the mater only in respect of eviction decree on the ground of default in payment of rent was pending in Apex Court. It cannot be disputed that on account of sons having attained majority and especially when his eldest son was sitting idle after obtaining training in electronic goods repairs business, he had a fresh cause of action to file the present suit. 11. I, therefore, find no reason to interfere with the finding of the trial Court, whereby it was held that the plaintiff required the suit premises for its use as residence and business purpose. 12. So far the question of partial eviction is concerned, it is not in dispute that the suit premise is 20 wide in front portion and 38 long and the plaintiff in his evidence claimed that his requirement cannot be satisfied substantially by partial eviction of the defendant, and as such he required the entire premises. On the other hand, on this aspect of the matter no evidence was adduced on behalf of defendant, nor any thing is available on record that defendant was satisfied with his partial eviction. There was one more practical difficulty in dividing the suit premises into two parts, the frontage would have been less than 10. 13. In these circumstances, I find no merit in this Revision application. It is, accordingly, dismissed, but without costs.