JUDGMENT:---This writ petition is directed against the show cause notice dated 7-9-2000, Annexure B, issued by the Competent Authority, SAFEMA/N.D.P.S., Bombay against the petitioner under section 6(1) of the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the Act). The said Notice was issued by the Competent Authority on behalf of the Government of India, Ministry of Finance. It recited that a detention order under COFEPOSA was passed against the petitioner on 22-3-1999 by the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department and it was revoked under section 21 of the General Clauses Act by the Principal Secretary to Government of Maharashtra on 8-9-1999 and the said revocation has no effect on the proceedings under the SAFEMA. It calls upon the petitioner to show cause why the property mentioned therein should not be forfeited. 2. The learned Counsel for the petitioner Mr. Maqsood Khan has challenged this notice as it suffers from the vice of lack of jurisdiction and also the reasons shown therein which led to believe the authority to invoke the section 6 of the Act is faulty and extraneous and the notice is therefore liable to be quashed. 3. The learned Central Government Pleader Mr. H.V. Mehta mainly makes two submissions. He submits that the writ petition is not maintainable as it is premature. Petitioner without submitting his explanation to the authority should not have come to this Court to quash the notice. He further submits that since the revocation of the Detention Order was under section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, it will not come in any of the circumstances for revocation mentioned in section 2(2)(b) of the SAFEMA. 4. We are not very much concerned about the facts which led the authority to believe. We are concerned only the jurisdictional aspect of the notice. It is true that the Show Cause Notice itself shows that the order of detention was revoked. But as contended by Mr. Mehta only those revocation as mentioned in section 2(2)(b) can be taken into account for excluding the operation of SAFEMA. Section 2 deals with the application of the Act, which reads as follows : 2. Application.---(1) The provision of this Act shall apply only to the persons specified in sub-section (2). (2) The persons referred to in sub-section (1) are the following namely : (a) ............................. .................................. .................................. Section 2 deals with the application of the Act, which reads as follows : 2. Application.---(1) The provision of this Act shall apply only to the persons specified in sub-section (2). (2) The persons referred to in sub-section (1) are the following namely : (a) ............................. .................................. .................................. (b) every person in respect of whom an order of detention has been made under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1947 (52 of 1947): Provided that.--- (i) Such order of detention, being an order to which the provisions of section 9 or section 12-A of the said Act do not apply, has not been revoked on the report of the Advisory Board under section 8 of the said Act or before the receipt of the report of the Advisory Board or before making a reference to the Advisory Board; or (ii) Such order of detention, being an order to which the provisions of section 9 of the said Act apply, has not been revoked before the expiry of the time for, or on the basis of, the review under sub-section (3) of section 9, or on the report of the Advisory Board under section 8, read with sub-section (2) of section 9 of the said Act; or (iii) Such order of detention being an order to which the provisions of section 12-A of the said Act apply, has not been revoked before the expiry of the time for, or on the basis of the first review under sub-section (3) of that section, or on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board under section 8, read with sub-section (6) of section 12-A, of that Act; or (iv) Such order of detention has not been set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction; 5. We are mainly concerned here about the Clause (i) of the proviso to section 2(2)(b) of the Act. This clause deals with the revocation of the order on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board under section 8 or before the receipt of the report of the Advisory Board and/or before making a reference to the Advisory Board. According to Shri Mehta the order of revocation made in this case does not fall in any of the circumstances mentioned in the proviso to Clause (i) of the proviso to section 2(2)(b). 6. According to Shri Mehta the order of revocation made in this case does not fall in any of the circumstances mentioned in the proviso to Clause (i) of the proviso to section 2(2)(b). 6. At our request the learned Public Prosecutor of the Maharashtra State has made available to files relating to revocation. It reveals that two other detenues were also ordered to be detained on the same grounds by the Competent Authority. But those two detenues had approached Nagpur Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No. 142/99 and the Nagpur Bench of this Court has set aside that order on the ground of delays in two pockets, one in making proposal after the last statement recorded and secondly in passing the detention order. It was noticed by the Government that the name of the petitioner was surfaced in the statements of the other two co-accused on 16-10-1998 and the detention order was passed only on 22-3-1999. This Court has held with regard to the co-accused Shri Atul Gondia that there is an inordinate delay in passing the detention order and the detention order was therefore set aside. Evidently the petitioner has not filed a writ petition to challenge the detention order. But his wife made a representation to the Government and following the same principal of undue delay as found by this Court the order of detention was revoked by the authority. We do not find that out of any extraneous consideration the order was passed by the Government in revoking the detention of the petitioner. But we have to consider the objection raised by Mr. Mehta, whether this revocation of the detention order has any bearing on the application of SAFEMA to the case of the petitioner. 