JUDGMENT Venkatachalamoorthy J : - The appellant/accused was tried for charges under Secs.302, 201 and 392, I.P.C. by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tanjore in S.C.No.67 of 1992. The trial court found the accused guilty under Sec.302 I.P.C. and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment. The accused was also found guilty under Secs.201 and 392, I.P.C. and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 2 years and 5 years respectively. Being aggrieved by the verdict of the lower court, the accused has preferred the above appeal. 2. The prosecution in its endeavour to bring home the guilt of the accused examined P.Ws.-1 to 15, marked Exs.P-1 to P-19 and produced M.O.s-1 to 16. 3. The case of the prosecution is as follows: P.W-1 is the son of the deceased. P.W-1, the deceased and the younger sister of P.W-1 were all residing together in the village called Thirupanthuruthi. About two years prior to the occurrence, P.W-1 was approached by his friend P.W-3 for some financial assistance by way of loan. Since P.W-1 had no funds with him, he offered to help P.W-3 by providing some jewels so that P.W-3 could pledge the same in a Bank and get money. P.W-3 got the jewels from P.W-1 and with the help of one Saravanan, he pledged the same in the Bank and borrowed Rs.3, 500. Keeping Rs.2, 500 with him, he handed over the balance sum of Rs.1, 000 to P.W-1. About six months prior to the occurrence, P.W-1 approached P.W-3 and requested him to return the jewels and P.W-3 promised to take steps to get back the jewels from the Bank and return to him. On 4.12.1991, at about 4.30 P.M., P.W-1 was bundling the straw at a place called Othaiveedu, which is about two miles away from his house. After informing P.W-1 the deceased met P.W-3 and asked him to return the jewels and came back by about 5 P.M. to the place where P.W-1 was working. The deceased informed P.W-1 that P.W-3 agreed to return the jewels on the coming Saturday and further told him that she would like to return home through Vellamandapam route. The deceased was at that time wearing saree, jacket, skirt, gold Thaali, nose-stud, Thaali gundu (2 in number), two gold coins and yellow Thaali thread. P.W-1 after finishing the work, returned home at about 6 P.M. in the cart loaded with straw bundles. The deceased was at that time wearing saree, jacket, skirt, gold Thaali, nose-stud, Thaali gundu (2 in number), two gold coins and yellow Thaali thread. P.W-1 after finishing the work, returned home at about 6 P.M. in the cart loaded with straw bundles. At the house, P.W-1 found that the deceased was not available. He enquired his younger sister, who replied that the deceased had not come back. P.W-1 then went in search of his mother viz., the deceased to various places, but he was not able to locate her. On 5th also he searched for her in various placed but failed to trace her. On 6.12.1991, P.W-1 went to Nadukaveri Police Station at about 10 A.M. and gave a complaint to the effect that the deceased was missing. P.W-13, the Head constable at the said Police Station received the complaint and registered Crime No.324 of 1991 and prepared Express F.I.R. and sent the same to the Judicial Magistrate and also his superiors. On 7.12.1991, at about 11 A.M. P.W-1 came to know that a dead body of a female was found on the northern side of Vellamandapam and he proceeded to that place and reached there at about 12 P.M. He found the body in a decomposed stage and the same was subjected to fish bite. From the saree, jacket, skirt and he nose-stud P.W-1 could identify the dead body as that of his mother. P.W-1 also noticed aluminium bangles as well as the walking stick of his mother lying near the body. P.W-4 the Village Administrative Officer of Melathirupanthuruthi was in his office at about 12 noon on 7.12.1991, when his Talayari by name Thangavel came and informed him that a dead body of a female was found lying near Vellamandapam. P.W-4 then along with the Talayari proceeded to that place and found a dead body as informed. On enquiry, he came to know that it was the body of the deceased. The Village Administrative Officer then prepared a report and sent it to Nadukaveri Police Station. He also sent reports 1o the Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvaiyaru and the Tahsildar. P.W-14, the Sub Inspector at Nadukaveri Police Station received the complaint sent by the Village Administrative Officer at about 2.30 P.M. on 7.12.1991. Then he altered the crime as one of suspected death from that of man missing. He also sent reports 1o the Judicial Magistrate, Thiruvaiyaru and the Tahsildar. P.W-14, the Sub Inspector at Nadukaveri Police Station received the complaint sent by the Village Administrative Officer at about 2.30 P.M. on 7.12.1991. Then he altered the crime as one of suspected death from that of man missing. He also prepared Express Report and sent the original to the court of Judicial Magistrate and the copies to his superiors. P.W-15, the Inspector of Police, Thiruvaiyaru received a telephonic message at about 4 P.M. on 7.12.1991 and proceeded to the scene of occurrence viz., Vellamandapam along with the Photographer. He prepared observation mahazar Ex.P-5 and sketch Ex.P-17 in the presence of one Perumal and Talayari. Inquest over the dead body was held and Ex.P-18 is the inquest report. At the inquest, he examined P.W-1 Subramanian, Usiladiar, Mathi and Sukku Thangavel and recorded their statements. At the scene of occurrence, he seized M.O-9 aluminium bangles, M.O-10 walking stick, M.O.11 - 16 “thread, M.O-12 mud from the jacket of the deceased, and M.O-13 ordinary sample mud under Ex.P-6 in the presence of the Village Administrative Officer and Thangavel. P.W-15 examined the other witnesses on subsequent dates. P.W-2 is the Doctor at the Government Hospital, who on receipt of requisition from the Inspector of Police to conduct post mortem, proceeded with the same on 8.12.1991 at about 10.45 A.M. Ex.P-2 is the post mortem certificate. In the said certificate, the Doctor noted the following: “Injuries: 1. Multiple irregular post-mortem animal bite injuries seen involving both cheeks, chin, lips and nose and both ears. 2. Post mortem animal bite injury seen over the right side of neck 7 × 4 cms. 3. Post-mortem animal bite injuries noticed over the right hand with irregular margins and missing of index, middle, ring and little fingers at the level of metacarpal joint, exposing the metacarpal joint. 