Judgment : 1. The plaintiff is the petitioner. The plaintiff/ petitioner filed O.S.No.2996 of 1997 against the defendant for recovery of Rs.1,13,123.30 with interest. An ex parte decree was passed on 17.11.1997. The respondent filed two applications I.A.Nos.7480 and 7481 of 2000, one for stay of further proceedings pursuant to the ex parte decree and the other for condonation of delay in filing the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The delay was 868 days. The delay was condoned and the petitioner has filed these C.R.Ps. 2. Mr.G.Rajagopalan, senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the suit was originally filed in the High Court in 1984 as C.S.No.42 of 1984. On account of the change of the pecuniary jurisdiction, it was transferred to the City Court. It was adjourned from time to time and then posted in the special list. Since there was no representation on behalf of the respondent, they were set ex parte. The reason given by the respondent for the delay is not at all tenable and the respondent is Food Corporation of India, which is one of the largest litigants and there is no justification for them to have allowed the suit to go ex parte. It was nothing but indifference and, exercise of discretion in their favour, is not justified at all. He relied on the judgments reported in K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar (1992)2 L.W. 505 and Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalswamy Temple Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalswamy Temple Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalswamy Temple (1997)1 MLJ. 291 : (1997)1 L.W.276 and submitted that they are squarely on the point having arisen from cases which were transferred to the City Civil Court in similar circumstances as this case and where it was held that the delay ought not to be condoned. Therefore, according to the learned senior counsel, the lower Court erred in showing indulgence to the respondent. 3. Mr.Imtias, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Food Corporation of India submitted that the respondent had made out a case for non-appearance on the day of the ex parte decree and also for the delay in filing the application for setting aside the same. 3. Mr.Imtias, learned counsel appearing for the respondent Food Corporation of India submitted that the respondent had made out a case for non-appearance on the day of the ex parte decree and also for the delay in filing the application for setting aside the same. He submitted that it was undoubtedly true that numerous cases were transferred to the City Civil Court pursuant to the enhancement of the pecuniary jurisdiction and the Registry in the High Court also printed and posted on the notice board, lists of cases which have been transferred, to enable the counsel to take the necessary steps. He also admitted that no notice was necessary by the Transferee Court in cases of statutory transfer. However, in this case, for some reason, the suit was not transferred along with the other suits. It was an isolated transfer. Further, another suit which was filed before the City Court as O.S.No.5752 of 1983 against this respondent was transferred at the instance of the petitioner to be tried along with this suit, which was then pending on the High Court. Therefore, the other suit was transferred to the High Court and renumbered as C.S.No.479 of 1985 to be tried along with C.S.No.42 of 1984 (which was the original number of the present suit). This order suit is still pending in the High Court and had not been transferred. The pendency of this suit in the High Court as well as the transfer being an isolated transfer were bona fide reasons why the respondent was not present on the day when the ex parte decree was passed. He also submitted that the respondent Corporation was conducting very many cases and there was absolutely no reason for them to be different about this case. He also submitted that one other reason why there was some lapse in this matter was because the previous Panel lawyer for the respondent Corporation was elevated as a Judge of the High Court and therefore these cases came to be handled by other advocates. He further submitted that the Court below while exercising its discretion had rightly put the respondent on terms by directing payment of Rs.2,000 which is in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy (1999)1 MLJ. (S.C.) 114: (1998)7 S.C.C. 123 . He further submitted that the Court below while exercising its discretion had rightly put the respondent on terms by directing payment of Rs.2,000 which is in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy (1999)1 MLJ. (S.C.) 114: (1998)7 S.C.C. 123 . The learned counsel also submitted that when the cost was paid, it was received by the petitioner though without prejudice and such acceptance of cost estopped the petitioner from challenging the order. For this, the learned counsel relied on the decision reported in M/s. Fast Coal Services by Partners Radhamohan and another v. P.Shanthakumari M/s. Fast Coal Services by Partners Radhamohan and another v. P.Shanthakumari M/s. Fast Coal Services by Partners Radhamohan and another v. P.Shanthakumari (2000)1 MLJ. 506 . Learned counsel also submitted that normally when the lower Court exercises its discretion and finds that there is sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the High Court in revision ought not to interfere with the same. Therefore, he submitted that the order of the Court below must be confirmed. 4. I have gone through the affidavit filed in support of the application for condonation of delay. The defendant has stated that only when they received notice in the E.P. they realised that an ex parte decree was passed. It is also stated in the affidavit that only from the Court records, the respondent could ascertain what happened with the help of the present Panel advocate and that the respondent was bona fide under the impression that the case was still pending in the High Court. There was no reason for them to be negligent in conduct of the case. The petitioner on the other hand in their counter has submitted that the respondent being a major litigant, cannot claim ignorance of the statutory transfer and that there was no proper explanation for the delay and that the conduct of the respondent smacks of irresponsibility and negligence. The learned Judge, on the other hand, on a consideration of the material before him found on facts that the decision reported in Krishnammal v. Arulmighu Madanagopalswamy Temple (1997)1 MLJ. 291 : (1997)1 L.W. 276 and K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar (1992)2 L.W. 505 . did not apply to this case. The learned Judge, on the other hand, on a consideration of the material before him found on facts that the decision reported in Krishnammal v. Arulmighu Madanagopalswamy Temple (1997)1 MLJ. 291 : (1997)1 L.W. 276 and K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar (1992)2 L.W. 505 . did not apply to this case. He has also accepted the reasons given by the respondent that the pendency of the connected suit and the fact that the erstwhile panel advocate was elevated to be a Judge were acceptable reasons for the respondent not being aware of the transfer. Further, the learned counsel for the respondent had also submitted that this was not transferred during the time there was a mass transfer pursuant to the enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction. According to them, this was another reason why they could not follow up the case. In any event, the Court below appears to have accepted the reasons given by the respondent as being bona fide and has also come to the conclusion that there was no material to show that the respondent was interested in protracting the matter. 5. The Supreme Court decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent is right on the point. In that decision, it was held that, when the lower Court accepts the explanation for the delay as sufficient, then the Supreme Court should not disturb the finding much less in revisional jurisdiction, but when the Court of the first instance refuses to condone the delay, the Supreme Court can come to its own finding untrammelled by anything else. These are obviously different standards fixed for the two different situations. The same decision also gives the reason why: “The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time-limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause.” The Supreme Court also held that the refusal to condone the delay would result in foreclosing a suiter from putting forth his case. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in Krishnammal v. Arulmighu Madanagopalswamy Temple (1997)1 MLJ. 291 : (1997)1 L.W. 276 was not a case of statutory transfer. In that case, the suit was originally before the District Munsif, Ariyalur. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in Krishnammal v. Arulmighu Madanagopalswamy Temple (1997)1 MLJ. 291 : (1997)1 L.W. 276 was not a case of statutory transfer. In that case, the suit was originally before the District Munsif, Ariyalur. In the Transferee Court, the first call was on 16.3.1992 and Vakalat was filed on behalf of the plaintiff on the very same day. The Transferee Court had informed the respective counsel about the transfer of the suit, therefore, the learned Judge found that there is no explanation for the non-appearance of the defendant. The decision reported in K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan v. R.Thilak Kumar (1992)2 L.W. 505 . However is similar to this case since that was also an instance of delay occurring after the statutory transfer, but as rightly noted by the Court below, in that case, the learned Judge found on facts, that the defendant had ample knowledge of the proceedings, but however chose to come to the Court only in 1988. The learned Judge clearly came to the conclusion that the defendants case that he had no knowledge at all of the proceedings was false. There is no material in the instant case for us to hold that the case of the respondent corporation that they had no knowledge of the proceedings is false. Therefore, the Court below correctly came to the conclusion that those two decisions were distinguishable on facts. 6. Now, we come to the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent as to the effect of the acceptance of costs. In the case cited above the belated application filed by the tenant for setting aside the ex parte decree was allowed on payment of costs. The landlord accepted the costs under protest and filed the appeal thereafter. The learned Judge held that having accepted the costs, albeit under protest, the landlord was estopped from challenging the order. The learned Judge in that case had referred to several decisions with regard to the question, whether receipt of costs under protest will bar the party from questioning the correctness of the order. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that, that decision would not apply to this case. The learned Judge in that case had referred to several decisions with regard to the question, whether receipt of costs under protest will bar the party from questioning the correctness of the order. The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that, that decision would not apply to this case. That was a case where the landlord has accepted the costs, but here, the demand draft was sent by the respondent and it was received with the endorsement: “Plaintiff is filing revision. Received without prejudice”. The same demand draft was returned without encashing on 12.9.2000 stating that the Demand Draft is returned because the C.R.P. was admitted. So, according to the learned senior counsel, there was no receipt of costs at all. There was no retention of the demand draft for two months until the revision was admitted and therefore, that decision would not apply. 7. The effect of the respondent not returning the amount immediately, but returning it only after the revision was admitted is not quite the same as refusing to receive the costs. I ask myself the question: what would be the effect of the aforesaid decision on the instant case, if the respondent had paid cash instead and the petitioner had retained it until the C.R.P. was admitted and then returned it. I am not very sure that the stand taken by the learned senior counsel that the decision reported in M/s. Fast Cool Services v. P.Shanthakumari M/s. Fast Cool Services v. P.Shanthakumari M/s. Fast Cool Services v. P.Shanthakumari (2000)1 MLJ. 506 . will not apply to him is correct. But, since I am dismissing the C.R.P. following the decision of the Supreme Court reported in N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy N.Balakrishnan v. M.Krishnamurthy (1999)1 MLJ. (S.C.) 114: (1998)7 S.C.C. 123 on the ground that the exercise of discretion by the Court below is not so arbitrary or perverse as to be disturbed in revision, I will not answer that question. In the result, the C.R.P. is dismissed. No costs. C.M.P.Nos.11304 and 11305 of 2000 are closed.