ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a writ petition filed by Anand Kumar Tiwari praying for quashing the order of the state Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow dated 17. 12. 1996. Petitioner has further prayed for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to treat the petitioner in service as Constable in the u. P. Police. Facts of the case as emerge from the pleadings of the parties are : ( 2 ) PETITIONER was recruited as a Constable in 1974 and was lastly posted at Jaunpur. Petitioners elder brother died at his village on 11. 9. 1984. The death of elder brother of petitioner had a serious effect on his mind. Petitioner claimed in the writ petition that he prayed for leave and when the authorities did not grant him leave, he submitted his resignation on 27. 10. 1984. Petitioner thereafter on 2. 11. 1984 submitted an application for grant of leave for period of one month. The said application has been annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. In the leave application, petitioner stated that the acceptance of resignation of the petitioner will take sometime and petitioner has to go to his home for sowing his crops, hence he should be granted one month leave. Petitioner has further stated in will petition that he sent another application on 21. 11. 1984 praying that no action be taken on his resignation dated 27. 10. 1984. The said application is annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition, which was claimed to have been sent under certificate of posting. A copy of certificate of posting is annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition. Petitioner stated that he continued to remain under treatment of a Doctor till 27. 4. 1989 and could report at Jaunpur on 28. 4. 1989, but he was not allowed to join on the ground that he is no more in service. Petitioner thereafter filed a claim petition No. 179/v/hm3/89 in the U. P. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. In the claim petition, the petitioner reiterated that after submitting his resignation on 27. 10. 1984, he wrote to the Superintendent of Police a letter dated 21. 11. 1984 withdrawing his resignation. Petitioner thereafter filed a claim petition No. 179/v/hm3/89 in the U. P. State Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. In the claim petition, the petitioner reiterated that after submitting his resignation on 27. 10. 1984, he wrote to the Superintendent of Police a letter dated 21. 11. 1984 withdrawing his resignation. Petitioner in the claim petition took the ground that resignation until accepted by the concerned authority, is nullity and petitioner can withdraw before communication of the orders thereon ; hence he is entitled to join his duties and be treated to be in continuous service. A written statement supported by an affidavit was filed by superintendent of Police, Jaunpur before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal. In the written statement, it was stated that the petitioner has submitted his resignation voluntarily. Petitioners resignation was accepted nine days after expiry of his one months leave vide order No. R-389/84, dated 11. 12. 1984. It was further stated that the aforesaid order dated 11. 12. 1984 was communicated in two copies to the Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur, Bihar with the request to get it served on the petitioner. It was further stated that Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur sent a report that person of the name of petitioner does not live in the village but he lives outside, his father also lives outside. The letter was returned with the aforesaid report regarding service on the petitioner. In his written statement, Superintendent of Police has categorically stated that the letter dated 21. 11. 1984 was never received in the office of Superintendent of Police, Jaunpur. It was stated that after sending his resignation on 27. 10. 1984, the petitioner again sent a letter reiterating his request of resignation. Petitioner filed a rejoinder-affidavit to the written statement in which there is no specific reply of paragraph 3 of the written statement in which it was stated that resignation was accepted vide order dated 11. 12. 1984. Paragraph 10 of the written statement contains the allegation that letter of acceptance of resignation sent on 11. 12. 1984 was returned back with the report of Superintendent of Police. Bhojpur that petitioner 19 not residing in the village, has also not been specifically denied. 12. 1984. Paragraph 10 of the written statement contains the allegation that letter of acceptance of resignation sent on 11. 12. 1984 was returned back with the report of Superintendent of Police. Bhojpur that petitioner 19 not residing in the village, has also not been specifically denied. Public Service Tribunal after considering the evidence of both the parties recorded following findings : (i) Petitioner has not shown any receipt of the office of opposite parties or signatures of any official in token of the letter of withdrawal having been received which is being denied categorically by the opposite party. The certificate of posting dated 21. 11. 1984 filed by the petitioner, does not conclusively prove that it was only the letter of withdrawl of resignation which has been sent through it. (ii) Alleged application submitted by wife of the petitioner has been denied by the opposite parties. The petitioner has not shown any receipt of they having been received in the officer of opposite parties. In view of there being no evidence on behalf of the petitioner and denial by opposite parties, the case of the petitioner cannot be accepted. (iii) The Superintendent of Police did not accept the resignation during the leave period of the petitioner and did so only when he did not turn up for nine days after the expiry of leave. These facts also establish that the Superintendent of Police and other officers had sympathy with the petitioner and were not biased against him. That being the position if the petitioner would have withdrawn his resignation during his leave period he would have certainly been allowed to do so. ( 3 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner Shri S. K. Verma, Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Sidharth Verma submitted in support of the writ petition that petitioner was never communicated the acceptance of his resignation, hence the resignation never became effective and he had every right to withdraw the same and resume his duties. