JUDGMENT Chatterjee, J. ; The writ petitioners started a small manufacturing fruit processing unit at 37, Imjad Ali Lane, Calcutta under the name and style "Tulip Products Co.". In the said fruit processing unit, the writ petitioners were manufacturing fruit juice, jelly, jam etc. The writ petitioner was a registered dealer under the Bengal Finance Sales Tax Act, 1941. West Bengal Sales Act, 1954 and is now registered under the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994. In the audited balance sheet for the year 1979-80 the value of the plant and machinery was Rs. 2,29,121.03/-. In 1994, the rate of sales tax on fruit juice was 20% and the rate of sales tax of jelly and jam was 12%. Until May 1994, there was no incentive scheme with regard to such fruit processing unit and as such, the State Government came out with an incentive scheme for exemption of sales tax with regard to fruit processing unit by a Notification being Notification No. 1428-FT dated 26th May, 1994. In this Notification, it was stated that no sales tax would be payable on fruit juice, fruit syrup etc. when the notified commodities are manufactured in the small scale industrial unit in West Bengal registered with the Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries by the Government of West Bengal and the investment by the dealer in plant and machinery of such unit is less than Rs. 5 lacs. This Notification has been annexed at page 36 of the writ petition. According to the writ petitioner, the value of the plant and machinery which could be used in the process of manufacture of either fruit juice or jam and jelly on the date of issue of Notification was less than Rs. 5 lacs. As such, for the assessment year ended four quarters of 31st March, 1995, the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes on the basis of such scheme had accepted the dealer's claim for eX3mption under the aforesaid Notification and by his order dated 27th June, 1997, the exemption was allowed. However, for the assessment under the 1941 Act which was made later i.e. on 23rd June, 1998, the Assistant Commissioner, however, valued the plant & machinery above Rs. 5 lacs and, accordingly, held that the petitioner was not entitled to exemption of sales tax on the aforesaid products on the basis of the Notification as noted hereinabove. However, for the assessment under the 1941 Act which was made later i.e. on 23rd June, 1998, the Assistant Commissioner, however, valued the plant & machinery above Rs. 5 lacs and, accordingly, held that the petitioner was not entitled to exemption of sales tax on the aforesaid products on the basis of the Notification as noted hereinabove. The Assessing Officer took the book value assessment as on 31st March, 1980 at Rs. 2,27,148.78/- and the addition made from 1981 to 1986-87 took the value of investment of plant and machinery for the assessment year 1.5.1995 to 31st March, 1996 as Rs. 6,58,587/- for assessment under West Bengal Sales Taxes Act, 1994 along with an assessment for, the broken period between 1.4.1995 to 30.4.1995 including the turn-over tax. The aforesaid order of the Assistant Commissioner was thereafter confirmed by the Deputy Commissioner in appeal. The matter thereafter was taken to the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal (In short "Tribunal"). By its order dated 19th January, 2000, the impugned assessment order and the appellate order were set aside on a limited ground. The matter was remanded back to the Assessment Officer for re-assessment in the light of the observations made therein. However, the Tribunal held that the assessment on turn-over tax was made illegal but rejected the other points raised by the writ petitioners. Feeling aggrieved by this order of the Tribunal, this writ petition has been moved at the instance of the writ petitioner. 2. Mr. Soumen Bose, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner at the first instance submitted that as the incentive scheme was formulated for promotion of industries and the said scheme was introduced on 27th May, 1994 by a Notification in which the preamble states "whereas the Governor is of opinion that industrial unit is manufacturing certain goods in West Bengal which are in need of financial assistance and accordingly it is necessary to formulate a scheme of industrial promotion to assist such unit for the purposes mentioned hereinabove; the writ petitioner was entitled to tax exemption in terms of the Notifications mentioned hereinabove and under Rule 41 of the West Bengal Sales Tax Rule, 1995 or under Rule 3 (116) of the 'Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941. Mr. Mr. Bose had also drawn our attention to some other similar notification which were also issued under the relevant provisions of the Sales Tax Act for exemption of sales tax on such items and copy of such Notification relevant for the writ petitioner's case has been annexed at page 36 of the writ petition. Mr. Bose also had drawn our attention to the Extraordinary Gazette dated 26th May, 1994 whereby, it was directed that no tax shall be payable under the Sales Tax Act, 1954 or 1941 Act and similar Notification was subsequently issued in the year 1994 by which exemption was granted on sale of fruit juice etc. Therefore, Mr. Bose contended that the expression "investment" on plant and machinery in the aforesaid exemption notification read with the incentive scheme makes it clear that the entire object of issuing such notification was for promotion of new industrial unit. Mr. Bose further contended that as the expression "investment" has not been defined in the