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2001 DIGILAW 566 (MAD)

District Collector v. M. Ponnusamy

2001-04-30

A.SUBBULAKSHMY, P.SHANMUGAM

body2001
Judgment : P. Shanmugam, J. 1. Respondents are the appellants. A batch of 42 writ petitions were filed for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other appropriate writ or direction to the third respondent namely the Joint Register No.I, Office of the District Registrar, Erode to deliver the original registered document dated 23.8.1995 and pass such further order as the court deems fit and proper in the interest of justice. The learned Judge has not only issued the direction as prayed for, but has also quashed the Reference made under Section 47-A(1) of the Indian Stamp Act. These writ appeals are against this order. 2. Thefacts of the case are stated below: The respondents in each of the writ appeals, 21 of them, have purchased an undivided 1?21 share in Door Nos.406/407, Perunthurai Road, Erode by sale deeds dated 23.8.1995 and they were presented for registration on the same day. All the documents were duly registered on the same day by the third appellant herein who assigned separate document numbers for each of the deeds of conveyance and completed the registration. However, the documents were not returned to the respondents and hence they approached the second and third appellants more than 20 times within the period of two years from the date of registration with a request to return the original registered documents. According to them, appellants 2 and 3 had ignored their request for the reasons best known to themselves and were purposely and intentionally evading delivery of the document under some pretext or other. Since there was no valid reason for withholding the documents for a period of one year and eleven months, legal notices were issued to them on i 18.6.1997 requesting them to deliver the original documents within one week. The third appellant, in his reply dated 23.6.1997, has stated that the report on the market value is awaited and that they will be intimated about that in due course. Contending that the reply is only to drag on the proceedings and that in the absence of the original document, their valuable rights to raise loan for their business etc. is affected, they have preferred the writ petitions on 3.8.1997. After receipt of the notice from the court, the third appellant made a reference on 25.9.1997 under Section 47(A)(1) as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 24/1967 of the Indian Stamp Act to the Collector. is affected, they have preferred the writ petitions on 3.8.1997. After receipt of the notice from the court, the third appellant made a reference on 25.9.1997 under Section 47(A)(1) as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 24/1967 of the Indian Stamp Act to the Collector. The respondents have, inter alia, contended that the nondelivery of the original sale deeds by the third appellant is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that it was beyond his jurisdiction. According to them, the documents were duly registered and he had no reasons to believe that the market value of the property had not been truly set forth in the instrument. That is the reason why the third appellant had been keeping the original document with him without making any reference. If he had not been satisfied with the valuation of the stamp duty, the third appellant ought to have referred it within a reasonable time. Therefore, the retention of the original document by the third appellant was without jurisdiction and in excess of his power. It is further contended that the third appellant ,failed to understand the difficulties of the respondents due to non-delivery of the original document-.and he had shown callousness and indifference in gross negligence of his duties. The third appellant, according to them, ought to have returned the original document-as per Section 61(2) of the Registration Act and therefore, the failure on the part of the third appellant is a colourable exercise of power. 3. The appellants, in their counter affidavit in the writ petitions, have stated that the respondent had valued the property at Rs.100 per sq.ft. as against the guideline value of Perunudhurai-Road at Rs.270.50 per sq.ft., that one Annamalai had submitted a petition on 26.8.1995 to the Inspector General of Registration alleging that the properties have been under-valued and that there is huge loss of revenue to the Government. The Assistant Inspector General of Registration Coimbatore enquired into the matter and submitted a report regarding the under-valuation and suppression of facts relating to the building. It was further found in the report that the value of the property at Brough Road is Rs.712 per sq.ft. and it seems there is a loss of revenue. The Assistant Inspector General of Registration Coimbatore enquired into the matter and submitted a report regarding the under-valuation and suppression of facts relating to the building. It was further found in the report that the value of the property at Brough Road is Rs.712 per sq.ft. and it seems there is a loss of revenue. The respondents have suppressed the relevant information on the value of the property and there is no intentional delay on the part of the Registering Officer as the matters have to be enquired into in detail regarding the valuation of the property by several officers in different places. It is further pleaded in the counter that when the respondents approached for the release of the documents, necessary informations were furnished to them and they were apprised that there is an under-valuation of value and that they had to pay the difference of stamp duty to enable them to get the original document. The respondents had promised to pay the stamp duty, but they never turned up and hence the documents have been referred under Section 47 (A)( 1 ) of the Act. 4. The second set of 21 writ petitions and the writ appeals relate to deeds of release which were also registered, but were dated 15.3.1996 and they were presented on 27.3.1996 for registration which was completed on that day itself. Insofar as these release deeds are concerned, the case of the respondents is that they were obtained as an abundant caution in favour of the vendor from another co-owner of the property and therefore, there is no question of under-valuation. On behalf of the appellants, it was contended that for the purpose of collecting the registration fee, the market value is relevant and that is why the documents of release were not returned. 5. The learned Judge, in his judgment, found that the registering authority has not recorded the reason for his belief that the true market value has not been set out in the document. Only after recording such reasons, the registering authority has to complete the registration of the instrument and thereafter alone he could refer the same to the Collector. 