7. The recital in the Show Cause Notice shows that revocation order was issued under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act reads as follows : "11. Mehta, whether this revocation of the detention order has any bearing on the application of SAFEMA to the case of the petitioner. 7. The recital in the Show Cause Notice shows that revocation order was issued under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act reads as follows : "11. Revocation of detention Orders.---(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified; (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of a State Government, by that State Government or by the Central Government; (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer of the Central Government or by a State Government, by the Central Government. (2) The revocation of a detention order shall not bar the making of another detention order under section 3 against the same person." 8. On reading of section 11 of COFEPOSA, we do not find any difference being show to its effect between the revocation order as mentioned in Clause (i) of proviso to 2(2)(b) of the Act or the revocation made under section 11 except that the revocation made under section 21 of the General Clauses Act will not be a bar to make any other fresh detention order against the same person. We do not find any reason for not giving any legal effect to such revocation order which was passed under section 21 of the General Clauses Act. 9. The learned Counsel Mr. H.V. Mehta has argued that the detention order could not be taken effect since the petitioner was avoiding the service of the detention order. Therefore order of revocation was passed against an order which was not taken effect to. This cannot be considered as a circumstance that exonerate the detenue from his charge and it cannot be treated that the order was not validly made. According to him, when the detention order was made unless it is revoked under the circumstances mentioned in the Clause (i) to proviso to section 2(2)(b), there is no illegality in continuing the initial SAFEMA proceeding. We have seen that the revocation order has been made by the Government of Maharashtra under section 11 of the Act and that the revocation was made before receipt of the report of the Advisory Board. We have seen that the revocation order has been made by the Government of Maharashtra under section 11 of the Act and that the revocation was made before receipt of the report of the Advisory Board. Therefore, according to us, the revocation order has to be given its full effect. 10. The Supreme Court in (Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas and others)1, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2179, has examined the validity of the SAFEMA and in paragraph 39 of the above judgment has quoted a passage from Vardarajan, J., a case where the order of this Court was examined, which was passed under section 2, 6 and 7 of the SAFEMA which observed thus : "Therefore, a valid order of detention under COFEPOSA is a condition precedent to proceedings being taken under sections 6 and 7 of SAFEMA cannot stand. Therefore, we have to consider whether the impugned order of detention dated 19-12-1974 under COFEPOSA is void and has to be quashed." 11. It is clear from the aforesaid passage that the provisions of SAFEMA can be invoked only when a valid order of detention subsists or operated at the time of initiating the proceeding under SAFEMA. But here at the time of issuing Show Cause Notice the order of detention did not subsist. Therefore, the SAFEMA proceedings cannot be initiated. At this juncture, we have to refer to a decision of the Single Bench of Gujarat High Court relied upon by the learned Counsel Mr. Mehta, in (1996 Gujarat Law Reporter, Vol. XXVIII (2) 1595)2. Before the learned Judge a similar question has been arisen in paragraph 16, and it has been held that the dealing with the four categories of the case where SAFEMA still cease to have any application, the learned Judge has held thus : "It is not the case of the petitioner that his case falls in any of the categories mentioned above. Thus, the revocation of detention is only under section 11 of the COFEPOSA. It has to be borne in mind that all the four situations have been recognized in the statute where the Act (sic, Act) would not or cease to apply in the event of detention or (sic. Order) being revoked or set aside, revocation under section 11(i) of the COFEPOSA is not one of those contingencies as contemplated by law. It has to be borne in mind that all the four situations have been recognized in the statute where the Act (sic, Act) would not or cease to apply in the event of detention or (sic. Order) being revoked or set aside, revocation under section 11(i) of the COFEPOSA is not one of those contingencies as contemplated by law. This Act is a special piece of legislation dealing with specified situation and as such it is not possible to go beyond the scope of exceptions created by the provisions (i) to (iv) section 2(2)(b) of SAFEMA and take note of the revocation orders which are of the general nature passed under section 11(i) of the COFEPOSA to hold that jurisdiction of that competent authority to proceed on the basis of the said detention order cease to exist because to do so would be to contribute something to the intention of the legislature which was not there because had it been so, there was nothing to prevent reference in the Act itself by adding revocation of detention under section 11(i) of the COFEPOSA also to be drawn by way of additional proviso to section 2(2)(b) of SAFEMA. Thus, the mere fact of revocation of detention order which generally, falls outside the ambit of the proviso and section 4 of the Act would be inconsequential so far as the proceedings under the Act are concerned." 