Notification, such expression shall be construed in the context of the purpose of the Notification intended to be issued. In support of this submission Mr. Bose relied a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (1) Commissioner of Sales Tax v. Industrial Coal Enterprises, 114 Sales Tax Cases 365. He also cited another case reported in (2) 196 ITR 188, Bajaj Tempo Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax. Relying on the aforesaid two decisions Mr. Bose contended that under the West Bengal Act and the Industrial Scheme, the policy of granting such incentive is to promote or setting up new industrial unit. Therefore, according to Mr. Bose, the expression 'investment' as used in the exemption Notification mentioned hereinabove, should be construed in a way that the plant and machinery of the new industrial unit must be capable of being used at the time of starting production and that it cannot mean in this context that the plant and machinery which are obsolete or scrap long ago as from 1980 to 1986 be regarded as investment in 1994. Therefore, Mr. Bose submitted that having regard to the nature of the items used in fruit processing unit the plant and machinery which was discarded or replaced either as scrap or un-useable between 1980 to 1994 cannot be treated as 'investment' for setting up industrial unit in 1994. Mr. Therefore, Mr. Bose submitted that having regard to the nature of the items used in fruit processing unit the plant and machinery which was discarded or replaced either as scrap or un-useable between 1980 to 1994 cannot be treated as 'investment' for setting up industrial unit in 1994. Mr. Bose further submitted that the earlier Assessing Officer under the 1954 Act making its assessment which was at page 32 of the writ application had taken the investment at less than 5 lakhs whereas another Assessing Officer in his later assessment did not make any estimate of the investment of the writ petitioner in respect of the plant and machinery on the date of restarting of the food processing unit as in the year 1994. Therefore, Mr. Bose contended that it was not open to the Assessing Officer to hold that the writ petitioners were not entitled to exemption of payment of sales tax under the Notification in question in view of the previous assessment order in which the exemption under the Notification in question was granted by the assessing officer. Therefore, Mr. Bose, contended that principles of res judicata should be applied in the facts and circumstances of the case and the Tribunal has erred in law by not holding that by applying the principles of res judicata the writ petitioners would be entitled to the exemption of payment of sales tax under the Notification in question in view of the earlier adjudication of the Assessing Officer in respect of the earlier assessment order. It was next contended by Mr. Bose that this case related' to best judgment assessment. Relying on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (3) Raghuvir Mondal Harihar Mondal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1957 SC 810 , and also in the case of (4) Sethia Mining and Manufacturing Corporation Limited v. Commercial Tax Officer, 1977 (Vol. 39) STC 246 Mr. Bose contended that the Assessing Authority did not take into account any of the materials namely, sales vouchers and bills both for cash and credit which were available in. this very case. Therefore, Mr. Bose contended that the Assessing Authority had bifarcated the sales figure arbitrarily and with a motive in a manner whereby out of total turn-over of Rs. Bose contended that the Assessing Authority did not take into account any of the materials namely, sales vouchers and bills both for cash and credit which were available in. this very case. Therefore, Mr. Bose contended that the Assessing Authority had bifarcated the sales figure arbitrarily and with a motive in a manner whereby out of total turn-over of Rs. 1,18,000/- approximately he estimated sale of jam and jelly in respect of which the rate of tax was lowered i.e. 12% as Rs. 10,00,000/- and the sales of fruit juice squash at Rs. 1 Crore wherein the rate of tax was higher i.e. 12%. Accordingly, Mr. Bose submitted that this estimate was wholly arbitrary and motivated and, therefore, the Tribunal ought to have remitted this point also to the Assessing Officer inasmuch as the entire assessment was set aside by the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal and the Assessing Officer had in any event to make are assessment. 3. On the question of levy of interest Mr. Bose contended that in view of the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (5) J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer, 94 STC 422 wherein the Supreme Court held that where interest is to be levied on "tax due" as provided in the Statement, such interest cannot be asked for unless there was an assessment of tax quantified and a demand notice was served. Mr. Bose after drawing our attention to Sections 10 and 10A of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 and Sections 8 and 8A of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 and Sections 30 and 31 of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1994 submitted that interest would be payable only if the dealer had failed to pay the full amount of that "tax due" under this Act according to such return. