K. SREEDHAR RAO, J. ( 1 ) THE appeal filed against the judgment and decree passed by the xv additional city civil and sessions judge, Bangalore in o. s. No. 5422 of 1988. The appellants 1 and 2 are the defendants 1 and 2 in the suit. The 3rd defendant in the suit is placed exparte and he has been impleaded as 2nd respondent in this appeal. The first respondent/plaintiff filed suit claiming damages in a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- towards the damage caused to his car by negligent felling of a tree on 18-5-1988 near kidwai hospital, Bangalore. The undisputed facts of the case disclose that in front of kidwai hospital there was a huge tree, which was almost decayed and was posing threat to the passers by. Besides, the corporation was contemplating the widening of the road, kidwai hospital authorities requested the corporation to take effective steps for cutting and removal of the tree. In that regard, the corporation also took necessary steps by initiating proceedings and entrusting the job of cutting the tree to the 2nd respondent herein. During the course of the cutting of the tree, it is said that a huge branch of the tree fell on the car of the plaintiff/respondent resulting in damage to the car to an extent of 1,50,000/ -. Accordingly, the plaintiff has claimed damages with interest and costs. ( 2 ) THE appellant-corporation in the written statement, took up the plea that the corporation is not responsible for the accident and that the 2nd respondent, who was the contractor, entrusted with the job of cutting the tree, alone should be held responsible, in causing damage to the plaintiffs car. The trial court on the consideration of the oral and documentary evidence decreed the suit directing the defendants to pay a sum of Rs. 1,24,500/- with interest at 10% p. a. from the date of the suit till realisation. Being aggrieved, the present suit is filed. ( 3 ) THE counsel for the appellant relied on the ruling of Supreme Court in the case of rajkot municipal corporation v manjulaben jayantilal nakum and others1. The Supreme Court copiously dealing with the english law on the point has made salutary observation in paras 62 and 63 of the judgment as follows:"the statute enjoins a power to plant trees on the roadsides or in public places. The Supreme Court copiously dealing with the english law on the point has made salutary observation in paras 62 and 63 of the judgment as follows:"the statute enjoins a power to plant trees on the roadsides or in public places. There is no statutory sanction for negligence in that behalf. But the question is whether the statutory function to plant trees gives rise to a duty of maintaining the trees. In a developing society it is but obligatory on every house holder, when he constructs a house and equally for a public authority to plant trees and properly nurtures them in a healthy condition so as to protect and maintain the eco-friendly environment. But the question is whether the public authority owes a statutory duty towards that class of persons who frequent pass and repass on the public highway or road or the public places. If the local authority/statutory body has neglected to perform the duty of maintaining trees in a healthy condition and when damage, due to fall of the tree occurs, the question emerges whether the neighbour relationship and proximity of the causation and negligence and the duty of care towards the plaintiff have been satisfactorily proved to have existed so as to fasten the defendant with the liability due to tort of negligence. It depends on a variety of facts and circumstances. It is difficult to lay down any set standards for proof thereof. In a situation like the present one where the victim being not aware of the disease/decay the tree suddenly falls in a still weather condition, no one can anticipate and it is difficult to foresee that a tree would fall suddenly and thereby a person who would be passing by on the roadside, would suffer injury or would die in consequence. The corporation or the authority is not liable to be sued for tort of negligence since the causation is too remote. Novas actus inconveniences snaps the link and, therefore, it is difficult to establish lack of care resulting in damage and foreseeability of the damage. The case in hand falls in this category. Jayantilal was admittedly passing on the roadside to attend to his office duty. The tree suddenly fell and he sustained injury and consequently died. It was difficult to foresee that a tree would fall on him. The case in hand falls in this category. Jayantilal was admittedly passing on the roadside to attend to his office duty. The tree suddenly fell and he sustained injury and consequently died. It was difficult to foresee that a tree would fall on him. The conditions in India have not developed to such an extent that a corporation can keep constant vigil by testing the healthy condition of the trees in the public places, roadsides, highways frequented by passersby. There is no duty to maintain regular supervision thereof, through the local authority/other authority/owner of a property is under a duty to plant and maintain the tree. The causation for accident is too remote. Consequently, there would be no common law right to file suit for tort of negligence. It would not be just and proper to fasten duty of care and liability for omission thereof. It would be difficult for the local authority etc. , to foresee such an occurrence. Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to conclude that the appellant has been negligent in the maintenance of the trees planted by it on the roadsides". ( 4 ) AFTER going through the said decision, i find that on facts, the ratio laid down in the decision is not applicable to the facts on hand. The situation in the present case is not an accidental fall of a tree. In the course of removal of the tree by cutting the branch of the tree fallen on the car causing damage. Therefore, it is a case of negligent manner of cutting and removal of the tree by the third respondent. ( 5 ) THE counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the third respondent is an independent contractor. The corporation has no control and right over the manner of performance of the act of cutting of the tree by the third defendant. Therefore, for the actions of an independent contractor, the corporation cannot be held liable and relied on the ruling of Supreme Court in the case of silver jubilee tailoring house and others v chief inspector of shops and establishments and another. ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the statutory obligation of the corporation it is necessary to refer to the Provisions of clause 18 of Section 58 of the Karnataka municipal corporations Act, which reads thus:"58. Obligatory functions of the corporation. ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the statutory obligation of the corporation it is necessary to refer to the Provisions of clause 18 of Section 58 of the Karnataka municipal corporations Act, which reads thus:"58. Obligatory functions of the corporation. It shall be incumbent on the corporation to make reasonable and adequate provision by any means or measures which it is lawfully competent to use or to take, for each of the following matters namely xxx xxx xxx (18) the planting and maintenance of trees on roadsides and elsewhere; the definition in Section 2 (10) of the act (hereinafter called as 'act') defines essential services thus: (10) "essential services" means services in which any municipal officer, servant or other person is employed by or on behalf of the corporation and which are specified in schedule ii; (emphasis supplied) the schedule ii of the act categorises the essential services in the following way: essential services class i (a) scavenging or cleansing streets or premises. (b) maintaining, repairing, cleansing or reflushing drains. (c) removing or disposing of excretions or polluted matter from houses, privies, urinals or cesspools. (d) removing carcasses. (e) preventing nuisances generally. Class ii (a) fire brigade service. (b) services in connection with the maintenance or service of any corporation water works, drains, pumping stations or fire hydrant, including (i) inspectors, (ii) sub-inspectors, (iii) foremen, (iv) mechanics, (v) drivers, (vi) watchmen, (vii) labourers, (viii) workmen. (c) lamplighters". ( 7 ) THE definition of nuisance under Section 2 of the act defines thus:" (22) "nuisance" includes any Act, omission, place or thing, which causes or is likely to cause injury, danger, annoyance or offence to the sense of sight, smell or hearing or disturbance to rest or sleep or which is or may be dangerous to life or injurious to health or property". ( 8 ) AFTER carefully going through the relevant Provisions of the municipal Corporation Act it emerges that the planting of trees and taking precautionary steps in respect of decayed tree or trees which are foreseeable and known to be dangerous to the public safety is one of the mandatory functions of the corporation. ( 8 ) AFTER carefully going through the relevant Provisions of the municipal Corporation Act it emerges that the planting of trees and taking precautionary steps in respect of decayed tree or trees which are foreseeable and known to be dangerous to the public safety is one of the mandatory functions of the corporation. Even in the case of an accidental fall, the Supreme Court in the cited case "rajkot municipal corporation case, supra", has held that the corporation would be liable for the damage caused to the passerby on account of accidental fall, if it is shown that it was within the knowledge of the corporation about the dangerous conditions of the tree. In the present case, precisely a question would arise as to the liability of the corporation to answer and account for the negligent actions of the third defendant. ( 9 ) IT was strenuously contended by the counsel for the appellant/corporation that the third defendant being an independent contractor for any of his negligent acts, the corporation cannot be held liable. The principle of law that a person cannot be held liable vicariously for the acts of an independent contractor is a salutary principle acknowledged in the realm of tort, but, a question would arise whether the mandatory function of a corporation could be delegated to a third party agency to absolve all its statutory responsibilities and obligations. ( 10 ) IN the present case, the Provisions of municipal corporations act enjoin a duty on the corporation as mandatory function to attend essential services, which include prevention of nuisance. It is also permissible under the definition of essential services that the corporation can get the things done by its officers or servants or other persons employed by or on behalf of the corporation. In that view of the matter, if the corporation had delegated the act of cutting and removal of the tree to the third defendant, which is one of the essential services, it cannot absolve itself from the liability on the plea that the third defendant is an independent contractor. The defence that the third defendant is an independent contractor is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case. Any of the essential services if done by the corporation through its servants or through any other agency the corporation would become liable for such actions. The defence that the third defendant is an independent contractor is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the case. Any of the essential services if done by the corporation through its servants or through any other agency the corporation would become liable for such actions. In view of the specific emphasis in the definition of essential services in sub-section (10) of Section 2 of the Act, wherein it permits the corporation to carry out the essential services through its servants or other persons employed by or on behalf of the corporation. ( 11 ) ON the question of damages the appellant has let in oral evidence and also examined the mechanic. may be that evidence placed is not clinching. But however, there is no contra evidence placed by the defendant to disprove the veracity of the version of the oral testimony of the witnesses. Therefore, i do not find any error committed by the trial court in granting damages to an extent of Rs. 1,24,500/ -. However, the trial court has granted interest at 10% p. a. from the date of the suit till realisation. In view of the Provisions of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code the interest can be granted only at 6% p. a. from the date of the suit till realisation. ( 12 ) ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is partly allowed to an extent of modifying the interest to 6% on the amount awarded from the date of the suit till realisation with costs. Order on being spoken to 8-8-2001 the counsel for the appellant submitted that whole of the decreetal amount including the interest has been deposited at the time of admission of appeal and it is requested that part of the interest refundable from the deposited amount be directed to be payable. The counsel for the respondents has no objection for the request. Accordingly, the request is allowed. The excess of interest as per the decree collected by the respondent is to be refunded. --- *** --- .