4. Two post-mortem animal bite injuries seen over the front of right forearm measuring 5 × 3 cms. and 4 × 2cms. 5. Two post-mortem animal bite injuries seen over the back of uppers and 3rd left forearm 4 × 3 cms, and 3 × 2 cms. over the front of left forearm at the lower. The third post mortem animal bite injuries noted were pale, with serralled margin and depth from skin to muscle deep. 6. and 4 × 2cms. 5. Two post-mortem animal bite injuries seen over the back of uppers and 3rd left forearm 4 × 3 cms, and 3 × 2 cms. over the front of left forearm at the lower. The third post mortem animal bite injuries noted were pale, with serralled margin and depth from skin to muscle deep. 6. Ante-mortem contusion seen on both sides of the neck measuring 4 × 2 cms. each. On further dissection inward fracture of greater horn of the hyoid bone on both sides noticed with haemorrhagic patch at the site of fracture. Finger nails cyanosed. Heart: Musculature flabby chambers and valves normal. Cavities contained few cc of blood dark coloured. Coloured vessels normal. Great vessels normal. Lungs: Both showed decomposition changes. Stomach contained 400 gms. of undigested rice diet. Mucoal showed decomposition changes. Liver, spleen, kidneys were decomposition changes. Uterus 4 × 2 × 1 cms. atrophied. Brain decomposed and liquified. In the said certificate, the Doctor had given an opinion that the deceased would appear to have died of asphyxia due to manual strangulation. Before court, the Doctor has opined that injury No.6 could have been sustained because of a person strangulating with hands. The Inspector arrested the accused on 15.12.1991 near Mangala Coffee Bar at Kandiyur-Thirukattupalli, in the presence of the Village Administrative Officer and Thangavel. On arrest, the accused gave a voluntary confession statement Ex.P-7. The accused volunteered to take the prosecution party and the police officials to show the place where he had hidden the Thaali thread and the persons to whom he pledged the jewels and also the goldsmith to whom he had entrusted the jewels for converting them into gold coins. The accused also produced a cash of Rs.300 which he was having his person and the same was seized under Ex.P-8 in the presence of witnesses. At about 5 P.M. in the evening, the accused took them to P.W-5 with whom he had pledged on 5.12.1991 M.O-7 series gold coins and took a loan of Rs.250. Ex.P-13 is the counter-foil in which the accused has signed. M.O-7 series were recovered under Ex.P-9 and duly attested by witnesses. P.W-5 was examined by the Inspector and his statement was recorded. The accused thereafter took the police officials to the shop of P.W-6 were the accused pledged M.O-4 Thaali on 5.12.1991. Ex.P-13 is the counter-foil in which the accused has signed. M.O-7 series were recovered under Ex.P-9 and duly attested by witnesses. P.W-5 was examined by the Inspector and his statement was recorded. The accused thereafter took the police officials to the shop of P.W-6 were the accused pledged M.O-4 Thaali on 5.12.1991. Ex.P-14 is the counter-foil of the receipt issued to the accused wherein he had signed. M.O-4 Thaali was seized under Ex.P-10 mahazar in the presence of witnesses. Thereafter, P.W-6 was examined by the police and his statement was recorded. P.W-7 is a goldsmith by profession and he was carrying on his business at Thiruvaiyaru. The accused took the police party to him and recovered M.O-6 series Thaali gundu (2 in number) which the accused entrusted with P.W-7 on 5.12.1991 for the purpose of converting the same as gold coins. M.O-6 series were recovered under Ex.P-11 mahazar in the presence of witnesses. The Inspector of Police examined these witnesses as well. The accused was working under P.W-8 and he was irrigating P.W-8's lands. On 3.12.1991, P.W-8 sprayed pesticide and the accused was irrigating the lands on the next day that was on 4.12.1991. P.W-9 owns a land adjoining the lands of P.W-8 and at about 1P.M. on 4.12.1991, he saw the accused working in the land belonging to P.W-8. P.W-10, who belongs to the place called Nadukaveri-Vellamandapam was returning from Thirupanthuruthi after purchasing rice and while returning, he saw the accused irrigating the lands of P.W-8. The Inspector of Police P.W-15, after effecting various recoveries referred supra and also examining the witnesses, returned to the station at about 10 P.M. and altered the crime as one under Sec.302, I.P.C. and prepared Express F.I.R. Ex.P-19. He sent the same to the Court of Judicial Magistrate and copies to his superiors. After completing the investigation, the Inspector filed his report on 31.12.1991. 4. When the accused was questioned under Sec.313, Cr.P.C. he denied having any complicity in the commission of the offence. 5. P.W-2 is the Doctor, who conducted post mortem on the body of the deceased on 8.12.1991 at about 10.45 P.M. and Ex.P-2 is the post mortem certificate issued by her, wherein, she had opined that the deceased should have died of asphyxia due to manual strangulation. The Doctor also noted as many as six injuries of which injuries 1 to 5 were because of animal bites (post-mortem). The Doctor also noted as many as six injuries of which injuries 1 to 5 were because of animal bites (post-mortem). Injury No.6 has been described as “Ante-mortem contusion seen on both sides of the neck measuring 4 × 2 cms, each. On further dissection inward fracture of greater horn of the hyoid bone on both sides noticed with haemorrhagic patch at the site of fracture and finger nails cyanosed.” Before court, the Doctor has deposed that injury No.6 should have been sustained, by a person strangulating the neck of the deceased with hands. The medical evidence placed before court would clearly show that the deceased died due to manual strangulation. 6. The question for consideration is as to whether the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that it was the accused, who had committed the grave crime. 7. There are no eye witnesses to the occurrence and this is a case of circumstantial evidence. It is the settled principle of law that in a case where there are no eye-witnesses to the occurrence and the case against the accused depends entirely on circumstantial evidence, the standard of proof required to convict the accused on such evidence is that the circumstances relied upon must be fully established and the chain of evidence furnished by the circumstances should be such that they should lead to only inescapable and irresistible conclusion that it was the accused who committed the crime and there should not be any circumstance which would be consistent with the innocence of the accused. Or, in other words, in a case of circumstantial evidence, not only should the various links in the chain of evidence be clearly established, but also the completed chain must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. Keeping the above principles of law in mind, let us proceed to analyse the evidence to find out whether the prosecution has succeeded in establishing all the links in the chain of circumstances to prove that the accused committed not only robbery but also in the course of same transaction, committed murder of the deceased. 8. The prosecution would rely on two circumstances viz., (i) the accused was seen on the date of occurrence working in a land about 200 ft. 8. The prosecution would rely on two circumstances viz., (i) the accused was seen on the date of occurrence working in a land about 200 ft. away from the place where the body of the deceased was found and (ii) recovery of jewelleries from P.Ws.-5 to 7 pursuant to the confession statement made by the accused. 