AMITAVA LALA, J. ( 1 ) ALL these writ petitions being W. P. No. 4072 (W) of 2000, W. P. No. 2367 (W) of 2000 and W. P. No. 1552 (W) of 2000 are arising out of a notification issued by the Special Secretary to the Government of West Bengal, Finance Department, Taxation, under Memo No. 223-F. T. dated January 31, 1996 which is as follows :"the Governor is pleased hereby to create a post of Commissioner of Entertainments Tax, West Bengal, in the Finance Department to administer the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, 1922 (Ben. Act V of 1922) throughout the territory of West Bengal. The Governor is further pleased to order that such post shall be held by the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax, West Bengal, appointed under the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944 (Bengal Act IV of 1944 ). " ( 2 ) THEREFORE, from the plain reading of the notification it appears that the authority of the agricultural income-tax has been given power to administer the appropriate functions of the Bengal amusements tax. The word "administer" as per Law Lexicon, 1997 Edition, at page 58 is to direct or manage ; to furnish ; to give ; to dispense ; to tender (as) persons having authority to administer on oath ; to fulfil functions of or performing duties of an administrator. The word "minister" is said to be derived from the same root as the latin word manus, the hand. Etymologically, therefore, the word "administer" would seem applicable to anything that could be done by the hand, to or for another. ( 3 ) UNDER General Clauses Act, the word "administer" means a person who manages the affairs. In any event, the word "administer" is a person concerned to do the needful for the purpose of appropriate functions as prescribed under the law. ( 4 ) IT appears to this Court that the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, 1922 and the Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944 are the scheduled Acts under the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987. The West Bengal Taxation Tribunal has been formed in view of Article 423-B of the Constitution of India for various purposes including levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax as well as for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto specified under sub-clause including the Clause 2 (a) under Article 423-B of the Constitution of India. The West Bengal Taxation Tribunal has been formed in view of Article 423-B of the Constitution of India for various purposes including levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax as well as for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto specified under sub-clause including the Clause 2 (a) under Article 423-B of the Constitution of India. In giving explanation as to the applicability of such Tribunal in respect of certain areas, an elaborate judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court prescribing the specific scope and ambit of the same which are to be heard by the Tribunal. The part of the penultimate paragraph of the judgment is very interesting one for the purpose of coming to a definite conclusion in respect of this matter. Within such quoted parts, two parts are very important for the purpose of consideration. One is that the Tribunal will act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted and secondly, the litigants can approach even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislation by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Act. ( 5 ) THEREFORE, according to this Court, the Tribunal as constituted under Article 423-B of the Constitution of India is not a Tribunal below the rank of a single Bench of the Court of the writ jurisdiction but similar to a single Bench of the writ jurisdiction of the Court. Therefore, my reading is that whenever the writ court sits singly the same can be decided by the Tribunal itself. If there is any change thereafter, the same can only be made before a division Bench of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. There is no scope to by-pass the authority of the Tribunal unless the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged. Such dispute is not present in the instant case. ( 6 ) MR. Mihir Lal Bhattacherjee, learned counsel appearing in support of the petitioners, contended before this Court that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is available under Sections 6 and 8 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987. Section 6 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 speaks that the Tribunal will adjudicate the dispute in respect of levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax under any specified State Act and the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 6 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 speaks that the Tribunal will adjudicate the dispute in respect of levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax under any specified State Act and the matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 8 of the said Act under its explanation is restricted only in relation to levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax. Such section has also explained as to the "order" made by the authority under the specified State Act and the "action" means an action taken by any authority under any of the specified State Acts or by the State Government. Taking silence of the portions being "matters connected therewith or incidental thereto", the learned counsel for the petitioners contended before this Court that the Tribunal has no power and authority to decide the issue as made in the instant writ petitions by challenging the notification. The notification as issued on behalf of the Governor is an administrative order which de hors the Act and it cannot be adjudicated by the Tribunal. ( 7 ) MR. Bhattacherjee, learned counsel for the petitioners, has given a narrow meaning of the word "administer", Mr. Bhattacherjee, learned Advocate for the petitioners submits that in effect the word "administer" cannot cover the areas of levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax because the person concerned has lack of authority to administer which is only the subject-matter before the writ court. So far as the word "incidental" is concerned, Mr. Bhattacherjee, learned counsel for the petitioners, has also given a meaning from the Law Lexicon, 1997 Edition, at page 915, by saying that a thing is said to be incidental to another if it merely appertains to something as primary. The word "incidental" does not merely refer to a matter of casual nature. The procedure for disposal of an appeal includes as a necessary incidental matter but filing of an appeal on a proper fee. I think that the word "incidental" to another if it merely appertains else as primary, I have no quarrel with the dictionary meaning of the word "incidental". My judgment is only restricted as to whether the word "incidental" is related to the primary object of the Act, i. e. , levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax on the basis of the notification. My judgment is only restricted as to whether the word "incidental" is related to the primary object of the Act, i. e. , levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax on the basis of the notification. ( 8 ) THE moot point is that whether the order of the Governor to administer the functions of the office under the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, 1922 will be done by the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax for the purpose of levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax or not and if it is so, whether such administrative order will exist or not exist and further whether such existence or non-existence will be decided by this Court or not. ( 9 ) IT is crystal clear that by a notification the Governor directed the authority of the Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax to administer the functions of the office under the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, 1922. ( 10 ) ARTICLE 162 of the Constitution of India as pointed out by Mr. Tarun Kr. Roy, learned counsel for the respondents, prescribes that the executive functions of the State is co-extensive with the legislative functions in certain areas. The power of the State shall exist to the matter in which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws, although Mr. Surajit Mitra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in W. P. No. 1552 (W) of 2000, has objected to such submission by saying that proviso under Article 162 of the Constitution of India cannot give the authority to pass such executive power in respect of which the Legislature of the State has power to make laws but restricted or limited by way of legal sanction. But I do not feel that such objection of Mr. Mitra is very much tenable in the eye of law so far as the matter is concerned. ( 11 ) MR. Bhattacherjee, learned counsel for the petitioners, has given my attention to judgment in the case of Dr. Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, to establish before this Court that the litigant before the Tribunal depends for its answer on the provisions of the Act. The Tribunal having been created by the Act, the scope and extent of its jurisdiction have to be determined by interpreting the provisions thereof. ( 12 ) MR. Duryodhan Sahu v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra, to establish before this Court that the litigant before the Tribunal depends for its answer on the provisions of the Act. The Tribunal having been created by the Act, the scope and extent of its jurisdiction have to be determined by interpreting the provisions thereof. ( 12 ) MR. Bhattacherjee, learned counsel for the petitioners, cited another judgment in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India. In the light of such judgment any matter can be adjudicated by the Tribunal. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is as follows :"the jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 42 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 423-A and Article 423-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal. Section 5 (6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated. " ( 13 ) MR. Tarun Kr. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondent, contended before this Court that the scope and ambit under Section 8 (3) (c) of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, the Tribunal has extraordinary jurisdiction of any of the authorities under the said specified State Act. " ( 13 ) MR. Tarun Kr. Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondent, contended before this Court that the scope and ambit under Section 8 (3) (c) of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, the Tribunal has extraordinary jurisdiction of any of the authorities under the said specified State Act. Mr, Roy, learned counsel for the respondent has also drawn my attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India 1997 (1) CHN 112, wherein it has been decided the vires of the statutory legislations which can only be challenged before the Tribunal. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in this matter. ( 14 ) MR. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioners, joined the issue in reply stated that an extraordinary jurisdiction in respect of any of the authorities under Section 8 (3) (c) of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 is applicable only in respect of levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax and it cannot extend its power in the garb of the words"matters connected therewith or incidental thereto". ( 15 ) I have extensively gone through the arguments put forth before me by the appearing parties. According to me, the notification as published by the order of the Governor is admittedly an administrative order but such administrative order is in relation to the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, 1922 as well as the West Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944. Both are scheduled Acts under the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987. Since both are scheduled Acts by an administrative power, one authority can be entrusted to act as an authority of different Acts and to that extent, there cannot be any procedural vires for the same. Even if assuming for the moment, the procedural vires is available, it is under the domain of the Tribunal. ( 16 ) I cannot give any narrow meaning of the word "administer" rather than the word "administer" includes the power in relation to levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax. Other than such explanation, there is no meaning forthcoming from the word "administer" under the notification. ( 16 ) I cannot give any narrow meaning of the word "administer" rather than the word "administer" includes the power in relation to levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax. Other than such explanation, there is no meaning forthcoming from the word "administer" under the notification. Moreover, under Article 423-B of the Constitution of India itself read with Section 6 of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987, it will be very clear that the power of levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax is not distinguished from the words "matters connected therewith or incidental thereto" and only restricted under Section 6 of the said Act. Moreover, the explanation as given under Section 8 of the said Act in respect of an extraordinary jurisdiction for the purpose of levy, assessment, collection and enforcement of any tax cannot supersede the authority as given in respect of incidental happening under Article 423-B of the Constitution of India itself in Clause 2 (j ). Therefore, neither the court can go with the word "administer" nor with the limited scope of the explanation under Section 8 of the said Act. Therefore, the court cannot hold that the Tribunal has no authority to decide the procedural vires, if any, in connection with the notification specially in L. Chandra Kumar's case prescribed under the penultimate paragraph on the question of vires. ( 17 ) HAD it been so that one of the Acts of the Bengal Amusements Tax Act, 1922 or the West Bengal Agricultural Income-tax Act, 1944 is out of the Schedule under the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal Act, 1987 and by virtue of this administrative order, in fact, the law was wanted to be amended by an administrative order without appropriate sanction, it would have been a different matter altogether in doing so. But in the present case I cannot find any justification as to why the question of vires, if any, cannot be challenged before the Tribunal itself in addition to factual disputes. ( 18 ) UNDER such circumstances, all these three writ petitions are dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. There will be no order as to costs. But in the present case I cannot find any justification as to why the question of vires, if any, cannot be challenged before the Tribunal itself in addition to factual disputes. ( 18 ) UNDER such circumstances, all these three writ petitions are dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. There will be no order as to costs. ( 19 ) HOWEVER, this order will not prevent the petitioners from making any application before the Tribunal as early as possible on the self same cause of action and if it is done the same will not hit by the principle of res judicata and analogous thereto or law of limitation. ( 20 ) IN view of the order passed by this Court in the writ petitions, the application being CAN No. 10400 of 2000 has become infructuous and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.