JUDGMENT : DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J. 1. Rule. Returnable forthwith. The learned counsel for the First Respondent waives service. By consent, taken up for final hearing. 2. The Industrial Court has dismissed a complaint, being Complaint ULP No. 59 of 1999 filed under item 9 of Schedule IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (the “MRTU & PULP Act, 1971”), by its impugned order dated 12th October, 2000 on the ground that it was barred by limitation. The complaint arises out of a settlement entered into between the parties on 8th February, 1996. Under Clause (1) of the settlement which is annexed at Exh. A to the Petition, the workmen of the member employees of the First Respondent were to be paid an ad-hoc rise on the existing wages as on 31st December, 1993 with stipulated percentage increases during the period 1994 to 1998. The arrears for the year 1994 were to be paid on or before 31st March, 1996. Similarly, dates were prescribed for the payment of arrears for the period thereafter. In the complaint in paragraph 3(D), the following averment has been made: “The Complainant states and submits that the formula of percentage rise i.e. ad-hoc rise agreed in the Settlement dated 8.2.1996 clearly shows that while arriving at the percentages for the successive years, the wage for the month of January of the next year as a whole, should be considered and on that, the percentage rise should be worked out. However, the Respondents have not worked out the same for the year 1994, as a result of which the wages of the envelope workers have subsequently been calculated at the lower rates. As such, the Respondent has failed to implement the Settlement dated 8.2.1996 and thereby the Respondent is indulging in the unfair labour practices under Item 9 of the Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. The Complainant states and submits that on an average, the difference in wages is 12% and because of the failure of the Respondent to pay 12% ad-hoc rise amount there are further adverse repercussions on the wages of the workmen even for the subsequent years. This has caused grave prejudice and inconvenience to the envelope workers number to around 400/500. The Complainant states and submits that on an average, the difference in wages is 12% and because of the failure of the Respondent to pay 12% ad-hoc rise amount there are further adverse repercussions on the wages of the workmen even for the subsequent years. This has caused grave prejudice and inconvenience to the envelope workers number to around 400/500. The Complainant states and submits that the Respondents are engaging in and are continuing to engage in the unfair labour practices under Item 9 of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act. 1971 by their acts of failure to implement the Settlement dated 8.2.1996.” 3. A reading of the complaint would thus show that the case of the Petitioner was to the effect that since the First Respondent had not correctly worked out the wages from 1994, the wages which were payable for the subsequent years were also adversely affected, since what was payable for the subsequent years was computed on the basis of a percentage rise over the previous years' wages. The complaint was filed on 21st January, 1999. The Industrial Court by its impugned order dated 12th October, 2000, rejected the complaint as barred by time on the basis that since the arrears for 1994 were to be paid on or before 31st March, 1996, the period of limitation of 90 days would commence from 31st March, 1996. On this footing, the Industrial Court held that there was no explanation for the delay of two and half years in moving the complaint, and that, it was accordingly liable to be rejected. Under sub-section (1) of Section 28, the union is empowered to move a complaint of unfair labour practice before the competent Court within 90 days of the occurrence of the unfair labour practice. Under the proviso to sub-section (1), the Court may entertain a complaint after the expiry of the period of 90 days if good and sufficient reasons are shown by the complainant for the late filing of the complaint. In view of what has been set out earlier, it would be apparent that the reasons contained in the impugned order of the Industrial Court for rejecting the complaint on the ground of limitation are unsustainable. 4. In view of what has been set out earlier, it would be apparent that the reasons contained in the impugned order of the Industrial Court for rejecting the complaint on the ground of limitation are unsustainable. 4. If the complaint is carefully perused, particularly having regard to the averments in paragraph 3(D), it would be apparent that the grievance of the union was in regard to the manner in which the settlement had been implemented and, the case of the union was, that the improper fixation of wages for the year 1994 has prejudicially affected the revision for subsequent years. That being the position, I am of the view that the impugned order of the Industrial Court is unsustainable and is liable to be quashed and set aside. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the First Respondent, however, submitted that all the rights and contentions of the First Respondent may be kept open including the objection of the First Respondent to the effect that the aforesaid settlement on which reliance has been placed was never implemented by the parties. While allowing the present Petition, it is expressly clarified that all the rights and contentions of the respective parties are kept open and no view is expressed by this Court on the merits of the complaint. The Petition is accordingly made absolute in terms of prayer clause (a). The complaint will accordingly stand restored and be heard and disposed of on merits by the Industrial Court. 5. There shall be no order as to costs. 6. Parties to act on a copy of this order duly authenticated by the Associate of this Court on the payment of usual copying charges. 7. Petition Allowed.