JUDGMENT S.P. Khare, J. 1. This is a second appeal by defendant No. 2 Puhap Singh alias Shambhu Prasad under Section 100, CPC. The following substantial question of law was formulated by this Court by order dated 26-8-1989 at the time of admission of this appeal: "Whether the case decided on the basis of special Oath Act which has been repealed, the judgment and decree is rendered a nullity ?" 2. The facts relevant for the decision of the question referred to above are that Nain Singh filed the suit for declaration of his title and joint possession in the lands in dispute. The plaintiff's claim was that he was legitimate son of defendant No. 2 Puhap Singh alias Shambhu and therefore, he was also entitled to these lands. The defendant Nos. 1 to 10 filed the written statement. They admitted in para 6 of the written statement that Parvatibai was married wife of defendant No. 2 Puhap Singh alias Shambhu Prasad but it was pleaded that after 2-3 months of her marriage she went to her father's place and lived there for one year and plaintiff Nain Singh was born to her during this period. She came to the house of the defendant No. 2 at the time of the death of his father in the month of Phalgun and at that time she was pregnant. She gave birth to Nain Singh in the month of Bhado in his house. In the written statement an offer was made on behalf of the defendants that even now if Parvatibai says in the Court by holding Gangajal and Ramayan that Nain Singh is son of Shambhu he is prepared to accept him. ;fn vHkh Hkh ikoZrhckbZ xaxkyky vkSj jkek;.k mBkdj vnkyr esa ;g dg nsa fd uSuflag 'kEHkw dk iq= gS rks og 'kEHkw mls Lohdkj djus dks rS;kj gSA 3. Several issues were framed on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. Issue No. 1 was on the point whether the plaintiff is son of defendant. No. 2 Puhap Singh. The case was fixed for evidence of both the sides on 4-7-1975 and the witnesses of both the sides were present. Parvatibai was also present as a witness of the plaintiff. Counsel for the plaintiff expressed before the Court that Parvatibai is prepared to accept the offer of the defendants in para 6 of the written statement. The case was fixed for evidence of both the sides on 4-7-1975 and the witnesses of both the sides were present. Parvatibai was also present as a witness of the plaintiff. Counsel for the plaintiff expressed before the Court that Parvatibai is prepared to accept the offer of the defendants in para 6 of the written statement. Parvatibai was called in the Court and para 6 of the written statement was read over to her. She expressed willingness to abide by it. By holding a Ramayan and Gangajal she made her statement before the Court. Thereafter, both sides expressed that they do not wish to lead any further evidence. The statement made by Parvatibai is as under :-- ^^eSa gkFk esa yh gqbZ jkek;.k o xaxkty dh dle [kkdj dgrh gw mifLFkr U;k;ky; uSuflag mifLfkr U;k;ky; 'kEHkw mQZ iksgi flag dk iq= gS tks esjs xHkZ ls iSnk gqvk gSA** 4. The Trial Court on the basis of the unchallenged testimony of Parvatibai held that plaintiff Nain Singh is son of Puhap Singh alias Shambhu Prasad and decreed the suit for declaration of title and joint possession. 5. Puhap Singh filed the first appeal challenging the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. That appeal has been dismissed and therefore, he filed the present appeal before this Court. He died during the pendency of the appeal and, therefore, his legal representatives have been brought on record in his place. 6. It was brought to the notice of the First Appellate Court that the Oaths Act, 1873 which contained the provisions relating to special oath in Sections 9 to 12 was repealed by the Oaths Act, 1969 and there was no provision regarding the special oath in the new Act and therefore, the Trial Court could not legally administer special oath to Parvatibai and decide the suit on the basis of such oath. The First Appellate Court took the view that defendant No. 2 Puhap Singh alias Shambhu Prasad was present in the Court when Parvatibai made the said statement and he must have been fully satisfied regarding the sanctity of her statement and for that reason it was expressed on behalf of the defendants that they do not want to lead any further evidence. It has been held that the Trial Court has rightly decreed the suit on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence on record. It has been held that the Trial Court has rightly decreed the suit on the basis of the pleadings and the evidence on record. It has been found that Puhap Singh as defendant No. 2 had admitted that Parvatibai was his wife and her marriage with him subsisted when Nain Singh was born to her. Therefore, the presumption under Section 112 of the Evidence Act was available and the burden was on defendant No. 2 Puhap Singh to prove non-access. He did not discharge that burden as he declined to give any evidence to prove non-access and he was satisfied with the statement of his wife Parvatibai. 7. It has been reiterated on behalf of the appellants before this Court that the Oaths Act, 1873 containing the provision of Special Oath stood repealed on the date Parvatibai was administered this oath by the Trial Court and, therefore, the entire exercise was without jurisdiction. After considering this argument this Court is unable to accept it. The offer made by the defendants in para 6 of the written statement, extracted above, was without any reference to the Oaths Act. That offer was accepted by the plaintiff. Parvatibai made a statement on oath in the manner desired by defendant No. 2 who was present in the Court. He must have been fully satisfied as to the statement made by Parvatibai and then it was expressed on behalf of the defendants, as noted in the order sheet by the Trial Court, that they do not wish to lead any other evidence. The defendant No. 2 must have been satisfied on this count that Parvatibai had conceived the child from him. The defendant No. 2 did not adduce any evidence to disprove non-access. Therefore, the finding which has been recorded is that the plaintiff is son of the defendant No. 2. The view taken by the First Appellate Court is reasonable and correct. 8. Recently this Court has exhaustively considered the legal position on Section 112 of the Evidence Act in Manjeet Singh Vs. Meena, 2001(2) MPHT 366 = 2001(2) MPLJ 455 . Therefore, the finding which has been recorded is that the plaintiff is son of the defendant No. 2. The view taken by the First Appellate Court is reasonable and correct. 