JUDGMENT 1. IN all these writ petitions, the same questions of law arises. 2. W. P. No. 4880 of 2001 is filed by one n. Vishwanathan, W. P. No. 4733 of 2001 by nisar ahmed and W. P. No. 5603 of 2001 by the Karnataka state transport corporation. In all these writ petitions, petitioners have questioned the grant of counter-signature made by the Karnataka state transport authority, in favour of the second respondent-venkateshwara bus union in respect of the variations of the route "chikkaballapur to tirupathi" with an additional vehicle. 3. FACTS will be referred to with reference to W. P. No. 4880 of 2001. 4. THE second respondent-venkateshwara bus union is a stage carriage operator, operating a stage carriage service on the route "tirupathi to chikkaballapur'' under a permit granted by the transport authority of Andhra Pradesh under the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 in pursuance of an inter-state agreement entered into between the state of Andhra Pradesh and karnataka. He had sought for variation of the said permit under Section 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as it existed then by inclusion of an additional trip to be operated by an additional vehicle. The said application was granted by the transport authority of Andhra Pradesh on 16-4-1984 outside the inter-state agreement. The additional trip granted was not covered by the "agreement". 5. THE second respondent after the grant of variation filed an application for grant of counter-signature before the Karnataka state transport authority in respect of the additional trip to be operated by the additional vehicle. 6. THE state transport authority by its resolution dated 4/5-2-1994 in subject number 168 following the decision of the division bench of this court in the case of Karnataka state road transport corporation v venkateshan shetiy, wherein this court had held "fresh permits cannot be granted on nationalised routes and held that it would apply to additional trips as well", rejected the application on the ground that the counter-signature of the variation of the permit will have the effect of offending the kolar district nationalisation scheme. The second respondent accepted the said decision by not challenging the same before the higher tribunal or before this court. Thus the said decision became final, binding and conclusive. 7. The second respondent accepted the said decision by not challenging the same before the higher tribunal or before this court. Thus the said decision became final, binding and conclusive. 7. SUBSEQUENTLY after the coming into force of the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the second respondent got his earlier permit granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 for operating the stage carriage permit on the route "tirupati to chikkaballapur" replaced by new permits under sub-section (4) of Section 80 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, which were accordingly replaced as permit No. 7-a/1962 and 7-b/1962 by Andhra Pradesh transport authorities for the period 19-7-1996 to 18-7-2001. After, having the permits so replaced, he again sought for counter- signature of the "additional trip with the additional vehicle" which was outside the inter-state agreement again before the state transport authority, karnataka. 8. WHEN the application for counter-signature was presented second time, the state transport authority relying on the decision of this court in r. Maheshwari and others v Karnataka state transport authority, Bangalore and others, wherein it was held that "it was permissible to grant variation by way of additional trip to be operated by an additional vehicle to the existing permit and such a variation granted did not amount to a new permit, the operation of which did not offend the kolar pocket scheme" granted the counter signature by its resolution dated 23-12-2001 vide Annexure-G. This resolution is challenged as illegal and without jurisdiction by the three writ petitioners as stated above. Heard Sri krishna swamy, Sri prakash shetty, the learned counsels for the petitioner, Sri gupta, the learned counsel for the grantee- second respondent. 9. Heard Sri krishna swamy, Sri prakash shetty, the learned counsels for the petitioner, Sri gupta, the learned counsel for the grantee- second respondent. 9. SEVERAL contentions were raised by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners who have assailed the validity of the impugned Order, chief among them being (1) that the grant of counter-signature for the additional trip to be operated by the additional vehicle offends the kolar district nationalisation scheme; (2) that the grantee's application for counter-signature being already rejected by the state transport authority, which order became binding, final and conclusive on 4/5-2-1994, a second application for the same relief could not have been entertained as the power was already exercised and exhausted and such an act amounts to review of its earlier order which power the state transport authority lacked; (3) that the grant of counter-signature to the additional trip with additional vehicle being outside the inter-state agreement between the state of Karnataka and andhra pradesh, no additional permit could have been granted by the primary authority on an inter-state route much less countersigned. 