JUDGMENT - Smt. K.K. BAAM, J.:---In view of the fact that the subject matter in issue is common in the three petitions, the same are disposed of by a common order. 2. The petitioners herein has filed the petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking an appropriate writ, direction or order directing respondent No. 1, the Hon'ble Speaker of the Legislature Assembly, to take up and/or decide the Disqualification Petition Nos. 1, 4 and 3 of 2000 expeditiously and within a time frame, for costs and other reliefs. 3. Apart from Writ Petition No. 173 of 2001, the petitioner herein has filed against the respondent No. 1 Hon'ble Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, two other petitions which are pending, that is, Writ Petition No. 172 of 2001 against Manohar Azgaonkar, i.e. respondent No. 2 Writ Petition No. 174 of 2001 against Sanjay Bandekar, i.e., respondent No. 2 and disqualification petition has also been filed against Ramkant Khalap. 4. The brief facts which have given rise to the filing of the petitions are stated as under :- On 9th November, 2000, the petitioner filed petitions for disqualification of the respondents No. 2 under the provisions of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution to the effect that the respondents No. 2 incurred the disqualification under paragraph 2(a) of the Tenth Schedule. On 24th November, 2000, notices were issued to the respondents No. 2 requiring them to furnish comments in writing on the petitions, to which respondents No. 2 sought two months' time to file their replies on the ground that as Ministers they were busy discharging their duties and further that they desired to engage lawyers to file replies on their behalf. Accordingly, on 1st December, 2000, one month's time was granted to the respondents No. 2 to file their replies. 5. By an application dated 11th December, 2000, the petitioner sought to recall the order dated 1st December, 2000 on the ground that sufficient cause had not been shown by the respondents No. 2 for seeking time to file their replies and that the respondents No. 2 were discharging their duties of Ministers when petitions for disqualification were pending and, according to the Rule, 7 days time was provided for filing replies. On 11th December, 2000 in response to the notice of the respondent No. 1, the Leader of the Indian National Congress filed his comments on the petitions and by order dated 14th December, 2000 the petitioner's application was rejected and the order granting respondents No. 2 one month's time was maintained. On 23rd December, 2000, the respondents No. 2 filed their replies to the petitions, to which the petitioner filed his rejoinder. 6. According to the petitioner, the pleadings were completed as far back as on 5th February 2001. However, no action was taken by the respondent No. 1, the disqualification petitions were not decided no heard, hence, an application was made by the petitioner on 9th March, 2001 seeking a direction that the petitions be fixed for hearing and be disposed of expeditiously as the respondents No. 2, who had to be disqualified, continued to be Ministers and participate in the Assembly Sessions where important business of the Government were taken up for consideration and decided. Another application was made by the petitioner on 9th April, 2001 reiterating the request for expeditious hearing of the disqualification petitions. As the matters were not heard, these petitions have been filed. 7. According to the petitioner, though the petitions for disqualification have been filed as far back as in November 2000, no action has been taken, the same have not been heard, as a result of which respondents No. 2, who are Ministers in the Cabinet headed by Mr. Manohar Parrikar which transacts important Government business, participate in the Assembly Sessions when petitions for their disqualification are pending hearing. 8. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the respondents No. 2 are also participating in the Budget Session though their right to continue as Ministers are not yet decided and should have been decided prior to the Budget Session where important issues involving public interest and finances were being agitated and considered. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that respondents No. 2 were not entitled to participate in this Session where important Government decisions were discussed and adopted as petitions for disqualification are filed and are pending against them. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that respondents No. 2 were not entitled to participate in this Session where important Government decisions were discussed and adopted as petitions for disqualification are filed and are pending against them. Relying on the decision in the case of (Brundaban Nayak v. Election Commission of India and another)1, as reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1892, it is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the significance of deciding the question of disqualification expeditiously even if the same being questioned at the instance of a citizen is necessary as the whole object of democratic elections is to constitute legislative chambers composed of members who are entitled to that status, and if any member forfeits that status by reason of subsequent disqualification, it is in public interest that the matter be decided expeditiously. It is the case of the petitioner that though the pleadings in the matters were completed in February 2001, respondent No. 1 has not conveyed any emergent inability with regard to the application of the petitioner to dispose of the matters exditiously. This action, therefore, is arbitrary, more particularly, when the rules framed by the Goa Legislative Assembly indicate that the petitions are to be disposed of as expeditiously as possible in keeping with the spirit of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The petitioner, therefore, has filed these petitions to seek the intervention of this Court to direct respondent No. 1, who is adjudging the matter as a Tribunal, to dispose of the disqualification petitions expeditiously or within a time frame. 