JUDGMENT 1. - The instant writ petition has been filed for seeking direction to the respondents to pay the amount of gratuity and family pension etc. as the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners had served the respondents. 2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that one Shri Satyanand Sarswat had joined the services of respondents as Vaidhya with effect from 24-7-1964. He remained absent from duty on 5-7-77 and reported back on 2-8-84 after expiry of seven years and six months. He made various representations to the State for allowing him to continue in service. However, the respondents issued a letter dated 8-5-98 (Annx. 1) pointing out that it was a fresh appointment. He died while in service on 4-8-90. Hence this petition for the aforesaid reliefs. 3. Mr. Vyas, learned counsel for the petitioners, has submitted that the services of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners could not treated to have been terminated and the order dated 8-5-89, treating it as a fresh appointment,is bad in law and liable to be quashed and the petitioners are entitled for the reliefs claimed. On the other hand Mr. R.N. Upadhyaya, learned counsel for the respondents, has opposed the reliefs asked for by the petitioners on the ground that there is no provision to remain absent for a period of seven and half years and it was a clear case of abandonment of service. His further contention is that the order dated 8-5-89 had not been challenged by the said employee and the said order clearly stipulated that it was a fresh appointment and he would not be entitled for any benefit on the basis of the past services as the same stood forfeited. 4. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. 5. The order dated 29-5-90, appointing the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners with effect from 8-5-89, makes it crystal clear that his past services I stood forfeited and it was a fresh appointment. His past services stood forfeited for the reason that he remained absent from 16-2-77 to 7-5-89. I see no reason as why the terms and conditions of the said appointment order dated 29-5-90 be not enforced. 6. His past services stood forfeited for the reason that he remained absent from 16-2-77 to 7-5-89. I see no reason as why the terms and conditions of the said appointment order dated 29-5-90 be not enforced. 6. In M/s. Jeewan Lal Ltd., Calcutta v. Its Workmen, 1961 (2) FLR 537 (SC) , the Apex court held as under:- " If an employee continues to be absent from duty without obtaining leave and in an unauthorised manner for such a long period of time that an inference may reasonably the drawn from such absence that by his absence he has abandoned service, then such long unauthorised absence may legitimately be held to cast a break in continuity of service........We would like to make it clear that...........there would be the class of cases where long unauthorised absence may reasonably give rise to an inference that such service is intended to be abandoned by the employee." 7. Similarly, in Shahoordul Haque v. The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar and another, AIR 1974 SC 1890 , the Apex Court observed as under:- 'The undenied and undeniable fact that the appellant had actually abandoned his post or duty for an exceedingly long period, without sufficient ground for his absence, is so glaring that giving him further opportunity to disprove what he practically admits, could serve no useful purpose. It could not benefit him or make any difference to the order which could be and has been passed against him..............On the view we have adopted on the facts of this case, it is not necessary to consider the further question whether any notice for termination of service was necessary or duly given on the assumption that he was not published. We do not think that there is any question involved in this case which could justify an interference by us...." 8. For the purposes of termination, there has to be positive action on the part of the employer while abandonment of service is a consequence of unilateral action of the employee and the employer has no role in it. 9. In the State of Haryana v. Om Prakash and another, (1998) 8 SCC 733 , the Hon'ble Apex Court explained the distinction between 'Retrenchment' and 'abandonment' from service, observing as under:- 'Retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) means termination by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason whatsoever. 9. In the State of Haryana v. Om Prakash and another, (1998) 8 SCC 733 , the Hon'ble Apex Court explained the distinction between 'Retrenchment' and 'abandonment' from service, observing as under:- 'Retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) means termination by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason whatsoever. Therefore, it contemplates an act on the part of the employer which puts an end to service to fall within the definition of the expression 'retrenchment' in Section 2 (oo) of the Act. There was nothing of the sort in the instant case. It was the workman who ceased to report for duty.................therefore this is a a case in which the employer has done nothing whatsoever to put an end to his employment and hence, the case does not fall within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. Therefore, the case does not attract Section 2 (oo), nor does it satisfy the requirement of Section 25-F." 10. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Vijay Singh Charan v. Management, Shri Sivetamber Nakoda Parshzvnath Tirth Mewa Nagar and another, 1999 (83) FLR 357 (Raj) . In Syndicate Bank v. General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association and another, 2000 (85) FLR 807 (SC) , and Aligarh Muslim University and others v. Mansoor Ali Khan, 2001 (91) FLR 28 (SC) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court ruled that if a person is absent beyond the prescribed period for which leave of any kind can be granted, he should be treated to have resigned and ceased to be in service. In such a case, there is no need to hold an enquiry or to give any notice as it would amount to useless formalities. 