B. K. RATHI, J. ( 1 ) THE dispute in this case is regarding a shop, part of house No. 328 situated on South Bhopa road, Muzaffarnagar. The respondent No. 1 moved an application for its release against the petitioner under Section 21 (1) (a) of U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "act" ). The application was contested by the petitioner. It was rejected by the prescribed authority on 27. 10. 1997 by judgment. Annexure-10 to the writ petition. Aggrieved by that order, the respondent No. 1 preferred appeal No. 28 of 1997 under Section 22 of the Act, the appeal has been allowed on 28. 3. 2001 by Judgment, Annexure-11 to the writ petition and the shop has been released in favour of the respondent No. 1 by the respondent No. 2. The petitioner has, therefore, preferred this writ petition invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India with the request that the order dated 28. 3. 2001, Annexure-11 to the writ petition, be quashed. ( 2 ) AN application for redelivery of possession of the disputed shop purported to be under sections 144 and 151, C. P. C. has also been moved by the petitioner on the allegations that forcible and illegal possession of the shop was obtained by the respondent No. 1 on 12. 4. 2001. ( 3 ) I have heard Sri Pramod Jain, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Ravi Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1. ( 4 ) A preliminary objection has been raised by Sri Ravi Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that in pursuance of the release a order passed by the respondent No. 2, the shop has been vacated by the petitioner under a compromise and he has delivered its vacant possession to the respondent No. 1. That, therefore, this petition has become infructuous. 1 propose to consider this objection of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 after considering the writ petition on merits. I shall also consider the application for redelivery of possession at the later stage. ( 5 ) NOW coming to the merits of the case. That, therefore, this petition has become infructuous. 1 propose to consider this objection of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 after considering the writ petition on merits. I shall also consider the application for redelivery of possession at the later stage. ( 5 ) NOW coming to the merits of the case. The first question that arises for decision from the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties is whether the respondent No. 1 is the landlord of the shop in dispute and has right to move the application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act. The petitioner has denied that the respondent No. 1 is the landlord of the disputed shop. His contention is that the respondent No. 1, his brother. Subhash Chandra and mother. Smt. Kiran devi are joint owners. That they served separate notices and claimed rights to realise the rent. That, therefore, he deposited the rent under Section 30 (2) of the Act. The first question, therefore, is whether the respondent No. 1 is the landlord of the premises in dispute? ( 6 ) IN this case, prior to filing of the application, the respondent No. 1 served a notice on the petitioner which is Annexure-5 to the writ petition. In this notice, he has mentioned that the respondent No. 1 is the owner and landlord of the shop in dispute since 1985 by virtue of a family partition. ( 7 ) THE copy of the application for release is Annexure-6 to the writ petition, in which he has alleged that he is the owner and landlord of the disputed shop in pursuance of the decree for declaration passed In Suit No. 88 of 1989. However, he did not allege that petitioner ever paid any rent to him. The question, therefore, is whether it could be accepted that the respondent No. 1 became the exclusive landlord by the decree In that suit and can file the application. Certified copy of the decree has not been filed. Only a photocopy of the same has been filed along with affidavit. This copy shows that the decree is dated 28. 2. 1989. The declaration of ownership has been obtained on the basis of mutual partition alleged to have held in the year 1985 and the respondent No. 1 claimed that he became exclusive owner by virtue of this decree dated 28. 2. 1989. This copy shows that the decree is dated 28. 2. 1989. The declaration of ownership has been obtained on the basis of mutual partition alleged to have held in the year 1985 and the respondent No. 1 claimed that he became exclusive owner by virtue of this decree dated 28. 2. 1989. However, the Suit No. 60 of 1992. Annexure-4 to the writ petition, was filed in the year 1992 by the respondent No. 1 and his brother. Subhash Chandra and mother. Smt. Klran devi against the petitioner for eviction and for recovery of arrears of rent. In Para 1 of the plaint, it was pleaded that all the three plaintiffs are the landlords of the premises in dispute. The mutual partition of 1985 and the decree for declaration were not pleaded in the suit. Not only this, on 21. 4. 