9. So far as respondent No. 1 is concerned, it is urged by learned Advocate General that it is not that the respondent No. 1 is sitting pretty on this issue as the respondent No. 1 has taken action in the matters. On the applications of the respondents No. 2, extension of time was granted to the respondents No. 2 to file replies. Thereafter the petitioner has filed his rejoinder. According to the respondent No. 1, so far as these petitions are concerned, pleadings have been completed in March 2001. However, it is the case of respondent No. 1 that it is not that the respondent No. 1 is concerned only with these three petitions but in all there are 15 petitions for disqualifications pending adjudication before respondent No. 1. According to the respondent No. 1, so far as these petitions are concerned, pleadings have been completed in March 2001. However, it is the case of respondent No. 1 that it is not that the respondent No. 1 is concerned only with these three petitions but in all there are 15 petitions for disqualifications pending adjudication before respondent No. 1. Further, respondent No. 1, apart from deciding the disqualification petitions, being a Speaker, is required to attend to various other duties and matters of public importance. Respondent No. 1 has been busy with the Assembly Session. In view of the fact that there are several such disqualification petitions pending, it was not possible for the respondent No. 1 to decide the petitions independently, more particularly when disqualification petitions have been filed against 15 Members of the House and 3 them are Members of the Privilege Committee. 10. In the course of the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent No. 1 though affidavit-in-reply has not been filed, the learned Advocate General has stated across the Bar that the pleadings in respect of all disqualification petitions have been completed in June 2001. After this Sessions the respondent No. 1 will look into the matter and decide the petitions. The fact that there are several disqualification petitions filed, the contention urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 to the effect that he cannot take decision on one matter at a time in view of the various intricacies involved is of substance and we are convinced on this count. We are also convinced on this aspect that the respondent No. 1 has put the wheels of action in progress. However, in view of the fact that apart from deciding the issue pertaining to disqualification, being a Speaker, respondent No. 1 is also entrusted with the responsibility to attend to various other matters pertaining to the proceedings in the house. 11. It is vehemently urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that so far as these petitions are concerned, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 or 277 as the Speaker enjoys total immunity and the jurisdiction of the Court is barred in respect of matters which have not attained finality before the respondent No. 1. It is vehemently urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that so far as these petitions are concerned, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief under Article 226 or 277 as the Speaker enjoys total immunity and the jurisdiction of the Court is barred in respect of matters which have not attained finality before the respondent No. 1. It is also urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that all the proceedings concerning the decision of the Hon'ble Speaker under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution of India are deemed to be proceedings of the legislature of the State within the meaning of Article 212 as provided for in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule. 12. It is also contended on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that there is a limited scope of Judicial Review available on account of finality clause in Paragraph 6 and also having regard to the Constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power, that is, the Hon'ble Speaker. It is also urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that on judicial review is available at any stage prior to the making of a decision by the Hon'ble Speaker and a quia timet action would not be permissible, nor would any interference be permissible at any interlocutory stage, except in cases of interim disqualification or suspension during pendency of proceedings wherein such interim order would have grave, immediate and irreversible respercussions and consequences. 13. It is also urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that Article 226 cannot be used for securing an expedited hearing of the matter before the Hon'ble Speaker. It is urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that the petitioner was entitled to file an interim application before the Hon'ble Speaker or the petitioner being a Member of the House can move the House for amendment of the Rules with regard to the hearing of the petitions as also incorporating a time frame within which petitions for disqualification of Members are required to be decided. According to the respondent No. 1, the house is in Session. Nothing prevented the petitioner from seeking the remedy, which is constitutionally available to him. 14. We have heard arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents. According to the respondent No. 1, the house is in Session. Nothing prevented the petitioner from seeking the remedy, which is constitutionally