Judgment :- The Order of the Court was as follows : The petitioner and his wife are registration certificate holders under the Tamil Nadu Kerosene (Regulation of Trade) Order 1973. Pursuant to the policy of the Government issued in G.O.Ms. No.202 Food and Co-operation Department dated 23-3-1982, the State Government directed that the wholesalers in the district shall henceforth supply the kerosene only to the following categories of retailers :- (a) Retailers operating under the public distribution system i.e. the fair price shops run by the Tamil Nadu Civil Supplies Corporation and Co-operatives; (b) The private retailers holding kerosene retail registration certificate and who are exclusively dealing with kerosene for their livelihood and were attached with family cards not exceeding 500 for distribution of kerosene to the cards; and (c) Hand cartmen holding retail registration certificate and were doing street vending in Kerosene. The said guidelines were challenged before this Court and this Court in the judgment reported in " 1984 WLR 77" (Sic) struck down the classification as unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. At the instance of the Government of Tamil Nadu, the Apex Court in the judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 4082 to 4098 of 1989 (arising out of SLP Nos. 11459-11463 of 1984) held that the above classifications were reasonable and are not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. After the orders of the Apex Court, the 1st respondent issued instructions to stop the supply to retailers. Accordingly, the suply to the petitioner was abruptly stopped which necessitated the petitioner to file the writ petition before this Court and the writ petition was allowed with a direction to hold an enquiry to find out whether the petitioner is depending upon the kerosene trade for his livelihood. Pursuant to the said direction, an enquiry was conducted by the 3rd respondent who by order dated 18-3-1991 held that the petitioner owns a house valued at Rs.50, 000/- that he owns a petty shop at Door No.58, Sannathi Street, Thiruvanai Koil and that he is getting an income of Rs.500/- per month. Therefore, he is not entitled to the supply of kerosene. The petitioner filed an appeal to the 2nd respondent who dismissed the same on 19-10-1992. The petitioner again filed revision before the 1st respondent who by order dated 22-8-1994 dismissed the petition. Therefore, he is not entitled to the supply of kerosene. The petitioner filed an appeal to the 2nd respondent who dismissed the same on 19-10-1992. The petitioner again filed revision before the 1st respondent who by order dated 22-8-1994 dismissed the petition. While dismissing the revision, the 1st respondent on accepting the contention of the petitioner that once the petitioner is considered as a person solely depending upon the business in selling kerosene for the purpose of grant of one registration certificate, the consideration of the licences for other areas cannot be rejected on the said ground. however, the revisional authority rejected the request of the petitioner by placing reliance on clause (b) of G.O.Ms. No. 202 Food and Co-operation Department dated 23-3-1982 on the ground that the petitioner is already having a retailer registration certificate and if the present request for grant of registration certificate is granted, the petitioner is having more 500 cards which would not be in conformity with clause (b) of the Government letter dated 23-3-1982. Aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition has been filed. 2. Mr. D. Peter Fransis, learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the said order on the ground that as per Order 5.8 of the Tamil Nadu Kerosene (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1973, a person carries on business as retailer in more than one place, separate registration certificates shall be obtained in respect of each place of business. By virtue of the said order the petitioner is entitled to carry on the business as retailer in more than one place. Clause (b) of the Government letter Ms. No. 202 Food and Co-operation Department dated 23-3-82 should be read with reference to the above clause. The conditions stipulated in the said clause with reference to a maximum of 500 cards should be considered only with reference to each licence and the registration certificate and not with reference to the individual namely the retailer. The reason adduced in the impugned order that the petitioner has got registration certificate to do the retail business in kerosene in some other place and he has got 500 cards already and therefore if the licence in question is given, the petitioner will be having more than 500 cards which would be contrary to clause (b) of the said order is not correct. The respondents have misapplied the said Government letter in rejecting the request of the petitioner. 3. Mr. M.G.H. Varadarajan, learned Addl. Government Pleader on the other hand would submit that the petitioner is having a licence to vend kerosene on retail basis already and as per clause (b) of the said Government letter, he should not own more than 500 cards. He would further submit that the petitioner had made another request for licence to vend kerosene on retail basis in some other place. In that event he is entitled to have cards up to 500 in number. If that be so, the petitioner would be having more than 500 cards for two licences. Therefore, the petitioner cannot have such number of cards contrary to clause (b) of the Government letter dated 23-3-82. Hence the reason adduced by the 1st respondent in rejecting the revision petition is justified. 