5. The learned Judge, in his judgment, found that the registering authority has not recorded the reason for his belief that the true market value has not been set out in the document. Only after recording such reasons, the registering authority has to complete the registration of the instrument and thereafter alone he could refer the same to the Collector. In this case, no reasons had been recorded before or at the time of registration of the instrument and for more than two years, the registering authority had kept silent and only on 25.9.1997, reference has been made under Subsection (1) of Section 47-A of the Act. He found that the action of the registering authority in referring the matter to the Collector after two years is arbitrary and is in excess of jurisdiction. The learned Judge refused to accept the case of the appellant that reference can be made at any time and that the two years period of limitation applies only to suo motu action under Section 47(A)(3) of the Act. He found that the reference in this case was an after-thought. Ultimately, he held that the reference should have been made immediately after registration or sooner the registration was completed, and at any rate, within three weeks from the date of completion of the registration of the document, besides sending a communication to the person who is liable to pay the stamp duty on the instrument in question. It was further held that there is no reason at all to withhold the original instrument on the facts of the present case. The reference made by the registering office to the Collector under Section 47(A)(1) was found to be arbitrary and was quashed. 6. The learned Special Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the appellants submitted that there is no prayer for quashing of the reference and therefore, the court ought not have quashed the reference orders. According to him, there is no limitation provided for a reference under Section 47 (A)(1). The act of registering a document and the subsequent act of reference are two distinct and separate official acts and the performance of the former does not automatically imply the acceptance of the value stated in the instrument as the true market value of the property. The act of registering a document and the subsequent act of reference are two distinct and separate official acts and the performance of the former does not automatically imply the acceptance of the value stated in the instrument as the true market value of the property. Section 47(A)(1) contemplates and provides for retention of the original document for making reference and the learned Judge should not have issued a direction to return the document once they are registered and even- if there is a reference with such, an endorsement, the time limit of three weeks for the purpose of reference is contrary to Section 47-A and these directions are beyond the relief prayed for in the writ petitions. 7. The counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that he had specifically pleaded in paragraph 8. of the affidavit that appellants 2 and 3, for reasons best known to themselves, were purposely and intentionally delaying delivery of the documents under some pretext or other and even in reference to the legal notice issued for delivery of the original document, an evasive reply was given as if the enquiry regarding the valuation was still going on even after a period of two years, He denied the contention made in the counter that the respondents have agreed to pay the deficit stamp fee and come and take the original document according to him the counter affidavit was filed on the day of final hearing of the writ petition and hence, he could not immediately file a reply affidavit. He submitted that there is absolutely no reason for the respondents to state so before the officers, for which they have no jurisdiction even to receive the additional stamp duty. According to him, appellants 2 and 3 have failed to discharge their duties and caused great loss and suffering to the respondents by keeping the document for more than two years after having registered it and without referring if there is any doubt as to the valuation. He has referred and relied on a number of authorities in support of his contentions. 8. Wehave heard the counsel and considered the matter carefully. 9. The fact that 21 documents of sale were executed and presented for registration on 23.8.1995 and that they were registered on the same day is not in dispute. He has referred and relied on a number of authorities in support of his contentions. 8. Wehave heard the counsel and considered the matter carefully. 9. The fact that 21 documents of sale were executed and presented for registration on 23.8.1995 and that they were registered on the same day is not in dispute. Similarly, the release deeds dated 15.3.1996 were presented on 27.3.1996 and were registered on that day itself also is not in dispute. The further fact that the respondents have issued a legal notice for the release of the documents dated 18.6.1997 after a period of one year and eleven months of the registration for delivery of the document is also not in dispute. When reply was given to this legal notice by the third appellant, it was not indicated that the third appellant is going to refer the matter, but it was only stated that the process of valuation is going on. The writ petitions were filed on 3.8.1997 and after notice in the writ petitions, the third appellant has referred the matter to the Collector as having under-valued the property under Section 47(A) (1) of the Act. 10. The following questions arise for consideration before this Court: (1) Whether the Registering Officer has to decide about the under-valuation prior to the registration or subsequent thereto?(2) Whether the Registering Officer can retain the registered document for the purpose of referring the matter to the Collector ? and, (3) What is the time limit for making such a reference ? 11. It is conceded by the appellants that the registering authority is bound to register the document, whether satisfied or not satisfied as to the correctness of the market value set forth in the document. But, it is argued that registration of the document does not automatically imply the acceptance of the value stated in the instrument and by a separate official act, the Registering Officer can refer the matter and that no time limit whatsoever is prescribed under Section 47(1) of the Act for reference. Section 3 of the Act, which is a charging section, reads as follows : "3. Instruments chargeable with duty. Section 3 of the Act, which is a charging section, reads as follows : "3. Instruments chargeable with duty. Subject to the provisions of this Act and the exemptions contained in Schedule I, the following instruments shall be chargeable with duty of the amount indicated in that Schedule as the proper duty therefor respectively." Section 10 indicates as to how the stamp duty should be paid. The relevant, portion reads as follows : "10. Duties how to be paid. - (1) Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, all duties with which any instruments are chargeable shall be paid, and such payment shall be indicated on such instruments, by means of stamps." 