10. THESE contentions of the petitioners were sought to be met by the counsel for the grantee contending that in view of maheshwari's case, supra, rendered by the learned single judge in W. P. No. 43544 of 1999, dd: 13-4-2000, the grant of counter-signature was perfectly legal. So also, it was argued that due to the change in circumstances the second application for counter-signature was perfectly maintainable and there was no exhaustion of power. In view of the said contentions the following points arise for consideration. Point No. 1. Whether the grant of counter-signature for the additional trip to be operated by additional vehicle offends the kolar district nationalisation scheme. On facts there is no dispute that the grantee was earlier granted a permit to operate on the route "tirupathi to chikkaballapur" with one round trip and a single vehicle. This permit was granted in pursuance of an inter-state agreement between the state of Andhra Pradesh and the state of karnataka. It is also not in dispute that the operation of this permit was saved under the kolar pocket scheme (in other words the grantee was permitted to continue to operate this permit under the scheme). This permit was granted in pursuance of an inter-state agreement between the state of Andhra Pradesh and the state of karnataka. It is also not in dispute that the operation of this permit was saved under the kolar pocket scheme (in other words the grantee was permitted to continue to operate this permit under the scheme). Later he was granted an additional trip to be operated by an additional vehicle under the guise of variation of permit as per the earlier provision of Section 57 (8) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, which later came to be replaced by two permits under the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and this variation of the original permit not covered under the inter-state agreement by the inclusion of an additional trip with an additional vehicle is countersigned, which order is under challenge. 11. THE question whether variation of a permit by the inclusion of one more round trip with an additional vehicle, amounted to variation of an existing permit, if so, saved by the scheme or amounted to grant of a new permit not saved by the scheme, has been the subject-matter of discussion in number of cases both by the Supreme Court and this court. I will only refer to few of the cases cited at the bar which has a bearing. (1) in the case of Karnataka state road transport corporation v Karnataka state transport authority, the division bench of this court relying on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Karnataka state road. transport corporation, Bangalore v b. a. Jayaram and others and r. Raghuram v p. Jayarama naidu and others3, and quoting the following paragraph from r. Raghuram's case, supra: "on a careful consideration of the above arguments, we are clear of the view that it is not open to this court to find out which of the rulings lay down the correct law in view of the categoric statement in the case of r. Raghuram, supra,, page 412 wherein it has been held at paragraphs 3 and 4 as follows: "3. In adarsh travels bus service and another v state of Uttar Pradesh and others, a Constitution bench of this court has held that where a route is nationalised under chapter iv-a of the Act, a private operator with a permit to ply a stage permit over another route but which has a common overlapping sector with the nationalised route, cannot ply his vehicle over that part of the overlapping common sector, even with corridor restrictions, such as that he would not be able to pick up or drop passengers on the overlapping part of the route unless such an exemption had been allowed in the scheme itself. Even when the scheme provides that an existing operator is exempted from the operation of the scheme it only means that he can continue to operate his services with the existing number of trips on the date on which the scheme is published and it does authorise him to apply for a variation of his permit so that he can increase the number of trips on the overlapping portion of the notified route thus increasing the burden of private operation of vehicles on the notified route in question. The variation authorising increasing the number of trips in fact amounts to granting of a fresh permit to run one more stage carriage service doing one round trip on the notified route and that would be in violation of the scheme itself because the scheme protects only the number of trips which were being operated at the time of its publication. 4. Our attention is, however, drawn to another decision of this court in karnataka state road transport corporation's case, supra, in which it has been held by a bench consisting of two learned judges that Section 57 (8) does not create a legal fiction and grant of an application for variation in the conditions of one existing permit in respect of matter set out in Section 57 (8) does not result in the grant of new permit in every case. With great respect to the learned judges who decided the said case we feel that the said opinion is erroneous because the increase in the number of trips of vehicles which were being run under the existing permit does amount to grant of a new permit to operate one more stage carriage. With great respect to the learned judges who decided the said case we feel that the said opinion is erroneous because the increase in the number of trips of vehicles which were being run under the existing permit does amount to grant of a new permit to operate one more stage carriage. Such a thing could not be permitted particularly in view of the decision in M/s. Adarsh travels case, supra. The construction on the statute placed by the decision of this court in Karnataka state road transport corporation's case, referred to above must be deemed to have overruled in M/s. Adarsh travel's case, supra. The prejudice of the finances that is caused to the state transport undertaking for whose benefit the scheme is made is not so much by the number of vehicles used but by the number of trips that are operated on the notified route in question. The economy and co-ordination, two of the factors governing a scheme would also be affected. On the basis of the above view, another division bench has disposed of another petition at the stage of admission". held that the variation amounted to a new permit and if granted on a nationalised route, such a grant is void. 12. IN r. Raghuram's case, supra, the bench was presided over by Sri e. s. Venkataramaiah the then c. j. And ranganatha mishra, j., held, "that the increase