Research › Search › Judgment

Patna High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 593 (PAT)

Jagdeo Yadav v. State Of Bihar

2001-07-18

S.K.CHATTOPADHYAYA

body2001
Judgment 1. In this application a prayer has been made to quash the order dated 30.7.1999 by which cognizance of the offence has been taken by the learned Magistrate under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 27 of the Arms Act. 2. Some facts are necessary to be stated for appreciating the points involved in this case. On the basis of an information given by the informant, Ram Charitar Yadava case was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 324 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. Charge-sheet was submitted on 23.1.1999 and on the same day cognizance was taken under those sections and summons were issued. Charge-sheet submitted is annexure-2 to this application. However, the informant being aggrieved by the conduct of the Investigating Officer in filing the charge-sheet under only those sections filed an application before the Superintendent of Police, who directed the Inspector of Police, Rosera to supervise the case. After supervision, of the case a supplementary charge-sheet was submitted on 28.2.1999 under the aforesaid sections including Sections 307 and 407 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 27 of the Arms Act. The Supplementary charge-sheet dated 28.2.1999 is Annexure-4 to this application. On the basis of this supplementary charge-sheet the learned A.C.J.M. Rosera by the impugned order dated 30.7.1999 took cognizance of the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 27 of the Arms Act including the aforesaid sections under which cognizance was taken earlier. 3. The petitioner being aggrieved moved in Criminal Revision No. 489 of 1999 before the learned Sessions Judge but without success. By order dated 3.5.2000 the learned Sessions Judge has dismissed the Revision application holding that there was no irregularity in the order of the learned Magistrate dated 30.7.1999. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that once cognizance has been taken by the Court on the basis of the first charge-sheet under Sections 147, 148, 149, 323, 504 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, he could not have taken cognizance of offence under Section 307 read with Section 27 of the Arms Act on the basis of the supplementary charge-sheet. According to him, taking cognizance twice on same set of facts of supplementary charge-sheet is bad in law. According to him, taking cognizance twice on same set of facts of supplementary charge-sheet is bad in law. In support of his contention learned counsel has relied on the decision reported in the case of The State v. Mehar Singh and others, 1974 Cri LJ 970 and Jago Singh and others v. The State of Bihar and another, BBCJ 1973 (1) 445. Learned Counsel for the State, on the other hand, has strongly contended that only because the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of the offence under certain Sections of the Indian Penal Code on the basis of the first charge-sheet he is not debarred to take cognizance under other sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Arms Act on the basis of the supplementary charge-sheet. 5. It appears that initially the first information report was registered under Sections 147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 504, 307 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act. However, when the charge-sheet was filed under other sections excluding Section 307 of the India Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act the informant requested the Dy. Superintendent of Police to supervise the case again as, according to him, the Investigating Officer in connivance with the petitioner did not file charge-sheet under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act. The Dy. Superintendent of Police investigated the case and on supervision found that there was sufficient material on record to submit charge-sheet under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act. Being satisfied he directed the investigating officer to submit further charge-sheet under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act besides other sections as already mentioned in the previous charge-sheet. The Investigating Officer accordingly filed supplementary charge-sheet. 6. The learned Magistrate after perusal of the case records as well as injury report was satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to take cognizance under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code and 27 of the Arms Act. He was of the opinion that there was no bar to consider the further charge-sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer. The Revisional Court concurring with the findings of the learned Magistrate found that there was no illegality in taking cognizance on the basis of the supplementary charge-sheet. 7. He was of the opinion that there was no bar to consider the further charge-sheet submitted by the Investigating Officer. The Revisional Court concurring with the findings of the learned Magistrate found that there was no illegality in taking cognizance on the basis of the supplementary charge-sheet. 7. Unfortunately on the basis of an overruled decision of the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that the impugned order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the supplementary charge-sheet is bad in law. I am constrained to observe that the learned counsel ought not have relied on the decision of the Full Bench in the case of State v. Mehar Singh and others (supra) which has been overruled by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Om Prakash Narang and another v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1979 SC 1791 . It is well settled that notwithstanding the filing of a final charge-sheet, a police officer could still investigate and lay further charge-sheets if he got information and that there was no finality either to the investigation or to the laying of charge-sheets. The observation of the Full Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of State v. Mehar Singh and others, (supra) that the police became functus officio once the Court took cognizance of an offence on the filing of a charge-sheet by the police and thereafter further investigation by the police was not permissible has been disapproved by their Lordships by holding that the procedure of suspending cognizance suggested by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana does not appear to be warranted by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. Their lordships ultimately concluded by observing as follows : "As observed by us earlier, there was no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which, expressly or by necessary implication, barred the right of the police to further investigate after cognizance of the case had been taken by the Magistrate. Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 leads us to hold that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. Neither Section 173 nor Section 190 leads us to hold that the power of the police to further investigate was exhausted by the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence. Practice, convenience and preponderance of authority, permitted repeated investigations on discovery of fresh facts. In our view, notwithstanding that a Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence upon a police report submitted under Section 173 of the 1893 Code, the right of the police to further investigate was not exhausted and the police could exercise such right as often as necessary when fresh information came to light. Where the police desired to make a further investigation, the police could express their regard and respect for the Court by seeking its formal permission to make further investigation." 8. In the light of this well settled principle of law I am of the view that the impugned order taking cognizance by the learned Magistrate cannot be held to be illegal. The case of Jago Singh and others (supra) decided by this Court is quite distinguishable and, in my opinion, does not help the petitioner. In the result, I find no merit in this application which is accordingly, dismissed.