4. The Government letter Ms. No. 202 Food and Co-operation Department dated 23-3-82 was challenged before this Court and this Court has held that the classification made in the said letter was not on the basis of any differentia and consequently struck down those objections. However, the Apex Court in the judgment in Civil Appeal Nos. 4082 to 4088 of 1989 dated 22-9-89 while considering the said guidelines has held as follows :- "The object of the order was to maintain an equitable and effective distribution of kerosene amongst the people through those who were intimately connected with the trade. At the same time the classification was made for the purpose of assisting those retailers who were exclusively depending upon the trade in kerosene. Admittedly, the petitioners in the writ petitions are carrying on business in other articles and in those circumstances if the Government decided that the kerosene should be distributed through people who were exclusively dealing with kerosene for their livelihood and were attached with family cards not exceeding 500 for distribution of kerosene at the scales prescribed to the family cards and those handcartman holding retail registration certificate and are doing street vending in kerosene. This classification does not appear to be wholly unreasonable and it cannot be said that there is no nexus between the distribution of kerosene and the classification the retailers made by the Government for the purposes of clause (1) of Cl.3 (sic) of the order. This classification does not appear to be wholly unreasonable and it cannot be said that there is no nexus between the distribution of kerosene and the classification the retailers made by the Government for the purposes of clause (1) of Cl.3 (sic) of the order. The High Court was therefore, in error in holding that clauses (b), (c) were discriminatory and are violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Kerosene during the relevant time was a scarce commodity and it could not therefore be distributed through all persons. Some amount of restriction had to be placed on the classes of persons who could deal in it. At the same time it was necessary to ensure adequate return to them to make the policy of distribution effective. We do not find that any under favour is shown to the two classes who undoubtedly belonged to poorer section of society." 5. In view of the above, now it cannot be said that the 1st respondent cannot rely upon clause (b) of the said Government letter in the case of the petitioner. However, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that as per the said clause, a retailer cannot have more than 500 cards for grant of licence. The said conditions restricting 500 cards has to be attached only to the individual licence and not to the retailer. The said submission has been disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents as referred to above. It is to be noted that the object of the restrictions imposed in clause (b) of the said letter is to encourage the small traders. The said clause therefore restricts 500 cards to a retailer and when a retailer is the same person in respect of different licence, he can have a maximum 500 cards put together for all licence he possesses. If the retailer is allowed to have up to 500 cards for each licence, by virtue of Order 5.8, an individual can have more than one licence and by that he can have more than 500 cards. If that interpretation is given to clause (b) of the said letter, the very purpose of imposing restrictions of 500 cards to a retailer would be defeated. If that interpretation is given to clause (b) of the said letter, the very purpose of imposing restrictions of 500 cards to a retailer would be defeated. When once the said classification is upheld by the Apex Court, it should be held that the restriction of 500 cards should be only with reference to the individual retailer and not with reference to the individual retail licence. Admittedly, in this case, the petitioner is already owning a registration certificate to vend kerosene on retail basis wherein the petitioner can have cards up to 500 in number. If the present licence sought by the petitioner is also granted, the petitioner will be having another 500 cards and put together would be having 1000 cards. In my considered view, the purport and object of the restrictions, restricting 500 cards is only with reference to the individual retailer and not with reference to each licence. If once that conclusion is arrived, I do not find any reason to differ from the reason adduced by the 1st respondent in rejecting the request of the petitioner for grant of licence to vend kerosene on retail basis. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the restrictions imposed in clause (b) of the Government letter dated 23-3-82 in respect of 500 cards should be individuals. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, W.M.P. No. 24399 of 1994 is also dismissed. Petition dismissed.