D. K. SETH, J. ( 1 ) IN this application for contempt for violation of the order dated 7th December, 2000 passed by this Court in A. S. T. No. 4301 of 2000 (W. P. 22397), a preliminary point was taken on behalf of the alleged contemnor No. 1. that the contempt petition is not maintainable in view of infraction of rule 7 of the contempt Rule framed by this Court. Mr. P. K. Roy on behalf of the alleged contemnor No. 1 had relied on the decision in the case of Dr. Luis Proto Borbosa v. Union of India, AIR 1992 SC 1812 (para-89); Calcutta Corporation Teachers Association v. Calcutta Municipal Corporation 1993 (2) Cal HN 444 (para-4); Indian Airport Employees Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee (1999) 1 JT (SC) 213 : (1999 Cri L. J. 1332) (para-7, 11) in support of his contention. He also relied on rule 4,5,6,7 and 8 of the Contempt Rules. Pointing out from the pleading made out in the application he had submitted that it does not comply with the provisions of rule 7 of the Contempt Rules and the other rules as elaborated by him in course of his argument. However such elaboration would be dealt with at a later stage. ( 2 ) MR. Sibdas Banerjee on behalf of the petitioner on the other hand contends that the technicality cannot stand in the way when it appears to the court that there was a violation of the order of this Court. The preliminary duty of the petitioner is only to bring to the notice of the Court the alleged violation. The contempt is a matter between the Court and the alleged contemnor. According to him the decision cited by Mr. Roy are distinguishable. In as much as the earlier order passed in the earlier writ petition on 29/09/2000 in W. P. No. 18054 (W) of 2000 was also known to the alleged contemnor No. 1 and that the order dated 7/12/2000 was virtually a follow-up of the said order of which the alleged contemnor no. 1 was well aware. According to him the object of rule 4 and 7 is only to give opportunity to the alleged contemnor. But after having committed contempt one is not entitled to avoid the implication relying on the technicalities. 1 was well aware. According to him the object of rule 4 and 7 is only to give opportunity to the alleged contemnor. But after having committed contempt one is not entitled to avoid the implication relying on the technicalities. He has also relied on Pritam pal v. High Court of M. P. , AIR 1992 SC 904 : (1992 Cri LJ 1269); B. M. Bhattacharjee v. Russel Estate Corporation, AIR 1993 SC 1632 : (1993 Cri. L. J. 2251) and Bank of India v. Vijay Transport, (2000) 8 SCC 512 : (2001 Cri LJ 732) in support of his contention. ( 3 ) MR. Pratap Chatterjee, ld. Counsel for Sri Ashim Bhattacharya, who sought to intervene and was so permitted by this Court and added as a party in the contempt proceedings, submitted that his client is not responsible for any impropriety. Therefore, he cannot be affected by any order passed in these proceedings. Since no allegation has been made as against his client, no order which might visit Sri Ashim Bhattacharya with any unfavorable consequences can be passed. Court can punish the guilty, but not a third party. In such case the Court has a choice either to compensate the affected person or for a direction for seeking relief through a suit for specific performance. In the present case the subject matter not being an immovable property is capable of being compensated by money. He relied on the decision in the case of Attorney General v. Newspaper Publishing Company 1997 (3) All ER 159 at page 168 in support of his contention. ( 4 ) MR. P. K. Roy, on merit, had submitted that there is nothing from which a contumacious conduct on the part of the alleged contemnor No. 1 could be made out. According to him the interim order referred to an expression "in the mean time" which means the time between the date of the order and tilll 15th of January,2001. Thus there was a scope for being mislead. The alleged contemnor no. 1 had bona fide believed that the interim order was till 15th of January, 2001, in view of the expression 'in the meantime' used in the order. That apart the said order permitted the petitioner to carry on the ferry service with mechanised boats as recommended by Jadavpur University and IIT Kharagpur. The alleged contemnor no. 1 had bona fide believed that the interim order was till 15th of January, 2001, in view of the expression 'in the meantime' used in the order. That apart the said order permitted the petitioner to carry on the ferry service with mechanised boats as recommended by Jadavpur University and IIT Kharagpur. But the petitioner did not carry on the ferry service with mechanised boats as stipulated in the order dated 7th of December, 2000. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any benefit of the said order. Upon failure of the petitioner to comply with the said order the alleged contemnor No. 1 was entitled, in the public interest, to terminate the lease since it is the general public who are using the ferry service, would be suffering and that the lives of the passengers using the ferry service would be in danger. There was every likelihood of exposure of the passengers to disastrous result. He had also distinguished the decisions cited by Mr. Banerjee. However, at the intial stage Mr. Roy had pointed out that his client was tendering unqualified apology even if he is remotely connected with the alleged violation. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the alleged contemnors No 2 and 3 had pointed out that no allegation has since been made as against them. Therefore, their names should be expunged. ( 6 ) KHARDA Municipality and the Rishra Municipality are represented by their Learned Counsel through-out the hearing, though however none of the officers either of the Kharda Municipality or the Rishra Municipality has been made a party to the contempt proceedings. It does not appear from the pleadings that any material allegation of contumacious conduct has been made against either the Kharda Municipality or the Rishra Municipality. ( 7 ) NOTHING has been alleged as against the alleged contemnors No. 2 and 3. In the absence of any allegation as against the alleged contemnor No. 2 and 3 their presence in the proceedings is unnecessary. Their names, therefore, are expunged. ( 8 ) AT the behest of one Sri Ashim Bhattacharya, to whom the lease for ferry service has been given, sought to intervene in this proceedings. Leave was granted to intervene and Sri Ashim Bhattacharya was added as a party in the proceedings since his presence is necessary. In as much as in case the action of alleged contemnor no. Leave was granted to intervene and Sri Ashim Bhattacharya was added as a party in the proceedings since his presence is necessary. In as much as in case the action of alleged contemnor no. 1 is found illegal and if it is set aside, in that event, the right of the