in the number of trips covered by the notified route would amount to grant of a fresh permit in violation of the scheme and hence not permissible". After referring to adarsh travel's case, supra, court held the decision in Karnataka state road transport corporation's case, supra, not a good law and overruled the same which had held that "the increase in the number of trips amounted only to a variation in the existing permit and did not offend the scheme. This remained the position of law and was being followed by the transport authorities all along. This remained the position of law and was being followed by the transport authorities all along. However, the state transport authority relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Karnataka state road transport corporation, Bangalore v Karnataka state transport authority, Bangalore and others, presided over by the bench of three judges, one of them being Justice ranganatha mishra as he then was has held that the grant of additional trips to an existing permit amounted to only variation of an existing permit and did not offend the scheme. 13. THIS view was challenged by some of the transport authorities before the learned single judge in maheshwari's case, supra. Learned single judge has held after considering all the decisions and the decision of the Supreme Court in fourth Karnataka state road transport corporation, supra, as follows: "para 23: this finding of the tribunal is assailed before me on the very same grounds. I am of the view that the tribunal is right in placing the reliance on second Karnataka state transport authority's case, supra, in coming to its conclusion. Admittedly second Karnataka state transport authority's, case, supra, is a judgment of 3 judges and the judge after noticing other cases has ruled that an additional trip with additional vehicle can be granted for an existing permit-holder in the kolar pocket scheme. B. a. Jayaram's case, supra and r. Raghuram's case, supra, are the judgments of significant strength. In r. Raghuram's case, supra, unfortunately second Karnataka state transport authority's case, supra, has not brought to the notice of their lordships. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has overruled b. a. Jayaram's case, supra, in r. Raghuram's case, supra and referred it to a larger bench. Second Karnataka state transport authority's case, supra, is a judge of a larger bench judgment and this judgment, the Supreme Court after notificing b. a. Jayaram's case, supra, did not consider that b. a. Jayaram's case, supra, is bad in law. I am of the view that the tribunal is right in following, the said second Karnataka state transport authority's case, supra, judgment in the light of the principles governing the law of precedents. 24. It is well-settled principle that when there are conflicts of two. Equal strength judgments later one has to prevail if there is a. Larger bench judgment, the same has to be followed. 24. It is well-settled principle that when there are conflicts of two. Equal strength judgments later one has to prevail if there is a. Larger bench judgment, the same has to be followed. In this connection, I may usefully refer to the judgment in govinda naik g. Kalghatagi v west patent press company limited, a full bench judgment of this court consisting of five judges. The full bench of this court has ruled that if two questions of the Supreme Court on a question of law cannot be reconciled and one of them is by larger bench, while the other is a smaller bench earlier or later in point of time, should be followed by high court and other courts. In the case of mattulal v radhe lal, in para 11 at page 1601, the Supreme Court has ruled that a former decision of a larger bench has to be followed than in the latter. In the light of these judgments, I am of the view that the tribunal has not committed any error in following larger bench of a Supreme Court in coming to its conclusion that it does not amount to a new permit as contended by the respondent. I confirm the view of the tribunal on this issue", and thus has sustained the order of the tribunal. 14. IN the case of Karnataka state road transport corporation, referred to by the learned single judge, the decision was rendered by his lordship ranganatha mishra for the bench. It has been held therein at para 4 as follows: "4. As notified earlier, the scheme authorises the continued operation of the services by the existing permit holders subject to corridor restrictions. Having heard learned counsel, we are of the view that the condition imposed in the scheme has not been violated. There is nothing said in the case of mis. Adarsh travels, supra, which would support the appellant in the facts of the present case. Learned counsel also made grievance by alleging non-compliance with the Provisions of the motor vehicles apt in the matter of granting extension were heard and prima facie there was compliance of the requirements of the Provisions of Section 57 (8) of the act. Defects, if any, in the matter of extension of trips could be agitated before the appellate forum under the act. Defects, if any, in the matter of extension of trips could be agitated before the appellate forum under the act. Before the high court the main contention was confined to the argument relating to plying in contravention of the law based upon the scheme. We do not find any merit in the appeals and they are dismissed with costs". In view of the decision in raghuram's case, supra, which was presided by one of the same judges who was also judge in the fourth ksrtc's case of the Supreme Court, and in the light of the earlier decisions referred to; the contention was maheshwari's case, supra, calls for reconsideration. 15. SINCE it was submitted that maheshwari's case, supra, is already under consideration in the writ appeal filed against the said decision for the present suffice it to say that maheshwari's case, supra, holds the field. 