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Bose to a decision of this Court in the case of (6) Recols India Limited, 4 STC 271. Mr. Bose, however, submitted before us that the aforesaid decision of this Court was a direct decision of a Special Bench of this Court with regard to the interpretation of what is meant by "tax due" and "tax payable" under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. Therefore, Mr. Mr. Bose, however, submitted before us that the aforesaid decision of this Court was a direct decision of a Special Bench of this Court with regard to the interpretation of what is meant by "tax due" and "tax payable" under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941. Therefore, Mr. Bose contended that interest was not payable in respect of the tax dues of the writ petitioners and in respect of such contention strong reliance was placed by Mr. Bose in the case of J. K. Synthetics Ltd. (supra). Finally it was contended by Mr. Bose that as the assessment was set aside by the Tribunal and the matter has to be re-assessed by the assessing authority, all the points mentioned above may also be considered and in any event by the order of the Tribunal the quantum of taxable turn-over has been reduced and further if the assessment is otherwise set aside on other ground, this question has to be considered by the Assessing Authority while the matter I would be brought to its notice after the order of remand passed by the Tribunal. Accordingly, Mr. Bose contended that the order of the Tribunal is liable to be set aside on the submissions made by him noted hereinabove. 4. The submissions as noted hereinabove of Mr. Bose appearing on behalf of the writ petitioners were hotly contested by Mr. Lakshmi Gupta appearing on behalf of the respondent. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having noted down the respective submissions of the learned Counsel for the parties the points for consideration in this writ application are enumerated below :- (1) Whether the respondents were entitled to disallow exemption under the Notification in question in view of the fact that assessment order for the period of 12 months ending 31st of March, 1995 was passed allowing exemption under the same Notification that is to say whether the benefit under the Notification in question could be disallowed to the writ petitioners as such exemption was granted by the authorities under the same Notification in view of earlier adjudication made by the Assessing Officer in a previous assessment proceeding in which such exemption was allowed to the writ petitioners ? (2) Whether the claim of the writ petitioners that the depreciation is to be deducted to ascertain value of plant and machinery was justified or not? (2) Whether the claim of the writ petitioners that the depreciation is to be deducted to ascertain value of plant and machinery was justified or not? (3) Whether an exemption Notification is to be liberally interpreted to confer benefit on a dealer? (4) Whether interest is chargeable after quantification only or for any period prior to that? 5. Let us take up first the point No.1 for consideration. It is an admitted position that by the Assessment Order for the period of 12 months ending 31st March, 1995 (Annexure 'B', page 31 of the writ application) the benefit given under the Notification in question was extended to the writ petitioners. The order by which such exemption was granted by the authorities on 27th of June, 1997 would be required to be produced at this stage as from the said order the nature of the order that was passed would come to light. Accordingly, we propose to reproduce the said order which runs as under :- "Dealer is a manufacture of jam, jelly etc. He is heard and found nothing contrary order his declaration G.T. Rs. 16, 70, 226.70 is accepted. Dealer claims for exemption for Rs. 16,70,226.70 under Notification No. 1428 FT, 26.5.94 is allowed. So the taxable balance stands Nil T.S.P.P. @ 4% is charge on Rs. 5,00,000/-." 6. From a plain reading of the Assessment Order passed in connection with 12 months ending 31st March, 1995, as noted hereinabove, it is clear to us that the said Assessment Order does not show that the value of the plant and machinery of the writ petitioners was at all ascertained by the Assessing Officer. In any view of the matter we are of the view that the principle of res judicata in the present proceeding cannot at all be applicable. In the case of (7) Doma Sao Mohanlal v. State of Bihar & Ors., 27 STC 473, the Supreme Court held at page 476 as follows:- "The tax sought to be recovered in the proceedings out of which that writ petition arose related to the Assessment Years 1949-50. But, each assessment period is distinct, and any decision by the authorities declaring liability to tax cannot operate as res judicata in respect of another period." (Emphasis Supplied) 7. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. But, each assessment period is distinct, and any decision by the authorities declaring liability to tax cannot operate as res judicata in respect of another period." (Emphasis Supplied) 7. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Bose that since the writ petitioners were allowed exemption of payment of Sales Tax in the earlier assessment order under the Notification in question, it would not be open to the respondents to disallow such exemption in the subsequent assessment order.