added respondent would be affected. Therefore, he has a right of hearing. In order to give him such opportunity he is brought on record and is so heard as observed earlier. However, no allegation of contempt was alleged against him in petition nor he was made a party to the proceedings. There is no question to examine if he was quilty of any contumacious conduct. His right of hearing is confined only to the question of consequential order, if there by any,which might affect his right. ( 9 ) HOWEVER, such question can be gone into only after it is decided that the order passed by the alleged contemnor no. 1 is held to be illegal and is set aside. Therefore, we may examine the other questions before embarking upon a decision on this question. ( 10 ) IN order to appreciate the situation it may be noted thathat the contempt petition having not been properly drafted there were some apparent infraction of Rule 7. Therefore, the ld. Advocate on Record for the petitioner was given opportunity to file supplementary affidavit. Accordingly supplementary affidavit has since been filed. Still then it seems that the pleadings are not very happy and that there might be reason to hold that there has been infraction of the rules framed by this Court relating to contempt proceedings and technically the contempt application may not be maintainable. ( 11 ) IT would not be necessary to enter into the said question if the Court finds that there are materials which spells out contumacious conduct on the part of the alleged contemnor in that event the Court has every right to proceed suo motu. In such case the Court cannot closed its eyes and be a silent on looker if its orders are flouted or violated deliberately and wilfully. If the Court has reason to believe that it was done wilfully and deliberately and to avoid certain consequences, then the Court has every right to activate its jurisdiction even suo motu, if occasion so demands. If the Court has reason to believe that it was done wilfully and deliberately and to avoid certain consequences, then the Court has every right to activate its jurisdiction even suo motu, if occasion so demands. Though there might be some substance in the submission of Mr. Roy that on technical grounds the petition may not be maintainable, yet it is not necessary to examine and scrutinise the said question in the facts and circumstances of the case and the Court may examine the situation for passing appropriate orders. ( 12 ) THAT apart rule 4 requires refernce to the contumacious conduct and similarly rule 5 requires statements to be supported by affidavit and rule 6 makes it obligatory to describe the particualrs of the materials upon which the petition is grounded and rule 7 requires precise statement of particulars of contumacious conduct in the prayer. It is this infraction of rule 7 that is being alleged. In fact, it was not properly spelt out in the prayer made in the contempt petition, even it could not be properly clarified by the supplementary affidavit. However,the petition being supported by affidavit and the alleged contumacious conduct and grounds having been spelt out, rules 5 ,4 and 6 respectively can not be said to have been infracted. ( 13 ) BUT however, in course of argument it appears that the alleged contemnor had understood the implication. In such circumstances of the case it appears that he was aware of the order. ( 14 ) IN order to appreciate the situation the facts of the cases may be referred to. The Municipality had held an auction for the ferry service for a period of three years in which the petitioner had bade for Rs. 3,50,000 towards lease rent for three years. In the said auction the erstwhile lessee Sri Chandranath Dutta had made an offer for Rs. 2,75,000. Instead of accepting the offer of the petitioner, the Municipality had invited the petitioner and the said Sri Chandranath Dutta for negotiation. Sri Chandranath Dutta had also agreed to enhance the bid to 3,50,000 and requested the petitioner to agree to divide the period between themselves of one and half year each. It is so evident from letter dated 19/03/1998 of the Municipality. The petitioner was asked to deposit 1,75,000 for the second term from 1/10/1999 till 31/03/2001. Sri Chandranath Dutta had also agreed to enhance the bid to 3,50,000 and requested the petitioner to agree to divide the period between themselves of one and half year each. It is so evident from letter dated 19/03/1998 of the Municipality. The petitioner was asked to deposit 1,75,000 for the second term from 1/10/1999 till 31/03/2001. the said Sri Chandranath Dutta had completed his term,but did not handover the ferry service to the petitoner. ( 15 ) THE petitioner had, therefore, to apporach this Court in writ petition No. 18725 (W) of 1999. In the said writ petition an interim order was granted on 30/08/1999 directing the petitioner to deposit Rs. 1,75,000 with the Rishra Municipality. Pursuant thereto the petitioner had depostied the said amount. The wirt petition was ultimately disposed of on 22/09/1999 directing the Municipality to permit the petitioner to run the ferry service. The Municipality preferred MAT 3454 of 1999, in which the identity of the petitioner having been questioned, the Appeal Court directed an investigation. In the investigation the identity of the petitioner was established. The matter after having been so remanded, by an order dated 7/06/2000 passed in the said W. P. No. 18725 (W) of 1999, this Court directed that the petitioner shall continue the ferry service for a period of one and half year. The Municipality preferred an appeal against the said order being MAT No. 2118 of 2000 since been disposed of the 18th of July 2000. In the said order the Municipality was directed to execute the lease within 15 days from making an application as Pravas Routh / Bhulana Routh to be handed over to the counsel for the Municapality. ( 16 ) ONLY pursuant to the order passed by the Appeal Court, the Municipality had handed over the ferry service to the petitioner. But thereafter some members of local Dawn family claimed to be the owner of the land from which the ferry sevice was operated for all these long years and had been attempting to prevent Municipality despite having been informed took no steps. On the other hand the Municipality attempted to grant lease of the ferry service to the Dawn family. In the earlier proceeding when the trial Court had passed an order in favour of the petitioner the Municipality had taken an unusual plea with regard to the indentity of the petitioner. On the other hand the Municipality attempted to grant lease of the ferry service to the Dawn family. In the earlier proceeding when the trial Court had passed an order in favour of the petitioner the Municipality had taken an unusual plea with regard to the indentity of the petitioner. The appeal Court directed the local