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that tribunal did not record finding that acceptance of resignation was ever communicated to the petitioner, rather the pleading of respondent in the written statement proves that letter of acceptance was never received by the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that tribunal did not record finding that acceptance of resignation was ever communicated to the petitioner, rather the pleading of respondent in the written statement proves that letter of acceptance was never received by the petitioner. In the above circumstances, petitioners services never came to an end and he had right to resume his duties and the Tribunal having ignored to give the findings on vital issues the order is vitiated. ( 4 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner cited the decisions of Apex Court and other High Courts contending that unless the acceptance of resignation is communicated, the resignation does not become effective. Shri S. K. Verma relied on following decisions : (a) State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 ; (b) Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 180 ; (c) K. Sudha Nagraj v. Chief Manager, Andhra Bank and another, 1996 Labour and Industrial cases 1228 ; (d) Ravindra Singh v. State of M. P. and others, 1995 (3) Service Law General 65 ; (e) S. K. Jain v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, 1989 SLR 100 ; (f) Satya Veer Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1989 (5) SLR 165. ( 5 ) PETITIONERs counsel cited two more decisions, i. e. , (i) Sher Singh v. Joint Director of consolidation, 1969 All LJ 38, for the proposition that Court Acts in exercise of its jurisdiction with the substantial irregularities in omitting to give its finding on vital questions, (ii) AIR 1940 cal 227, for the proposition that where a certificate of posting is put in evidence, the presumption is that the letter was posted and that it reached its destination unless something is shown to the contrary. ( 6 ) AFTER having heard the counsel for the petitioner and the learned standing counsel, following points arise for consideration : (i) Whether acceptance of resignation has to be served on the employee before it can be held to be effective? (ii) Whether on facts pleaded before the Tribunal, it is proved that petitioner withdrew the resignation before its acceptance? (iii) Whether Tribunal omitted to record necessary findings while deciding the case? ( 7 ) RESIGNATION is the voluntary relinquishment of the employment. Resignation is a bilateral concept and offer of resignation is to initiate from the employee which requires its acceptance by the competent authority. (iii) Whether Tribunal omitted to record necessary findings while deciding the case? ( 7 ) RESIGNATION is the voluntary relinquishment of the employment. Resignation is a bilateral concept and offer of resignation is to initiate from the employee which requires its acceptance by the competent authority. The act of resignation is complete as soon as the same is accepted by the competent authority. ( 8 ) THE contention of the petitioner that the acceptance is meaningless unless its communication is received by the petitioner is not correct. Petitioners counsel cited decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 , for the proposition that the order of dismissal could not be said to have taken effect until the respondents came to know about it. In the aforesaid judgment. Apex Court held in paragraph 11. "it is plain that the mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer concerned. If the appointing authority passed an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that in some cases, the authority may feel that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the said order and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is held that mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exercised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts and decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him? these and other complications would inevitably arise if it is held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is passed, though it may be communicated to the officer concerned several days thereafter. It is true that in the present case, the respondent had been suspended during the material period, but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. We are, therefore, reluctant to hold that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. " ( 9 ) THE aforesaid case of the Apex Court was dealing with dismissal of an employee. Present case is not a case of dismissal and the principles governing dismissal from service are not the same with regard to communication of acceptance of resignation. The Apex Court itself has occasion to consider the question regarding communication of a dismissal order and that of acceptance of resignation. The Apex Court held that where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority. The apex Court itself has distinguished the proposition laid down in the case of State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika. AIR 1966 SC 1313 . Apex Court in