9. Circumstance No.I: P.W-8 is the owner of the land in which the accused was employed as a water man. He has deposed that on 3.12.1991, the accused sprayed pesticides for the crops and on the succeeding day that was on 4.12.1991, the accused irrigated the lands. P.W-9 owns lands close to that of P.W-8's lands. According to him, on 4.12.1991, at about 1 P.M. himself and one Thangavel went to irrigate the lands. At that time, no water was available in the channel and he had to irrigate by using Palmyrah leafs folded. To get an aruval, he went to the house of the accused and at that time, he saw the accused digging manure pit. According to him, he returned the aruval after half an hour. P.W-10 is a resident of Nadukaveri Vellamandapam. He has deposed that on 4.12.1991, he went to Thirupanthuruthi to purchase rice and on his return, he saw the accused irrigating the lands. 10. It has to be pointed out that in the cross examination, P.W-8 has stated that he did not visit the field on 4.12.1991. As far as P.W-9 is concerned, he saw the accused at about 1 P.M. coming to P.W-10; he has not mentioned any timing as to when he saw the accused in the field of P.W-8 on 4.12.1991. The occurrence took place, according to the prosecution, at about 6 P.M. There is no evidence to show that between 1.30 P.M. and 6 P.M. the accused was there in the filed. Hence, it cannot be said that evidence let in by the prosecution has established that the accused was seen near the place where the body of the deceased was found at or about 6 P.M. 11. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that even assuming that the accused was present in the filed of P.W-8 on 4.12.1991 inasmuch as he was admittedly employed under P.W-8 to do agricultural operations like watering the plants, it cannot be said to be a circumstance, disclosing the unnatural conduct of the accused. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that even assuming that the accused was present in the filed of P.W-8 on 4.12.1991 inasmuch as he was admittedly employed under P.W-8 to do agricultural operations like watering the plants, it cannot be said to be a circumstance, disclosing the unnatural conduct of the accused. Or, in other words, according to the learned counsel, in as much as the accused had reason to be present in the filed of P.W-8 on 4.12.1991, that cannot be taken as one of the clinching circumstances. We are in entire agreement with the learned counsel for the appellant. We are of the considered view assuming that the presence of the accused in the field of P.W-8 on 4.12.1991 has been proved, as the accused has a reason to be there, this circumstance can only be in the nature of a weak circumstance. 12. Circumstance No.II: The accused was arrested by the Inspector of Police on 15.12.1991 near Mangala Coffee Bar at Kandiyur-Thirukattupalli in the presence of the Village Administrative Officer and one Thangavel and on arrest, he made a voluntary confession statement and the admissible portion of the same has been marked as Ex.P.7. The accused volunteered that if he is taken, he would show the persons with whom he pledged the jewels and also the gold smith to whom he had given the gold gundus for the purpose of converting the same as gold coins. P.W-4, the Village Administrative Officer has spoken not only about the arrest of the accused, but also the recoveries of the jewels made from P.Ws-5, 6 and 7. Learned Counsel for the appellant contended that a mere perusal of the testimony of P.W-5 would clearly show that he was not present at the time when the accused made the confession statement. Learned counsel further contended that various mahazars were prepared not in the respective places as indicated in the mahazars, but only in the police station at a later point of time. 13. We have carefully examined the testimony of P.W-4 and we do not find anything in the evidence to discredit his testimony. Nothing has been suggested against this witness indicating the reason as to why the witness was deposing falsely. The suggestion put to the witness that the accused was in fact arrested even on 9.12.1991 has been emphatically denied by him. Nothing has been suggested against this witness indicating the reason as to why the witness was deposing falsely. The suggestion put to the witness that the accused was in fact arrested even on 9.12.1991 has been emphatically denied by him. There is no basis for the counsel for the appellant to contend that the mahazars were prepared only at the police station. We are satisfied that P.W-4 the Village Administrative Officer has spoken only the truth and has not uttered any falsehood before court. 14. P.W-5 has been carrying on pawn broking business at Thiruvaiyaru Main Road. He has deposed that on 5.12.1991, the accused came and pledged 2 gold coins and borrowed a sum of Rs.250 and for which P.W-4 also issued a receipt. The counter foil of the receipt containing the signature of the accused has been marked as Ex.P.13. On 15.12.1991, subsequent to the confession, the police party along with the witnesses and the accused went to the shop of P.W-5 and from the shop recovered M.O-7 series gold coins under Ex.P-9 Mahazar. In the said Mahazar, apart from P.W-4 and Thangavel P.W-5 had also signed. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that since P.W-5 has been carrying on business as pawn broker, he has to necessarily oblige the police and that is why he has falsely deposed and that P.W-5 has signed Ex.P-9 mahazar only at the police station. According to the learned counsel, it would be totally unsafe to rely on the testimony of this witness as well as on recovery. We do not find any substance in the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. A careful reading of the cross examination would show that nothing was suggested to this witness as to why he should utter falsehood. It has to be also pointed out that signature of the accused under Ex.P-13 counter foil has not been disputed. Similarly, it is not the case of the accused that this signature was obtained from him by the police by compulsion or by threat after he was arrested. Equally, the recovery of M.O-7 from P.W-5 has not been disputed. The only suggestion put to the witness was that M.O-9 mahazar was prepared in the. police station, which has been emphatically denied. We are of the view that P.W-5 is a reliable witness and his testimony can be safely relied on. 15. Equally, the recovery of M.O-7 from P.W-5 has not been disputed. The only suggestion put to the witness was that M.O-9 mahazar was prepared in the. police station, which has been emphatically denied. We are of the view that P.W-5 is a reliable witness and his testimony can be safely relied on. 15. P.W-6 is also a person, who has been carrying on pawn broking business under the name and style of “Rajarajeswari Finance”. She has deposed that on 5.12.1991, the accused came and handed over M.O-4 and took a loan of Rs.400 and for which she had also issued a receipt. Ex.P-14 is the counter foil of the receipt in which the accuseci had signed. 16. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that this witness has deposed falsely and that M.O-4 Thaali was not recovered and the mahazar was signed by the witness only at the police station. Of course, such suggestions were made to the witness, but however, she has emphatically denied. Here again, it has to be pointed out that the accused has not disputed his signature in Ex.P-14. So also, it is not the case of the accused that his signature was obtained forcibly in Ex.P-14 after he was taken into custody by the police. We are of the opinion that the testimony of P.W-6 infuses confidence in the minds of this Court. Consequently, we held that the prosecution has proved the recovery of M.O-4 Thaali from P.W-6 on the basis of the confession given by the accused. 17. P.W-7 is a goldsmith by profession and he was carrying on his business at Thiruvaiyaru. This witness has deposed that on 5.12.1991, the accused came and handed over two gold gundus and asked him to cor vert them into a cold coin. After the arrest of the accused, when the police party went there, on accused identifying the same, they were recovered from P.W-7. M.O-6 series are the said gold gundus. P.W-7 had also signed in the said mahazar Ex.P-11. Learned counsel for the appellant here again contended that the whole recovery was only a make-believe affair and that the mahazar Ex.P-11 was prepared only at the Police Station, in which P.W-7 signed and hence the testimony of P.W-7 so also the recovery of M.O-6 have to be eschewed from the consideration of this court. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant here again contended that the whole recovery was only a make-believe affair and that the mahazar Ex.P-11 was prepared only at the Police Station, in which P.W-7 signed and hence the testimony of P.W-7 so also the recovery of M.O-6 have to be eschewed from the consideration of this court. 18. On a careful reading of the testimony of P.W-7 we find that in the cross examination, no questions were put to this witness with regard to recovery, which should mean that on behalf of the accused, the recovery made from P.W-7 has not been disputed. It has also to be pointed out that in fact no suggestions were put to him, when he was in the witness box as to why he was deposing falsely against the accused. We find no reason to reject his testimony as unworthy of acceptance. We hold that M.O-6 gold ornament was recovered from P.W-7 pursuant to the confession statement made by the accused. 19. To sum up, we hold that after arrest, the accused made a voluntary confession statement and on that basis, the police authorities recovered M.O-7 series (gold coins) from P.W-5, M.O-4 Thaali from P.W-6 and M.O-6 gold Thaaligundus from P.W-7. 20. Now, the question for consideration is, whether the conviction can be based solely on the basis of recovery of jewels made pursuant to the confession made by the accusede In brief, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that mere recovery of some articles cannot form the basis for convicting the accused for murder as well and at best on the basis of recoveries, a person can be convicted only for an offence under Sec.411, I.P.C. In support of his contention, learned counsel referred to certain rulings of the Supreme Court. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State referee to various rulings and submitted that the court can in a given case draw a presumption under Sec.114 of the Evidence Act that a person in possession of the stolen articles is guilty of robbery and also murder and that the same would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case and the case on hand is one such case. 21. It would be more appropriate to consider these rulings chronologically. 21. It would be more appropriate to consider these rulings chronologically. In Tulsiram v. State, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 1, a Bench of three learned Judges of the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider a case where there was a long gap between the alleged murder and recovery of the ornaments. In fact, in that case, the High Court, for convicting the accused, placed reliance on the confession statement made by the accused before the Magistrate, the discovery of a blood-stained piece of cloth from the house of the appellant and identification of certain ear ornaments seized from one Mangroo which appeared to have old blood-like marks here and there. The Supreme Court after considering the matter came to the conclusion that the alleged confession made to the Magistrate cannot be relied on as the Magistrate after administering warning, left the accused in the police custody. With regard to the bloodstained dhoti, the Court held that the Serologist's report did not mention the blood as that of human and hence that piece of evidence was of no use. Thirdly, with regard to seizure of certain ear ornaments from one Mangroo, the Court rejected that piece of evidence as well. In that context, the Supreme Court observed as under: “Apart from this confession, the judgment of the High Court is based on the identification of the gold ornaments. The Sessions Judge recognised that if the ornaments had been proved to have been the property of the deceased, it would have been possible to infer that the accused was the person who committed the murder and robbed the murdered man. In our opinion, this reasoning, under the circumstances of the case, is unsound. The alleged murder took place on 28.5.1949 and assuming that the ornaments were traced to the accused at the end of October, 1949, no legitimate inference could be drawn about the appellant being the murderer of the deceased. The important factor which appears to have been overlooked is that five months had elapsed between the date of the alleged murder and the tracing of the ornaments. The presumption permitted to be drawn under Sec.-114 illu. (a) Evidence Act, has to be read along with the important time factor. If ornaments or things of the deceased are found in the possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. The presumption permitted to be drawn under Sec.