12. Section 27 of the Act mandates that the consideration of the market value and all other facts and circumstances affecting the chargeability of any instrument with duty shall be fully and truly setforth therein. Section 47-A of the Act sets out the procedure to be followed with reference to the undervalued documents. Under Section 47-A the Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Under-valuation of Instruments) Rules, 1968 has been framed. The registering authority shall refuse registration of a document if the market value of the property as required by Section 27 of the Act is not set forth in the instrument as required by Sub-rules (1) and (1)(a) which require the information about the items and their own assessment of the market value to be furnished. Once there is an assessment of the market value and information is furnished as required, the document will be registered. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 3 states as follows : "(3) The registering officer may, for the purpose of finding out whether the market value has been correctly furnished in the instrument, make such enquiries as he may deem fit. He may elicit from the parties concerned any Information bearing on the subject and call for and examine any records kept with any public officer or authority." Sub-rule (4) states as follows : (4) The registering officer may also look into the “Guidelines Register" containing the value of properties supplied to them for the purpose of verifying the market value. Explanation - The “Guidelines, Register" supplied to the officers is intended merely to assist them to ascertain prima facie, whether the market value has been truly set forth, in the instruments. Explanation - The “Guidelines, Register" supplied to the officers is intended merely to assist them to ascertain prima facie, whether the market value has been truly set forth, in the instruments. The entries made therein regarding the value of properties cannot be a substitute for market price. Such entries will not foreclose the enquiry of the Collector . under Section 47-A of the Act or fetter the discretion of the authorities concerned, to satisfy themselves on the reasonableness or otherwise of the value expressed in the documents. " 13. If the document presented sets forth the market value of all other facts necessary truly, the document has to be registered. To find out whether the market value has been correctly furnished in the instrument or not, Sub-rules (3) and (4) enable the registering authority, whether the market value has been correctly furnished in the instrument or not. If the registering authority, on the basis of this enquiry, has reason to believe that the market value of the property has not been truly set forth in the instrument, he may refer the matter to the Collector for determination of the market value of such property. But, even here, before referring the matter, he shall do so only after registering the said instrument. 14. Thus, it could be seen that if the document is registered without any doubt as to the undervaluation of the document, or any reasonable belief as to the true value set forth in the instrument, and once it is registered, there is no further scope for holding the enquiry after registration regarding the value of the property for the purpose of reference. Therefore, necessarily before registering the document, the registering officer is entitled either to accept the valuation or refuse to accept the valuation. If he accepts the valuation also, he has to register the document; if he does not accept the valuation also, he shall register the document and then refer the same to the Collector. Therefore, once the document is registered, it pre-supposes that the Collector is satisfied about the valuation or it could be that he was not satisfied about the valuation, but followed It by a reference after registration. Therefore, the argument of the learned Special Government Pleader is that even after registration, he can go on with the enquiry on the valuation of the property, as has been done in this case. Therefore, the argument of the learned Special Government Pleader is that even after registration, he can go on with the enquiry on the valuation of the property, as has been done in this case. But how long-? In the reply to the legal notice, the third appellant, after one year and eleven months, has stated that he is awaiting the report of the valuation for the purpose of reference. Thus, there is a clear violation of Section 47-A of the Act. 15. On this subject, the Supreme Court, in categorical terms, in State of Punjab v. Mohabir Singh, 1996 (1) S.C.C. 609 , has held that the function of the Registering Authority is quasi judicial and he must make up his mind whether true price is reflected and that registration and reference follows. Considering the scope of the section similarly worded namely Section 47-A, as amended by the Punjab Stamp Act 1962, their lordships observed as follows : “4. Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A empowers the Registering Officer, while registering any instrument relating to the transfer of any property, if he has reasons to believe that the value of the property or consideration, as the case may be has not been truly set forth in the instrument, after registering such instrument, to refer the same to the Collector for determination of the value of the property or the consideration, as the case may be and the proper duty payable thereon. It would, therefore, be clear that the Registering Authority has to satisfy himself that value of the property or the consideration for it has not been truly set forth in the instrument. He may make a reference to the Collector in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 47-A. Before making reference, he is required to register the document and he is not. empowered to withhold the registration. Such a registration, of course, will be subject to the determination of the true market value prevailing in the locality though the value mentioned in the instrument for such registration under sub-section (1) of Section 47-A was not conclusive. 6. It would thus be seen that the aforesaid guidelines would inhibit the Registering Authority to exercise his quasi Judicial satisfaction of the true value of the property or consideration reflected in the instrument presented before him for registration. 