- 8. Let us now take up the second point for consideration. According to Mr. Bose, the claim of the writ petitioners that depreciation is to be deducted to ascertain the value of the plant and machinery must be allowed and if such depreciation of the value of the plant and machinery of the writ petitioners is allowed, there cannot be any dispute that the writ petitioners would be entitled to be exempted from paying sales taxes under the Notification in question and in the event it is found that the depreciation of the value of the plant' and machinery cannot be granted to the writ petitioners, in that case no dispute can be raised that the writ petitioners were entitled to exemption of Sales Taxes under the Notification in question. This submission of Mr. Bose was hotly contested by Mr. Gupta appearing on behalf of the respondents. At the first instance Mr. Gupta. has submitted that we are exercising extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court and, therefore, we are not entitled to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the appellate authorities as well as by the Tribunal on the question the question whether the investment made by the writ petitioners was less than Rs. 5 lakhs or not. Even assuming that in the facts and circumstances of the case the writ petitioners are entitled to raise such question before us even then on merit also, we are not inclined to accept the contention of Mr. Bose. Since in this case the interpretation of the word "investment" as used in the Notification would be required to be dealt with, we feel it necessary to quote the said Notification for the purpose of deciding this writ application more effectively. Bose. Since in this case the interpretation of the word "investment" as used in the Notification would be required to be dealt with, we feel it necessary to quote the said Notification for the purpose of deciding this writ application more effectively. The said Notification being No. 1428-F.T. dated 26th May, 1994 runs as under:- "WHEREAS the Governor is satisfied that it is necessary so to do in the public interest; Now, THEREFORE, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 4AA of the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954 (West Bengal Act, IV of 1954) (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), the Governor is pleased hereby to direct that no tax shall be payable under the said Act on sales by a dealer of- (a) (i) fruit juices, (ii) fruit syrups, (iii) fruit concentrates, (iv) fruit squashes, (v) fruit cordials, and (vi) fruit sarbat. Included in this department Notification No. 3945-FT, dated the 26th August, 1977, as subsequently amended; (b) canned, bottled or any other preserved fruits, included in this department Notification No. 2252-FT, dated the 9th June, 1969; (c) processed food, commonly known as instant food, that is to say, pre-cooked or curried vegetable, and vegetable soup, included in this department Notification No.1036-FT, dated the 31st March, 1988, when the notified commodities mentioned in (a), (b) or (c) are manufactured in this small scale industrial unit in West Bengal registered with the Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries of the Government of West Bengal and the investment by the dealer in plant a and machinery of such unit is Jess than five lakhs rupees. This notification shall come into force on and from the 1st day of June, 1994." (Emphasis Supplied) 9. From the aforesaid Notification it is clear that a dealer which is a small scale industrial unit in West Bengal and registered with the Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries of the Government of West Bengal is entitled to apply for exemption when the investment of such a dealer in plant and machinery of such unit is less than 5 lakhs rupees. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioners are small scale industrial unit in West Bengal registered with the Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries of the Government of West Benga1. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioners are small scale industrial unit in West Bengal registered with the Directorate of Cottage and Small Scale Industries of the Government of West Benga1. The only question at this stage would be whether it can be said that the 'investment' of the writ petitioners in plant and machinery of its small scale industrial unit was less than five lakhs of rupees. It is true that the word 'investment' as used in the Notification in question has not been defined. In our view when the 'investment' in the Notification has not been defined, it is open to us to take into consideration the dictionary meaning of the word 'investment'. According to Black's Law Dictionary, 'investment' means "An expenditure to acquire property..... laying out of money....". In Wharton's Law Lexicon, the meaning of the word 'investment' is ".... to layout money ...." Thus, from a plain reading of the Dictionary Meaning of the word 'investment' we have no hesitation in our mind that the word 'investment' as used in the Notification means the amount invested in acquiring a property. In this connection the submission of Mr. Bose may be referred to. According to Mr. Bose, the writ petitioners were entitled to interpret the word 'investment' as used in the Notification in question on the basis of Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 which allows depreciation. In our view, Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot at all be applied in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It cannot be disputed after perusing Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 that Section 32 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 allows depreciation only for the determination of the net income of an assessee. After depreciation is allowed, the balance is a book value of the plant and machinery which is owned and possessed by the assessee. It would be difficult for us to hold that the book value can be said to be the investment figure nor it could be said