B. K. RATHI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner. Indian Oil Corporation in both writ petitions, is the tenant of house No. 15b, amar Nath Jha Marg, Allahabad. An application for enhancement of rent under Section 21 (8) of u. P. Act, No. XIII of 1972 was moved by Sri S. N. Vaish, respondent with the request that the rent which is Rs. 1,175 be enhanced to Rs. 50,000 per month. The application was contested by the petitioner and he filed written statement. Annexure-2 to the writ petition. The respondent No. 4, Sri Prakash Azad moved an application under Order XXII, Rule 10, C. P. C. for his impleadment. His application is Annexure-8 to the writ petition. The same was opposed by the petitioner by objection, Annexure-9 to the writ petition. It appears that no separate order was passed on the application of respondent No. 4, Annexure-8 to the writ petition. The matter was finally considered by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, respondent No. 2, and he recorded a finding that the respondent No. 4. Sri Prakash Azad has become entitled to receive the rent. He, by order, Annexure-12 to the writ petition ordered that the rent be enhanced to Rs. 8,400 per month. However, he avoided to pass an specific order as to whether the respondent No. 3 or respondent No. 4 will be entitled to receive the enhanced rent, though in the body of the judgment, he recorded a finding that respondent No. 4 has become entitled to realise rent. ( 2 ) AGGRIEVED by the enhancement of the rent, the petitioner preferred Appeal No. 69 of 2000 before the District Judge, Allahabad against respondent No. 3 and the District Magistrate, allahabad. The respondent No. 4, Sri Prakash Azad also preferred Appeal No. 49 of 2000 requesting for further enhancement of the rent. In Appeal No. 69 of 2000 the respondent No. 4 was not impleaded as party by the petitioner. Therefore, he moved an application for impleading him as parry in that appeal. The application was allowed by order dated 14. 11. 2000 and he was impleaded as party in Appeal No. 69 of 2000 also. Thereafter, both the appeals were disposed of on 26. 2. 2001 by common Judgment by the respondent No. 1, Annexure-15 to the writ petition. He enhanced the rent of the premises In dispute to Rs. 41,284 per month. 11. 2000 and he was impleaded as party in Appeal No. 69 of 2000 also. Thereafter, both the appeals were disposed of on 26. 2. 2001 by common Judgment by the respondent No. 1, Annexure-15 to the writ petition. He enhanced the rent of the premises In dispute to Rs. 41,284 per month. Aggrieved by judgments, two separate writ petitions mentioned above have been filed by the petitioner as two appeals were decided by the same judgment. Therefore, both this petitions involve the same question and accordingly are being disposed of by this common judgment. ( 3 ) I have heard Dr. R. G. Padia, senior advocate for the petitioner and Sri Rajesh Tandon, senior advocate for the respondent No. 4. ( 4 ) ON the basis of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, the first question that arises for decision in these petitions is whether the respondent No. 4 was rightly substituted in place of Sri S. N. Vaish in the case and the Appeal No. 49 of 2000 preferred by the respondent No. 4 was maintainable. There is no dispute regarding the facts that application for enhancement of rent under Section 21 (8) of the Act was moved by the respondent No. 3 alone. The respondent No. 4 moved an application for substitution of his name under Order XXII, Rule 10, C. P. C. It is admitted case of the parties that no separate order was passed on that application. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer considered the matter of substitution in the judgment and held that respondent No. 4 has filed an affidavit on 4. 12. 1979 according to which he has been nominated by the respondent No. 3 for the freehold of the land and has been given the right to realise the rent. Considering the entire evidence, on the record, the Rent Control and Eviction officer has held that respondent No. 4 has become landlord and is entitled to the rent. This finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was also confirmed by the appellate court. As regards this finding, after considering the arguments and the evidence on the record, I am of the view that the respondent No. 4 has become entitled to receive the rent. This finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer was also confirmed by the appellate court. As regards this finding, after considering the arguments and the evidence on the record, I am of the view that the respondent No. 4 has become entitled to receive the rent. However, at the risk of the repetation, it may be mentioned that the judgments of Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as of the appellate court are conspicuous by the absence of a specific order as to who is entitled to apply for enhancement of rent and to whom it shall be paid. ( 5 ) I may briefly point out the reasons mentioned in the support of the findings that the respondent no. 4 has become entitled to receive rent and is the landlord as defined in Section 3 (j) of the act. ( 6 ) ADMITTEDLY the respondent No. 3, the original landlord executed a registered agreement of sale in favour of respondent No. 4, which is Annexure-5 to the writ petition. The land on which the building is standing was a nazool land. The respondent No. 3 nominated the respondent No. 4 before the District Magistrate for making the land as freehold. He also executed a power-of-attorney in favour of the respondent No. 4, Annexure-6 to the writ petition, according to which the respondent No. 4 became owner and rent is payable to him. After the nomination, the District Magistrate, Allahabad executed a transfer deed making the land freehold in favour of respondent No. 4, the copy of which is Annexure-C. A. 1. Not only this, the respondent No. 3 wrote a letter on 28. 