16. POINT No. 2. The grantee's application for counter-signature being already rejected by the state transport authority on 4/5-2-1994 on the ground, that it offends kolar pocket scheme and the said decision having attained finality as having been accepted by the grantee in not challenging whether the state transport authority had the power to grant the counter-signature, relying on maheshwari's case, supra. Elaborate arguments were advanced by the learned counsel for the writ petitioners and the learned counsel for the grantee in support of their respective cases. While the petitioners contended that the state transport authority having already exhausted its power on an earlier occasion could not review the said order relying on a subsequent judgment while the grantee contended that the said principle is not applicable to the facts inasmuch as, when the grantee presented a fresh application for counter-signature on the basis of a subsequent renewal, the sta had power to treat it as a fresh application and the earlier decision is not binding. 17. I have already stated that under a reciprocal agreement between the states of Karnataka and andhra pradesh, the grantee was granted a permit to operate one round trip with a single vehicle on the route "tirupathi to chikkaballapur". Subsequently under the earlier Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the transport authorities of Andhra Pradesh had granted a variation of the permit by inclusion of an additional trip for the route "tirupathi to chikkaballapur" with an additional vehicle. Subsequently under the earlier Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 the transport authorities of Andhra Pradesh had granted a variation of the permit by inclusion of an additional trip for the route "tirupathi to chikkaballapur" with an additional vehicle. This application for counter-signature was rejected by the state transport authority on the ground it offends the kolar pocket nationalisation scheme. For reasons best known to the grantee, he did not challenge the said order and allowed it to become final, binding and conclusive. 18. LATER the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 came to be repealed by the enactment of the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. As large number of operators were operating under the permits granted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and since the act 1939 was repealed, questions cropped up as to the fate of those permits regarding its validity and renewal in gajraj singh v state transport appellate tribunal and others, before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the form, "whether the grant or renewal of a stage carriage permit granted under old Motor Vehicles Act should necessarily be preceded by the grant of a stage carriage permit under Section 72 of the new motor vehicles act in accordance with the procedure laid down in sections 70 and 71 of the new act. After considering various earlier decisions of the same court on that point, it was held: "the rights of the existing named operators saved in the appropriate approved schemes in respect of specified permits were not destroyed by the new act. By necessary implication of Section 104, they were saved. They became entitled to avail of their right to apply for grant of permit in accordance with the procedure prescribed under sections 70 and 71 and to obtain permit under Section 72 of the new act before the expiry of the permit or renewed permit saved under the approved scheme and should obtain permit afresh to ply their stage carriages before expiry of the period mentioned therein. The rta or sta, as the case may be, should consider and may grant permits or renewal of permits as per law or rejection thereof for reasons to be recorded in that behalf. The rta or sta, as the case may be, should consider and may grant permits or renewal of permits as per law or rejection thereof for reasons to be recorded in that behalf. No third party/private operators are entitled to apply for permits on the same notified route or part thereof, nor are they entitled to compete with them for grant of permit, since the right of all other private operators to apply for and operate in the approved notified area, route as a part thereof, has been frozen. The right is reserved only in relation to the named operators and that too for specified permit, and none else. Along with the application under Section 70 of the new act filed for grant of permit under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 made by the named holder of a specified permit in an approved scheme, he should enclose an authenticated copy of the approved scheme, the details of the route on which he was plying his stage carriage with corridor restrictions on overlapping routes. The rta or sta, as the case may be should verify the original scheme under which the named operator, whose specified permit was saved, whether he is entitled to ply the stage carriage in the approved scheme with the condition of the corridor restrictions on the notified scheme and if so to what extent. What is the duration of his right saved in the approved scheme? Whether he had plied his stage carriage on complying with the law in force? His right to permit under Section 72 or renewal under Section 81 of the new act cannot be higher than the original right saved in the approved scheme. The stu also should be heard in that behalf. On consideration of these and all other relevant facts in relation to grant of stage carriage permit or renewal thereof, the appropriate authority may grant or reject; in the later event, for reasons to be recorded in support of the rejection. The authorities should consider their applications in accordance with the law and the prescribed procedure and may grant new permits under Section 72 and later on before the expiry thereof, to renew it in accordance with the procedure prescribed in sections 80 and 81, that too on compliance with law, until the scheme is duly modified or cancelled in accordance with