that such book value was the market value of the plant and machinery. It is well known that sometimes market value in a given case can be more than the book value due to appreciation or less than book value due to obsolence. It is well known that sometimes market value in a given case can be more than the book value due to appreciation or less than book value due to obsolence. That being the position and keeping in mind that in the present case we are only concerned with the word 'investment' in a sales tax proceeding under the Sales Tax Act, it cannot be said that depreciation of the value of the plant and machinery of the writ petitioners could be allowed in this case. In any view of the matter even under the Income-tax Act, 1961 i.e. under Section 32 (1) (vi) Explanation 3 : Aggregate value in plant and machinery has been held to be determinable without allowing depreciation. Reference can be made in the case of (8) Commissioner of Income-tax v. J.H. Kharawala, 208 ITR 691. That being the position, we are unable to answer the point No.2 in favour of the writ petitioners and accordingly, the point No. 2 is decided in favour of the respondents. 10. Let us now take up the point No.3 for consideration. This point also, in our view, should be answered in favour of the respondents. The claim of the writ petitioners that an exemption notification for promotion of an industry is to be purposively interpreted, even if accepted, does not permit its interpretation bereft of the conditions stated in the Notification. The Notification in question itself is clear on this point. It has clearly stated that the investment of the dealer in the plant and machinery would not be less than Rs. 5 lakhs. As we have already held that the meaning of the word 'investment' does not include the depreciated value of the plant and machinery, we are of the view that the literal meaning of 'investment' cannot be unduly stretched. That being the position, we are not in a position to accept the submission of Mr. Bose that the word 'investment' used in the Notification in question would be the depreciated value of the plant and machinery and not the value of the plant and machinery as invested by the dealer. 11. The point No.4 is whether interest is chargeable after quantification only or for any period prior to that. Mr. Bose that the word 'investment' used in the Notification in question would be the depreciated value of the plant and machinery and not the value of the plant and machinery as invested by the dealer. 11. The point No.4 is whether interest is chargeable after quantification only or for any period prior to that. Mr. Bose in support of this contention contended that interest can only be charged after quantification of liability, had relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer, 94 STC 422 which overruled the earlier' decision of the Supreme Court reported in (9) 48 STC 466, Associated Cement Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer. In our view, these two decisions of the Supreme Court cannot be applied to the facts and circumstances of this case. In both the aforesaid two decisions the Apex Court of our country was considering the provisions under the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 particularly Section 11 B of the said Act before its substitution by Act No.4 of 1979 with effect from April 7, 1979. The Supreme Court held that un-amended provision did not permit the charge of interest. In the same judgment the Supreme Court also held that the amendment of 1979 contains more elaborate provision and permits charging of interest prior to quantification. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the Supreme Court clearly upheld the legislative power of making provision for charging of interest prior to quantification. The West Bengal Acts with which we are concerned, clearly provide for charging of interest before assessment also i.e. prior to quantification of liability. Section 8A of the 1954 Act and Section 31 of the 1994 Act make this situation clear. Therefore, we are unable to agree with Mr. Bose that interest was not liable to be charged before quantification. 12. Before we part with this judgment, a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer, 94 STC 422 which was strongly relied upon by Mr. Bose on the question of liability to pay interest by the writ petitioners may be considered. 12. Before we part with this judgment, a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of J. K. Synthetics Ltd. v. Commercial Taxes Officer, 94 STC 422 which was strongly relied upon by Mr. Bose on the question of liability to pay interest by the writ petitioners may be considered. We have carefully perused the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court and after considering the said judgment in detail we have no hesitation in our mind that the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court cannot be said to be an authority for the proposition that interest cannot be charged prior to quantification of liability as claimed by the writ petitioner. No other point was raised by the learned Counsel for the parties. Accordingly, we do not find any merit in this writ application. 13. The writ application, thus, is rejected. There will be no order as to costs. Latter-After the judgment is delivered in open Court, learned Advocate for the appellant prays for stay of operation of the judgment. Considering the facts and circumstances the prayed for stay is refused. Let xerox certified copies of the judgment, if applied for, be given to the learned Advocates for the parties. Banerji, J. : I agree.