police station to enquire into the matter particularly with regard to the identity of the petitioner. The police Authority had identified the petitioner and then the agreement was executed pursuant to the order of the appeal Court which affirmed the order dated 7/06/2000 passed in W. P. No. 18725 (W) of 1999. ( 17 ) APPREHENDING that the Municipality will grant a lease to someone else by a writ petition being AST No. 3000 of 2000 was filed. In the said writ petition an interim order was granted on 19th September 2000, directing the Municipality not to grant lease to anyone else within two kilometers of the petitioner's ferry service. The said writ petition was ultimately disposed of on 26/09/2000 on the submission of the learned counsel for the Municipality that the Municipality was not going to grant any lease of the self-same ferry service to anyone else. ( 18 ) AFTER this order was passed the Dawn family episode was proped up. Therefore, writ petition No 18054 (W) 2000 was intiated on 29/09/2000 in which an interim order was granted on the same day to the extent that the Rishra Municipal will permit petitioner to run ferry from the new jetty and the Municipality was also directed to extend protection to the petitioner if sought for. Municipality was also granted liberty to seek police assistance for protecting the petitioner. The interim order was directed to Continue till 31st of December, 2000. ( 19 ) ON 28/11/2000 the Kharda Muncipality entered into the scene. A meeting was alleged to be held on 25th of October, 2000, in which the Rishra Municipality, the Kharda Municipality and the surface Transport Corporation had participated. In the said meeting it was held that the ferry is being operated from old bamboo jetties which is endangering the safety of the passengers. A meeting was alleged to be held on 25th of October, 2000, in which the Rishra Municipality, the Kharda Municipality and the surface Transport Corporation had participated. In the said meeting it was held that the ferry is being operated from old bamboo jetties which is endangering the safety of the passengers. Therefore, ferry service should be continued from the new jetty constructed by the Surface Transport Corporation and for that the petitioner would be permitted to run the ferry till 31st of March, 2001 and the balance amount deposited by the petitioner should be refunded and that the new lesses would be permitted to run the ferry service from 1st of April, 2001. Pursuant to the said meeting the Kharda Municipality had addressed a letter to the petitioner on 28th of November, 2000 and informed the petitioner that he was asked to send his consent to the resolution taken in the meeting held on 25/10/2000, and that the petitioner having not consented, he was assumed not to be interested to run mechanised ferry service, and therefore, the surface Transport Corporation shall be free to proceed in terms of the resolution taken in the said meeting. Against this letter writ petition No. 22397 (W) of 2000 was moved on 7th of December, 2000. In the said order the petitioner was directed to arrange operation of the ferry service by motor launch or mechanised boats of proven safety norms which he may purchase or hire within 15th of January, 2001. The Surface Transport Corporation was asked to complete the jetty on the Kharda side if not already completed. However, the respondent shall not allow anyone else to operate the ferry service in the intervening period the petitioner was asked to maintain such mechanised boats as recommended by Jadavpur University and Indian Institute of Technology, Kharagpur and shall be entitled to operate the ferry service by motor lauch on and from 15th of January, 2001. ( 20 ) IT is this order dated 7/12/2000 the violation whereof has been alleged. It is, therefore, beneficial to quote the said order for the purpose of appreciating the situation as hereafter :"the petitioner alleges that two modern jetties have been constructed one at Rishra and the other at Khardah by the West Bengal Surface Transport Corporation. ( 20 ) IT is this order dated 7/12/2000 the violation whereof has been alleged. It is, therefore, beneficial to quote the said order for the purpose of appreciating the situation as hereafter :"the petitioner alleges that two modern jetties have been constructed one at Rishra and the other at Khardah by the West Bengal Surface Transport Corporation. The surface Transport Corporation wants that the ferry services should be continued with modern mechanised vessels for which certain specification has been provided which is available by a brochure produced by Mr. Banerjee today which may be taken on record. With a view to implementing the scheme of the surface Transport Corporation, a meeting was convened by the Khardah Municipality in which the Chairman and other members of the Rishra Municipality and the members of West Bengal Surface Transport Corporation including the petitioner and the passenger association were present. Therein decision was taken that the newly constructed modern jetties should be put to public use. Mr. Banerjee contends that the modern jetties constructed on the Rishra side has since been handed over to the petitioner which is now being used. He prays that his client may be permitted to use the modern jetty constructed by West Bengal Surface Transport Corporation on the Khardah Side. In the said meeting, it is contended, that the petitioner was asked to give his consent but the petitioner did not given consent and therefore the respondents had been trying to induct some one else to operate the ferry though the period of the petitioner is yet to expire on 28th February, 2002. Mr. Ganguly, learned Counsel for the Khardah Municipality and Mr. Tarun Ray, learned Cousel for the Rishra Municipality, pray for time to file affidavit-in-opposition which they may file by 10/01/2001. Let this matter appear 'for order' on 18/01/2001 along with W. P. 18054 (W) of 2000. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case particularly in order to protect the safety of the passengers crossing the river, the petitioner shall arrange to operate the ferry service by Motor Launch of proven safety norms. He may either procure through purchase or by hire and shall put the same to use within 15/01/2001 positively. The Surface Transport Corporation shall also ensure the completion of the jetty on the Khardah Side for the purpose of operation of the ferry service, if not already completed. He may either procure through purchase or by hire and shall put the same to use within 15/01/2001 positively. The Surface Transport Corporation shall also ensure the completion of the jetty on the Khardah Side for the purpose of operation of the ferry service, if not already completed. It is contended by Mr. Banerjee that the floating jetty on the Khardah Side is yet to be commissioned. The respondents concerned shall ensure commissioning of such floating jetty before 15/01/2001 at least by 14/01/2001. In the meantime, however, the repsondent shall not allow any one else to operate the ferry service. During the intervening period the petitioner shall use such mechanised boats which have been recommended by the expert of the Jadavpur University and the Indian Istitute of Technology, Kharagpur as is appearing from the said brochure keeping in view the safety of the passengers. The petitioner shall not be entitled to use mechanised country boat or country boats hereafter subject to the reokacenebt of such mechanisedboats by motor launch on and from 15/01/2001. " ( 21 ) ON 19th March, 2001 the contract was awarded to Sri Ashim Bhattacharya by the surface Transport Corporation. Thereupon this contempt application was filed alleging violation of the order dated 7/12/2000. ( 22 ) ADMITTEDLY, the lease was for a period of 3 years which was due to expire on 31/03/2001. Despite the petitioner being the highest bidder the Rishra Municipality purportedly went out of its way to help the erstwhile lessee Sri Chandranath Dutta and negotiated. The negotiation should normally be to secure a bid higher than Rs. 3,50,000. But it was not so done. It seems that the negotiation was only to help out the said Sri Chandranath Dutta who seems to be a favoured child of the Municipality. In the negotiation Sri Chandranath Dutta was allowed to raise his bid to Rs. 3,50,000 the same amount as was bade by the petitioner. Thus it appears it was only to help Sri Chandranath Dutta the petitioner was deprived of his right despite having been the highest bidder. Through the said negotiation Sri Chandranath Dutta was given the 1st half of the period of 3 years. But when the petitioner's term came the Municipality was not interested in giving it to the petitioner. The ferry service was not given to the petitioner. He had approach this Court. Through the said negotiation Sri Chandranath Dutta was given the 1st half of the period of 3 years. But when the petitioner's term came the Municipality was not interested in giving it to the petitioner. The ferry service was not given to the petitioner. He had approach this Court. All possible ways and means were explored to provent the petitioner from enjoying the benefit of the bid, even by disputing the identity of the petitioner with whom the Municipality had negotiated. Then it took the help of Khardah Municipality when it found itself cornered by reason of the order passed by this Court and the appeal Court. Before this Court however the Municipality had pointed out that they are not interested in granting lease to anyone else. Even thereafter one Dawn family was proped up and then a meeting was called on and Khardah Municipality was brought in the picture along with Surface Transport Corporation. Despite the lease having been granted, only in a meeting petitioner was asked to give consent to give up his right and the same was sought to be terminated by granting lease to someone else, through Surface Transport Corporation. Even in the meeting, it was proposed that the petitioner would be continuing till 31st of March, 2001, but then on 19th of March, 2001 contract was awarded to Sri Ashim Bhattacharya. The Khardah Municipality, Rishra Municipality and Surface Transport Corporation all were parties in the successive writ petition. Two of the writ petitioners are still pending. The letter dated 28th Novermber, 2001 was purported to be issued when the earlier writ petition was pending and the interim order granted in the earlier writ petition was continuing till 31st of December, 2000, and by reason or order dated 7/06/2000 passed in W. P. No. 18725 (W) of 1999 the petitioner was entitled to continue till 28th February, 2002. The 7/12/2000 order, however, does not specify any time. The facts were known to the alleged contemnor. ( 23 ) THIS is a case where a well thought- out plan has been chalked out which is apparent from the facts disclosed that the Municipality was determined not to allow the petitioner to run on the ferry service and intended to frustrate the orders passed by this Court. The facts were known to the alleged contemnor. ( 23 ) THIS is a case where a well thought- out plan has been chalked out which is apparent from the facts disclosed that the Municipality was determined not to allow the petitioner to run on the ferry service and intended to frustrate the orders passed by this Court. Therefore, the Rishra Municipality sought to induct and take the help of Khardah Municipality and the Surface Transport Corporation In order ot avoid their responsiblity it seems that they had made the Surface Transport Corporation a scapegoat. It was open for all the three parties to ask for variation or modification of the order from the Court. Instead of doing so they purported to mainpulate the matter with a view to avoid the interim order passed by this Court and frustrate the order passed by the Appeal Court. ( 24 ) THE situation is as such that the Court has to lift the veil. It is a fit case where the principle of piercing the veil is to be invoked. Though however,the contempt petition has not been happily drafted yet the Court in its jurisdiction to furnish for contempt may examine the facts, when it has reason to believe that the parties had sought to over-reach the Court. Therefore, I propose to lift the veil to find out what is real. ( 25 ) AS discussed above, it appears that the Municipalities had invented a well-laid plan to ease out the petitioner, what they had been trying right from the moment when the petitioner was the highest bidder. Even sometimes going out of its way. The Rishra Minicipality had no business to negotiate when the petitioner was the highest bidder. The entire three year period ought to have been given to the petitioner. In case, he failed to deposit the bid money within the time stipulated it could have awarded the contract to the said Sri Chandranath Dutta who was the next highest bidder. There was nothing to negotiate without enhancing the bid above 3. 5 lakhs and distributor the period to the petitioner and Sri Chandranath Dutta who is presumably the favoured child of the Municipality. Then again by one way or other the petitioner was prevented from operating the ferry. Despite orders of Court, direct or indirect attempts were made to prevent the petitioner from operating ther ferry service. 