1989. Kiran Devi sent a notice to the petitioner, Annexure-2 to the writ petition, asking him to pay the rent to her. The decree is alleged to be dated 28. 2. 1989. If by that decree the respondent No. 1 became exclusive owner, there was no question of serving of notice by Klran devi on the petitioner demanding the rent from him and filing of Suit No. 60 of 1997 by the three landlords. ( 8 ) IT may further be mentioned that the rent receipts were also issued by Kiran Devi to the petitioner and the receipts issued from May, 1988 to January, 1989 were produced before the prescribed authority. If there was family partition in the year 1985, there was no question of realisation of rent by Kiran Devi, mother of the respondent No. 1. As against this, the respondent no. 1 never received rent to the shop in dispute from the petitioner. In the circumstances, it is clear that the decree for declaration Is collusive and fake decree and does not confer right of ownership on the respondent No. 1. The respondent No. 1 is, therefore, not the owner and landlord of the shop in dispute and has no right to move the application. ( 9 ) AFTER finding on the above point, it is not necessary to consider the bond fide need of respondent No. 1. Even then, I consider it proper to consider the bona fide need as well. The disputed shop admittedly is of the size of 9 x 9. ( 9 ) AFTER finding on the above point, it is not necessary to consider the bond fide need of respondent No. 1. Even then, I consider it proper to consider the bona fide need as well. The disputed shop admittedly is of the size of 9 x 9. The respondent No. 1 is already running a halwai shop, the size of which is 20ft x 12ft. The respondent No. 1 alleged that the shop in which he Is carrying on halwai business is owned by Manoj Kumar and he is paying the rent of Rs. 500 per month ; that Manoj Kumar has asked him to vacate the shop. This allegation of the respondent No. 1 also appears to be totally false. Manoj Kumar is the real brother of the respondent No. 1. It is not alleged as to how Manoj Kumar became the exclusive owner and landlord of that shop. On the other hand, the respondent No. 1 has suppressed these facts and only pleaded in the application, Annexure- 6 to the writ petition, that he is carrying on halwai business in a shop at rental of Rs. 500 per month. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that Manoj kumar is the owner of the shop in which the respondent No. 1 is presently carrying on halwai business and Manoj Kumar has any right to get it vacated from the respondent No. 1 and Manoj kumar ever asked respondent No. 1 to vacate it. The respondent No. 1 is carrying on halwai business, and is not required to vacate the same, in a big shop and, therefore, there is absolutely no need of this shop, which is very small in size. ( 10 ) THEREFORE, consideration of the facts shows that there is absolutely no need what to say of bona fide need of respondent No. 1 of the disputed shop and the application was absolutely frivolous based on entirely false allegations. ( 11 ) IN view of the above, the question of consideration of comparative hardship does not arise and I am of the view that the respondent No. 2 has erred in allowing appeal. ( 12 ) NOW corning to the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the petitioner has already vacated the shop under an agreement and delivered possession to him and. therefore, this writ petition has become infructuous. ( 12 ) NOW corning to the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the petitioner has already vacated the shop under an agreement and delivered possession to him and. therefore, this writ petition has become infructuous. Regarding this, the contention of the petitioner is that he has been forcibly dispossessed from the disputed shop while he was legal tenant of the same. It is contended that the judgment of the respondent No. 1 is dated 28. 3. 2001. The operative part of the judgment shows that the petitioner was allowed two months time to vacate the disputed shop, i. e. . time upto 28. 5. 2001. Sub-section (6) of Section 21 of the Act provides that the tenancy stands terminated in respect of the released portion on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the order of release. That, therefore. according to this clause, the petitioner was legal tenant of the disputed shop till 28. 4. 2001. However, he was forcibly dispossessed on 12. 4. 2001. It Is alleged in the affidavit that on that day, the petitioner was at allahabad and he received telephonic message regarding forcible dispossession and then he went to Muzaffarnagar to know the facts and came to know that the possession has been obtained by force on 12. 4. 2001. In support of the argument besides the railway reservation ticket, annexure-2 to the affidavit and report of S. I. , Annexure-3 to the affidavit has been filed. ( 13 ) IN this regard the respondent No. 1 filed first affidavit on 18. 4. 2001 with the request that the petition has become Infructuous and be dismissed. It was pleaded In this affidavit that the petitioner on 7. 4. 