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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2001 DIGILAW 617 (MP)

Mushamma Sarod Patnaha v. Harishankar

2001-08-20

V.K.AGRAWAL

body2001
Judgment ( 1. ) THIS appeal is directed against the order dated 19-9-2000 in Civil Suit No. 46-A/2000 of IInd Additional District Judge, Satna whereby application of the plaintiffs/appellants marked as I. A. No. 3 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC for temporary injunction was rejected. ( 2. ) UNDISPUTABLY, Ayodhya Prasad was the original holder of the suit-property bearing House No. 12-Kha, Ward No. 40, Chawk Bazar, Satna and House No. 108, Subhash Park, Satna. The plaintiffs filed a suit for declaration that they are also co-sharers and have l/4th share in the suit-property and also for permanent injunction restraining the respondents from alienating the same. The respondent No. 1 is the son of Ayodhya Prasad, while the other respondents 2 to 6 are the LRs of the remaining sons of Ayodhya Prasad. ( 3. ) AN application for temporary injunction restraining the respondents from alienating the suit-property was also filed by the plaintiffs appellants. The said application has been dismissed by the impugned order. The learned Trial Court has observed therein that the material placed on record indicates that Ramesh Prasad, the husband of appellant No. 1 and father of remaining appellants had taken his share in partition on 22-5-1968 and separate from the joint family. Accordingly, prima facie, it appears that the appellants had no right, title or interest in the joint family property belonging to the respondents. It was also held that it has not been shown that the appellants are in exclusive possession of any part of the disputed property. Accordingly, it was held that the appellants application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2, CPC for temporary injunction cannot succeed. ( 4. ) THE learned counsel for the appellants submits that the learned Lower Court erred in recording a finding that Ramesh Prasad has separated after taking his share. It has been submitted that the appellants, who are the widow and children of deceased Ramesh Prasad would suffer irreparably, in case the joint Hindu family property is alienated before the suit is decided. It was, therefore, submitted that a temporary injunction ought to be granted in favour of the appellants. ( 5. ) AS against the above, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the respondent No. 1 is the only surviving son of original holder Ayodhya Prasad. It was, therefore, submitted that a temporary injunction ought to be granted in favour of the appellants. ( 5. ) AS against the above, the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the respondent No. 1 is the only surviving son of original holder Ayodhya Prasad. It has also been submitted that Ramesh Prasad himself had admitted in a sale-deed executed by him on 15-5-1970 that he had separated from the remaining members of the family on 22-5-1968. It was also urged that the respondent No. 1 being the Karta of the family had the right to alienate the property, in accordance with law. It was further submitted that in case the temporary injunction is granted in favour of the appellants, interest of the respondents is likely to suffer irreparably, inasmuch as, the respondent No. 1 or the other respondents would not be able to deal with the property for an indefinite period. It was also urged that the remedy for the appellant was to bring a suit for partition, which they have not done. ( 6. ) AFTER considering the submissions as above and perusal of the impugned-order, it appears that by sale-deed dated 15-5-1970, Ramesh Prasad the predecessor of the appellants had alienated the property with the recital that he had separated from his father and brothers on 22-5-1968. The Trial Court in Paras 10 and 11 of the impugned order referred to the aforesaid aspect of the matter to record a finding that prima facie it appears that there was separation of Ramesh Prasad from the rest of the family as back as on 22-5-1968. He had alienated the property, which was received by him in his share. ( 7. ) IT is also clear that even if the appellants submission that the property is a joint family property and they are members of the said family is accepted for the sake of argument, yet the property remedy for the appellants was to bring a suit for partition and possession, rather than only praying for declaration and injunction, as they have done. It is also clear that even if the property is joint, the respondents have right, title and interest thereon and, therefore, should be permitted to deal with it in the manner they feel proper, subject to such rights as the appellants may ultimately establish in the suit. ( 8. It is also clear that even if the property is joint, the respondents have right, title and interest thereon and, therefore, should be permitted to deal with it in the manner they feel proper, subject to such rights as the appellants may ultimately establish in the suit. ( 8. ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants relied upon Dorab Cawasji Warden Vs. Coomi Sorab Warden and others ( AIR 1990 SC 867 ) to support his submission that irreparable injury is likely to be caused to the plaintiffs in case temporary injunction is not granted to them. However, the facts of that case are entirely different and do not help the appellants case. It appears that in the said case, a transaction was entered in a hush-hush manner and the purchasers of the joint family property were inducted in the joint family house suggesting that the vendors were attempting to forestall the situation and to gain an undue advantage in a hurried and landestine manner defeating the appellants attempt to go to Court or appropriate relief. It was observed in that case that in the above circumstances, vendors could not be permitted to take advantage of their own act and defeat the claim of the appellants in the suit by saying that cause of action under Section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act no longer survives in view of their taking possession. As noted earlier, in the instant case, the appellants have already filed a suit, but have chosen not to seek relief of partition and possession by metes and bounds and yet they have sought an injunction against the respondents, who are admittedly the co-owners of the joinl family property, restraining them from alienating it. Such an injunction, in the circumstances of the case when there was material to believe that prima facie the predecessor of the appellants had separated from the rest of the family way back in 1968, could not have been granted. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be accepted. ( 9. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Sunil Kumar and another Vs. Ram Parkash and others ( AIR 1988 SC 576 ) to canvass his contention that an injunction against the proposed alienation against the Karta of the joint Hindu family property cannot be issued. ( 9. ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents referred to the judgment of the Apex Court in Sunil Kumar and another Vs. Ram Parkash and others ( AIR 1988 SC 576 ) to canvass his contention that an injunction against the proposed alienation against the Karta of the joint Hindu family property cannot be issued. It was laid down in the case that a suit for permanent injunction by a coparcener against the Karta for restraining him from alienating the house property belonging to the joint Hindu family for legal necessity would not be maintainable because the coparcener had got the remedy of challenging the same and getting it set-aside in a suit subsequent to the completion of the sale. This Court in Tillomal Thadani Vs. Smt. Bachhi Bai [ 2001 (1) MPHT 31 ] referred to the above decision of the Apex Court and refused to grant an injunction against the coparcener. ( 10. ) IN the circumstances, the impugned order rejecting the appellants prayer for temporary injunction appears to be justified and calls for no interference. ( 11. ) THIS appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed. However, it is clarified that the observations made in this order or the impugned order shall be confined to the disposal of the application for temporary injunction only and shall have no reflection on the merits of the suit.