JUDGMENT V.K. Gupta, C.J. 1. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner, M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. Led. challenging the legality, validity and correctness of the order dated 3rd April, 2001. passed by respondent No. 2, the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jharkhand, whereby, while exercising his suo motu revisional jurisdiction in terms of Sub-section (4) of Section 64 of the Bihar Finance Act. 1981, he set aside the order dated 16.12.2000 passed by respondent No. 3, the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Jamshedpur and directed respondent No. 4, the Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Urban Circle, Jamshedpur, to cancel the Exemption Certificate issued earlier in favour of the petitioner. The brief facts leading to the filing of this petition may be stated as hereunder :-- 2. The Government of Bihar in 1995 came out with an Industrial Policy Resolution which stipulated certain concession to the newly set up Industrial Units in the State and granted concessions and exemptions to such Units with a view to encouraging further industrialization of various areas in the undivided State of Bihar and to attract new Entrepreneurship by way of setting up New Units and diversification of the existing Units. Since Industrial Policy Resolution, 1995 was only by way of an intention statement of the State of Bihar and was more of a Policy framework, SO 479 dated 22nd December, 1995, was issued in terms of Section 7(3) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981, granting exemption from payment of Sales Tax on purchase of raw materials utilised for sale of the finished products on certain terms and conditions contained in the Notification itself. SO 58 dated 2nd March, 2000, was issued by the Government of Bihar, again in exercise of the power conferred upon it under Section 7(3)(b) of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 whereby certain amendments in SO 479 dated 22nd December 1995 were brought about. The preamble of SO 58 reads thus :-- "In exercise of the powers conferred under Sub-section 3(b) of Section 7, of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 (Bihar Act No. 5 of 1981) the Governor of Bihar has reasons to believe that in the interest of industrial development of the State, it is essential to incorporate following amendments in the previous Notification No. SO 479 dated 22nd December, 1995, issued by the Deptt. of Commercial Taxes." The following clauses of SO 58 dated 2nd March. 2000 are relevant for our purposes ;-- "New Industrial Unit" has been defined to mean such a new unit where production starts between September. 1995 and 31st August, 2000 and which has obtained a letter of permission etc. etc. Any Unit where Rs. 500 crores or more has been invested in diversification would also be treated as a New Unit under the said Notification and any Unit which has obtained prior permission before 31st August, 2000 from the State Government and started production within five years from the date of such permission would also be treated as a New Unit. Clause 4(c) of this Notification being of utmost importance for our case may be reproduced in verbatim. It reads thus :-- "In case of diversification, these benefits shall be applicable only to such nature of Commercial products which were not produced earlier by the unit and that after diversification the facilities available shall be to the extent of actual production only." 3. It is the case of the petitioner that it falls within the scope, purview and ambit of the aforesaid exemption Notification and that because it is entitled to the grant of exemption on the purchase of raw material, it should be allowed such exemption, by passing of an appropriate order under Bihar Finance Act. 1981. The petitioners case is that it was primarily engaged in the manufacture of Iron & Steel Products, namely, Hot Rolled Products. Subsequently, in the changed marketing scenario, the petitioner decided to diversify to manufacture Cold Rolled Products. The Hot Rolled Products were being manufactured through Hot Rolling Mill (HRM) and the Cold Rolled Products were manufactured through Cold Rolling Mill (CRM). The two products, therefore, hereafter shall be referred to as HRM and CRM. 4. The petitioners case is that CRM was a different product from HRM and it decided to set up a New Unit for the manufacture of CRM, a product which was not being manufactured earlier by the petitioner and for setting up such a New Unit, it invested a sum of Rs. 1300 Crores. 