6. It would thus be seen that the aforesaid guidelines would inhibit the Registering Authority to exercise his quasi Judicial satisfaction of the true value of the property or consideration reflected in the instrument presented before him for registration. The statutory language clearly indicates that as and when such an instrument is presented for registration, the Sub-Registrar is required to satisfy himself, before registering the document whether the true price is reflected in the instrument as it prevails in the locality. If he is so satisfied, he registers the document. If he is so satisfied that the market value of the consideration has been truly set forth in the instrument, subject to his making reference under sub-section (1) of Section 47-A. he registers the document. Thereafter, he should make a reference to the Collector for action under sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 47-A. Accordingly, we hold that the offending instructions are not consistent with sub-section (1) of Section 47-A. It would, therefore, be open to the State Government to revise its guidelines. and issue proper directions consistent with the law." (Italics added). 16. In M/s. Park View Enterprises v. State, A.I.R. 1990 Mad. 251, a Division Bench of this court, while considering the scope of Section 47-A of the Act as well as Section 27 and 34 of the Registration Act, held that the Registering Officer has no jurisdiction or authority to hold enquiry and decide as to what is the stamp duty that is payable. Rule 3(3) only enables him to arrive at the prima facie assessment whether the market value furnished in the sale deed could be relied upon to proceed with the registration. If he opines that the market value is not correct the statutory duty cast upon him is to register it and send it to the Collector by overlooking the procedure under Section 47 A. Except the Collector, no authority could fix the market value and decide upon the proper stamp duty payable in respect of any instrument covered under Section 47-A. The Division Bench further held that the Registering Officer cannot delay the registration of the instrument of the kinds covered by Section 47-A. He has no right to go behind the terms of the document and any other agreement or any other transaction. The role of the Collector is to find out the market value relating to the chargeability of the instrument and he has to go by the terms of the document regarding the nature of the transaction. 17. In the above decision, the Division Bench held that the circular issued by the Inspector General of Registration dated 9.12.1988 directing the Registering Authority keep pending registration of sale deeds relating to sale of undivided shares and directing the Deputy Inspector General to inspect the property was held to be contrary to Section 47-A, though the High Court upheld the statutory provision. On appeal before the Supreme Court by the Government of Tamil Nadu in Civil Appeal Nos.5656-5914 of 1990, by a judgment dated 21.12.2000, the view of the Division Bench was upheld. The Supreme Court held that such a rule cannot possibly be read to provide assessment of the market value on the basis of evidence, since that would be contra to the statute and it is in this perceptive that the circular was stated to be beyond the executive power. The Supreme Court has categorically held as follows : “While it is true that the Government revenue should be protected and there cannot be any exception provided, however, the same is otherwise in consonance with the principles of law and not de hors the same. The statute itself expressly provides that it is only after registration that the Registrar or an officer authorised in that behalf can take certain steps and on the wake of such a statutory provision, question of taking steps before the registration does not and cannot arise and it is this conclusi on which has prompted the High Court to decry the validity of the circular. We also think it fit to lend our concurrence therewith. The judgment decrying the validity of the circular cannot possibly be faulted in any way whatsoever." The reference to this judgment by the learned Special Government Pleader is actually against the proposition he is canvassing. The Registering Authority has to decide independently on the question of the market value as set out in the instrument and cannot be guided by any guidelines or circular. If he is not satisfied about the setting forth of the market value correctly, he has no other option but to register and refer the same to the Collector. 18. The Registering Authority has to decide independently on the question of the market value as set out in the instrument and cannot be guided by any guidelines or circular. If he is not satisfied about the setting forth of the market value correctly, he has no other option but to register and refer the same to the Collector. 18. InS.P. Padmavathy v. State of Tamil Nadu, A.I.R. 1997 Mad. 296, a Division Bench of this court has held that power under Section 47-A of the Act can only be exercised when the Registering Officer has reason to believe that the market value of the property, which is the subject of conveyance, has not been truly set forthwith a view to fraudulently evade payment of proper stamp duty. In that case, the Division Bench found that the department did not raise a plea that there was an attempt to evade stamp d uty and that there was no whisper about the lack of bona fides on the part of the parties. The Division Bench further held, “There is no finding recorded that there was lack of bona fides or any reason to belief that there was under-valuation. " In that case, it was found that the Registering Authority had purported to exercise the power under Section 47-A of the Act on the ground that there was a time gap between the agreement of sale and the date of execution of the sale deed. Ultimately, the Division Bench held that when there is no allegation of under valuation or lack of bona fides, the mere fact that there is time gap between the agreement of sale and the date of execution of the sale deed is not sufficient for the Registering Authority to invoke Section 47-A of the Act unless there are reasons to believe that there is an attempt on the part of the parties to the instrument to deliberately under-value the property with a view to evade payment of proper stamp duty. 19. It is seen, in this case, there is no decision on the part of the Registering Authority that he had reason to believe that there was an attempt on the part of the parties to under-value the subject matter of the transfer with a view to evade payment of proper stamp duty. 19. It is seen, in this case, there is no decision on the part of the Registering Authority that he had reason to believe that there was an attempt on the part of the parties to under-value the subject matter of the transfer with a view to evade payment of proper stamp duty. The only reasons apparently found from his memo that it is contrary to the guidelines cannot be the ground for referring the matter to the District Collector under Section 47-A(1) of the Act, especially after having registered the document without any demur and on his satisfying about the market value. 20. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Board of Revenue v. Vidyavathi, AIR 1962 SC 1270, held that the question whether an authority acts judicially is to be gathered from the express provisions of the Act in the first instance. Where, however, the provisions of the Act are silent, the duty to act judicially may be inferred from the provisions of the statute or may be gathered from the cumulative effect of the nature of the rights affected. The manner of disposal provided the objective criterion to be adopted, the phraseology used and other judicial and other indica afforded by the statute. The Supreme Court found that if a decision by the authority goes against the person executing the instrument, it may result in payment of large amount as deficit stamp duty and even larger amount as penalty and in the circumstances, it was held by the Supreme Court that the Board of Revenue should near the person executing the document before saddling him with large pecuniary liability. In this case, insofar as the Collector hearing the matter under Section 47-A(2) of the Act is concerned, he will follow the procedure prescribed and there will not be any difficulty in holding that fair opportunity will be given to the party concerned. But, we are concerned with the question as to whether the Registering Authority, even prior to the reference, has to form an opinion and has reasonable belief that the market value of the property has not been truly set forth in the instrument. This decision has been taken by the Registering Authority, though it is not required under the rules to be taken after hearing the parties. This decision has been taken by the Registering Authority, though it is not required under the rules to be taken after hearing the parties. In view of the consequence that follows out of this decision, it has to be held that the Registering Authority has to act judicially and therefore, there must be some records and basis to show that he has reason to believe that the document has been under-valued. 21. In this case, there is absolutely no record whatsoever, neither noted in the document nor by separate endorsements. It is only in a collateral proceeding relating to a complaint against the officer that he replies in Na.Ka. No.6913/OM/95, dated 11.9.1995 to the District Registrar that the valuation of the document is not in accordance with the guidelines and therefore, the document is kept pending for the purpose of getting valuation for the reference. When we directed the Special Government Pleader to furnish the originals of the Registered document, now said to have been referred, to find out whether there is any entry in reference to this decision of the Registering Authority, they are not forthcoming. A xerox copy of the alleged document is produced with a marking, “House. (Field Inspection)". In the light of this pencil mark in the document without any initials of the person making it or the date, the Special Government Pleader wants to infer that there is a decision taken not to release the document since the value has not been truly set forth. We are afraid that we will not be able to appreciate a quasi judicial authority, who has to take a decision for the purpose of finding out whether the document is properly valued or not and has come to a conclusion that he has got reason to believe to doubt the genuineness of the valuation, has taken so lightly on this quasi- judicial power and after registering the document, he is said to have noted “House (Field Inspection)" in the document. Therefore on the non-production of the original instrument and on the mere writing of “Field Inspection" in pencil. we cannot infer-that the Registering Authority has taken such a decision. 22. Therefore on the non-production of the original instrument and on the mere writing of “Field Inspection" in pencil. we cannot infer-that the Registering Authority has taken such a decision. 22. Section 47-A of the Act was introduced by the Madras Amendment Act, 1967 (Act 24 of 1967) and its constitutional validity along with the substantial amendment to the principal Act with substitution of the words market value for the word consideration occurring in certain entries in the principal Act, came up for consideration before this Court. A learned single Judge of this court, while considering the various legal aspects, held that the section is constitutionally unsustainable. One of the grounds on which the learned Judge found the section illegal was that it is void for uncertainty. In the course of the judgment in Writ Petition Nos.2653 of 1970, 529 and 1383 of 1971 dated 17.1.1972, Palaniswamy J. has held that if a citizen acquires or disposes of property with the Amending Act on the statute book, he would be doing it under the risk of not only being called upon to pay higher stamp duty on a value which may be fixed on the basis of uncertainties, prophecies and conjectures, but also would have to face a prosecution which may end in punishment of imprisonment, fine or both. This plight of suspense will continue for a period of two years after the date of registration. The learned Judge held that the impugned Amending Act, by which market value of the property has been substituted as the basis for levy of stamp duty in the place of consideration, has introduced uncertainty and vagueness in the matter of computation of stamp duty. 23. The above judgment of the learned Judge was reversed and Section 47-A of the Act was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in State v. T.M. Chandrasekharan, A.I.R. 1974 Mad. 117. Their Lordships have disagreed with the view of the learned single Judge and held that the provision was constitutionally valid. In the course of the judgment, some of the observations made by their Lordships are relevant for the purpose of our case. The Division Bench held that the learned single Judge apprehended that the Amending Act might be used as a means of oppression by the officers entrusted with the duty of collecting the charge. In the course of the judgment, some of the observations made by their Lordships are relevant for the purpose of our case. The Division Bench held that the learned single Judge apprehended that the Amending Act might be used as a means of oppression by the officers entrusted with the duty of collecting the charge. But, this charge can be levelled in respect of other taxing statutes as well, where the basis of tax or quantification of tax is the market value. The Division Bench observed as follows : “Even so we are inclined ,to think that the object of the Amending Act being to avoid large scale evasion of stamp duty, it is not meant to be applied in a matter of fact fashion and in a haphazard way. Market value itself, as we already mentioned, is a changing factor and will depend on various circumstances and matters