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2001 DIGILAW 62 (HP)

BISHAMBARI DEVI v. STATE OF H. P.

2001-04-26

C.K.THAKKER

body2001
JUDGMENT C.K. Thakker, C.J.—This petition is filed by the petitioners praying therein to call for records and proceedings from Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Himachal Pradesh, Shimla, by which he granted interim stay on December 2, 2000 against an order passed by Additional Director, Consolidation of Holdings, and to quash and set aside the said order. A prayer, directing the Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh (respondent No. 1), has also been made to hold an inquiry into the matter in respect of averments and allegations made by the petitioners against respondent No. 2, and to submit a report. A further prayer is made that revision filed by respondents No. 3 to 12 before the second respondent be held to be not maintainable, and the proceedings initiated by respondent No. 2 be quashed and set aside. In the alternative, the case may be transferred from respondent No. 2 to any other officer. 2. It appears that consolidation proceedings were initiated by the authorities in accordance with the H.P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). An order was passed under sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Act and, being aggrieved by the said order, the present petitioners filed an appeal before the Additional Director, Consolidation under sub-section (4) of Section 30 of the Act. The said appeal was placed for hearing before the them Additional Director Consolidation one K. Certain allegations were levelled by the present respondents No. 3 to 12 against K and a prayer was made before the Director, Consolidation of Holdings to transfer the said case , to some other officer. The record discloses that the said prayer was granted and the appeal, which was before K was ordered to be transferred to another officer M. In view of the fact however, that there was re-structuring of the department, the post of Additional Director, Land Records was abolished by the Government and it was re-designated as Deputy Commissioner (Revenue). M to whom the case was allotted for hearing, had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. Hence, he had to return the case papers. The then Director, Consolidation once again sent the said case for hearing to K against whom allegations were made and the case was transferred. M to whom the case was allotted for hearing, had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. Hence, he had to return the case papers. The then Director, Consolidation once again sent the said case for hearing to K against whom allegations were made and the case was transferred. The case was thus decided by K against which revision was filed under Section 54 of the Act which has been entertained by respondent No. 2 and is pending with him. On December 4, 2000, an interim order was passed by respondent No. 2. The relevant part reads as under : "The petitioner has also filed application under Section 151 CPC for stay. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, I feel that the ends of the justice will be met if the operation of the impugned order dated 2.12.2000 is stayed till the disposal of this revision petition. It is feared by the petitioner that if stay is not granted, the respondents who are head strong, may alter the possession of the land on the spot. They have also sought the liberty of this Court to file the revision petition without copy of the impugned orders for which they have applied but fear that they may not get the copy in due course due to the bias of the Presiding Officer of the Court below. The request is granted. In the meantime, the record of the lower courts may be obtained. The case be fixed for regular hearing on 6.1.2001 at Shimla." 3. It is not in dispute by and between the parties that the revision is pending before the second respondent and awaits final hearing. It is the interlocutory order, which is challenged by the present petitioners under Article 227 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard Mr. Ajay Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. M.L. Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General assisted by Mr. Vivek Thakur, Asstt. Advocate General for the State and Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma learned Counsel for respondents No. 3 to 12. 5. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the revision petition filed before the second respondent was not maintainable. Ajay Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioners Mr. M.L. Chauhan, Deputy Advocate General assisted by Mr. Vivek Thakur, Asstt. Advocate General for the State and Mr. Bhuvnesh Sharma learned Counsel for respondents No. 3 to 12. 5. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the revision petition filed before the second respondent was not maintainable. He also submitted that in view of the approach adopted and steps taken by respondent No. 2, it is in the fitness of things, even if the revision which is otherwise not maintainable, is entertained and decided, that the same may be transferred to someone else. He submitted that there is reasonable apprehension in the minds of the petitioners that if respondent No. 2 will decide the matter, the petitioners will not get justice from him. This is sufficient ground to make an order of transfer of the case. He submitted that in exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, it is right and duty of this Court to ensure that all subordinate Courts and Tribunals act within the purview of their authority. When an action is taken by the second respondent, which is not in accordance with law, appropriate order deserves to be passed so as to safeguard and protect the interest of the petitioners. He, therefore, submitted that this is a fit case, which requires interference by this Court. 6. Mr. Sharma also submitted that some statements have been made by respondent No. 2 in the order as well as in the affidavit-in-reply, which are not in consonance with law and that ex-parte interim relief was granted without being mindful of the principles, applicable before grant of interim relief. 7. Mr. Chauhan, learned Deputy Advocate General on behalf of respondents No. 1 and 2 submitted that the action taken by respondent No. 2 cannot be said to be contrary to law. He has revisional jurisdiction and is undoubted exercise of the said jurisdiction, has entertained the revision petition as he was prima facie satisfied that the matter deserves consideration and in the light of the facts and circumstances, interim relief deserved to be granted and as such he has passed the order. As and when the matter will be taken up for hearing, the same will be decided in accordance with law after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and at this stage no interference is called for. As and when the matter will be taken up for hearing, the same will be decided in accordance with law after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and at this stage no interference is called for. He also submitted that looking to the entire record, prima fade, respondent No. 2 was of the opinion that the order passed by Additional Director deserved to be stayed and, accordingly, he has stayed the order. 