ORDER: The petitioners have filed this writ petition to quash the notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act to acquire the land of the petitioners comprised in T.S.No.14 of block No.27 of Ayanavaram village. 2. The notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act was published in the Gazette on 23.1.1985. The same was published in the locality on 16.3.1985. The petitioners filed the writ petition W.P.No.2739 of 1985 challenging the said notification. The writ petition was admitted and interim stay was granted as early as 27.3.1985. Subsequently the said order was modified by this Court by order dated 20.4.1987 making the interim stay granted already as absolute regarding the dispossession of the petitioners alone. There was no stay in other respects. After this the respondents have published the declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act on 11.5.1989. Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that even though the stay already granted had been restricted with regard to dispossession alone, the respondents did not publish the declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act within the stipulated period. As per the Proviso to Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act, if the publication is beyond the prescribed period, the acquisition proceedings is liable to be quashed. 3. So far as this question is concerned, the same had been decided by the Apex Court in the case reported in Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2000)3 M.L.J. (S.C.) 72: (2000)3 L.W. 366, wherein it has been held that even in case where the stay of delivery of possession alone was granted, still the period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing of the award. The learned Judges relied upon the judgment in Yusufbhai Noormohamed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, (1991)4 S.C.C. 531 , Snagappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, (1994)4 S.C.C. 145 and Government of Tamil Nadu v. Vasantha Bai, (1995)2 S.C.C. (Supp.) 423 and held as follows: “Thus, the position is now well settled that even when dispossession alone is stayed by the Court, the period during which such stay operates would stand excluded from the time fixed for passing the award, the expiry of which would render the acquisition proceedings lapsed. In the light of the said interpretation, it is now idle to contend that the Government is debarred from proceeding with the acquisition.” Hence the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot be countenanced. 4. However, the learned counsel for the petitioners represents that the petitioners residential house and other superstructures are in existence in the acquired portion and hence the respondents may be directed to exclude the land of the petitioners from the acquisition. 5. Such a request cannot be conceded. However, it is made clear that it is for the petitioners to approach the appropriate authority i.e., the government for exclusion of their land from the acquisition. On receipt of such representation within reasonable time the first respondent is directed to consider and dispose of the said representation on merits and in accordance with law. The writ petition is dismissed with the above direction.