11. I find no force in the submissions made by Mr. Vyas that even for a long absence of seven and half years, service could not be terminated without holding an Enquiry. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jai Shanker v. State of Rajasthan, 1966 (13) FLR 133 (SC) , is not the authority applicable in the instant case. The facts thereof are distinguishable. 12. The Apex Court has reiterated time and again that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula and its application would depend upon the scheme and policy of the statute and relevant circumstances involved in a particular case. The facts thereof are distinguishable. 12. The Apex Court has reiterated time and again that the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula and its application would depend upon the scheme and policy of the statute and relevant circumstances involved in a particular case. (Vide Union of India v. PI Roy and another, AIR 1968 SC 850 . Channabasappa Basappa Happali v. State of Mysore, AIR 1972 SC 32 and Kitnmi Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant and another, (2001) 1 SCC 182 .) 13. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jag Mohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that where on admitted or undisputed facts, only one conclusion is possible and under the law only penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue the writ to compel the observance of the principles of natural justice as it would amount to issuing a futile writ. Similarly, in State of U.P. v. O.P. Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 679 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the Courts have to see whether non-observance of any of the principles enshrined in statutory rules or principles of natural justice have resulted in deflecting the course of justice. Thus, it can be held that even if in a given case there has been some deviation from the principles of natural justice but which has not resulted in grave injustice or has not prejudiced the cause of the delinquent, the Court is not bound to interfere. This Court does not function as a Court of Appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority, rather it has limited power of judicial review to the departmental proceedings in which appreciation of evidence is not permissible. The Court can review only to correct the error of law or fundamental procedural requirements which lead to manifest injustice or Court can interfere with the impugned order if the same has been passed in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice, (vide Rae Bareli Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Bhola Nath Singh and another, 1997 (76) FLR 313 (SC) .) 14. Thus, in this case, I fail to understand as what could have been the defence of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners for his long absence for seven and half years and what was the material in his possession to justify such a long absence. Thus, in this case, I fail to understand as what could have been the defence of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners for his long absence for seven and half years and what was the material in his possession to justify such a long absence. Even before this Court, petitioners have not submitted any cogent reason for his remaining absent for such a long period. Thus, in the said case even if enquiry had been held, it could have been meaningless. 15. Mr. Vyas has submitted that what is being canvassed before this Court by the other side would amount to automatic termination. The question of automatic termination has been dealt with by Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again and it has categorically been held that any rule, providing for automatic termination, is ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Punjab Land Development Area Reclamation Corporation Ltd, v. Presiding Officer, labour Court and others, 1990 (61) FLR 73 (SC) . Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Milmmra, AIR 1994 SC 112 . D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A Industries Ltd., 1993 (67) FLR 111 (SC) . Scooters India v. Vijay E.V. Eldred, 1999 (81) FLR 87 (SC) and Uptron India Ltd. v. Smt. Shamtni Bhan, 1998 (79) FLR 233 (SC) categorically held that imposition of such a condition was effect but the facts, in the instant case, are quite distinguishable. There is no rule providing for automatic termination after a particular period of absence. Thus, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in those cases is not applicable herein. 16. In case of Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab and others, 1995 (71) FLR 938 (SC) . the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "Under Article 141, the law declared by it is of a binding character and as command full as the law made by the legislative body or an authorised delegate of such body............Their Lordships' decision declare the existing law but do not enact any fresh law, is not in keeping with the plenary function of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution, for the Court is not merely the interpreter of law as existing but much beyond that. The Court, as a wing of the State, is by itself a source of law. The law is what the Court says it is." 17. The Court, as a wing of the State, is by itself a source of law. The law is what the Court says it is." 17. The present case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. jeevan Lal Ltd. (supra), and Shahoordul Haque (supra), wherein continuous absence for very long time, would give rise to presumption that the employee himself has abandoned the service and the same being not a misconduct, no inquiry is required. 18. In view of the above, no relief can be granted to the petitioners for the reason that the earlier services of the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners stood forfeited being remaining absent for an inordinate period. Forfeiture means - any forfeiture as a punishment but as the employee had abandoned the service, he would not have been able to get any benefit of his past services. For the subsequent period, his services had been for about nine months only. It was a negligible period. Petition is devoid of merit and accordingly dismissed.Petition Dismissed. *******