8. Recently this Court has exhaustively considered the legal position on Section 112 of the Evidence Act in Manjeet Singh Vs. Meena, 2001(2) MPHT 366 = 2001(2) MPLJ 455 . The legal position has been summarised as under: "Section 112 of the Evidence Act provides that the fact that any person was born during the continuance of a valid marriage between his mother and any man, or within two hundred and eighty days of its dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried, shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate son of that man, unless it can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access to each other at any time when he could have been begotten. Thus the law presumes strongly in favour of legitimacy of the off-spring. A child born during the continuance of a valid marriage is legitimate unless non-access is proved by the husband. The proof of non-access must be strong, distinct, clear satisfactory and conclusive. Unless absence of access is established presumption of legitimacy cannot be displaced. In Venkateshwarlu Vs. Venkatanamyana AIR 1954 SC 176 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that the presumption, which Section 112 contemplates, is a conclusive presumption of law which can be displaced only by proof of the particular fact mentioned in the section, namely, non-access between the parties to the marriage at a time when according to the ordinary course of nature the husband could have been the father of the child. Access and non-access connote existence and non-existence of opportunities for marital intercourse. Non- access can be established not merely by positive or direct evidence; it can be proved undoubtedly like any other physical fact by evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which is relevant to the issue, though, as the presumption of legitimacy is highly favoured by law, it is necessary that proof of non- access must be clear and satisfactory. In Dukhtar Jahan Vs. Mohd. Farooq AIR 1987 SC 1049 . In Dukhtar Jahan Vs. Mohd. Farooq AIR 1987 SC 1049 . It has been observed that this rule of law based on the dictates of justice has always made the Courts incline towards upholding the legitimacy of a child unless the facts are so compulsive and clinching as to necessarily warrant a finding that the child could not at all have been begotten to the father and as such a legitimation of the child would result in rank injustice to the father. Courts have always desisted from lightly or hastily rendering a verdict and that too, on the basis of slender materials, which will have the effect of branding a child as a bastard and its mother an unchaste woman. Again in Gautam Kandu Vs. State of West Bengal AIR 1993 SC 2295 , it has been stated that Section 112 requires the party disputing the paternity to prove non-access in order to dispel the presumption. "Access" and "non-access" mean the existence or non-existence of opportunities for sexual intercourse; it does not mean actual cohabitation. It is a rebuttable presumption of law under Section 112 that a child born during the lawful wedlock is legitimate, and that access occurred between the parents. This presumption can only be displaced by a strong preponderance of evidence, and not by a mere balance of probabilities." 9. In the present case defendant No. 2 Puhap Singh was fully satisfied by the statement of Parvatibai and he expressed that he does not wish to adduce any evidence from his side. In the absence of any evidence of non-access the inference which naturally arose was that the plaintiff was son of Puhap Singh. He cannot be permitted to take somersault and retract the offer which he himself had made and argue that the special oath could not be administered to Parvatibai. The Oaths Act, 1873 had been repealed long back and the Oaths Act, 1969 does not contain any provision for special oath. The offer of the defendants in para 6 of the written statement was dehors provisions of the Oaths Act which was in force in 1975. The offer made by the defendant No. 2 was accepted by the plaintiff and that gave rise to an agreement between the parties which was acted upon. Such a compromise would be binding on the parties. The offer made by the defendant No. 2 was accepted by the plaintiff and that gave rise to an agreement between the parties which was acted upon. Such a compromise would be binding on the parties. It has been held by a Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Thakur Singh Vs. Inder Singh that the only effect of exclusion of Sections 9 to 12 of the Oaths Act, 1873 by Oaths Act, 1969 is that if any party to any judicial proceeding offers to be bound by any special oath and the Court thinks it fit to administer such an oath to the other party consenting thereto and such oath is taken by the other party, the evidence given on such oath as against persons who offered to be bound as aforesaid would no more be conclusive proof of the matter stated in such deposition. Where an agreement was arrived at between the counsel for parties that if the defendant were to take oath in a particular Gurdwara stating that the suit land was not of plaintiff and that defendant had not executed any agreement in favour of plaintiff, the suit of plaintiff be dismissed and in pursuance of the order of the Court on the basis of agreement, the defendant did take oath, there being no special oath either prescribed or taken, and the suit having been dismissed on the basis of such oath. Held that the compromise arrived at between the counsel for the plaintiff on behalf of his client and the defendant-appellant would be covered by Section 20 of the Evidence Act and the plaintiff would be bound by the statement made by the defendant if the same is found to have been made strictly in accordance with the terms offered by him. The matter is not left there. After the statement on oath made by Parvatibai the defendant No. 2 expressly stated that he does not wish to lead any evidence on that point. That rendered the statement of Parvatibai wholly unrebutted and it became of unimpeachable character. In J.A.M. Naidu Vs. K.S.P.T. Chettiar AIR 1977 Mad. 273 , a Division Bench of Madras High Court has also held that though Section 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 had been repealed, what was stated under special oath would not deprive its status as evidence. That rendered the statement of Parvatibai wholly unrebutted and it became of unimpeachable character. In J.A.M. Naidu Vs. K.S.P.T. Chettiar AIR 1977 Mad. 273 , a Division Bench of Madras High Court has also held that though Section 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 had been repealed, what was stated under special oath would not deprive its status as evidence. The two Courts below have rightly held on the basis of the material on record that the plaintiff is son of the defendant No. 2 and he has a right to joint possession of the land in dispute. 10. The appeal is dismissed. 11. Second Appeal dismissed.