-114 illu. (a) Evidence Act, has to be read along with the important time factor. If ornaments or things of the deceased are found in the possession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be permitted. But if several months expire in the interval, the presumption may not be permitted to be drawn having regard to the circumstances of the case. This criticism applied equally to the reasoning of the High Court for its conclusion.” (Italics supplied) 22. The next ruling the can be usefully referred to is the one reported in Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 54. It was a case where the occurrence was on 1.1.1948 and the accused was arrested on 13.1.1948 and on the same day, the accused produced a gold kanthi from his bara where it was lying buried in the ground. The another accused in that case was arrested subsequently, (i.e.) on 18.1.1948 and on 19.1.1948, he produced a silver plate (atshk) bearing certain inscription, from his house where it lay buried in the ground. The court was considering a case whether the accused in that case could be held guilty for murder as well. We extract the relevant paragraph, which runs as under: “The learned counsel for the State in support of the view taken by the High Court placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court in Queen-Empress v. Sami, 13 Mad. 426(A). The head-note of the report says that “Recent and unexplained possession of stolen property which would be presumptive evidence against the prisoners on the charge of robbery would similarly be evidence against them on the charge of murder.” This head note, however, does not accurately represent the decision given by the learned Judges. In the particular circumstances of that case it was observe that in cases in which murder and robbery are shown to form parts of one transaction, recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property while it would be presumptive evidence against a prisoner on the charge of robbery would similarly be evidence against him on the charge of murder. Here, there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the robbery and murder formed parts of one transaction. It is not even known at what time of the night these events took place. Here, there is no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the robbery and murder formed parts of one transaction. It is not even known at what time of the night these events took place. It was only late next morning that it was discovered that the Mahant and Ganpatia had been murdered and looted. In our judgment, Beaumont, C.J., and Sen J. in Bhikha Gobar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1943 Bom. 458 rightly held that the mere fact that an accused produced shortly after the murder ornaments which were on the murdered person is not enough to justify the inference that the accused must have committed the murder.” There must be some further material to connect to accused with the murder in order to hold him guilty of that offence. Our attention was drawn to a number of decisions which have beer summed up in a Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in State v. Shankar Prasad, A.I.R. 1952 All. 776 in some of which a presumption was drawn of guilt from the circumstance of possession of stolen articles soon after a murder. We have examined these cases and it appears to us that each one of these decisions was given on the evidence and circumstances established in that particular case and no general proposition of law can be deduced from them. “In our Judgment no hard and fast rule can be laid down as to what inference should be drawn from a certain circumstance. Where, however, the only evidence against an accused person is the recovery of stolen property and although the circumstances may indicate that the theft and the murder must have been committed at the same time, it is not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was the murderer. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof.” (Italics supplied) It has to be noted that the earlier Ruling viz., Tulsiram v. State, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 1 was not brought to the notice of the court. 23. The next ruling is the one reported in Baiju v. State of M.P., 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 142. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof.” (Italics supplied) It has to be noted that the earlier Ruling viz., Tulsiram v. State, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 1 was not brought to the notice of the court. 23. The next ruling is the one reported in Baiju v. State of M.P., 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 142. In that case also, the Court was considering the question whether on the basis of recovery of some gold ornaments, an inference can be drawn under Sec.114 of the Evidence Act and that it was the accused, who committed the murdere In that case, the occurrence was on 20.1.1975 and the accused was arrested on 28.1.1975. The accused gave a confession statement and also took the police to his house and produced certain articles. The accused also showed the person to whom he sold some silver articles viz., to a gold smith P.W-7 in that case. The recovered articles were put up for identification and the memoranda in that respect was also placed on record. The two prosecution witnesses correctly identified the articles as belonging to the deceased Ramdayal. The Supreme Court, in para No. 14 of the Judgment held as under: “As has been stated, the prosecution has succeeded in providing beyond any doubt that the commission of the murders and the robbery formed part of one transaction, and the recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property by the appellant justified the presumption that it was he, and no one else, who had committed the murders and the robbery. It will be recalled that the offences were committed on the night intervening January 20 and 21, 1975, and the stolen property was recovered from the house of the appellant or at his instance on January 28, 1975. The appellant was given an opportunity to explain his possession, as well as his conduct in decoying Smt. Lakhpatiya and the other persons who died at his hand, but he was unable to do so. The question whether a presumption should be drawn under illustration (a) of Sec.114 of the Evidence Act is a matter which depends on the evidence and the circumstances of each case. The question whether a presumption should be drawn under illustration (a) of Sec.114 of the Evidence Act is a matter which depends on the evidence and the circumstances of each case. Thus, the nature of the stolen article, the manner of its acquisition by the owner, the nature of the evidence about its identification, the manner in which it was dealt with by the appellant, the place and the circumstances of its recovery, the length of the intervening period, the ability or otherwise of the appellant to explain his possession, are factors which have to be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision. We have made a mention of the facts and circumstances bearing on these points and we have no doubt that there was ample justification for reaching the inevitable conclusion that it was the appellant and no one else who had committed the four murders and the robbery. In the face of the overwhelming evidence on which reliance has been placed by the High Court, it is futile to argue that the murders could not have been committed by a single person. As has been stated, there is satisfactory evidence on the record to show that the dead bodies of Ramdayal and Smt. Fulkunwar were found at two different placed near the”nala“so that it cannot be said that they were murdered together. As regards Smt. Bhagwati and Rambakas, the evidence on the record shows that they were murdered while they were asleep in the house, and there is no reason why a single person could not have committed their murders also.” (Italics supplied) It has to be pointed out that the Supreme Court relied two Rulings viz., (i) Wasim Khan v. The State of Utter Pradesh, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 400 and Alisher to hold that recent and unexplained possession of stolen articles can well be taken to be presumptive evidence of the charge of murder as well. 24. Then we have the next ruling reported in State of Maharashtra v. Annappa Bandu Kavatage, 1980 S.C.C. (Crl.) 155. It was a case where a boy of three years age and the accused were missing and on the following day, a boy was recovered from a well situate in the filed of one third party. 