relevant to the consideration. No exactitude is in the nature of things possible. In. working out the Act, great caution should be taken in order that it may not work as_an engine of op pression. Having regard to the object of the Act, we are inclined to think that normally, the consideration stated as the market value in a given instrument brought for registration should be taken to be correct unless circumstances exist which suggest fraudulent evasion." (Italics added). “Market value of the property has been substituted as a measure of finding out the stamp duty in the place of consideration, which was a measure of duty in the principal Act. According to the Division Bench, the liability to duty is on the instrument and its quantum depends on the description as well as the measure indicated in the First Schedule to the Act. Section 27 of the Principle Act requires facts affecting duty to be set forth in the instrument as the basis for measure of the extent of liability or quantum of stamp duty with which such instrument is chargeable." The Division Bench further went on to hold that there is a provision for determination of the true market value where, it is suspected to be under stated. The Amending Act has not shifted the chargeable event from an instrument to a market value and the duty, after the Amending Act, is still on the instrument and not on the market value any more than the consideration mentioned therein. The Amending Act has not shifted the chargeable event from an instrument to a market value and the duty, after the Amending Act, is still on the instrument and not on the market value any more than the consideration mentioned therein. 24. But, the Division Bench forewarned when the newly introduced Section 47-A was questioned for its validity that great caution should be taken in order that it may not work as an engine of oppression, since the market value is a changing factor and it will depend upon various circumstances and the matters relevant for consideration. The Registering Authority, in this case, as apprehended by the Division Bench, has decided that there is an evasion of stamp duty and has applied the provisions as a matter of fact fashion without any object of apparent application of the provisions of the Act and an independent decision on the subject which he is required to make. 25. There is absolutely no reason whatsoever for the third appellant to retain the document for two years without returning the same to the parties. It is only their filing of writ petitions and receipt of the notice therein impelled the Registering Officer to make a reference under Section 47-A(1). The reason set forth for the inordinate delay is that the parties have agreed to pay the deficit stamp fee and that they were awaiting for that payment is too naive a proposition to be given any credence. Firstly, in the light of the averment made by the writ petitioners that they had been repeatedly meeting the officers nearly 20 times during this period, followed by a legal notice, there is no reason as to why they should have agreed to pay the deficit stamp fee and not coming forward to pay it later on and filing the writ petitions. Secondly, that is not the reason stated in the reply notice by the third appellant. Thirdly, there is no scope of provision for paying the deficit stamp duty at the instance of the Registering Officer after having registered the document. Therefore, the attempt of the third appellant to find out some reasons to justify the inordinate delay is nothing but an after-thought. 26. The District Registrar, in his counter, has stated that there was a petition dated 26.8.1995 to the Inspector General of Registration alleging under-valuation etc. Therefore, the attempt of the third appellant to find out some reasons to justify the inordinate delay is nothing but an after-thought. 26. The District Registrar, in his counter, has stated that there was a petition dated 26.8.1995 to the Inspector General of Registration alleging under-valuation etc. The matter was referred to the Assistant Inspector General of Registration and in the enquiry, it was found out that there is suppression and under-valuation. The records relating to these and the original instruments were not made available before the learned single Judge. Before us after a specific direction and adjournment for that purpose, the complete records are not forthcoming. The original file relating to the alleged enquiry is not before us, but an unsigned typed copy said to be the report is produced. The original of the instrument is not produced inspite of our direction that adverse inference will be drawn against the department. Therefore, their case that the document was registered subject to verification and that the enquiry report concluded suppression and under-valuation cannot be accepted. In any event, this has no relevance to the decision of the Registering Authority under Section 47-A. The learned Special Government Pleader could not say as to the action taken on the basis of the report. The reply is that the finding of suppression is only against the respondents and that the officers have been exonerated. But, there is one revealing aspect in the reply of the Joint Registrar No. 1 dated 11,9.1995 to the memo issued by the Deputy Registrar on the complaint dated 28.8.1995. He has stated that the market value shown in the document is lesser than the guideline value. Therefore, for the purpose of taking proceedings under Section 47-A , after field inspection, the matter is kept pending. It was reiterated that after field inspection, the documents will be referred under Section 47 A. But there was no reference for two years thereafter Strangely, the reply of the same officer dated 23.6.1997 for the lawyer's notice is that the field inspection report is still awaited and they are taking steps to return the document to the respondents. Thus, the Registering Officer is misleading both the Deputy Registrar as well as the respondents and this makes out a clear case of misuse and arbitrary exercise of power vested in them. Thus, the Registering Officer is misleading both the Deputy Registrar as well as the respondents and this makes out a clear case of misuse and arbitrary exercise of power vested in them. The action of the third appellant thereafter in referring the document for the alleged under-valuation is clearly an ex facie arbitrary exercise of power and resorted to save the situation. The action of reference is, unreasonable unfair and constitutes colourable exercise of power and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is now well settled law laid down by the Supreme Court in a series of decisions that if an action is arbitrary, there must be denial of equality; Article 14 thus strikes at arbitrariness in any form. The High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, has the discretion to frame a proper order and appropriate relief