4. The petitioners case is that CRM was a different product from HRM and it decided to set up a New Unit for the manufacture of CRM, a product which was not being manufactured earlier by the petitioner and for setting up such a New Unit, it invested a sum of Rs. 1300 Crores. It, accordingly, applied, by invoking the aforesaid SO 479 dated 22nd December 1995 read with aforesaid SO 58 dated 2nd March, 2000, to the Joint Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, for grant of exemption from payment of Sales Tax on purchase of raw material for producing CRM. Actually, it appears that the application was made to the Deputy Commissioner. Commercial Taxes, Jamshedpur, who sought approval of the Joint Commissioner for grant of such exemption for payment of Sales Tax on purchase of raw material. The Joint Commissioner passed an order on 16.12.2000 granting such approval. The operating part of this order reads thus :-- "In view of the facts and legal position discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. I am of the opinion that the case of the applicants company is covered by the amended provisions of the Industrial Policy 1995 and SO 478/479 dated 22.12.1995. However, there is no justification for exemption of tax free purchase of raw materials in the form of HR sheet/coil and FHCR as these are to be met by its captive production. The exemption of tax free purchase of raw materials can be allowed as per the approved project which is obviously based on integrated steel plant concept and indigenous supply of HR coils/strips from captive production. Exemption cannot be allowed on the basis of future contingencies and surmises. Therefore, exemption of HR coils/strips and FHCR are not approved. Subject to the above, the orders passed by the Deputy Commissioner under SO 478 and 479 are approved with usual conditions as prescribed in the said notifications. Deputy Commissioner, Urban Circle, may issue exemption certificates accordingly." 5. It appears that respondent No. 2, Commissioner of Commercial Taxes did not find himself in agreement with the aforesaid view of his Joint Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner and. accordingly on 22nd February 2001, he passed an order exercising his suo motu revlsional jurisdiction under Sub-section (4) of Section 46 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and issued notices to the parties with respect to his proposal to set aside the aforesaid order of the Joint Commissioner. accordingly on 22nd February 2001, he passed an order exercising his suo motu revlsional jurisdiction under Sub-section (4) of Section 46 of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 and issued notices to the parties with respect to his proposal to set aside the aforesaid order of the Joint Commissioner. Four points were formulated by him for adjudication in the said notice. There are as under :-- "1. Whether the said order is legal & proper in accepting the HR Products and CR Products as different when they are clubbed together under the same Sub Category (VI) of Item (IV) of Section 14 of CST Act. 1956 specially when the Honble Supreme Court of India in M/s. Telen-gana Steel Industries, 93 STC 187 SC, has clearly pronounced that items which fall under one sub category of Section 14 cant be treated as different commodity for taxation purpose? 2. Whether the principles as enunciated by the Honble Supreme Court in M/s. Jagannath Cotton Company and another, 1995 (5) SCC 527 , for treating commodities as different and making them eligible for benefits under the Industrial policy are fulfilled in the instant case? 3. Whether the different provisions of SO 478/479 (as amended by SO 57/58 dated 2.3.2000) dated 22.12.1995 can be read in isolation or they are to be read as an integrated and inter related one. The question of incremental production as envisaged in Para 4 of the SO 57/58 dated 2.3.2000 has to be looked into for industries going in for diversification. As per the provision of SO 57/58 dated 2.3.2000 the criteria of investment has been laid down with a sole purpose of diversification and has been made operative from 26.8.1997 (Para 1 of the notification)? 4. Whether the Commercial Taxes Department is bound to grant any such exemption to the dealer concerned particularly when the life of the Industrial Policy 1995 of the State of Bihar under which exemption are sought & granted, has already lapsed on 31.8.2000 much before the creation of the Jharkhand State on 15.11.2000?" 6. Ultimately on 3rd April, 2001, the impugned order was passed by Respondent No. 2 whereby he, as noticed at the outset. set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner and directed the cancellation of the Exemption Certificate. The concluding part of the aforesaid impugned order reads thus : "To conclude. Ultimately on 3rd April, 2001, the impugned order was passed by Respondent No. 2 whereby he, as noticed at the outset. set aside the order of the Joint Commissioner and directed the cancellation of the Exemption Certificate. The concluding part of the aforesaid impugned order reads thus : "To conclude. Hot Rolled steel products and Cold Rolled Steel Products which are classified under same sub-item (vi) of Item (iv) of Section 14 of CST Act 1956 and which are treated to be the same commodity for the purpose of levy of tax, cannot be treated to be different commodity for the purpose of exemption of tax, as the levy of tax and exemption of tax governed by the same statute. Therefore, the CRM unit of the dealer TISCO, cannot qualify for diversification as the nature of the Cold Rolled Steel product and that of Hot Rolled Steel Products being manufactured earlier, is essentially the same, as far as sales tax is