2001 has delivered possession of the disputed shop on the presence of Raj kurnar Singh and Aditya Kumar Verma and executed a memorandum regarding it, which is annexure-1 to affidavit. The petitioner in the application for the redelivery of possession has denied this document and alleged that it is a forged document and he never delivered the possession of the shop in dispute nor he signed the memo, Annexure-1 to the affidavit. Thereafter the respondent No. 1 filed counter-affidavit on 30. 4. 2001, In which he pleaded that there was an agreement between the parties and the respondent No. 1 gave Rs. 50. Thereafter the respondent No. 1 filed counter-affidavit on 30. 4. 2001, In which he pleaded that there was an agreement between the parties and the respondent No. 1 gave Rs. 50. 000 to the petitioner and in lieu thereof, he vacated the disputed shop. He reasserted the execution of the agreement dated 7. 4. 2001. In this regard, the petitioner against alleged that it is a forged document and he has not signed it. Annexure-1 of the affidavit of respondent No. 1 shows that there are signatures of the respondent No. 1 as well as of the petitioner on this document. However, the petitioner has filed its copy along with rejoinder-affidavit which is Annexure-R. A. 1, in which the signatures of the respondent No. 1 are wanting. It is contended that the document has been prepared for the purpose of this case. ( 14 ) THERE is affidavit and counter-affidavits only in regard to the fact where the shop was vacated by the petitioner and the agreement was executed. Therefore, it has to be decided on the basis of the circumstances. ( 15 ) THE present writ petition was preferred by the petitioner on 11. 4. 2001 and its copy was supplied to the counsel for the respondent No. 1 on that date. Naturally some time might have been taken in preparation of the writ petition. It is against the natural course of conduct that after delivering the possession on 7. 4. 2001 to the respondent No. 1, the petitioner immediately came to the Allahabad and got prepared this writ petition and filed it in this Court. ( 16 ) THE next important circumstance is that the allegation regarding the payment of Rs. 50. 000 to the petitioner by the respondent No. 1 appears to be false. As already said In the first affidavit dated 18. 4. 2001, the respondent No. 1 did not allege regarding the payment of Rs. 50. 000. Not only this, there is also no mention in the memo, Annexure-1 to the affidavit that Rs. 50,000 were paid. No separate receipt of payment of Rs. 50,000 was executed. The amount was not paid by the cheque or demand draft. Respondent No. 1 has not disclosed as to from where he arranged rs. 50,000. No account books have been produced to show that respondent No. 1 has balance of rs. 50,000 were paid. No separate receipt of payment of Rs. 50,000 was executed. The amount was not paid by the cheque or demand draft. Respondent No. 1 has not disclosed as to from where he arranged rs. 50,000. No account books have been produced to show that respondent No. 1 has balance of rs. 50,000 in his account books and withdrawn the same. Therefore, the allegation regarding the payment of Rs. 50,000 appears to be false and concocted for the purposes of this case. ( 17 ) IT is also Important to mention that attempt was being made to dispossess the petitioner by force. Therefore, he filed Suit No. 434 of 1989 for injunction which was decreed on 7. 3. 1994. The copy of judgment is Annexure-3 to the writ petition. Earlier Suit No. 60 of 1992 for eviction of the petitioner was filed, the copy of plaint is Annexure-4 to the writ petition. ( 18 ) CONSIDERING the overall circumstances of the case, it appears that the petitioner never delivered the possession of the shop to the respondent No. 1. On the other hand, the respondent no, 1 forcibly dispossessed the petitioner during the period which the petitioner was legal tenant and was in lawful possession of the disputed shop. The writ petition therefore, has not become infructuous. It will be mockery of justice in case the writ petition of the tenant is made infructuous by forcible dispossession by the landlord. Therefore, the preliminary objection of the respondent No. 1 is without merit. ( 19 ) NOW I consider the application of redelivery of possession moved under Section 144 read with Section 151, C. P. C. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this point does not require a detailed scrutiny after the finding that the respondent No. 1 is not the landlord of the shop in dispute and he has no bona fide need and the petitioner has been forcibly dispossessed from the disputed shop. Therefore, he Is entitled to get back the possession. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has raised legal points and contended that the application under Section 144, C. P. C. is not maintainable. He has also referred to the provisions of Section 144 (1 ). Therefore, he Is entitled to get back the possession. ( 20 ) HOWEVER, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has raised legal points and contended that the application under Section 144, C. P. C. is not maintainable. He has also referred to the provisions of Section 144 (1 ). C. P. C. which is as follows : "where and in so far as a decree [or an order) is (varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit Instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree of order) shall. on the application of any party entitled in any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be. place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree (or order) or (such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified) ; and, for this purpose, the court may make any orders, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly (consequential on such variation. reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order.)" ( 21 ) THE bare reading of this section shows that application can lie under this section in the case where the decree or order under which the possession was taken in varied or reversed in appeal or other proceedings. ( 22 ) IT is also contended by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 that the application could be moved before the Court of first instance. Learned counsel in support of the argument has referred to Neelathupara Kummi Seethi Koya Phangal v. Montharapalla Padippua Attakoya and others, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 760. In this case, the Apex Court has held that application under section 144 (1 ). C. P. C. lies in the Court of first instance only. The other case referred to on this point is State Bank of Saurastitra v. Chitranjan Rangnath Raja and another. AIR 1980 SC 1528 . The Apex Court in this case has held that where the decree Is varied or reversed in the appeal by the High Court, the Court of the first instance is competent to order restitution. The other case referred to on this point is State Bank of Saurastitra v. Chitranjan Rangnath Raja and another. AIR 1980 SC 1528 . The Apex Court in this case has held that where the decree Is varied or reversed in the appeal by the High Court, the Court of the first instance is competent to order restitution. In this case it was further held that the restitution cannot be granted even by the Honble Supreme Court. ( 23 ) THE last case referred to on this point is Mahijibhai Mohanbhat Barot v. Patel Manibhai cokalbhai and others. AIR 1965 SC 1477 . It was held in this case that application for restitution is an application for execution of decree. ( 24 ) ON the basis of these authorities and the provisions of Section 144, C. P. C. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 is that the application under Section 144. C. P. C. is not maintainable and secondly that the application does not lie in this Court. ( 25 ) I have carefully considered the arguments are of the view that Section 144, C. P. C. has no application on the facts of the present case. It applies where in the execution of decree, the possession has been obtained and thereafter the decree Is varied or reversed. It does not apply to the cases where a lawful occupant is dispossessed Illegally by force. This application is to be treated under Section 151. C. P. C. under Inherent powers. ( 26 ) IN the present case, the application under Section 144, C. P. C. will also not lie in the executing court simply for the reason that the possession has not been delivered in the execution of the release order. This is a case of forcible dispossession. Therefore, this Court in exercise of powers under Section 151. C. P. C. and also under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is fully empowered to undo the wrong done to the petitioner during the pendency of the proceedings in the court below and High Court. The High Court is not powerless to ignore such a flagrant violation of law and cannot show its helplessness to do justice between the parties. The High Court is not powerless to ignore such a flagrant violation of law and cannot show its helplessness to do justice between the parties. In my opinion, it is a fittest case where the possession of the disputed shop is restored and to award compensation for the unlawful act of the respondent No. 1 to the petitioner under Section 151, c. P. C. and under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. ( 27 ) I have, already expressed that a frivolous application was filed by the respondent No. 1 and he in his highhandedness also dispossessed the petitioner by force from the business premises. Therefore, it is proper case where Rs. 20,000 is awarded as compensation to the petitioner from the respondent No. 1. ( 28 ) THE petition is accordingly allowed and release order passed by the respondent No. 1. Annexure-11 to the writ petition is quashed and it is ordered that the release application shall stand dismissed. ( 29 ) THE learned prescribed authority is directed to immediately restore the possession of the disputed shop to the petitioner. For that purpose he may provide police help on the request of the petitioner on such terms as he thinks fit. ( 30 ) THE respondent No. 1 is also directed to pay Rs. 20. 000 as compensation to the petitioner, which shall also be got recovered by the prescribed authority, if not paid. .