5 lakhs and distributor the period to the petitioner and Sri Chandranath Dutta who is presumably the favoured child of the Municipality. Then again by one way or other the petitioner was prevented from operating the ferry. Despite orders of Court, direct or indirect attempts were made to prevent the petitioner from operating ther ferry service. Various enginuous modes and methods have been invented in cooperation with Kharda Municipality and the Surface Transport Corporation. ( 26 ) THE ferry was municipal ferry service. Therefore, it can be controlled only by the Municipality. When a lease is already granted and is valid till 28th of February, 2002 and is subject matter of pending writ petitions not one but two, and in which the Courts had found that the petitioner is admittedly entitled to continue till 28th February, 2002 and in order to protect such interest passed appropriate orders, no one can interfere with the same. At one point of time the Rishra Municipality had given the Court to understand that the petitioner will be permitted to continue till the end of the period for which no specific order was passed. Thus it seems that the municipality had played a game with the Court in order to lead the Court not to pass any order to protect the petitioner's entitlement and then to take advantage of the situation in the manner as discussed above. It is the Municipality who can only terminate the lease and that too after holding an appropriate proceedings giving an opportunity to the petitioner. Then again when the matter is sub-judice and pending before the Court had been granting interim orders from time to time, and so long the order dated 7/06/2000 is not recalled, it could not at all have been done. Even it could have been done, it could be with the leave of the Court. The Surface Transport Corporation cannot usurp the power of grant of lease of a municipal ferry service until through proper legislation or other wise such right is taken away from the municipality and is vested in the State and the delegated to the Sruface Transport Cooperation. There is nothing to show that the right of the municipality to award the lease in repsect of the municipal ferry service was every terminated and taken over by the State and delegation to the Surface Transport Corporation. There is nothing to show that the right of the municipality to award the lease in repsect of the municipal ferry service was every terminated and taken over by the State and delegation to the Surface Transport Corporation. Then again such step could not have been taken when the lease is valid till 28th Febrruary, 2002 and is sub-judice before this Court. ( 27 ) IT is further alleged that the petitioner was not carrying out the ferry service in terms of the order dated 7/12/2000 after 15/01/2001,therefore, the Surface Transport Corporation was compelled to terminate the lease and grant it to Sri Ashim Bhattacharya. But there is nothing to show that the petitioner was ever given any opportunity before terminating the lease after having alleged that he was not complying with the terms stipulated in the order dated 7/12/2000. At the same time, there is nothing to show that any auction was held before handing over the ferry service to Sri Ashim Bhattacharya apart from the question jurisdiction of the Surface Transport Corporation either to terminate the lease or to grant the lease in respect of a municipal ferry service. ( 28 ) IT is also not contended that while awarding the contract to Sri Ashim Bhattacharya the Surface Transport Corporation had held any auction. Such grant of lease is a largesse. It can be granted only after a properly held public auction or tender and not otherwise, as is held in Om Prakash Tiwari v. District Magistrate : 1995 (3) All W C 1524 : 1996 All L J 371 : (AIR 1996 Allahabad 115) relying on Ramanna Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628 : 1979 (3) SCC 489 ; Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana : AIR 1985 SC 1147 ; 1985 (3) SCC 267 Committee of Management Pachatyappa's Trust v. Official Trustee of Madras : (1994) 1 SCC 475 : (1994 AIR SCW 1484 ). In the present case nothing has been disclosed that any such auction was ever held before the contract was awarded to the said Sri Ashim Bhattacharya. Thus, it appears that the said Surface Transport Corporation had also not acted legally and bona fide, apart from acting without jurisdiction. ( 29 ) THE pleading of ignorance and misunderstanding by the alleged contemnor No. 1 has to be examined in this background. Thus, it appears that the said Surface Transport Corporation had also not acted legally and bona fide, apart from acting without jurisdiction. ( 29 ) THE pleading of ignorance and misunderstanding by the alleged contemnor No. 1 has to be examined in this background. The pleading with regard to the technicalities is also required to be examined in such context and the circumstances of the case. ( 30 ) THE word " in the mean time" has to be interpreted having regard to the context of the order. In the order dated 7th December,2000 it was recorded that the said order was passed having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case which included the writ petitioner's right to carry on the service till 28th February, 2002. The petitioner was granted liberty till 15th of January, 2001 within which he had to carry on the ferry service through the newly constructed jetty by motor launch replacing mechanised boats. Thus the petitioner was to carry on the ferry service after 15th of January, 2001 with motor launch. Therefore the expression "in the mean time has to be construed having regard to the fact that the lease is valid till 28th February, 2002 and the petitioner was to carry on the said service with motor launch on and from 15/01/2001 and he could do so till 28th February,2002. Thus, the expression "in the mean time" has to be read in the context in whihc the order was passed having regard to the earlier procedings where the petitioner apprehended that the lease would be granted to somebody else and which had come true by such grant to Sri Ashim Bhattacharya. The expression "in the mean time"cannot be interpreted out of context. In any event there was nothing to empower the Surface Transport Department to terminate the lease of the petitioner or to award contract to Sri Ashim Battacharya without holding public auction particularly when the lease of the petitioner was not terminated and was still subsisting. ( 31 ) THE principal laid down in the case of Dr. L. P. Borbosa v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1812 and Calcutta Corporation. 1993 (2) Cal. HN 444 (D. B.) are well settled principles of law. There cannot be any two opinion about the same. But every case is to be decided on the basis of its own peculiar facts and circumstances. L. P. Borbosa v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1812 and Calcutta Corporation. 