JUDGMENT - A.S. AGUIAR, J.:---Rule. By consent of the parties, taken up for hearing forthwith. Learned Advocate General waives service for the State/respondent. 2. By this petition, (originally filed as Criminal Revision Application), the petitioner seeks quashing and setting aside of the order dated 18-4-2001 of the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panaji permitting the respondent to re-investigate the case being Crime No. 106/98, registered against the petitioner and another for the offences under sections 177, 182, 403, 409, 463 read with section 34 of the I.P.C. and sections 7, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The said order has been passed on the application dated 16-4-2001 of the Addl. S.P. CID/Crime Branch, Panaji. By the said application, the Investigating Officer requested the Court to reopen the case for the purpose of re-investigation on the ground that the earlier closure report was submitted on the mistaken interpretation/assumption of the validity of the Notification dated 1-8-1996 which the complainant had claimed to be illegal in the FIR filed by him. The learned Magistrate being of the view that fresh material was placed before him for consideration for re-opening the case, accepted the submission of the Investing Officer and passed the said order on 18-4-2001 reopening the case for further investigation. The said order of the learned JMFC, Panaji Goa dated 18-4-2001 is impugned by the petitioner, inter alia, on the following grounds : i) that the application dated 3-4-2001 of the respondent for permission to re-investigate the Crime No. 106/98 was rejected by the learned JMFC on the ground that the applicant did not disclose any further material having been gathered by the investigating authorities; ii) that earlier request of the investigating agency vide application dated 28-1-1999 requesting to finalise the case as "C" summary was acceded to by the learned JMFC by his order dated 2-2-1999 after due application of mind; iii) that although the learned JMFC had rejected the said application for further investigation on the ground that there was no further material produced yet, granted the subsequent application dated 16-4-2001 on the ground that "new material" was placed before him for consideration for re-opening the case. 3. 3. Shri Lotlikar, the learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently argued that the order of the learned JMFC dated 18-4-2001, is illegal as no new material was brought on record justifying re-opening of the case and that the so called new material was available to the police even prior to the filing of the first application dated 3-4-2001. It is further contended that from the application of the Investigating Officer dated 16-4-2001, it was abundantly clear that the police are seeking to re-investigate the case solely at the behest of the Government, more specifically at the behest of the complainant, the present Chief Minister of the State, who at the relevant time was a M.L.A., sitting in the opposition. That since the matter is sought to be once again raked up at his instance, it is clear that the matter is being pursued out of political vendetta. 4. Learned Advocate Shri Lotlikar has contended that the JMFC could not have reviewed his own earlier order and has relied upon the case of (Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa and others)1, 2001 Cri.L.J. 128 wherein the Apex Court held that section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. He also referred to the case of (Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.))2, reported in A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1791, in support of his contention that the right of the police to further investigate can be exercised only when fresh information comes to light. It is contended that in the present case the so called fresh information on the basis of which the learned JMFC has permitted reopening of the investigation, cannot be considered to be sufficient material for having re-opened the investigation. 5. Reference is also made by learned Advocate Shri Lotlikar to the case of (S.N. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 786 in support of the contention that reinvestigation is not permitted if it is actuated by mala fides. The Apex Court in the said case held that though the Code gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed. The Apex Court in the said case held that though the Code gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed. In appropriate cases, an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a Police Officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the Police Officer from misusing his legal powers. It is contended that in the present case, the facts as set out in the said application clearly indicate the mala fides, and, therefore, the reinvestigation into the alleged offences ought not to have been allowed and to that extent the order of the Magistrate permitting reinvestigation is improper and, therefore, ought to be quashed and set aside. 