Raj Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1969 sc 180 ; has laid down following propositions : "4. The letters written by the appellant on August 21, 1964, and August 30, 1964, did not indicate that the resignation was not to become effective until acceptance thereof was intimated to the appellant. The appellant informed the authorities of the State of Rajasthan that his resignation may be forwarded for early acceptance. The letters written by the appellant on August 21, 1964, and August 30, 1964, did not indicate that the resignation was not to become effective until acceptance thereof was intimated to the appellant. The appellant informed the authorities of the State of Rajasthan that his resignation may be forwarded for early acceptance. On the plain terms of the letters, the resignation was to become effective as soon as it was accepted by the appointing authority. No rule has been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution which enacts that for an order accepting the resignation to be effective, it must be communicated to the person submitting his resignation. 5. Our attention was invited to a judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika, air 1966 SC 1313 , in which it was held that an order of dismissal passed by an authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it did not take effect as from the dale on which the order was actually written out by the said authority : such an order could only be effective after it was communicated to the officer concerned or was otherwise published. The principle of that case has no application here. Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is intimated to the employee. But where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determinated of his employment his services normally stand termination from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus paenitentiae but not thereafter. Undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case, the resignation was accepted within a short time after it was received by the Government of India. Undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case, the resignation was accepted within a short time after it was received by the Government of India. Apparently, the State of Rajasthan did not immediately implement the order, and relieve the appellant of his duties, but the appellant cannot profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving him of his duties. " ( 10 ) IN view of the proposition laid down by the Apex Court in Raj Kumars case, the contention of the petitioner that acceptance of resignation is necessary to be communicated before it becomes effective cannot be accepted. In the present case. It is further to be noted that acceptance of resignation was communicated to the petitioner by the Superintendent of Police, jaunpur through Superintendent of Police. Bhojpur in which a report was sent by Superintendent of Police, Bhojpur that petitioner and his father do not live in village. The acceptance of resignation was not thus kept in the file of the department but went out of it when the said letter was transmitted for communication to the petitioner. Thus, I am not persuaded to -accept the contention of the petitioner that resignation did not become effective since petitioner was not served with the copy of acceptance letter. Resignation become effective after its acceptance. ( 11 ) THE conduct of the parties and course of events which followed submission of letter of resignation also indicate that petitioner treated himself to have severed his status as Constable since there is a complete silence on the part of petitioner from November, 1984 till 28. 4. 1989. It was after more than 4 about 5 years that petitioner claimed to have gone to Jaunpur for resuming duty. Not a single letter is even claimed after November, 1984 till April 1989 stating that he continues in service since acceptance of resignation has not been received by him. With regard to acceptance of resignation. Apex Court has laid down that the conduct of party is relevant. Apex court in State of U. P. and others v. Ved Prakash Sharma, 1995 Supp. With regard to acceptance of resignation. Apex Court has laid down that the conduct of party is relevant. Apex court in State of U. P. and others v. Ved Prakash Sharma, 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 582, held as follows : "till 1987, i. e. , for over four years, he remained quiet and thereafter it suddenly occurred to him that he could take advantage of the fact that there was no formal acceptance of his resignation. He therefore, dashed off a letter dated December 10, 1987 with a view to withdrawing his resignation letter of March 14, 1983. Even thereafter he did nothing and went on making periodical representations, the last of which was rejected on June 13. 1990. Treating that as a cause of action he filed the writ petition in question. We think that in the circumstances it is absolutely clear that he had the animus to terminate his relationship by the letter of March 14. 1983. There was, therefore, no question of his being taken back in service after such a long lapse merely because of want of a formal communication accepting the resignation. The conduct of the parties has also relevance and the conduct of the respondent in particular shows his intention to terminate the contract. Counsel, however, relied on the decision of this Court in Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra and referred to paragraph 33 thereof, but we find that the said decision has no application to the facts of this case. That was a case which turned on the interpretation of article 217 proviso (a) and not a case of the present type where under the terms of the contract, the respondent had a right to sever relationship by one months notice. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court ought, not to have interfered in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution after a lapse of several years. The High Court should have realised that the respondent alone was responsible for the situation and must thank himself for the same. The management would have filled in the vacancy and cannot be expected to create a supernumerary post for no fault of its own. We, therefore, cannot allow the order to stand. The High Court should have realised that the respondent alone was responsible for the situation and must thank himself for the same. The management would have filled in the vacancy and cannot be expected to create a supernumerary post for no fault of its own. We, therefore, cannot allow the order to stand. We allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order and consequently the writ petition filed in the High Court by the respondent will stand dismissed with no order as to costs. " ( 12 ) THE petitioners complete silence from November, 1984 to April, 1989 proves that petitioner has accepted the fact that he is no more in service and claim of joining after more than 4 years was an afterthought. ( 13 ) PETITIONER has much relied on the following observations by the Apex Court in Raj Kumars case (supra) "undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case, the resignation was accepted within a short time after it was received by the government of India. Apparently the State of Rajasthan did not immediately implement the order, and relieve the appellant of his duties but the appellant cannot profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving him of his duties. " ( 14 ) THE above observations do not help the petitioner since in the present case, resignation was accepted on 11. 12. 1984 and was immediately communicated to the petitioner through S. P. , bhojpur. ( 15 ) THE counsel for the petitioner has relied on single Judge judgment of Andhra Pradesh High court in K. Sudha Nagraj v. Chief Manager, Andhra Bank and another, 1996 Labour and industrial Cases 1228. Aforesaid case laid down that it is always open to the employee to withdraw his resignation before the expiry of the effective date even in case where no effective date is stipulated, the resignation can be withdrawn before the acceptance of the resignation is communicated. There is no dispute with the proposition that the resignation can be withdrawn before it is accepted. There is no dispute with the proposition that the resignation can be withdrawn before it is accepted. Andhra Pradesh High Court has referred to Raj Kumars case (supra) and two other judgments of the Apex Court but in none of the judgments relied by Andhra Pradesh high Court, it was held that resignation can be withdrawn before receiving communication of the acceptance by the employee. The judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court does not correctly reiterate the ratio laid down in Raj Kumars case and other Apex Court judgment. ( 16 ) I am unable to persuade myself to follow the above judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court. The petitioners counsel further relied on Ravindra Singh v. State of M. P. , 1995 (3) SLJ 65, which was a case in which the resignation was withdrawn before its acceptance. In that case, resignation was accepted on the same day on which he withdrew the same. Thus, in the facts of the above case, the Apex Court ordered the appellant to continue in service. ( 17 ) ANOTHER judgment S. K. Jain v. Presiding Officer Labour Court. 1989 SLR 100, is clearly distinguishable. In the above case there was no acceptance of resignation before the workmen withdrew his resignation vide letter dated 26. 6. 1984. The Court held that it was necessary that resignation be accepted to make it effective. Punjab High Court did not lay down any proposition in the aforesaid case that for resignation being effective its communication and service of the acceptance on the workmen is necessary, in Rajasthan case Satya Veer Singh v. State of rajasthan. 1987 (5) SLR 165, the resignation although accepted had not become effective since the employee was asked to submit no due certificate which was not submitted in the above case. After acceptance of resignation necessary follow up action with a view to relieve the petitioner was not taken and the petitioner was not relieved of his duty. The aforesaid case considered Rule 22 of Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 which provided that resignation becomes effective only when it is accepted and the Government Servant is Relieved of his duties. The petitioner in that case was not relieved from his duties hence it was held that resignation had not become effective and he was permitted to withdraw. The aforesaid case considered Rule 22 of Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 which provided that resignation becomes effective only when it is accepted and the Government Servant is Relieved of his duties. The petitioner in that case was not relieved from his duties hence it was held that resignation had not become effective and he was permitted to withdraw. The aforesaid case was based on interpretation of particular service rules and facts of that case do not help the petitioner in the present case. ( 18 ) FROM the above discussion, it is clear that for becoming resignation effective, it is not necessary that the employee should receive the communication of acceptance. The acceptance of resignation brings an end the relationship of an employee and employer. The resignation being a bilateral act, it becomes complete when the offer of resignation is accepted. In the present case, there is material on record to prove that even acceptance of resignation was communicated to the petitioner although petitioner did not receive the communication. In the present case, acceptance of resignation having been proved and it being also communicated to the petitioner, the act of resignation was complete and petitioner is not entitled to claim joining on the ground that he never received communication of acceptance. ( 19 ) THE next submission of counsel for the petitioner that Tribunal did not record material findings also does not help the petitioner. Tribunal after considering the evidence did not accept the case of the petitioner that he sent withdrawl of his resignation vide letter dated 21. 