concerned. The dealer company, therefore, does not qualify for any sales tax exemption as enumerated in SO 57/58 dated 2.3.2000. The order dated 16.12.2000 passed by the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Admn.) Jamshedpur granting sales tax exemption to the dealer company is set aside and the Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Urban Circle) Jamshedpur is directed to cancel the Bikri-Kar Vimukti Praman Parta (Exemption Certificate) issued earlier by him on 21.12.2000 to the dealer M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Company. The petitioner dated 27.2.2001 of the dealer M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. requesting withdrawal of stay order issued earlier, is also disposed of, in accordance with the above order." 7. Even though in the show cause notice issued under Section 46(4) of the Act, the Commissioner had formulated four points as the grounds for his proposal to exercise suo motu revisional jurisdiction, in this petition, we are concerned only with one ground, a very limited one, and that is. about the fact whether CRM is commercially a different product than HRM. This point is directly relatable to Clause 4(c) of the Notification SO 58 dated 2nd March 2000 because it is under this clause that the benefit of exemption is made applicable only to such nature of commercial products which were not produced earlier by the Unit which has gone in for diversification. This point is directly relatable to Clause 4(c) of the Notification SO 58 dated 2nd March 2000 because it is under this clause that the benefit of exemption is made applicable only to such nature of commercial products which were not produced earlier by the Unit which has gone in for diversification. In other words, the only limited question with which we are concerned in this petition is to find out and decide, if possible (as we shall hereinafter see) as to whether CRM is commercially a different Product than HRM which was earlier being produced by the petitioner. We are saying so because Mr. B.S. Lal, learned Addl. Advocate General appearing for the respondent has very fairly, frankly and candidly stated before us that this is the only point arising for our consideration in this petition, inasmuch as no other issue is involved in this case for our adjudication, as according to Mr. Lal. Notification No. SO 479 read with Notification No. SO 58 have now been made applicable to the State of Jharkhand because the State of Jharkhand, has adopted Bihar Finance Act. 1981 and that because of the applicability of these two Notifications is the State of Jharkhand, these Notifications are applicable to the case of the petitioner as well, subject to the petitioner falling within the purview of the aforesaid Clause 4(c) of Notification No. SO 58. In other words, these Notifications are enforceable and operative as on date in the State of Jharkhand, these having been validly extended to Jharkhand State and we also proceed on the premise that the benefit of these Notifications is applicable to the petitioner as well, subject, of course, to the paramount and over-riding condition that CRM is a product commercially different from HRM. 8. Respondent No. 2 has taken a view that CRM is not a different product from HRM. While taking this view he has found support primarily in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Section 14 of the CST Act, 1956, in so far as it is relevant for our purposes, reads thus :-- "14. 8. Respondent No. 2 has taken a view that CRM is not a different product from HRM. While taking this view he has found support primarily in Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. Section 14 of the CST Act, 1956, in so far as it is relevant for our purposes, reads thus :-- "14. Certain goods to be of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce-It is hereby declared that the following goods are of special importance in inter-State trade or commerce :-- * * * * * * (iv) iron and steel, that is to say,-- * * * * * * (vi) sheets, hoops, strips and skelp both black and galvanised, hot and clod rolled, plain and corrugated in all qualities, in straight lengths and in coil form, as rolled and in riveted condition:" By, thus, applying the analogy in Section 14 of the 1956 Act on the ground that hot and cold rolled strips have been clubbed together, they cannot be deemed or considered as separate or different items, the Commissioner came to the conclusion and finding that CRM, thus: being the same item as HRM, the petitioner cannot be considered to have diversified and, therefore, not falling within the scope and ambit of the Notification SO 479 read with Notification SO 58, it is not entitled to the grant of exemption on the payment of sales tax on purchase of raw material. While taking this view, the Commissioner appeared to have been guided mainly and primarily by two judgments, one of the Supreme Court in the case of Telengana Steel Industries and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., reported in 93 STC 187 and the judgment of Karnataka High Court in the case of Master Strips (Pvt.) Ltd, v. Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Ors., reported in 99 STC 216 (Kar). The Commissioner, therefore, on applying the analogy of Section 14 of the CST Act, 1956 and on taking support from the aforesaid two judgments, appears to have been influenced by the factors relating to eligibility qua the Taxing Statutes or the eligibility or non-eligibility to the taxability aspect qua fiscal Statutes. As we shall presently see, in the present case, we are not dealing with any question or any issue relating to the taxability or non-taxability either for CRM or HRM. As we shall presently see, in the present case, we are not dealing with any question or any issue relating to the taxability or non-taxability either for CRM or HRM. No issue is involved in this case, whereby any party is claiming or counter-claiming whether CRM is taxable under any Statute or is not taxable, qua the analogy of HRM or vice versa. No dispute or question arises for consideration in this case as to whether these two or any one of them are taxable commodities or not taxable commodities or whether Section 14 of the CST Act, 1956 is applicable to this case or not applicable. The Commissioner, according to us, was not at all justified in relying upon and applying the Supreme Court Judgment in Telangana case (supra) or the Karnataka High Court judgment (supra) on the analogy of Section 14 of the CST Act, and by saying that because the two items, namely CRM and HRM have been clubbed together for the purposes of taxation as envisaged under Section 15 of the CST Act, 1956 these cannot be considered as different items. There appears to be a clear fallacy in the approach of the Commissioner by doing so. On the basis of the taxability aspect of the two items with reference to fiscal and taxing Statutes his holding that the two items are same or similar, he has misdirected himself by not properly appreciating the actual contour of the controversy involved in the present case. 9. The only question which arises for consideration in this petition is whether, totally unconnected with any taxing statute or for that matter any other law, uninfluenced by any factor or any analogy drawn from any such statute, the two products are same commercially or different commercially. The only point of relevance in the entire adjudicatory process at the hands of the Commissioner was to find out whether these two items were commercially different or not. In the exercise of such adjudicatory process, it was not open to the Commissioner to press into aid such considerations which were either extraneous or irrelevant to the aforesaid point in issue. In the exercise of such adjudicatory process, it was not open to the Commissioner to press into aid such considerations which were either extraneous or irrelevant to the aforesaid point in issue. We have no hesitation in holding and coming to a conclusion that the analogy drawn by the Commissioner on the strength of the taking/ fiscal statutes and by applying Section 14 of the CST Act, 1956, was wholly extraneous and irrelevant to the point in issue involved in this case. The issue as to whether the two products are same, similar or different was required to be adjudicated upon and determined by the Commissioner totally independent of any such consideration. Actually the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal in the case of Jindal India Ltd. v. Dy. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes and Ors., reported in 117 STC 426 was nearer to the point and closer to the issue when de hors any taxing or fiscal statute, it examined the two products from the point of view of their being different or not different on the touch-stone of commercial relevance and returned appropriate finding on the merits of the case. We are referring to the aforesaid judgment of the West Bengal Taxation Tribunal to emphasis the point that respondent No. 2 in the present case was extraneously and irrelevantly influenced by wrongly invoking the analogy of Section 14 of the CST Act, 1956, and thus thereby, by wrongly applying the ratio in the aforesaid two judgments, of the Supreme Court in Telangana Steel case (supra) and of the learned Single Bench of Karnataka High Court in Master Strips case (supra). These two judgments are totally distinguishable and non-applicable as these cover an entirely different filed having no relation or bearing to the points involved in our case. 10. What, therefore, emerges from the aforesaid reasoning and the discussion on various relevant facts involved in this case and the analysis of applicable law on the subject, is that the petitioner can be held entitled to the relief of exemption if it satisfies that CRM is commercially, a different product than HRM. That is all that it has to do. Nothing else; nothing more. A satisfaction simpliciter, of course on objectivity criteria, that CRM is a product commercially different than HRM. 11. That is all that it has to do. Nothing else; nothing more. A satisfaction simpliciter, of course on objectivity criteria, that CRM is a product commercially different than HRM. 11. Now, the question which comes up for consideration, however, is that has the