which would suit the exigencies of the case and the Court cannot dismiss the petition on a mere ground that proper relief has not been asked for. 27. On the question of limitation, the learned Judge has taken the view that; Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A as well as Sub-section (3) of Section 47-A of the Stamp Act applied to different contingencies which cannot be read conjointly nor it could be held that the Registering Authority could make a reference under Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A of the Act without any time-limit nor the contention that the reference under Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A of the said Act is not controlled by limitation of two years prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 47-A of the said Act is acceptable. The learned Judge held that the Registering Authority has not entertained any reasonable belief with respect to valuation of the property as prescribed by Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A and held that before completing registration, there cannot be a subsequent reference, much less after two years from the date of completion of the registration. While assailing this view of the learned Judge, it is submitted that the Section does not contemplate any time limit and therefore, reference can be made at any time. We are unable to countenance such a stand. While assailing this view of the learned Judge, it is submitted that the Section does not contemplate any time limit and therefore, reference can be made at any time. We are unable to countenance such a stand. In the absence of any time limit provided for under Section 47-A(1) and in the light of the analysis of the process involved in reference to Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A of the Act, there is no scope for holding that reference can be made at any point of time. 28. The learned Special Government Pleader placed strong reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. M/s. Mahajan Sabha, Gurdaspur, A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 2153. In that judgment, the Supreme Court held that if all the three sub-sections are conjointly read, the inevitable conclusion would be that the action of the Collector taken under Sub-sections (2) and (3) on reference under Sub-section (1) is not controlled by limitation of two year prescribed by Sub-section (3) and accordingly, it was held that the action initiated by the Collector was not barred by limitation. The Supreme Court was not dealing with the reference made under Section 47-A(1) and the time-limit for such a reference. In that case, the Society purchased a building and no stamp was affixed on the sale deed. When it was pointed out by the Audit Authority, the Sub Registrar made a reference to the District Collector for collection of the stamp duty. On receipt of reference, the Collector issued a notice to the Society who filed an objection contending that since the document was registered two years prior to the issuance of notice, the Collector ceased to take any action calling upon the respondents to pay stamp duty. The contention was rejected by the Collector and thereafter the matter was taken up before the District Judge who held that once the Sub Registrar registered the document, he becomes the functus officio and therefore, has no power to make a reference to the Collector. The High Court agreed with this view. The matter was taken up by special leave before the Supreme Court. The High Court agreed with this view. The matter was taken up by special leave before the Supreme Court. Thus, it could be seen that the objection was in reference to the notice issued by the Collector after a period of two years under Sub-section (2) of Section 47-A and not on the reference by the registering authority, though incidentally, the power of the registering authority also came up for consideration. In this context, the Supreme Courts after referring to Section 47-A held that the limitation of two years prescribed in Sub-section (3) would apply only in a case where the Collector takes action either suo motu or on receipt of reference from the Inspector General of Registration or the Registrar of the District appointed under the Registration Act, 1908. The Supreme Court observed as follows : “If all the three sub-sections are conjointly read the inevitable conclusion would be that the action of the Collector taken under Sub-sections (2) and (3) on reference under Sub-section (1) to Section 47A is not controlled by limitation of two years prescribed under Sub-section (3). Accordingly we hold that the action initiated by the Collector was not barred by limitation." (Italics added). Thus, it could be seen that the question before the High Court was the power of the Collector to take action under Sub-section (2) after a period of two years. The question that arose was whether limitation of two years prescribed under Sub-section (3) of Section 47-A of the Act stands attracted. It was contended on behalf of the respondent that when the Collector initiated action under Subsection (2) of Section 47-A, he gets jurisdiction only if the action is initialed within two years from the date of registration of the instrument. Since it was said to be revised after two years, the Collector is devoid of jurisdiction to take action under Sub-section (3) of Section 47-A. The Supreme Court held that there is no force in such a contention. Thus, the Supreme Court was dealing with the power of the Collector to initiate action under Sub-section (2) after a period of two years. Whereas, we are now concerned with the power of the Registering Authority to make a reference after two years. Therefore, on facts, the judgment is not helpful to the respondents. 29. Thus, the Supreme Court was dealing with the power of the Collector to initiate action under Sub-section (2) after a period of two years. Whereas, we are now concerned with the power of the Registering Authority to make a reference after two years. Therefore, on facts, the judgment is not helpful to the respondents. 