11. 1984. Paragraph 8 of the judgment of the Tribunal clearly demonstrates that Tribunal applies its mind and disbelieved the case of the petitioner of having sent withdrawal. Paragraph 8 of the judgment is extracted below : "i have given due consideration to the arguments advanced by the counsel and have looked into the documentary evidence filed. The petitioner after submitting the resignation had applied for one months earned leave on the ground that acceptance of resignation will take time and as he has to plough his fields etc. The petitioner after submitting the resignation had applied for one months earned leave on the ground that acceptance of resignation will take time and as he has to plough his fields etc. in the village, he may be granted one months leave and the leave applied for was sanctioned to him the same day, so that he may be able to do his personal work at the village, and be also able to think over the matter of his resignation again during his leave period. It has been contended by the opposite parties in Para 3 of the C/a that the petitioner during his leave period had again sent a resignation from the village. Even after this, the S. P. did not accept the resignation during the leave period of the petitioner and did so only when he did not turn up for 9 days after the expiry of leave. In these circumstances it was but natural for the s. P. to presume that the petitioner does not in fact want to continue in service. These facts also establish that the S. P. and other officers had a sympathy with the petitioner and were not biased against him. That being the position if the petitioner would have withdrawn his resignation during his leave period, he would have certainly been allowed to do so. The opposite parties have contended that the petitioner had in fact never with drawn the resignation already submitted by him. There is no doubt that resignation can always be withdrawn before its acceptance. The petitioner has not shown any receipt of the office of the O. P. or signatures of any official in token of the letter of withdrawal having been received which is being denied categorically by the opposite parties. It is also of little surprising that the petitioner did not send such an important letter of withdrawal of his resignation even by regd. post and chose to send it only under the certificate of posting for which the postal authorities take no responsibility of delivery to the addresses. Even this certificate of posting dated 21. 11. 1984 (Annexure No. II) filed by the petitioner does not conclusively prove that it was only the letter of withdrawal of resignation which had been sent through it. Even this certificate of posting dated 21. 11. 1984 (Annexure No. II) filed by the petitioner does not conclusively prove that it was only the letter of withdrawal of resignation which had been sent through it. It could be his request to accept the resignation already submitted by him as is alleged by or opposite parties in para of the CA/ws. " ( 20 ) THE Tribunal having not accepted the case of the petitioner of submitting withdrawal of resignation, the petitioners case that he withdrew resignation and continued in service cannot be accepted. ( 21 ) THE counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no finding/ that resignation was accepted and communicated to the petitioner. The Tribunal in paragraph 8 of the judgment has clearly found that Superintendent of Police accepted the resignation after 9 days of expiry of the leave. Thus, the Tribunal has recorded the finding that resignation was accepted, The case of respondents themselves in the written statement was that acceptance of resignation was not served on the petitioner. Thus, it being accepted position before the Tribunal that acceptance was not received by the petitioner, hence in not recording of any finding in that respect is non-consequential. ( 22 ) THE Act of resignation is complete on its acceptance, noncommunication does not change the situation. Moreso the letter of acceptance was put into communication to the petitioner at his village through S. P. , Bhojpur. Letter of acceptance once having gone/ out of command of the employer, ft had become effective. The Division Bench judgment of our High Court in Sher singh v. Joint Director of Consolidation. 1969 ALJ 38, is not applicable, since Tribunal has recorded necessary findings to sustain the judgment of the Tribunal. Last decision in AIR 1940 cal 227 also need to be considered. The Tribunal in its finding has stated that it is not proved that under certificate of posting which was filed by the petitioner, the letter of withdrawl was sent. The Tribunal did not draw any contrary presumption as laid down in Calcuttas case. The finding of the Tribunal was based on facts of the case and course of event which took place in the present case. The judgment of Calcutta High Court was thus not applicable. The Tribunal did not draw any contrary presumption as laid down in Calcuttas case. The finding of the Tribunal was based on facts of the case and course of event which took place in the present case. The judgment of Calcutta High Court was thus not applicable. ( 23 ) IN view of what has been said above, the judgment of the Tribunal is based on correct appreciation of evidence on record and it did not err in dismissing the claim petition of the petitioner. ( 24 ) I find no merits in the writ petition. The writ petition is dismissed. .