1993 (2) Cal. HN 444 (D. B.) are well settled principles of law. There cannot be any two opinion about the same. But every case is to be decided on the basis of its own peculiar facts and circumstances. If limited meaning is ascribed to the expression "in the mean time" used in the order dated 7th of December, 2000, in that event the other parts of the order by which the petitioner was to carry on the service through motor launch after 15/01/2001 would become infructuous, irrelevant and without any purpose and meaning. An interpretation which does not advance the purpose and object in the context of the order, cannot be accepted. Interpretation which will be in consonance with the object, purpose and context of the order is to be preferred. The said expression has to be understood in the context of the order read as a whole giving each part of the order the meaningful interpretation. The same cannot be interpreted out of context frustrating the order altogether. ( 32 ) IN Calcutta Corporation Teachers (1993 (2) Cal. HN 444) (supra) it was held that whether the two construction is capable, if one construction is accepted by the contemnor,in that event, he cannot be said to have committed contempt. But such construction is to be found out from the order itself. As discussed above in the presence case it was difficult to find out two construction. The order proceeded on the basis that the lease was valid till 28th February, 2002 and the direction with regard to the manner in which the ferry service is to be carried out till 15/01/2001 and thereafter. the issue between the parties in the writ petition was with regard to the right of the petitioner to carry on the lease till the entire period which was being obstructed by the repsondents and which was the apprehension of the petitioner. This apprehension which the Court had sought to protect. Therefore, in that event, having regard to the order that was passed it cannot be said that it was capable of two construction if it is read as a whole, particualrly when at one point of time one of the parties had contend that grant of any other lease was not contemplated. Therefore, in that event, having regard to the order that was passed it cannot be said that it was capable of two construction if it is read as a whole, particualrly when at one point of time one of the parties had contend that grant of any other lease was not contemplated. ( 33 ) IN Indian Airports Employees Union v. Ranjan Chatterjee (surpa) AIR 1999 SC 880 (1999) 1 J. T. (SC) 213 : (1999 Cri L. J. 1332) in the Supreme Court held that if an action is based on a bona fide interpretation of the order of the Court, in that event, it cannot amount to contempt. But this decision has no manner of application for the reasons as discussed here in above. In as much as the alleged interpretation could not have been done bona fide. 33a. The Court cannnot be an idle onlooker when it finds that the process of dispensing justice is interfered with and that the orders of this Court have been thrown to the winds in order to steal a march over the Court or in order to over-reach the judicial system. In such case even if technicalities stands in the way the Court is not supposed to spare such persons who are guilty of over-reaching the Court. It is open to the Court even to take suo motu notice of the situation and initiate appropriate proceedings for the purpose. But, however, whether the Court initiates such proceedings or takes any steps to punish for contempt or not, the Court cannot permit the situation which has been obtained by over-reaching the Court to continue. The Court must ensure that justice is done and set things right. It cannot permit an illegality to continue. When the Court is of opinion that there is an illegality even when it does not invoke its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, it has to restore the position and set aside the action of the alleged contemnor that had stood in the way of dispensing justice. Reference may be made to Arun Kumar Ghosh v. State of W. B. and Ors. W. P. No. 693 of 2000 disposed of on 12/06/2001 (reported in 2001 (2) Cal. H. N. 589) : State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma (1996) 2 Serv. Reference may be made to Arun Kumar Ghosh v. State of W. B. and Ors. W. P. No. 693 of 2000 disposed of on 12/06/2001 (reported in 2001 (2) Cal. H. N. 589) : State of Himachal Pradesh v. Suresh Kumar Verma (1996) 2 Serv. SLR 321 : ( AIR 1996 SC 1565 ) and Surinder Singh Jaswal v. State of J and K , (1996) 6 J. T. (SC) 725 : ( AIR 1996 SC 2775 ) and Union of India v. Kirloskar Pneumatic Co. (1996) 5 JT (SC) 26 : ( AIR 1996 SC 3285 ). ( 34 ) COURT can not allow to turnish the majesty of Law. In Dhananajay Sharma v. State of Haryana AIR 1995 SC 1795 the Apex Court had held that any conduct, which has the tendency to interfere with the administration of justice or the due course of judicial proceeding, amounts to the commission of contempt. The due process of law cannot be permitted to be slighted nor the majesty of law be made a mockery by such acts or conduct on the part of the parties to the litigation. Anyone who makes an attempt to impede or undermine or obstruct the free flow of the unsoiled stream of justice commits contempt of the Court and render himself liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act. If the action aims striking a blow at the Rule of law and has the tendency to shake public confidence in judicial institutions, no Court can ignore such conduct because the very structrue of an ordered life is put at stake. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned. ( 35 ) IF anything is done with oblique motive the same is interference withthe administration of justice. It would be a great public disaster if the fountain of justice is allowed to be poisoned. ( 35 ) IF anything is done with oblique motive the same is interference withthe administration of justice. In Chandra Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421 : (1994 AIR SCW 4994) it was held that contempt jurisdiction has been conferred on superior courts not only to preserve the majesty of law by taking appropriate action against one, however, high he may be, violates the Court's order, but also to keep the stream of justice clear and pure, so that purity of court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State and the parties which approach the court to receive justice do not have to wade through dirty and polluted water before entering that temple, relying on St. James Evening Post case (1742) 26 Er 683; Attorney General v. Times Newspapers Ltd. , 1974 AC 273 : (1973) 3 All ER 54. It was further held in Chandra Shashi (Supra) that to enable the courts to ward off unjustified interference in their working, those who indulge in any Acts that amounts to interfernece to be appropriately dealt with without which it would not be possible for any Court to administer justice in the true sense and to the satisfaction of those who approach it in the hope that truth would ultimately prevail. Anyone who takes recourse to deflect the course of judicial proceeding or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interfers with the administration of justice, The word 'interfere' means in the context of the subject, any action which