2. 1999, Annexure-C. A. 2 to petitioner to pay rent to respondent No. 4. Another letter, Annexure-C. A. 3 for the same was also written. The respondent No. 3 also returned the rent sent to him by the petitioner with the direction that it may be paid to respondent no. 4. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent No. 4 has also referred to the provisions of Section 8 of transfer of Property Act and contended that by the sale deed of the land by the District magistrate in favour of respondent No. 4, Annexure-C. A. 1, the building which is standing on the land also stand transferred. 4. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent No. 4 has also referred to the provisions of Section 8 of transfer of Property Act and contended that by the sale deed of the land by the District magistrate in favour of respondent No. 4, Annexure-C. A. 1, the building which is standing on the land also stand transferred. That therefore, the respondent No. 4 became owner and also became entitled to receive the rent and is the landlord within the meaning of Section 3 (j) of the act. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent in support of the argument has referred to the certain cases. The first is Ramesh Chandra v. IVth Additional District Judge, Aligarh and others. ARC 1983 479. It has been held that Section 3 (j) of the Act Includes in its ambit a person in whose favour owner has executed the agreement to sell the tenanted accommodation and has authorised him to collect the rent. The other case referred to is Kishan Singh v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta and others, 1981 ARC 81. It was held in this case that when the right of enjoyment of the properly was transferred, the transferees did become landlords within the definition thereof as given under section 3 (j) of the Act. Similar question arose before Delhi High Court in the case of Sushil kanta Chakravarty v. Rajeshwar Kumar, AIR 2000 Del 413 . It was held that a person in whose favour an agreement to sell-cum-power of attorney has been executed became owner of the property. ( 9 ) IN view of these decision and documents, there is doubt that respondent No. 4 has become landlord entitled to receive the rent. ( 10 ) HOWEVER, the question raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is totally different in this case. His contention is that the application under Section 21 (8) of the Act was moved by the respondent No. 3 alone. That in view of the assignment, as I have disclosed above, he is no more entitled to receive the rent nor he is now claiming the rent. He did not prefer an appeal against the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The appeal was preferred by the respondent No. 4 atone. No application under Section 21 (8) of the Act was moved by the respondent No. 4. He did not prefer an appeal against the decision of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. The appeal was preferred by the respondent No. 4 atone. No application under Section 21 (8) of the Act was moved by the respondent No. 4. That therefore, the enhancement of the rent cannot be made in favour of respondent No. 4 nor he would have preferred an appeal nor his name was ever substituted. It is also contended his name could not have been substituted in place of respondent No. 3. ( 11 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents in support of his argument has referred to the decision of this Court in Mrs. Ratna Prasad v. VIIIth Additional District Judge. Allahabad and others, 1978 ARC 140. It was observed in this case that Section 34 (4) of the Act permits substitution in two cases only ; (a) in which proceedings for determination of standard rent ; (b) in proceedings for eviction from a building. Therefore. It does not envisage substitution in any other case. ( 12 ) IT is also necessary to refer to Section 34 (4) which reds as follows : "section 34 (4) : Where any party to any proceeding for the determination of standard rent of or for eviction from a building dies during the pendency of the proceeding, such proceeding may be continued after bringing on the record : (a) In the case of the landlord or tenant, his heirs or legal representatives : (b) in the case of unauthorised occupant, any person claiming under him found in occupation of the building. " ( 13 ) IN the above case, it has been interpreted that it does not apply to any other proceedings. Therefore, it does not apply to proceedings under Section 21 (8) of the Act. It is also contended that this provision applies only in the case of death and not in the case of transfer. ( 14 ) THE other relevant provisions of law in this regard is Rules 22 and 25 of the Rules framed under the Act. Rule 22 provide regarding the application of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in certain matters. However, it does not apply to the application under Order XXII, C. P. C. Rule 25 provide the limitation for application for bringing the heirs or legal heirs on the record. Rule 22 provide regarding the application of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in certain matters. However, it does not apply to the application under Order XXII, C. P. C. Rule 25 provide the limitation for application for bringing the heirs or legal heirs on the record. ( 15 ) REFERENCE also to be made to sub-section 8 of Section 34 which is as follows : "section 34 (8 ).