available to him. 14. We have heard arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents. Reference is made to the members of the Goa Legislature Assembly (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Rules, 1986. The application have been made by the petitioner under Rule 6 of the Rules which requires that reference to the question as to whether a member has become subject to disqualification under the Tenth Schedule shall be made except by a petition in relation to such member in writing to the Speaker in accordance with the provision of Rule 6. Rule 6 provides the manner in which the petition is to be filed and the contents thereof, which if not complied with, respondent No. 1 is entitled to dismiss the petition and intimate the petitioner accordingly. As per Rule 7, which is the procedural Rule, it is provided therein under Rule 7(3)(b) that the member in relation to whom the petition has been made is required to file within 7 days of the receipt of such copies or within such further period as the Speaker may for sufficient cause allow, forward his comments thereon in writing to the Speaker. 15. It is apparent from the arguments advanced that the petitions filed by the petitioner, the Hon'ble Speaker, that is, the respondent No. 1, has forwarded the copies to the members in relation to whom the petitions have been made, that is, the respondents No. 2, who by applications dated 27th November, 2000 sought two months time to file the replies. On consideration of these applications on 1st December, 2000, one month's time was granted to the respondents No. 2 to reply which was challenged by the petitioner by an application dated 11th December, 2000 seeking to recall the order dated 1st December, 2000, which was rejected by order dated 14th December, 2000. It transpires that respondents No. 2 filed their replies on 23rd December, 2000. However, the petitioner herein filed his rejoinder on 5th February, 2001. It transpires that respondents No. 2 filed their replies on 23rd December, 2000. However, the petitioner herein filed his rejoinder on 5th February, 2001. Hence, though the petitioner has attributed delay to the learned Speaker respondent No. 1 and has also contended that the Speaker should decide the matter expeditiously, though the respondents No. 2 had filed their replies on 23rd December, 2000, the rejoinder was filed after a lapse of about 2 months. Bearing in mind the aforesaid dates, we are of the opinion that the learned Speaker respondent No. 1 has followed the procedure that he was required to follow. The matter is now required to be referred to the Privilege Committee. However, it is urged on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that out of 15 disqualification petitions, 3 are members of the Privilege Committee, which is required to be reconstituted for the purpose of making inquiry and determining the question as to the breach of the privilege of the house by a member, which results in the disqualification of the member under the Tenth Schedule. 16. On behalf of the respondents, reference is also invited to the provisions of the Tenth Schedule as to disqualification on the ground of defection. Provision 6(2) reads as under :- "All proceedings under sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph in relation to any question as to disqualification of a member of a house under this schedule shall be deemed to be proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of Article 122 or, as the case may be, proceedings in the legislature of a State within the meaning of Article 212." 17. From the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner and the respondents we are of the opinion that the issues that require to be determined are :- (1) Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief as prayed for in the petition under Articles 226 and 227? and (2) Whether the respondent No. 1 enjoys total immunity by virtue of it Constitutional status under Articles 211, 212(2) of the Constitution? Our answer to the issue are as under :- (1) Negative. (2) Affirmative. 18. A perusal of Article 226 enjoins upon the High Court a power to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari. Our answer to the issue are as under :- (1) Negative. (2) Affirmative. 18. A perusal of Article 226 enjoins upon the High Court a power to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition quo warranto and certiorari. The jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked under Article 226 not only for the enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement of any legal right and it is, therefore, urged on behalf of the petitioner that by virtue of the fact that the learned Speaker has not decided the matters, directions be given that the same be decided expeditiously or within a time frame particularly when the disqualification petitions No. 2, who are members of the Assembly and despite the petitions being pending against them have participated in the Assembly Sessions particularly the Budget Session where important decisions pertaining to the State Finance will be decided. 19. On behalf of the petitioner, reliance is placed upon Oxford Administrative Law, Eighth Edition by H.W.R. Wade and C.F. Forsyth as under :- "Where the duty is to reach a decision the order will usually be to hear and determine according to law, the law being indicated by the Court." 20. Reliance is placed on the following :- "A statutory duty must be performed without unreasonable delay, and this may be enforced by mandamus. Mandamus was granted on this ground against the Home Secretary when the Home Office insisted that a would-be immigrant who was legally entitled to enter the country 'without let or hindrance' should wait for over a year in the queue of applicants for entry certificates. Statutory duties are by no means always imposed by mandatory language with words such as 'shall' or 'must'." 