24. Then we have the next ruling reported in State of Maharashtra v. Annappa Bandu Kavatage, 1980 S.C.C. (Crl.) 155. It was a case where a boy of three years age and the accused were missing and on the following day, a boy was recovered from a well situate in the filed of one third party. The accused took the ear-rings from the body and they were sold in the market to a prosecution witness for Rs.35 and on a search of the person of the accused Rs34.50 were recovered from him. The only evidence available in that case was recovery. On the facts of that case, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the contention of the learned counsel for the accused is well founded and the contention being that even accepting all the circumstances. The possibility that after having snatched the ear-rings, the respondent might have left the boy near the field cannot be excluded. The court further observed that as there was sufficient interval between the death of the body, and the recovery of the body, the link in the chain of the circumstantial evidence does not appear to be fully complete. It has to be noted that the Supreme Court did not hold that a mere recovery is not sufficient but it only held that in the circumstances of that case, the accused cannot be convicted under Sec.302, I.P.C. In fact, the Supreme Court observed that “in these circumstances, therefore, we agree with the High Court that the respondent was entitled to benefit of doubt under Secs.302 and 364 I.P.C.” Here again, it is relevant to point out that the Ruling reported in Baiju v. State of M.P., 1978 S.C.C. (Crl.) 142 was not brought to the notice of the Supreme Court. 25. The next ruling is reported in Union Territory of Goa v. Beaventura D Souza, (1993)3 S.C.C. (Supp) 305. The question there was whether the conviction can be based on a mere recovery. In that case, the occurrence was on the night of 3rd September, 1980 and the accused was arrested on 3rd October, 1990, one moth after the occurrence. We are of the opinion that it is necessary to quote the relevant passage from the Judgment. Para No.9 of the Judgment reads thus: “It is only in this context the courts have to be careful. We are of the opinion that it is necessary to quote the relevant passage from the Judgment. Para No.9 of the Judgment reads thus: “It is only in this context the courts have to be careful. Suspicion, however, strong cannot take the place of proof. As already pointed out the learned Sessions Judge drew a presumption that since the accused did not give any explanation for the possession of the stolen articles then it must be so presumed that they committed the murder also. This finding to the extent it goes against the accused does not stand scrutiny in the eye of law. Unless there is something else to show that the accused alone were in the company of the deceased and in the absence of any explanation then perhaps a presumption can be drawn but even that depends upon the facts and the circumstances of each case. The illustration of Sec.114(a) of the Evidence Act is to the effect “that a man who is in the possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession”. No doubt in some given cases the presumption is further extended to the extent of holding that such person committed the offence of murder also. In this case, we are satisfied that there are no such circumstances to connect the accused with the murder. The only presumption that can be drawn by the application of Sec.114 (a) of the Evidence Act would be to the extent by holding them guilty under Sec.411, I.P.C. and that is to say that they have not explained the possession of stolen property. In the result, we confirm the acquittal of the two respondents in respect of all the charges but for the reasons stated above we convict them under Sec.411, I.P.C. Each of the respondent is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.” As far as this Judgment is concerned, it has to be pointed out that the Supreme Court has categorically held that in some given cases, presumption can be extended to the extent of holding that such person committed the offence of murder as well and that everything depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Or in other words, the Supreme Court did not hold that under no circumstances, recovery of articles alone (gold articles) can be a basis for conviction for murder. 26. The next ruling is reported in Gautam Maroti Umale v. State of Maharashtra, (1994)3 S.C.C. (Supp.) 326. In that case, the occurrence took place on 26.11.1984 and the accused was arrested on 28.11.1984 and at his instance, the silver kadas and two pairs of ear-rings were recovered. With regard to the recovery, the prosecution examined two panch witnesses viz., P.Ws.-3 and 4 out of whom one turned hostile. The recovery of ornaments was from the accused himself. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled that even if the recovery is accepted, that by itself cannot connect the accused with the murder and to hold him to the murderer of the deceased, and at best, he can be convicted under Sec.411, I.P.C. for being in possession of stolen property for which he has no explanation. It has to be noted that in that case apart from recovery from the person of the accused, there was no circumstance. We may also point out that neither the prosecution nor the accused brought to the notice of the court the earlier rulings. 27. In Gulab Chanad v. State of M.P., 1995 S.C.C. (Crl.) 552 the Supreme Court after referring to the earlier Rulings viz., Tulsiram v. State, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 1 and Sanwat Khan v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 54 observed thus: “No fixed time-limit can be laid down to determine whether possession is recent or otherwise and each case must be judge don it sown facts. The question as to what amounts to recent possession sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies according as the stolen article is or is not, calculated to pass readily from hand to hand. If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that period. If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be too long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that period. In our view, it has been rightly held by the High Court that the accused was not affluent enough to possess the said ornaments and from the nature of the evidence adduced in this case and from the recovery of the said articles from his possession and his dealing with the ornaments of the deceased immediately after the murder and robbery a reasonable inference of the commission of the said offence can be drawn against the appellant. Excepting an assertion that the ornaments belonged to the family of the accused which claim has been rightly discarded, no plausible explanation for lawful possession of the said ornaments immediately after the murder has been given by the accused. In the facts of this case, it appears to us that murder and robbery have been proved to have been integral parts of the same transaction and therefore, the presumption arising under illustration (a) of Sec.114 Evidence Act is that not only the appellant committed the murder of the deceased but also committed robbery of her ornaments.” 