29. If the argument of the Special Government Pleader is to be accepted, it could be now seen that Sub-section (3) is amended with effect from 10.2.2000 by Act 1 of 2000 substituting the words 'five years' instead of two years for a suo motu action by the Collector. The Registering Officer can now refer the document even after a period of five years and the Collector thereafter can initiate action after a further period of five years on the basis of reference. The Collector can also take suo motu action after a. period of five years. In our view any such interpretation giving power to the Registering Authority even to refer after a period of five years now would lead to a means of oppression by the officers entrusted with the duty of collecting the charges and it is beyond the scope of the Act and purpose and would be defeating the object of enaction of Section 47-A. 30. Section 61 of the Registration Act, 1908 mandates the Registering Authority to return the document to the person who presented the same for registration after completion of registration. The moment registration is made, the document shall thereupon be deemed complete and it shall then be returned to the person who presented the same for registration. Therefore, once a document is registered, there is no scope for retention of the document unless Section 47-A(1) comes into operation. The Registering Authority, after having reason to believe that the instrument was not properly valued, has registered it and hence he has no further reason to retain the document except to refer it. Therefore, once a document is registered, there is no scope for retention of the document unless Section 47-A(1) comes into operation. The Registering Authority, after having reason to believe that the instrument was not properly valued, has registered it and hence he has no further reason to retain the document except to refer it. Therefore, the direction of the learned single Judge that reference should be made immediately after registration or so sooner the registration is complete, at any rate, within three weeks from the date of completion of registration of the document and refer the instrument to the Collector under Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A of the said Act besides sending communication to the person who is liable to pay the stamp duty on the instrument in question cannot be objected to. In our view, this is a salutary direction to see that Section 47-A(1) does not operate as an engine of oppression on the plea of under valuation. 31. The provisions of the Act do not create any bar against an instrument not duly stamped being acted upon. Therefore, the beneficiaries of the transaction are entitled to get the instrument returned, of course subject to the payment of stamp duty and the penalty according to the procedure prescribed under the Act. The initial defect, if any, in reference to the payment of stamp duty will not affect the validity or the operation of the instrument. This has been been held by the Supreme Court in H.S. Limite d v. M/s. Dilip Construction, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 1238. A Division Bench of this Court, in Subramaniam Chettiar v. Revenue Divisional Officer, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 454, has held that an unstamped or defectively stamped document is not barred and is effective from the date of its execution though it is incapable of being made use of as evidence until it is stamped properly. Their Lordships approved the observation of Lindiey L.J. in Powell v. London And Provincial Bank, 1893 BC 555. (B) that, “No case that I kn ow of can be cited to show that an erroneous stamp would invalidate the deed." The action of the Registering Authority in keeping the document without returning it or referring it has indirectly invalidated its operation or its benefit to the vendees on the erroneous invocation of power under Section 47-A(1) of the Act. 32. 32. As rightly pointed out and which we are in full agreement, the parties to an instrument, for various reasons, will always be anxious to get the document registered at the earliest point of time and yet the document released. The parties may be in dire need, for completion of the registration process as early as possible for so many reasons like financial, health, family and other innumerable circumstances. They would always like to expedite the process of registration in order to avoid complications or litigations or things like that. It is rarely in few cases that the execution is done in a leisurely manner without any urgency whatsoever. Taking advantage of this plignt of the parties and the varying factors in reference to the market value and the expression being so uncertain or vague or indefinite, it is not uncommon that the registration is delayed, or even if it is registered, documents are retained. There are no guidelines set out to enforce uniformity or to avoid arbitrariness in the exercise of power. Citizens are left with no time or energy to take up their cause in higher forums and courts. This is taken advantage of. This case illustrates the point how a document which has been registered without any whisper whatsoever on the market value, has been retained for more than two years without being returned or referred to the Collector. In our view this case highlights as to how arbitrariness is writ large and how it can work as an engine of oppression against the par ties. For all the above reasons, we have no hesitation whatsoever in approving the view of the learned Judge that the document should be returned sooner its registration is complete, at any rate within three weeks from the date of completion of registration of the document or it must be referred within a period of three weeks to the Collector under Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A of the Act. 33. It has been well settled that actions of the State or its instrumentality, uninformed by reason may amount to being arbitrary and be liable to be questioned. Article 14 of the Constitution thus strikes at arbitrariness of the State action in any form. 33. It has been well settled that actions of the State or its instrumentality, uninformed by reason may amount to being arbitrary and be liable to be questioned. Article 14 of the Constitution thus strikes at arbitrariness of the State action in any form. The authorities under the Stamp Act are to exercise their powers reasonably to achieve the object and intendment of the provision and if there is any arbitrariness In their action, it is liable to be questioned. It is not open to the authorities to say that since there is no time limit set out under the Act, they can withhold the document for an unlimited period and then refer it for its valuation at any time they choose. Absence of any provision for time implies the reference follows registration and the plain language cannot be interpreted in any other manner. It is true that there is no outer limit prescribed for the disposal of a Reference by the Collector under Sub-section (2) of Section 47-A. But, there is no time left for the Registering Authority to refer under Sub-section (1) of Section 47-A. It is to follow registration subject to the time taken for the procedural formalities, but in any case, it shall not exceed three weeks from the date of registration. A contra stand on behalf of the appellants is ex facie unreasonable and cannot stand scrutiny under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 34. For all these reasons, we hold that no grounds are made out to interfere with the judgment of the learned single judge and the directions contained therein. The writ appeals are accordingly dismissed with a cost of Rs. 1,000 each. Consequently, the connected C.M.Ps. are closed.