21. It is, therefore, contended on behalf of the petitioner that a duty is cast upon the Speaker to adjudicate the issue expeditiously as possible or within a time frame. However, so far as the petitioner is concerned, he is not entitled to a mandamus or a direction as here the Speaker is given the power to determine the dispute. Till this date the Speaker has not passed any order. However, so far as the petitioner is concerned, he is not entitled to a mandamus or a direction as here the Speaker is given the power to determine the dispute. Till this date the Speaker has not passed any order. At this stage under Article 226 respondent No. 1 cannot be given the direction prayed for, more particularly, when the respondent No. 1 has complied with the procedural formalities and the proceedings under Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule are administrative in nature and deemed to be proceedings in Parliament within the meaning of Article 122 or, as the case may be, proceedings in legislature of a State within the meaning of Article 212 which proceedings cannot be inquired into nor supervised by the courts. 22. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that so far as the directions sought for by the petitioners are concerned, the said directions cannot be given as the same are not enforceable against respondent No. 1 and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to this relief. In the instant case we are of the opinion that the petitioner is not entitled to the relief which is in the nature of mandamus, which is discretionary and, more particularly, when the learned Speaker has followed the procedure and a statement has also been made on behalf of the learned Speaker, that is, respondent No. 1, by the learned Advocate General that after the Assembly Session is concluded the matters will be taken up for consideration. 23. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that the proceedings concerning the decision of the Hon'ble Speaker under the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution are proceedings as provided for in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule. It is also urged on behalf of the respondents that Articles 211 and 212(2) are complimentary and a restriction has been imposed under the Constitution on discussion in the legislature or inquiry into proceedings of the legislature. The proceedings in respect of which the petitioner seeks directions are the proceedings of the house in respect of which no interference can be called for at this stage and in respect of which the Speaker seeks absolute immunity. The proceedings in respect of which the petitioner seeks directions are the proceedings of the house in respect of which no interference can be called for at this stage and in respect of which the Speaker seeks absolute immunity. A perusal of Article 211 reflects that no discussion shall take place in the legislature of a State with respect to the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court in the discharge of his duties. A reference to Article 212 reflects an embargo on the courts to inquire into the proceedings of the legislature, more particularly, Article 212(2) which reads as under :- "No officer or member of the legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers." Under Article 212 the validity of any proceedings in the legislature of a State shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. The directions of the nature sought for cannot be granted by virtue of these provisions of the Constitution. Reference is also made to Articles 121 and 122 of the Constitution. Article 121 restricts the Parliament from having any discussion with respect to the conduct of any Judge of the Supreme Court or High Court in the discharge of his duties except upon a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for the removal of the Judge. Whereas Article 122 imposes a blanket ban on the courts not to inquire into the proceedings of the Parliament as under Article 122(1) it is provided that the validity of any proceedings in Parliament shall not be called in question on the ground of any alleged irregularity of procedure. Article 122(2) provides that no officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. Article 122(2) provides that no officer or member of Parliament in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in Parliament shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers. Reference is also made to the provision for disqualification of membership, which is Article 191 and Article 192 refers to the decision to be given on the question as to the disqualification of members which provides if any question arises as to whether a member of the House or member of the legislature of the State has become subject to any disqualification mentioned in Clause (1) of Article 191, the question shall be referred for the decision of the Governor and his decision shall be final. Clause (2) provides before giving any decision on any such question, the Governor shall obtain the opinion of the Election Commission and shall act according to such opinion. Hence, by virtue of these Constitutional provisions, we are of the opinion that, in view of the fact that by virtue of the Constitutional status enjoyed by the Speaker under the Constitution, so far as respondent No. 1 is concerned, he enjoys immunity by virtue of the fact that proceedings in respect of which the decision is sought are proceedings of the legislature within the meaning of Article 212. 