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2001 DIGILAW 599 (MAD)

R. Jayarani v. State of Tamil Nadu and another

2001-06-11

T.MEENA KUMARI

body2001
ORDER: The petitioner has filed the above writ petition seeking to issue a writ of certioriari calling for the records of the first respondent in G.O.Ms. No.310, Housing and Urban Development, dated 17.12.1979 and published in the supplement to Part II, Sec.2 of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette dated 7.3.1979, being the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act and relating to the petitioner’s land comprised in survey No.4/4B in Ponmeni Village, Madurai and quash the same. 2. Questioning the land acquisition proceedings the present writ petition has been filed. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the respondents have issued notification under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act on 17.2.1979 and declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act was made on 15.10.1980 and the award was passed on 25.3.1992 i.e., after a long gap of 12 years and hence, notification issued under Sec.4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act has to be quashed. 3. He has also contended that some of the petitioners have filed batch of writ petitions under Art.226 of the Constitution of India and this Court allowed the same on 15.7.1982 quashing the notification. Following the above judgment, the petitioner submits that the notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act has to be quashed. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that an award has been passed on 25.3.1982 and the possession was taken on 22.11.1982 and the land has been vested with the Government. 5. In the above circumstances, even though earlier this Court allowed the batch of writ petitions quashing the notification. In this case, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief, since the award has been passed on 25.3.1982 and possession was taken on 25.11.1982 and the possession vested with the Government. The petitioner approached this Court for the abovesaid relief after a period of 15 years from the date of issuance of notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and nearly 12 years from the date of the judgment of the learned single Judge. 6. The reasoning given by the learned counsel for the petitioner, for the abnormal delay is that the petitioner waited for the issuance of declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act. 6. The reasoning given by the learned counsel for the petitioner, for the abnormal delay is that the petitioner waited for the issuance of declaration under Sec.6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In State of Tamil Nadu v. L.Krishnan, (1996)1 S.C.C. 250 , the Apex Court held that the delay in challenging the notification was fatal and the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only and exercise of power under Art.226, after the award had been made, was held to be unjustified. 7. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. I.D.I. Co. (Pvt). Limited, A.I.R. 1997 S.C. 482, the Supreme Court observed as follows: “If the interested person allows the grass to grow under his feet by allowing the acquisition proceedings to go on and reach its terminus in the award and possession is taken in furtherance thereof and vest in the State from all encumbrances, the slumbered interested person would be told off the gates of the Court that his grievance should not be entertained when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has no doubt, discretionary power under Art.226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Sec.4(1) and declaration under Sec.6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not exercise its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Art.226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference”. 8. Similar view has been reiterated in State of Rajasthan and others v. D.R. Laxmi and others, (1996)7 S.C.C. 445, wherein the Apex Court has held that even the void proceedings need not be set at naught if the party has not approached the Court within reasonable time, as judicial review is not permissible at a belated stage. 9. In this case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner has approached this Court after the period of 15 years from the date of notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and 12 years from the date of the order of the learned single Judge. 9. In this case, it is not in dispute that the petitioner has approached this Court after the period of 15 years from the date of notification under Sec.4(1) of the Act and 12 years from the date of the order of the learned single Judge. As the award has been passed on 25.3.1982 and the possession has been taken on 22.11.1982 and the land is vested with the Government and the reason for the delay has not been properly explained, following the above judgments, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and accordingly, the same is dismissed. No costs. However, the petitioner is at liberty to make a representation to the Government to reconvey the land if it is permissible or otherwise within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. As and when such representation is made, the respondents are directed to consider the same and pass orders on merits. Consequently W.M.P. No.5900 of 1994 is also dismissed.