checks or hampers the functioning or hinders or tends to prevent the performance of duty. Obstruction of justice is to interpose obstacles or impediments or to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent the administration of justice. The purity of judical fermament are required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of courts environment, so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Such persons are reuqired to be properly dealt with not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similiaracts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice. Such persons are reuqired to be properly dealt with not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similiaracts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice. ( 36 ) IT is not known in exercise of what jurisdicion the alleged contemnor No. 1 had pruported to intervene with a valid lease of Municipal ferry service and vis a vis the judical process. It might be a case of victimisation due to certain extranuous influences exercised over the alleged contemnor No. 1 from some interested corner, as was sought to be suggested by Mr. Banerjee. But the said facts having not come to light it is difficult to presume so. Thus, the fact remains that the alleged contemnor No. 1 having knowledge of the pendency of the writ petition and the orders, had deleberately acted in violation thereof the alleged pleading of ignorance does not seem to be bona-fide or acceptable. He happens to hold a very high post and is a responsible officer. He cannot sherk his repsonsibility. He cannot plead that he did not understand the implication of the order. In any event he had the advantage of legal advice. When he was a party to the proceedings, he should have sought legal advice before venturing to usurp certain power which he does not have and thereby violate the order of this Court. If he has done so he has done the same at his own peril. If he has done it under the influence of anyone else in that event it is for him to spell it out. But then he cannot plead so, when he happens to be a high officer, who is not supposed to be influenced by anyone else. Thus, in my view he is guilty of contumacious conduct. If he has done it under the influence of anyone else in that event it is for him to spell it out. But then he cannot plead so, when he happens to be a high officer, who is not supposed to be influenced by anyone else. Thus, in my view he is guilty of contumacious conduct. ( 37 ) HOWEVER, I do not propose to award him any punishment, but to sound a note of caution for him in future to be careful while dealing with orders of the Court and a note of warning for being a little more careful and take legal advice when he is not able to understand the order the punishment is not awarded because of the reason that the contempt petition was not properly drafted and that the contumacious conduct was not clearly spelt out in the petition and that the he had pleaded for pardon which is accepted, I also do not propose to reframe the same and hear out the matter once again. ( 38 ) IN Pritam Pal v. High Court of M. P. AIR 1992 SC 904 : (1992cri L. J. 1269) the Apex Court had held that the power of the Supreme Court and the High Court to punish for contempt is not restricted or trammelled by ordinary legislation However, such power is to be exercised sparingly. The procedure to be followed must be fair, Mr. Banerjee counsel for the petitioner had relied on this judgment in order to contend that the procedural irregularity or technical infraction cannot stand in the way when the Court finds that its process has been interfered with. The Apex Court in the said decision had held that the jurisdiction to punish for contempt cannot be trammelled by any law. The infraction of the rules is not a ground for the Court to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction when the Court is of the opinion that there are grounds for holding that its process have been interfered with. ( 39 ) REPLYING on Major General B. M. Bhattacharjee v. Russel Estates Corporation AIR 1993 SC 1632 : (1993 Cri. L. J. 2251) Mr Banerjee had contended that any kind of action which tends to interfere with the order passed by the Court makes a person liable for contempt. ( 39 ) REPLYING on Major General B. M. Bhattacharjee v. Russel Estates Corporation AIR 1993 SC 1632 : (1993 Cri. L. J. 2251) Mr Banerjee had contended that any kind of action which tends to interfere with the order passed by the Court makes a person liable for contempt. On the same analogy in this case the ettempt to frustrate it's orders also attracts the said principle. In Bank of India v. Vijay Transport, (2000) 8 SCC 512 : (2001 Cri. L. J. 732) the Apex Court had held that Court can derive its jurisdiction and derive its satisfaction as to Commission of contempt from the Circumstances of the case. In the said case the facts involved may inspire drawing of the same analogy with the present one where in substance the order of this Court is attempted to be frustrated. The manner in which the present case has been handled by the alleged contemnor No. 1 appears to have polluted the stream of justice by attempting to frustrate and in fact frustrating the order of this Court. ( 40 ) WHEN the order of this Court is sought to be interfered with the Court has every right to remove such interference and restore the order of this Court. Even if it may not punish for contempt, still then the Court can correct the situation. While exercising power under Article 215 this Court is a Court of records. Its jurisdiction cannot be restricted by reason of certain infraction of rules. However, if such correction or removal of interference affects someone, he cannot claim that his right is affected. If he has achieved some benefit out of it, it can be said that it was not due to him and that he had got certain undue advantage because someone else had interfered with the order of the Court. Therefore, he cannot press or establish any claim or right over the same. Therefore, the contention that the petitioner can be compensated by money cannot be sustained as advanced on behalf of such person who himself did not come through proper channel and had obtained some advantage on account of undue and illegal action of someone else. In that event, Court is not concerned with the consequences. When it's order are flouted it is the majesty of law that is to be upheld. No matter how it affects a third party. In that event, Court is not concerned with the consequences. When it's order are flouted it is the majesty of law that is to be upheld. No matter how it affects a third party. In such a case question of compensation is out of place. In as much as it would amount to showing the colour of money, which will further furnish the majesty of law. ( 41 ) IN Attorney General v. Newspaper Publishing Co. (1997) 3 ALL