24. On behalf of the petitioner, reliance is placed upon the ruling in (Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and others)2, 1992 Supp. (2) S.C.C. 651 to support the contention that the petitioner is entitled to file these applications. The question that fell for consideration amongst other questions was set out in paragraphs 24(E) and 24(H), which are as follows :- "24(E) That the deeming provision in Paragraph 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule attracts the immunity under Articles 122 and 212. The Speaker and the Chairman in relation to the exercise of the powers under the Tenth Schedule shall not be subjected to the jurisdiction of any Court. The Tenth Schedule seeks to and does create a new and non- justiciable area of rights, obligations and remedies to be resolved in the exclusive manner envisaged by the Constitution and is not amenable to, but constitutionally immune from, curial adjudicative processes. 24(H). The Tenth Schedule seeks to and does create a new and non- justiciable area of rights, obligations and remedies to be resolved in the exclusive manner envisaged by the Constitution and is not amenable to, but constitutionally immune from, curial adjudicative processes. 24(H). That even if Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule is held not to bring about a change or affect Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the amendment is unconstitutional as it erodes and destroys judicial review which is one of the basic features of the Constitution." Whilst deciding the issue it was observed :- "86. The cognate questions are whether a dispute of the kind envisaged by Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule is in a non-justiciable area and that, at all events, the fiction in Paragraph 6(2) that all proceedings under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule be deemed to be "proceedings in Parliament" or "proceedings in the legislature of a State" attracts immunity from the scrutiny by courts as under Article 122 or 212, as the case may be. 87. Implicit in the first of these postulates is the premise that questions of disqualification of members of the house are essentially matters pertaining to the constitution of the house, and therefore, the legislature is entitled to exert its exclusive power to the exclusion of the judicial power. This assumption is based on certain British legislature practices of the past in an area which is an impalpable congeries of legal rules and conventions peculiar to and characteristic of British Parliamentary traditions. Indeed, the idea appears to have started with the proposition that the Constitution of the house was itself a matter of privilege of the house. Halsbury contains this statement: '1493. Privilege of the House of Commons in relation to its Constitution.---In addition to possession a complete control over the regulation of its own proceedings and the conduct of its members, the house of Commons claims the exclusive right of providing as it may deem fit, for its own proper constitution'. (emphasis supplied). 88. Halsbury contains this statement: '1493. Privilege of the House of Commons in relation to its Constitution.---In addition to possession a complete control over the regulation of its own proceedings and the conduct of its members, the house of Commons claims the exclusive right of providing as it may deem fit, for its own proper constitution'. (emphasis supplied). 88. But in the Indian Constitutional dispensation the power to decide a disputed disqualification of an elected member of the house is not treated as a matter of privilege and the power to resolve such electoral disputes is clearly judicial and not legislative in nature." It was observed therein the power to decide disputed disqualification under Paragraph 6(1) is pre-eminently of a judicial complexion. Reliance is also placed upon the following observation :- "That apart, even after 1986 when the Tenth Schedule was introduced, the Constitution did not evince any intention to invoke Article 122 or 212 in the conduct of resolution of disputes as to the disqualification of members under Articles 191(1) and 102(1). The very deeming provision implies that the proceedings of disqualification are, in fact, not before the house but only before the Speaker as a specially designated authority. The decision under Paragraph 6(1) is not the decision of the house, nor is it subject to the approval by the house. The decision operates independently of the house. A deeming provision cannot by its creation transcend its own power. There is, therefore, no immunity under Articles 122 and 212 from judicial scrutiny of the decision of the speaker or Chairman exercising power under Paragraph 6(1) of the Tenth Schedule." 25. Taking support on the above ruling, it is urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Speaker or Chairman is a Tribunal. It is also observed therein:- "Where there is a lis.---An affirmation by one party and denial by another and the dispute necessarily involves a decision on the rights and obligations of the parties to it and the authority is called upon to decide it, there is an exercise of judicial power. That authority is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a Court." 26. That authority is called a Tribunal, if it does not have all the trappings of a Court." 