--For the purposes of any proceedings under this Act and for purposes connected therewith, the said authorities shall have such other powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proof, rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed. " on the basis of these provisions and the decision of Mrs. Ratna Prasad (supra), it has been argued that the name of the respondent No. 4 could not be substituted in place of respondent No. 3. ( 16 ) AFTER considering the provisions, I am of the view that the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is correct. There is no provision for substitution of names in proceedings under section 21 (8) of the Act. Provisions under Order XXII, C. P. C. does not apply. It appears that the respondent No. 4 did move an application for substitution of his name under Order XXII, rule 10, C. P. C. which is Annexure-8 to the writ petition, to which the objection, Annexure-9 to the writ petition were filed by the petitioner. However, it appear that realising the difficulty that order XXII. Rule 10, C. P. C. as has no application, this application was never pressed for disposal nor any order was passed on this application. Only in the judgment, it was observed that the respondent No. 4 has became entitled to receive the rent. However, none of the two courts below have considered whether the respondent Nos. 3 or 4 is entitled to continue the application under Section 21 (8) of the Act and whether the respondent No. 4 is entitled to file the appeal against the order. This fact has also not been considered that because of the transfer, the respondent No. 3 is not entitled to further prosecute the application moved by him. The name of respondent No. 4 could not have been substituted and, therefore, he was also not entitled to prosecute the same and to file an appeal. This fact has also not been considered that because of the transfer, the respondent No. 3 is not entitled to further prosecute the application moved by him. The name of respondent No. 4 could not have been substituted and, therefore, he was also not entitled to prosecute the same and to file an appeal. ( 17 ) IN this connection, the learned counsel for respondent also pointed out that in the Appeal No. 69 of 2000 filed by the petitioner, the respondent No. 4 moved an application for impleadment which was allowed on 14. 11. 2000 and he was impleaded. The copy of the order dated 14. 11. 2000 has not been produced by any party. However, it appears that he was impleaded in the appeal preferred by the petitioner as the appeal against the same order was filed by the respondent No. 4. Therefore, the impleadment of respondent No. 4 in the appeal filed by the petitioner does not show that his name was substituted in place of respondent No. 3. ( 18 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent in reply to the argument has also referred to the decision in Dr. Niranjan Nath v. Sardar Mal and another, AIR 1950 Raj 31 . The reference has been made to para 7 of the judgment which deals regarding the matter of substitution under Order XXII, rule 10. C. P. C. It is not necessary to extract the said provisions as I am afraid that it has no application in the present case. This matter was regarding a regular suit in which Order XX, Rule 10, C. P. C. is applicable. However, the same is not applicable to the present proceedings and therefore, the taw laid down in this case is of no relevance. ( 19 ) AFTER considering the arguments, I am of the opinion that the respondent No. 3 was not entitled to further persue the application under Section 21 (8) of the Act. The name of the respondent No. 4 could not have been substituted in place of respondent No. 3 and he was also not entitled to pursue the application and file an appeal against the order of the Rent Control and eviction Officer. Therefore, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as of the appellate court cannot be maintained. Therefore, the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer as well as of the appellate court cannot be maintained. The application for enhancement of rent under Section 21 (8) of the Act was wrongly allowed. The application moved by the respondent No. 3 was not maintainable. Accordingly, both the orders. Annexures-12 and 15 to the writ petition are quashed. However, it may be clarified that I have not expressed any opinion on the merits and if another application under Section 21 (8) is moved, it shall be disposed of on its merits. ( 20 ) BOTH the writ petitions are accordingly disposed of.