ER 159 at page 168 it was held that:" Where it was sought to impose indirect liability for contempt on a third party, it was not necessary to show that the administration of justice in the relevant proceedings had been wholly frustrated or rendered utterly futile; it was, however, necessary to show that there had been significant and adverse effect on the administration of justice. Since the restraints on freedom of expression should be no wider than were truly necessary in a democratic society, a third party's conduct which was inconsistent with an order of the Court in only a trivial or technical way should not expose him to conviction for contempt. In the instant case, the breaches of the order committed by the respondents were minor and did not amount to a significant interference with the administration of justice. Furthermore, the evidence showed that editor of the newspaper genuinely believed that the newspaper could properly publish extracts from documents quoted in the judgment of the Court without infringing any order it had made. Accordingly since neither the actus reus of contempt nor the requisite means rea had been established, the application would be dismissed. " ( 42 ) THE ratio decided therein points out that if there is something insignificant than a third party may not be punished for contempt but that is not a question whether his Civil right can be affected while removing the interference. Then again, it is not a case of insignificant nature. It is a case of grave consequences, which indicate a situation, if permitted to continue, it is not the sufferance either of the petitioner or the third party but the sufferance of the judicial system and the judiciary as a whole. It is the majesty of law that will be turnished. It is the stream of justice that will be polluted. It is the majesty of law that will be turnished. It is the stream of justice that will be polluted. It is the confidence of the people in the institution that will be shaken. It is the faith of the people to the judiciary that will be destructed. Therefore, if in case of significant nature, a third party can be punished, in excercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt, then it can very well affect the Civil right of a third party in removing the interference and restoring the process of justice while upholding the majesty of law. ( 43 ) IN Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami AIR, 1997 SC 1041 : 1997 AIR SCW 1035, the Apex Court had held that equitable jurisdiction of the High Court must be exercised, so as to prevent perpetration of legal fraud and promote and good faith. ( 44 ) THUS the Court is empowered to remove all obstacles andinterference in the Course of dispensing justice. It is the duty of the Court to restore its order whenever it appears to have been turnished or frustrated. It has to maintain the parity of the fountain of justice. It has to protect and shield its process and ward off all attacks assaults against it. ( 45 ) THE award of contract in favour of Sri Ashim Bhattacharya is an obstacle. It is an interference it has trunished the majesty of law. It has furstrated the order of this Court. It is contrary to and is in conflict with the order dated 7/06/2000 passed in W. P. No. 18725 (W) of 1999 read with order dated 18/07/2000 passed in M A T No. 2118 of 2000, the order dated 26/09/2000 in AST No. 3000 of 2000, the order dated 29th Septmber 2000 in W. P. No. 18054 (W) of 2000. It has interfered with and is in violation of the order dated 7/12/2000 passed in W. P. No. 22397 (W) of 2000. ( 46 ) THEREFORE, the award of contract or lease of ferry in favour of Sri Ashim Bhattacharya by the Surface Transport Corporation during the pendency of the two writ petitions without the leave of the Court particularly when the lease is valid till 28th of February, 2002 cannot be sustained and is hereby quashed and the status quo ante to a date prior to 19th of March, 2001 is restored. The petitioner shall be permitted to resume the ferry service without disturbing the ferry service even for a day. Shri Ashim Bhattacharya and the two Municipal Authorities viz : Rishra Municipality and Kharda Municipality and the Surface Transport Corporation, Corporation shall make all arrangement for handing over possession of the ferry service to the petitioner within 15 days from this date. The two municipalities Rishra and Kharda and the Surface Transport Corporation and Sri Ashim Bhattacharya and each of them shall ensure compliance of this order. The surface Transport Corporation shall allow the petitioner to operate the ferry service from the new jetty on either side of the ferry service by the petitioner till 28th February, 2002. In case any additional rate is chargable by the Surface Transport Corporation in that event the same may be negotiated and be imposed upon the petitioner with the leave of the Court. However, the petitioner shall make arrangement for operating the ferry service by motor launch or such other vessels as are being used by Sri Ashim Bhattacharya. The petitioner having been deprived of the service for this period from 19th March, 2001 till date he recommences his ferry service, the petitioner shall be entitled to damages at the proprotionate rate of the bid money for the period to be paid by the Surface Transport Corporation. The Surface Transport Corporation shall, however, be entitled to recover the said amount from the alleged contemnor who had taken upon himself a job which he ought not to have taken up. Such amount shall be recovered from the salary of the alleged contemnor no. 1 in 12 equal monthly installments or less till be continues his service, whichever is earlier. ( 47 ) HOWEVER, in case the petitioner is unable to press into service motor launch or such vessel which are now being used by Sri Ashim Bhattacharya, in that event, it will be open to the municipality concerned to initiate proceedings for terminating the lease of the petitioners but however, the final order could be passed only with the leave of the Court and not otherwise. However, the parties shall ensure that in the process of handing over charge or taking over charge of the ferry service, the ferry service shall not be disrupted except between the normal hour of closure of the ferry service and the opening of the ferry service the following day. However, the parties shall ensure that in the process of handing over charge or taking over charge of the ferry service, the ferry service shall not be disrupted except between the normal hour of closure of the ferry service and the opening of the ferry service the following day. The petitioner shall also maintain all safety norms. Any breach thereto should be brought to the notice of the Court, which will pass appropriate order as may deem fit and proper. ( 48 ) THE, contempt petition is thus disposed of. No cost. Order accordingly.