26. However, so far as this ruling is concerned, the same would not apply to the facts of the present case nor assist the petitioner in seeking the relief, as the question that was considered here was a question of judicial review from the decision of the Speaker. Whether the same falls under the scope of 'judicial review' in this ruling it is observed :- "In view of the limited scope of judicial review that is available on account of the finality clause in Paragraph 6 and also having regard to the Constitutional intendment and the status of the repository of the adjudicatory power i.e. Speaker/Chairman, judicial review cannot be available at a stage prior to the making of a decision by the Speaker/Chairman and a quia timet action would not be permissible." It is also observed therein that interference would not be permissible at an interlocutory stage of the proceedings unless it falls within the category of cases where disqualification or suspension is imposed during the pendency of the proceedings, which would have grave, immediate and irreversible repercussions and consequences. Hence, we are of the opinion that so far as this ruling is concerned, the same would not apply to the facts of the present case nor the petitioner would be entitled to rely upon the same to seek the directions of the nature prayed for as judicial review is only against a final order of the Speaker and quia timet action is not permissible. Neither is interference permissible at the interlocutory stage of the petition. Neither has the petitioner been in a position to carve out any exceptions for interlocutory directions. 27. Reliance is placed on behalf of the petitioner in the ruling of (Dr. Kashinath G. Jalmi and another v. The Speaker and others)3, 1993(2) S.C.C. 703 wherein an observation is made that the question of disqualification of member should be decided as expeditiously as possible. However, the same is merely an observation and a passing reference, which does not bind the Court not can the petitioner seek any relief on this count. Further, we are of the opinion that petitioner has not been able to bring before us any material to show that there is any inaction on the part of the respondent No. 1. 28. Further, we are of the opinion that petitioner has not been able to bring before us any material to show that there is any inaction on the part of the respondent No. 1. 28. Reliance is also placed on behalf of the petitioner on the ruling in (Mayawati v. Markandeya Chand and others)4, A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 3340. However, so far as this ruling is concerned, the same refers to the scope of judicial review and, further, the same would not apply to the facts of the present case as there is not finality in this judgment by virtue of the fact that the matter has been referred to the Constitutional Bench for their decision. 29. On behalf of respondent No. 1, reliance has been placed upon the ruling in (M/s./ Narinder Chand Hem Raj and others v. Lt. Governor, Administrator, Union Territory, H.P. and others)5, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 2399 wherein it is observed :- "The power to impose tax being a legislative power can be exercised either by the legislature directly or by its delegate. But no Court can issue mandate to a legislature or a subordinate legislative body to enact or not to enact a law which it was competent to enact." Applying this principle it is urged on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to a writ or direction under Article 226 to the Speaker to dispose of the petitions within a time frame as is sought to be contended as there is no finality of the order. The same are proceedings pending before the house. That they are performing their duties and till the final decision is reached, the Court cannot interfere nor give directions. It is apparent that in this game of political cricket we cannot given directions of the nature sought for, more particularly, by virtue of the fact that Article 212(2) prohibits the Court from interfering with the proceedings of the legislature of the State on grounds of alleged irregularities of procedure. Neither can directions be given for regulating procedure or conduct of business or maintain order. Can this Court give any directions requiring the Speaker to exercise his powers within a particular period of time as these are proceedings before a house? We are of the opinion that the same does not warrant any interference or directions at this stage. Neither can directions be given for regulating procedure or conduct of business or maintain order. Can this Court give any directions requiring the Speaker to exercise his powers within a particular period of time as these are proceedings before a house? We are of the opinion that the same does not warrant any interference or directions at this stage. Further, as urged on behalf of the respondents, the petitioner being a member of the house, can move the house for seeking necessary relief and direction as it is a procedural relief sought, which he can avail of without resorting to a Court of law. 30. On behalf of the respondents reliance is placed in the ruling of (Shri Surendra Vassant Sirsat v. Legislative Assembly of State of Goa and others)6, 1996(2) Bom.C.R. 362 where the following questions arose for consideration :- "1(b)(i) Whether the proceedings of legislature concerning election of the Speaker by the legislature under the Chairmanship of Pro-tem Speaker amount to proceedings relating to conduct of business of the legislature and are protected under Article 212(1) of the Constitution of India? 3. Whether the respondents Nos. 2, 3 and 4 are entitled to Constitutional immunity from being sued under Article 212(2) of the Constitution of India?" It was observed therein that the validity of the proceedings in a legislature of a State cannot be called in question even if the same are unconstitutional or even if the same are illegal. The Advocates appearing on behalf of the respondents No. 2 have supported the arguments advanced on behalf of the respondents No. 1. 31. Hence, so far as the these petitions are concerned, we hold that the writ petitions are not maintainable. The petitioner is not entitled to any relief nor is the petitioner entitled to invoke Articles 226 and 227 at this stage relating to the procedure of the house and further, the same is barred under Articles 211 and 212 of the Constitution. 32. The petitions are, therefore, summarily dismissed. No order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----