12. With great respect we cannot agree with the propositions laid down by the learned Single Judge of the Gujarat High Court. First of all the learned Judge was dealing with a detention under Emergency where section 12-A is applicable so far application of SAFEMA in that case is concerned Clause (ii) (iii) are relevant and not Clause (i) or proviso to section 2(2)(b) as we found in this case. Secondly, proviso to section 2(2)(b) do not deal with types of revocations, they dealt with periods or timings during which detention order could be revoked. Those cases mentioned about at what stage the detention order could be revoked. 13. Section 21 of the General Clause Act is a general provision how to interpret provisions of an enactment or Regulation or Rules where certain powers are conferred on certain authority to issue an order and the extent to which such power could be exercised. Those cases mentioned about at what stage the detention order could be revoked. 13. Section 21 of the General Clause Act is a general provision how to interpret provisions of an enactment or Regulation or Rules where certain powers are conferred on certain authority to issue an order and the extent to which such power could be exercised. In doing so, such authority is conferred with power of modify, amend or to alter it. This power has been extended to the Detaining Authority or other authorities to revoke the order of detention in section 11 of the COFEPOSA. This position has been well clarified by the Supreme Court in (Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India others)3, reported in 1995(3) Bom.C.R. (S.C.)69 : J.T. 1995(3) S.C. 639. At para 6 the Supreme Court observed thus : "Article 22(5) does not, however, indicate the authority to whom the representation is to be made. Since the object and purpose of the representation that is to be made by the person detained is to enable him to obtain relief at the earliest opportunity, the said representation has to be made to the authority which can grant such relief, i.e. the authority which can revoke the order of the detention and set him at liberty. The authority that has made the order of detention can also revoke it. This right is inherent in the power to make the order. It is recognized by section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 though it does not flow from it. It can, therefore, be said that Articles 22(5) postulates that the person detained has a right to make a representation against the order of detention to the authority making the order. In addition, such a representation can be made to any other authority who is empowered by law to revoke the order of detention." Therefore Clauses (i) to (iv) of the proviso to section 2(2)(b) of SAFEMA deals the timings of revocation whereas section 11 of the SAFEMA dealt with the power of the authority to revoke the detention. Therefore the premises on which the learned Judge of the Gujarat High Court proceed to delve upon the matter is erroneous. We could see once an order is revoked it should follow all legal consequences. Therefore the premises on which the learned Judge of the Gujarat High Court proceed to delve upon the matter is erroneous. We could see once an order is revoked it should follow all legal consequences. Once an order of detention does not subsist any more legally, as it was revoked unless it is shown such revocation was made with extraneous consideration by mala fide exercise of power, the order of revocation is valid. Whether by any such mala fide exercise of power the order was revoked, could be discernible for the facts of each case. 14. The inordinate delay in passing the detention order is recognized by this Court as a sufficient ground to set aside the detention order as has been held by the Supreme Court in (Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal and others)4, reported in A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 2154 para 27, in (Smt. K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others)5, reported in A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 227 para 9 and in (Sat Pal v. State of Punjab and others)6, reported in A.I.R. 1982 S.C.(Cri.) 46. In paras 6, 9, 10 and 11, it has been held that the power of revocation is an over reading power. As mentioned earlier we have perused the file under which the revocation order was passed and we find no illegality in the order of such revocation. Any representation on behalf of the detenu or his relative for revoking the order of undue delay in passing the order has recognized by the Supreme Court in various judgments and on the very same ground this Court set aside the detention of the co-accused. We find no illegality in such revocation of the order. As observed by the Supreme Court in 1974 S.C. 2154 (supra) a detention order is a condition precedent for invoking SAFEMA and that order is no more valid or in existence. The show cause notice issued in this case suffers from the vice of lack of jurisdiction and it is therefore liable to be set aside. 15. In the result, we allow the writ petition. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a). Parties to act on the ordinary copy of this order authenticated by the Sheristedar of this Court. Writ petition allowed. -----