8. The learned Counsel for the contesting respondents No. 3 to 12 also supported the submissions of the learned Deputy Advocate General. He submitted that the petitioners of revision (respondents 3-12) had serious grievance against the partisan attitude of the Additional Director, Consolidation and their apprehension was held to be well founded and an order was passed transferring the case from that officer to other officer. In view of re-structuring of the department, however, the case was again posted before the same officer. According to him, the said action was taken without issuing any notice to the petitioners of revision petition. The officer had passed an order, which was vulnerable. Being aggrieved by the said order, they had approached respondent No. 2 and interim relief was granted which is legal and valid. No grievance can be made by the petitioner. 9. Having gone through the records and heard the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the opinion that it is not appropriate to entertain the petition at this stage. In the facts and circumstances, it is neither appropriate nor advisable to express any opinion on merits one way or the other, which may prejudicially affect either party. Whether or not the revision petition is maintainable and whether or not the order passed by the Additional Director is in accordance with law will obviously be decided by the revisional authority at the time of hearing of revision. It must be said to the fairness of Mr. Ajay Sharma, that according to him, the revisional authority, ought not to have entertained the revision in the light of Rue 27 of the H.P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1973. It must be said to the fairness of Mr. Ajay Sharma, that according to him, the revisional authority, ought not to have entertained the revision in the light of Rue 27 of the H.P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Rules, 1973. The said Rule requires the revisional authority under Section 54 of the Act to file revision petition, which shall be signed and verified by the applicant and which shall be accompanied by certified copy each of the orders passed under sub-section (4) of Section 30. It was submitted that when no copy of the order passed by the Additional Director was filed alongwith the revision, the respondent No. 2 could not have entertained the revision. He also drew my attention to the operative part of the interlocutory order, in which it was stated that the second respondent has entertained the revision petition without the copy of the impugned order in view of the fact that the applicants (respondent Nos. 3 to 12 herein) had applied for the copy but they feared that they might not get the copy in due course due to the bias attitude of the presiding officer. According to Mr. Sharma, there is nothing on record to show as to whether any application was made by respondent Nos. 3 to 12, who approached the second respondent by filing the revision petition and that in spite of such application, the copy of order was not supplied to them. In my opinion, however, revisional power can be exercised under the relevant provisions of law. Apart from aggrieved party approaching the revisional authority, the State Government can exercise such power suo motu with a view to ascertain "legality and propriety" of any order passed under the scheme or under the Act. Now if the State Government can call for the records and proceedings suo motu, then prima fade, it can not be said that without production of certified copy of the order passed by an officer subordinate to the State Government, no revision could have been entertained by the authority. 10. I may however, hasten to add that I may not be understood to have expressed final opinion on the question and it is open to the learned Counsel for the present petitioners to raise all contentions, including the maintainability of the revision petition before the revisional authority. 10. I may however, hasten to add that I may not be understood to have expressed final opinion on the question and it is open to the learned Counsel for the present petitioners to raise all contentions, including the maintainability of the revision petition before the revisional authority. So far as the grant of stay is concerned, ordinarily, it is the discretion of the authority concerned. When an order is passed by a subordinate authority and the revisional authority, prima facie, feels that revision deserves consideration and grants stay of the orders passed by the subordinate authority, it cannot be said that by exercising such power, illegality has been committed. 11. Regarding the observations made by the revisional authority either in the order impugned in the present petition or in the affidavit-in-reply dated February 9, 2001, wherein it was stated that the revisional authority was fully satisfied that orders passed by the Additional Director, Consolidation had been vitiated by illegal considerations, it is clarified that all those observations are of prima facie in nature and as and when the matter will be taken up for final hearing, the same will be decided on its own merits. 12. A grievance was also made that the partisan attitude of respondent No. 2 is clear when it was observed in the affidavit-in-reply that even prior to the passing of order in the revision on December 4, 2000, he had applied his mind and the said fact weighed with him. In the affidavit-in-reply, however, respondent No. 2 has stated that even prior to December 4, 2000, he had applied his mind in view of the fact that prior to filing of the present petition, an application was made in November, 2000 to him for transfer of the case but in view of the fact that by that time in the light of the order passed by another Director, his predecessor, the case had already been re-transferred to K and the hearing was over, he did not pass any order. In view of the above facts, be thought it proper to entertain the revision petition, which he entertained. He also thought it proper to grant interim relief which has been granted by issuing notice to the present petitioners and by fixing a date of January 6, 2001. It appears that thereafter, the matter is adjourned from time to time. In view of the above facts, be thought it proper to entertain the revision petition, which he entertained. He also thought it proper to grant interim relief which has been granted by issuing notice to the present petitioners and by fixing a date of January 6, 2001. It appears that thereafter, the matter is adjourned from time to time. 13, In view of all the circumstances, it cannot be said that there is a reasonable apprehension in the minds of the petitioners that they will not get justice from respondent No. 2 and the case deserves to be transferred to other Director. Apart from the fact that it was stated by the learned Dy. Advocate General that there is only one Director and under the doctrine pi necessity, he will have to hear and decide the matter, even otherwise, I see no reason to accede be the prayer of transfer. 14. For the foregoing reasons, no case has been made out by the present petitioners either to get the order dated December 4, 2001 quashed or transferred. At the same time, however, I may clarify that all the observations made by respondent No. 2 in the affidavit-in-reply as well as in the impugned order, are to be treated as prima facie in nature and as and when the matter will came up for final hearing, the same will be decided on its own merits without being influenced by these observations. The petition is accordingly dismissed. Notice discharged. No costs. Petition dismissed. -