law. This right is available exclusively to the named private operators and that too in respect of the specified permits and with same restrictions continued in the scheme and none else and no more". thus, the permits obtained under the old Motor Vehicles Act could be renewed under the same terms and conditions and for all intents and purposes it continued to be the old permit, being renewed periodically. If the renewal made to the grantee's permit under the new Motor Vehicles Act, in effect was the continuation of the permit earlier granted under the act 1939, inasmuch as he was the saved operator under the kolar pocket scheme and if his earlier application for counter- signature for the additional trip with the additional vehicle was already rejected by the state transport authority, then the further question viz., what is the effect of the earlier order rejecting the counter-signature? The legal position is, "a judgment or a decision rendered by a tribunal/court in the absence of challenge becomes final and binding on both the parties; prof. Wade in his book on administrative law, 17th edition at page 261 states: "in the interpretation of statutory powers and duties, there is a Rule that unless the contrary intention appears, the power may be exercised and the duty shall be performed from time to time as occasion demands, but this gives a highly misleading view of the law, where the power to decide question affecting legal rights, in those cases the courts are strongly inclined to hold that the decision once validly made is an irrevocable legal act and cannot be recalled or revised. The same arguments which require finality for the decisions of courts of law apply to the decisions of statutory tribunals". 19. THIS is also a case where the state transport authority when it rejected the earlier application for counter-signature had decided the legal rights of grantees. Can a subsequent decision, of a higher authority or a court in respect of the law, followed by the tribunal while deciding the binding decisions altering the said view or overruling the same, be a ground for reviewing the binding decision not being set aside by the higher authorities. This question, had come up in the same form for consideration before a division bench of this court in d. p. Sharma v state transport authority. This question, had come up in the same form for consideration before a division bench of this court in d. p. Sharma v state transport authority. It has been held as follows: "the mere reversal or overruling of the judgment does not have the effect uprooting a quasi-judicial determination made in another case relying upon that decision at a time when it was a binding precedent. It is trite proposition that even inter partes, if the law laid down in a pronouncement is later overruled, as distinguished from it being reversed, its binding effect inter partes is not set at naught. The decision itself has to be assailed and got rid of in a manner known to or recognised by law". 20. THE hon'ble Supreme Court in v. s. Charativos hussain v hussain jamadas, while discussing the consequences of a tenant not challenging the order dropping the proceedings for fixation of price in consequence of a deemed purchase under the Bombay tenancy and agricultural lands Act, 1948 has held, "a decision simply because it may be wrong would not thereupon become a nullity. It would continue to bind the parties unless set aside. The effect of a decision of 31-5-1961 on the " parties therefore cannot be ignored". On powers of review; it is well-known that the tribunals have no inherent power of review of its orders unless granted by the statute (see the decision of the Supreme Court in 1987 (4) SCC 525 ). 21. UNDER the scheme of Motor Vehicles Act, there is no express provision under which the transport authorities can review its own orders nor any inherent power can be spelt therefrom. 22. IT is also not out of place to refer in this context to a decision of this court in G. V. Chandrashekar v State Transport Authority, Wherein, in identical circumstances like the case on hand, this court had issued a writ of prohibition to the state transport authority, Bangalore from again considering an application for the grant of counter-signature which it had already rejected and had become final. The decision in G. V. Chandrashekar's case, supra, was also affirmed by the division bench in wa nos. 4813 to 4815 of 1999. The decision in G. V. Chandrashekar's case, supra, was also affirmed by the division bench in wa nos. 4813 to 4815 of 1999. From a discussion of the above, I am of the view that where transport authorities reject counter-signature following a binding decision of a court and that becomes final, binding and conclusive merely because the said decision is altered or overruled in subsequent cases, it cannot entertain a second application for counter-signature in respect of the same permit at any time, including subsequent renewals. 23. THE state transport authority had exhausted its power when it had already rejected the earlier application of the grantee, for granting counter-signature for additional trips and that decision having become final it could not have varied the said decision on the basis of maheshwari's case, supra, and merely because the counter-signature and the second application for counter-signature was made under the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, it made no difference. If such power is conceded to the transport authorities, it would have the effect of unsettling all the settled positions of law, on finality of judicial orders. 