28. The next ruling that can be usefully referred to is the one reported in Ashok Yadav v. State of M.P., 1997 S.C.C. (Crl.) 317. The question in that case was whether a conviction can be based on the recovery of certain articles viz., a watch, a pen and a dot-pen. On the facts of that case, the Court disbelieved the Panch witness and then observed as under: “The prosecution has attempted to connect the pen, Ext. P-9 and the dot-pen Ext.P-12 which are of a common make, with the deceased on the strength of the inscription of his name on the same. The investigating Officer admitted in his cross-examination that the price of the pen and the dot-pen was about Re 1 or Rs.2 in the market and the same were easily available. Parmal Singh, P.W-6, did not depose at the trial that when the pens were recovered allegedly on the pointing out of the appellants Mohan and Veerendra, they contained the name of Avadhesh inscribed on them. Parmal Singh, P.W-6, did not depose at the trial that when the pens were recovered allegedly on the pointing out of the appellants Mohan and Veerendra, they contained the name of Avadhesh inscribed on them. That the pen and the dot-pen contained the inscription of the name of Avadhesh is a later improvement, introduced at the trial. This renders the story of recovery of the pen and dot pen doubtful. So far as the recovery of the watch is concerned, there is no mention about the watch in the FIR. Watch, Ext.P-18 is a ladies wrist watch. At the trial P.W-9 tried to explain that the said watch had been purchased by him for his wife Saroj, P.W-10 and the deceased was wearing that watch on his wrist when he went to school. It also appears to be an afterthought because if that was so, there was no reason for P.W-9 not to have disclosed in the FIR that the deceased was wearing the watch. It appears to us that the recoveries are not free from doubt and the same appear to have been pressed into aid to buttress the prosecution's case. The evidence of Parmal Singh, P.W-6 when considered in the established facts and circumstances of the case, creates a doubt about his credit worthiness and consequently about the genuineness of, the recoveries. We are therefore, unable to place any reliance on the recoveries and hold that the recoveries do not connect the appellants with the crime.” 29. The next Ruling that can be considered is the one Net Raj Singh v. State of M.P., 1997 S.C.C. (Crl.) 506. In that case, the murder was on 11.10.1988 and the accused was arrested on 13.10.1988 and a silver todal was recovered from him. In that case, the courts below viz., the Sessions Court as well as the High Court found that the Silver todal recovered from his belonged to Sunder Lal and was in is possession during the ill-fated journey to destination Kerpani Village. In that case, the courts below viz., the Sessions Court as well as the High Court found that the Silver todal recovered from his belonged to Sunder Lal and was in is possession during the ill-fated journey to destination Kerpani Village. The Supreme Court pointed out that the accused was found openly moving about with the ornament keep in it on its person and that there is quite a variation in the evidence as to whether the silver todal was on the person of the deceased, as deposed to by her mother, when she left with her father or whether the father had the same throughout, as evidenced by the story put up by the prosecution and that there is no evidence to show that the concealed it nor was he in possession of any other stolen property involved in the dacoity. The Supreme Court further held that on the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not be sound to draw a presumption beyond the accused being a receiver of the stolen property with the requisite knowledge. In that judgment, the Supreme Court considered the earlier rulings, the conclusions of the court are worded as under: “We are of the opinion that, on the facts and circumstances of this case, it would not be sound to draw a presumption beyond his being a receiver of the stolen property with the requisite knowledge.” 30. In Shabad Pulia Reddy v. State of A.P., 1998 S.C.C. (Crl.) 116 the Supreme Court was considering about the nature of presumption to be drawn and the effect of recoveries made from the accused. In that case, the stolen articles recovered among other things were gold chain M.O-5, a pair of gold bangles M.O-6, a torchlight M.O-8, a gold ring M.O-3 and gold ear-flowers M.O-7 from various accused. In that case, the arrest was nearly after three months. The Supreme Court found that there was unusual and unexplained delay in holding the test identification parade. The Supreme Court pointed out two reasons viz., recovery of articles from the accused persons three long months after the incident and further the recovery is too artificial to be believed as it would be strange that even after three months of the incident all the accused were carrying a stolen article each/including a torch light. The Supreme Court pointed out two reasons viz., recovery of articles from the accused persons three long months after the incident and further the recovery is too artificial to be believed as it would be strange that even after three months of the incident all the accused were carrying a stolen article each/including a torch light. The Supreme Court had observed thus: ”If really they had stolen such articles, at the time of the murder, it was expected in the fitness of things that they would dispose of them as early as possible more so when the nature of articles was such that they could pass hands quickly. This apart, even one proceeds on the assumption that evidence regarding the identification of the articles and recovery there of is acceptable, still then, no presumption can be drawn after such a long lapse of time that they were party to the murder itself. The most favourable conclusion that can be drawn for the prosecution from such recovery is; that they dishonestly retained the stolen properties knowing them to be stolen but in absence of any charge framed under Sec.411, I.P.C. and on their acquittal of the charge under Sec.396, I.P.C., no order of conviction can be recorded against them.” 31. In Ronny @ Ronald James Alwaris v. State of Maharashtra, 1998 S.C.C. (Crl.) 859 the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the