6. Learned Advocate General Shri Nadkarni, on behalf of the respondents/State of Goa has vigorously argued supporting the order of the JMFC and contended that the State is fully justified in re-opening investigation in view of the material that has come on record pursuant to the judgment of this Court in Writ Petition No. 316/1998 dated 19th, 23rd and 24th April, 2001. The writ petition was filed for quashing the notifications dated 15-5-1996 and 1-8-1996. The brief facts leading to the filing of the said writ petition are :--- During the tenure of the petitioner as Power Minister, two Notifications were issued one dated 15-5-96 and another dated 1-8-1996. By these two Notifications, 25% rebate was granted to industrialists who applied for power before certain dates prescribed in the Notifications. On 11-5-1998, the petitioner therein Shri Manohar Parrikar, then only an MLA, lodged a complaint with the police against the petitioner alleging commission of offences in relation to the issue of the Notifications and further alleging that the said Notifications were issued for oblique purpose and for illegal monetary gain by the petitioner. The said Writ Petition No. 316/98 was filed on 12-8-1998. The judgment was delivered on 24-4-2001, in said writ petition resulting in quashing of the two Notifications. 7. The said Writ Petition No. 316/98 was filed on 12-8-1998. The judgment was delivered on 24-4-2001, in said writ petition resulting in quashing of the two Notifications. 7. While disposing of the writ petition, this Court observed that the Notification dated 1-8-1996 came to be issued without any consultation with the Council of Ministers or the Chief Minister as well as without consultation of the Finance Department, though the draft was referred to the Law Department before the Notification was issued. The Court also observed that the decision to issue Notifications dated 15-5-96 and 1-8-96 was finalised by respondent No. 2 (petitioner herein) without any further reference to the Council of Ministers or to the Chief Minister. It is further observed that during the course of investigations carried out pursuant to the complaint filed by the petitioner, the then Chief Minister had appeared before the Investigating Officer on 14-1-1999 and submitted a written statement in which it is stated that at no point of time, respondent No. 2 (petitioner herein) had placed before him the proposals regarding the impugned decisions dated 15-5-1996 and 1-8-1996. By judgment dated 24-4-2001 the said Notifications dated 15-5-1996 and 1-8-1996 were quashed, however, the Court while quashing the said Notifications declined to grant certain reliefs prayed for by the complainant/petitioner therein Shri Parrikar, viz. investigation into his complaint and recovery of money in respect of those industrial units to whom rebate of 25% has been illegally paid, or adjusted. 8. Shri Nadkarni, the learned Advocate General contends that the prosecution of the criminal complaint filed by Shri Parrikar which was closed as "C" summary, was re-opened pursuant to the impugned order of the JMFC dated 18-4-2001 in view of the observations made by this Court in its judgment dated 24-4-2001. Shri Lotlikar has pointed out that the so called ground of 'fresh material' was not available at the time when the application permitting reopening of the case was granted, namely on 18-4-2001, as the order in Writ Petition No. 316/98 was passed on 24th April, 2001. Shri Lotlikar has pointed out that the so called ground of 'fresh material' was not available at the time when the application permitting reopening of the case was granted, namely on 18-4-2001, as the order in Writ Petition No. 316/98 was passed on 24th April, 2001. However, the learned Advocate General has drawn my attention to the fact that the dictation of the judgment started on 19th April, it continued on 23rd April and it was delivered on 24th April, 2001, therefore, fresh material pertaining to the offences allegedly committed by the petitioner was available prior to the filing of the application dated 16-4-2001 for re-opening of the investigations. The learned Advocate General further supports the impugned order of JMFC on the ground that when the order of closure dated 2-2-1999 was made, no notice was given to the complainant on the said application for closure and contends that is sufficient ground for a fresh application being made for re-opening the investigation. In support thereof he has relied upon the case of (Union Public Service Commission v. S. Papaiah)4, reported in A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 3876, wherein the Supreme Court held that the order of the Magistrate which was passed for closure of the case without issuing notice to the informants, is illegal. 9. Learned Advocate General on behalf of the State has submitted that the petitioner herein is accused of serious misdeeds such as mis-use of his office as Minister and having issued Notifications without authority and that too for the purpose for monetary gain at the expense of the public ex-chequer. It is pointed out that even the Chief Minister was not consulted by the petitioner while issuing the said Notifications which has resulted in loss to the State Ex-Chequer to the tune of Rs. 9.00 Crores and the said loss would have gone up to the extent of 50.00 Crores had the writ petition not been filed by the complainant. It is further pointed out that the petitioner herein, has in his own handwriting changed the wordings of the Notifications, so as to give pecuniary advantage to some of the industrial units and, therefore, guilty of having committed forgery and various other offences. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the present application is an attempt by the petitioner to stall the investigation. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the present application is an attempt by the petitioner to stall the investigation. It is pointed out that the investigation is re-opened and recommenced after passing of the impugned order and the investigation is almost complete. Pursuant to re-opening of the investigation, the petitioner was arrested on 16-5-2001 and released on bail on 22-5-2001. Since the investigation is nearing completion, it is likely that the charge sheet will be filed within 2 to 3 weeks. 10. It is the case of the petitioner that the order of the JMFC dated 18-4-2001 allowing the police to reinvestigate into the complaint is illegal and required to be quashed. It is vehemently argued by learned Advocate General that even assuming that the order is illegal, the powers of the police to investigate are not taken away and this Court may not exercise discretary powers under Article 227 of the Constitution in the facts and circumstances of the case. In support thereof, the learned Advocate General has placed reliance on the case of (Kekoo J. Maneckji v. Union of India and others)5, reported in 1980 Cri.L.J. 258, paras 10, 12 and 21 where the Court held that it is not a rule that every illegal order must be set aside by the Court in the exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 227 and proceedings by way of certiorari are not of course and High Court has the power to refuse the writ if there is no failure of justice. 11. Having heard learned Advocate for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General, I am of the opinion that the impugned order dated 18-4-2001 of the learned JMFC does not require interference of this Court. The Apex Court in (Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and others)6, reported in 1992(4) S.C.C. 305 has observed that the inherent power of the High Court should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution and it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This Court would be constrained ex debito justitiae to interfere with such orders only if it is found that there was failure of justice in allowing prosecution to reopen and reinvestigate the case. 12. This Court would be constrained ex debito justitiae to interfere with such orders only if it is found that there was failure of justice in allowing prosecution to reopen and reinvestigate the case. 12. Undoubtedly, the case reverberates with political overtones and one may rush to conclusion that the entire investigation is actuated by malice and a result of political rivalry. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the petitioner is prima facie involved in a case of political impropriety of having misused his position in issuing the impugned Notifications and also having indulged in acts of forgery, all for the purpose of monetary gain. The offences in Crime No. 106/96 also include charges under the Prevention of Corruption Act, on disproportionate assets being disclosed. 13. Powers of police to investigate offences are clearly set out in section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment in the case of Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) (supra) shows that the right of the police to further investigations is not exhausted and the police can exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information comes to light. There is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure which expressly or by necessary implication bars the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permits repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In the present case, the fresh facts on which the application for reinvestigation of the case was made, have been set out in the writ petition and upheld by this Court by its order dated 24th April, 2001, clearly indicating that the Notifications were illegally issued. The facts of the case do not call for interference with the impugned order of the JMFC and it cannot be said that there would be failure of justice if the police are allowed to re-investigate the case. The petitioner will have his remedy before the trial Court if no legal evidence is brought on record. But as things stand today, the investigation is nearing completion, the petitioner, on re-opening of investigation, was arrested and released on bail The question, therefore of granting the present petition and interfering with the order of the Magistrate even if illegal, does not arise. Hence, the petition is dismissed and disposed of. Rule discharged. But as things stand today, the investigation is nearing completion, the petitioner, on re-opening of investigation, was arrested and released on bail The question, therefore of granting the present petition and interfering with the order of the Magistrate even if illegal, does not arise. Hence, the petition is dismissed and disposed of. Rule discharged. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----