Honble LAKSHMANAN, C.J.–Heard Shri N.K. Maloo, for the appellant and Shri Sanjay Pareek, for the contesting IVth respondent. (2). This Special Appeal has been filed by the appellant-Bank against the order dated 28.8.1995, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant-Bank and thereby confirming the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur dated 22.8.1983. (3). The respondent No.4 was an employee of the appellant-Bank. While working on the post of Clerk/Cashier, he was served with a charge sheet dated 27.2.1976 in connection with various mis- conducts. The respondent No.4 denied the charges and thereupon, a regular enquiry was held. Respondent No.4 participated in the enquiry. Several witnesses were examined on behalf of the appellant-Bank and nine witnesses on behalf of the respondent No.4. The enquiry officer submitted his report, in which he found the respondent No. 4 guilty of all the charges except charge No.5. The disciplinary authority, after giving a show cause notice to the respondent No.4 and considering the reply submitted by the respondent No.4, came to the conclusion that all the charges except charge No.5 were clearly proved and, therefore, imposed the punishment of dismissal from service vide order dated 6.8.1976. The respondent No.4 preferred an appeal against the order of dismissal. The appellate authority, after considering the matter and taking a lenient view, substituted the punishment of dismissal as under:- ``(i) Non payment of wages for suspension period except the subsistence allowance paid during the said period. (ii) That the period of absence from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement was to be adjusted from the Privilege Leave due if any and the rest of the period treated as on leave on loss of pay; and (iii) The punishment of dismissal was reduced to stoppage of one grade increment permanently, which will have the effect of postponing future increment. (4). An industrial dispute was raised and the matter was referred to the Central Industrial Tribunal by order dated 23.2.1981 passed by the Central Government. (4). An industrial dispute was raised and the matter was referred to the Central Industrial Tribunal by order dated 23.2.1981 passed by the Central Government. Four questions were referred for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, such as; (i) whether Shri L.D. Agarwal, Clerk/Cashier was rightly treated as suspended w.e.f. January 29th, 1976 instead of January 30th, 1976; (ii) whether the full wages for the period January 29th 1976 to the date of joining/reinstatement were correctly not paid; (iii) whether privilege leave and leave without pay was rightly adjusted against the period of suspension from duty and; (iv) whether the punishment of stoppage of one annual grade increment permanently is justified? (5). The industrial Tribunal, after hearing the arguments on merits, came to the following conclusion:- ``In the result, none of the charge stand proved against the worker Shri L.D. Agarwal. The evidence is such on which no reasonable man can arrive at a finding that the charges or any of them stand proved. In the result the penalty which has been awarded to Shri L.D. Agarwal cannot be sustained. It is hereby declared that the action of the management of Punjab Nation Bank in relation to its Koela Branch in treating Shri L.D. Agarwal, Clerk/Cashier Incharge w.e.f. 29.1.79 instead of 30.1.76, not paying full wages for the period from 29.1.1976 to the date of joining/reinstatement, adjusting privilege leave and leave without pay against the period of absence and awarding a punishment of stoppage of one graded increment permanently is not justified. The worker Shri L.D. Agarwal is entitled to the full wages from the period 29.1.76 to the date of joining/reinstatement. The punishment of stoppage of one grade increment permanently is set aside. Let this Award be sent to the Central Government for publication under Section 17(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (6). Being aggrieved, the appellant-Bank preferred writ petition before this Court with a prayer to quash the award of the Industrial Tribunal as published in the Gazette of India and for other consequential reliefs. Before the learned Single Judge, it was argued on behalf of the appellant-bank that once the industrial tribunal itself has held the domestic enquiry as fair and proper, it has no jurisdiction to re-examine the evidence led before the enquiry officer, question the findings of the enquiry officer and sit as a court of appeal. Certain other grounds have also been taken. (7). Certain other grounds have also been taken. (7). A detailed reply was filed by the respondent herein, denying the charges. It was submitted in the reply that the order of tribunal is not liable to be interfered with, since the tribunal, after hearing both the parties and perusing the entire record, has come to a clear finding that none of the charges levelled against the answering respondent stands proved and, therefore, the appellant-petitioner could not have any grievance against the findings of the tribunal. (8). The learned Single Judge of this Court, by its order dated 28.8.1995, considered the entire matter charge-wise and came to the conclusion that the order of the Industrial Tribunal is not liable to interfered with. As such, the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant-herein. (9). Being aggrieved, the present special appeal has been filed by the appellant-Bank. We have heard Shri Maloo and Shri Pareek, counsel for the respective parties. (10). Mr. Maloo submitted that the Tribunal has exceeded its powers, which have been conferred upon it and that a bare perusal of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 would show that the special powers have been conferred upon the Tribunal, only in cases of punishment and dismissal or discharge from service and that the jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence and to interfere in the quantum of punishment has been conferred upon the tribunal only in the cases of major punishment of dismissal or discharge from service and that the jurisdiction has not been conferred in matters of lighter punishment, which has been left within the jurisdiction and ambit of disciplinary authority. Thus, Mr. Maloo contended that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to see as to whether the domestic enquiry was conducted and whether such enquiry was in consonance with the statutory rules and standing orders and the principles of nature justice. This argument of Shri Maloo was countered by Shri Pareek. (11). We have perused the entire pleadings and carefully considered the rival submissions made by counsel appearing on either side. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides as under:- ``[11A. This argument of Shri Maloo was countered by Shri Pareek. (11). We have perused the entire pleadings and carefully considered the rival submissions made by counsel appearing on either side. Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 provides as under:- ``[11A. Powers of Labour Court, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen.- Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct re-instatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require. Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter.] (12). In our opinion, a reading of Section 11-A would show that the power of the Industrial Tribunal is without limitation. In our opinion, it can interfere when the punishment awarded is disproportionate to the proved guilt. Under such circumstances, the tribunal, in our opinion, is bound to give and should give its reasons in support of its decision. Five questions were referred to the Industrial Tribunal for its opinion. The Tribunal, after due discussion of the charges and the evidence adduced by both the parties, came to a categorical conclusion that none of the charges levelled against the respondent-herein, stand proved and that the evidence is such on which no reasonable man can arrive at a finding that a charge or any of them stand proved. In the result, the penalty which has been awarded cannot be sustained. The Tribunal, after holding so, declared that the action of the management of the appellant-Bank is not proper and justified. In the result, the penalty which has been awarded cannot be sustained. The Tribunal, after holding so, declared that the action of the management of the appellant-Bank is not proper and justified. the Industrial Tribunal held that the respondent- employee is entitled to the full wages from the period i.e. from 29.1.1976 to the date of joining/reinstatement. The tribunal also set aside the punishment of stoppage of one grade increment permanently. (13). At the time of hearing, it is represented by Shri Pareek that during the pendency of the proceedings in this Court, the respondent-worker had submitted an application for voluntary retirement and that the same has also been accepted by the appellant-bank. This change in circumstances has also to be taken into account by us while deciding this issue, which has now been raised in the present appeal. As already noticed, the tribunal has to necessarily come into the details of the case, while considering the entire material charge-wise and has to necessarily come to its finding one each charge and in the instant case also, on consideration of the charges and evidence adduced both, oral and documentary, has come to a categorical conclusion that none of the charges have been proved. When a competent Tribunal constituted under the Act renders a finding that none of the charges have been proved, it is not for this Court to interfere with such a categorical finding by exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, as such, in our opinion, the order passed by the Tribunal is perfectly in order and does not call for any interference. Under such circumstances, we confirm the order passed by the learned Single Judge and dismiss the present appeal. No costs.