nature of presumption that can be drawn under Sec.14 of the Evidence Act. In that case, the occurrence was on 21.7.1992 and the arrest was on 28.7.1992. Certain articles were recovered from the accused. Pursuant to the further statements made by A-2, VCR of National Panasonic Company was recovered from the house of P.W-59 and ornaments (Articles 64 to 73) were recovered from one Jewellery Shop. The ornaments that were sold by A.2 on 24th and 25th July are three golden rings, two bangles having black beads, one necklace, one pair of eartops and one small ear-chain. The gold ornaments and the receipt books were seized under recovery Panchaname. In that case, the Supreme Court relying on recoveries held as under: “Apropos the recovery of articles belonging to the Ohol family from the possession of the appellants soon after the robbery and the murder of the deceased (Mr.Mohan Ohol, Mrs. The gold ornaments and the receipt books were seized under recovery Panchaname. In that case, the Supreme Court relying on recoveries held as under: “Apropos the recovery of articles belonging to the Ohol family from the possession of the appellants soon after the robbery and the murder of the deceased (Mr.Mohan Ohol, Mrs. Ruhi Ohol and Mr.Rohan Ohol) which possession has remained unexplained by the appellants, the presumption under illustration (a) of Sec.114 of the Evidence Act will be attracted. It needs no discussion to conclude that the murder and the robbery of the articles were found to be part of the same transaction. The irresistible conclusion would, therefore, be that the appellants and no one else had committed the three murders and the robbery.” 32. A Division Bench of this Court had occasion to consider this aspect in the recent ruling reported in Abdul Razak @ Razak & Others v. State, (2000)2 L.W. (Crl.) 673. The Division Bench pointed out that the accused did not even come out with an explanation that the articles belonged to them and no plausible explanation for lawful possession of the articles was given by the accused in the case when they were questioned under Sec.313, Cr.P.C. In that case, this court held that a presumption can be drawn under Sec.114 of the Evidence Act to the effect that it was the accused who committed the murder. The Division Bench observed thus: “When we apply the above principles to the present case, it is to be noted that the accused had no explanation to offer for the recoveries. The accused did not even come out with an explanation that the articles belonged to them. No plausible explanation for lawful possession of the articles was given by the accused in the case when they were questioned under Sec.313, Cr.P.C. when we apply the principles as enunciated by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, 2000 S.C.C. (Crl.) 263 to the facts of the present case as stated earlier, we cannot but drew an irresistible inference against the accused that the accused committed robbery of the gold jewellery of the deceased-family and kept them concealed and that robbery and murder formed part of the same transaction. We, therefore, confirm their conviction for the offence of murder as charged.” 33. We, therefore, confirm their conviction for the offence of murder as charged.” 33. From the above rulings, the legal position is as under: (i) When stolen articles belonging to the deceased are recovered not only there can be a presumption that the accused committed robbery, but also that it was the accused, who committed the murder as well but however that is a matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The legal position as on date is that it is not as if no conviction can be based at all on mere recoveries whatever may be the facts and circumstances. (ii) The nature of the stolen article, the manner of its acquisition by the accused, the nature of the evidence about its identification, the manner in which it was dealt with by the accused, the place and circumstances of its recovery, the length of the intervening period, the ability or otherwise of the accused to explain his possession are factors which have to be taken into consideration in arriving at a decision. (iii) No fixed time-limit can be laid down to determine whether possession is recent or otherwise and each case must be judged on its own facts. (iv) If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily from hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that period. 34. Coming to the present case, the occurrence was on 4.12.1991. On the very next day, the accused pledged M.O-7 jewel and borrowed Rs.250 from P.W-5. The fact that the jewel was seized from the custody of P.W-5 has not been disputed by the accused. M.O-4 gold Thaali was seized from P.W-6. Nothing has been pointed out before this court to doubt the testimonies of P.Ws.-5 and 6. It has been proved that the accused on the very next day also handed over M.O-6 to a gold smith P. W-7 to convert it into a gold coin. The seizure of M.O-6 from P.W-7 has not been disputed by the accused. The son of the deceased i.e., P.W-1 had identified the recovered ornaments as that of the deceased. In the cross-examination to P.W-1 not even a suggestion was made disputing the claim that M.O-6 and M.O-7 belonged to the deceased. The seizure of M.O-6 from P.W-7 has not been disputed by the accused. The son of the deceased i.e., P.W-1 had identified the recovered ornaments as that of the deceased. In the cross-examination to P.W-1 not even a suggestion was made disputing the claim that M.O-6 and M.O-7 belonged to the deceased. Or in other words, only a suggestion to the effect that the deceased was not the owner of M.O-4 was put to P.W-1. The accused has not come forward with any plausible explanation as to how he came into possession of M.Os-4, 6 and 7. No claim has been made by the accused to the effect that those jewels belong to him or his family either by putting questions in the cross examination to the prosecution witnesses or by making statements when examined under Sec.313, Cr.P.C. The failure to come forward with an explanation as to how he (the accused) came into possession of M.Os-4, 6 and 7 would supply the missing link as ruled by the Supreme Court in Joseph v. State of Kerala, 2000 S.C.C. (Crl.) 926. In these facts and circumstances, we cannot, but draw an irresistible inference against the accused that the accused committed robbery of the gold jewels of the deceased and that in the facts and circumstances of this case, the robbery and murder formed part of the same transaction. Once we come to such conclusion, then it necessarily follows that we have to confirm the conviction and sentence under Sec.302, I.P.C., as well against the accused. 35. In the result we hold that the prosecution has proved the case beyond all reasonable doubts and that the accused is guilty under Secs.302, 201 and 392, I.P.C.. The conviction and sentence imposed on the accused by the trial court are hereby confirmed. There are no merits in the appeal. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. B.S.-----Appeal dismissed.