petitioner been able to lay the ground-work for such a satisfactory explanation and has the petitioner, in fact, and in effect and substance, been able to put forth such material as would form the basis of such satisfaction? The related question may also be as to who is the person who, in our view, should be considered most appropriate for being thus satisfied on this issued? Our answer to both these questions is that firstly the petitioner has not produced enough material whereby anyone can be said to have been satisfied fully that CRM is a product commercially different than HRM. Unless the petitioner does proceed in that direction and satisfies on that score, noting can be done. Secondly, we are of the view that respondent No. 2, Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, is the best suited and most appropriate Authority whom the petitioner should satisfy on this score. The related question which emerges is what should be the permanents of such a satisfaction? What should be the ingredients of the decision-taking process which would help the respondent No. 2 in arriving at a definite conclusion, whether one product is different from the other? We may attempt, by way of illustration to suggest that the relevant factors and material considerations which may tend to influence the Commissioner in deciding the said question may be the nature of the use of the two items, their process of manufacturing, the composition of the product, the ingredients which go into making the two products, the end-product that ultimately rolls out of the machine, who are the ultimate users and to what use the product is put to, depending also upon its marketability. The chemistry of product including its chemical composition, the industrial aspect etc. may also be relevant factors. In other words, factors relating to the technicality, finance economic aspects, viability and the marketing aspects broadly may be referred as relevant and material considerations. The chemistry of product including its chemical composition, the industrial aspect etc. may also be relevant factors. In other words, factors relating to the technicality, finance economic aspects, viability and the marketing aspects broadly may be referred as relevant and material considerations. We must immediately also hasten to add that we are not the Experts in the filed and the aforesaid illustrations are purely provisional and tentative and should not be taken as any expression of any final opinion by us. But illustrative they are, exhaustive they might not be. They are illustrative in the sense that the Commissioner may take his case from these illustrations, but ultimately what more, further or additional considerations are relevant should be in the exclusive domain of the Commissioner. 12. Accordingly, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 3rd April, 2001, is set aside. The matter is remanded to respondent No. 2 for reconsideration on the basis of the observations made hereinabove. He is directed to pass a fresh order after hearing the parties. If he thinks it desirable or advisable or, in other words, if in his opinion it is difficult to decide the issue involved in the case, without taking evidence, it is up to him to take appropriate evidence in deciding the issue. Evidence in this case can be or might be in the nature of examining Expert witness or witnesses because the facts which might be relevant in this case are in the realm of technical expertise and not in the domain of normal run-of-the mill oral evidence of laymen. Therefore, if at all the Commissioner considers that the material as is available to him is not sufficient to help him in arriving at a definite finding, he is free to examine any Expert-witness or witnesses who might be related to the subject and/or its various facts. It goes without saying that the recording of evidence of any such witness shall be subject to all the established Rules of evidence like examination-in-chief, cross-examination, re- examination and so on and so forth. 13. The Commissioner shall conclude the proceedings and pass consequential speaking and reasoned order as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from today. The interim direction issued by the court on 12th April, 2001 and modified on 31st May, 2001, shall continue to operate in the meanwhile. 13. The Commissioner shall conclude the proceedings and pass consequential speaking and reasoned order as expeditiously as possible and preferably within a period of three months from today. The interim direction issued by the court on 12th April, 2001 and modified on 31st May, 2001, shall continue to operate in the meanwhile. If, however, the Commissioner does not complete the aforesaid proceedings and pass consequential orders within three months from today, and also does not apply for extension of this period by offering cogent reasons and plausible explanation warranting such extension, it shall be open to the petitioner to approach this Court immediately at the expiry of three months to ask for grant of appropriate interim relief. 14. Petition stands disposed of. No orders as to costs. 15. W.P. disposed of.