24. THEREFORE, the grant of the counter-signature cannot be sustained and i answer the point accordingly. To refer now to the arguments and the authorities cited by Sri b. r. s. Gupta in this context to appreciate how far the arguments can sustain the order of the transport authority. In the first place the contention of Sri b. r. s. Gupta, learned counsel for the grantee/respondent 2 was, that after the coming into force of the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a fresh permit was issued by the transport authorities of andhra pradesh, on the route "chikkaballapur to tirupathi". One permit granted was under the inter-state agreement while the other was outside the inter-state agreement and the applications filed for counter-signature should be treated for all intents and purposes as a new application, filed under altered circumstances. Hence, the earlier decision of the state transport authority, Karnataka rejecting counter-signature, cannot be said to be binding on the authority. This contention overlooks the distinction between grant of a fresh permit and renewal of an existing permit which has already acquired certain privileges like in the case of obtaining exemption under the kolar pocket scheme. Hence, the earlier decision of the state transport authority, Karnataka rejecting counter-signature, cannot be said to be binding on the authority. This contention overlooks the distinction between grant of a fresh permit and renewal of an existing permit which has already acquired certain privileges like in the case of obtaining exemption under the kolar pocket scheme. To elaborate the same under the new Motor Vehicles Act of 1988, the permits granted already in favour of the grantee to operate the inter-state route was only renewed. If it is to be held as a new grant, then the very grant of the permit to operate on the inter-state route overlapping the kolar pocket scheme itself is void. The grantee, admittedly is claiming the right to operate on the inter-state route under the exemption clause provided under the kolar pocket scheme in view of the same being covered by the inter-state agreement. Admittedly the inter-state agreement between the state of Karnataka and andhra pradesh, and the kolar pocket scheme was very much prior to the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the grantee has acquired the privilege of operating the permit covered by inter-state agreement which is renewed notwithstanding the new Act, only because it is treated as a renewal and not as a fresh grant. Hence, what was granted to the grantee, under the new Motor Vehicles Act is nothing but a renewal of the old permit. A renewal of a permit is a continuation of the original permit and when the original permit is cancelled the renewal also gets cancelled (see the decision of the Supreme Court in v. c. k. Bus service limited v regional transport authority, coimbatore. And as per the decision of the Supreme Court in gajraj singh's case already referred to above, "the permit holders right under Section 72 or 81 of the new act cannot be higher than the original right saved in the approved scheme". 25. HENCE it cannot be said that the second application filed was in pursuance of a fresh grant. And as per the decision of the Supreme Court in gajraj singh's case already referred to above, "the permit holders right under Section 72 or 81 of the new act cannot be higher than the original right saved in the approved scheme". 25. HENCE it cannot be said that the second application filed was in pursuance of a fresh grant. Insofar as the decision of this court referred to by the learned counsel in Karnataka state road transport corporation, Bangalore v Karnataka state transport appellate tribunal, Bangalore and others, that was a case where the division bench of this court was considering the challenge made by the ksrtc in respect of a permit being operated in contravention of its scheme for a period of 29 years and after many renewals on the ground that no further renewal should be granted as it would be illegal, the court held the ksrtc had a right to so contend. Repelling the contention, of the grantee that the ksrtc had acquiesed in the private operator operating on the notified route, it was held that such acquiescence cannot constitute an estoppel from enforcing its right under the scheme. I fail to understand how this decision can be of any help to the 2nd respondent. Estoppel cannot be confused with the principle of finality of judgments and decisions. The case on hand involves the effect of "finality of statutory decisions" and not an "estoppel". 26. THE next case referred to by the learned counsel Sri gupta is muddappa v Karnataka state transport appellate tribunal and connected writ petitions. In the said case also, the division bench of this court has held that the rights of the ksrtc would not be affected, merely on the ground that on earlier occasion, a renewal was granted under a mistaken impression of law, that the private operators were entitled to operate on the notified route. This is again a case of estoppel. Therefore, no assistance can be drawn from the said decisions. Hence, the arguments of gupta in my opinion cannot sustain the decision of the state transport authority granting counter-signature in respect of an additional vehicle for an additional route by the impugned order. 27. IN the view I am taking that the grant cannot be sustained on this ground, it is unnecessary to go into the other point. 28. Hence, the arguments of gupta in my opinion cannot sustain the decision of the state transport authority granting counter-signature in respect of an additional vehicle for an additional route by the impugned order. 27. IN the view I am taking that the grant cannot be sustained on this ground, it is unnecessary to go into the other point. 28. FOR the reasons stated, these writ petitions are allowed, the impugned order in each of the writ petitions is quashed and there will be no order as to costs. After the orders were pronounced in the open court on 3-8-2001, Sri b. r. s. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the respondents prayed that the operative portion of this court may be suspended for a period of 4 weeks to enable him to prefer an appeal. 29. AFTER hearing learned counsel for the parties, the operative portion of this order is suspended for a period of 4 weeks from today.