ORDER M.Y. Eqbal, J. 1. In this writ application the question falls for consideration is whether after the acquittal of the petitioner in criminal charge, he is entitled to be reinstated in service with all consequential benefits including the arrears of salary after recalling the order of his dismissal from service. 2. The petitioner was in the service of respondent-Steel Authority of India Ltd. and was posted as Assistant Grade-II in the Bokaro Steel Plant. In 1984 a criminal case was instituted against the petitioner on the charges of demanding illegal gratification and a case was registered being R.C. Case No. 6/84 under Section 161. IPC read with Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. After institution of the case the petitioner was taken into custody. The petitioner was then put under suspension vide order dated 11.5.84. In 1989 the order of suspension was revoked and the petitioner was paid his salary for the period of suspension. In 1994 the trial of the criminal case was concluded and by judgment dated 20.1.94 the petitioner was found guilty of the charges and accordingly convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year. The petitioner being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and sentenced, preferred an appeal before the Patna High Court which was registered as Cr. Appeal No. 16/94 (R). By reason of conviction of the petitioner in the criminal case, an office order was issued on 11.7.94 whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service of the respondent-Company. The criminal appeal was however, disposed of by judgment dated 17.8.2000 and the petitioner was acquitted from the charges levelled against him and the judgment and order of conviction was set aside. On receipt of the order of acquittal in criminal appeal the petitioner applied before the respondent No. 2 for revoking the order of dismissal and reinstating the petitioner in service with full backwages. It is stated by the petitioner that he filed several representations but no order was passed. 3. The respondents appeared and filed counter affidavit stating, infer alia, that the representation of the petitioner was considered and by office order dated 9.4.2001 he has been reinstated in service. It is, however, stated that though the petitioner has been reinstated, he would not be entitled to get backwages. 4. Mr. 3. The respondents appeared and filed counter affidavit stating, infer alia, that the representation of the petitioner was considered and by office order dated 9.4.2001 he has been reinstated in service. It is, however, stated that though the petitioner has been reinstated, he would not be entitled to get backwages. 4. Mr. A.K. Mehta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the action of the respondents in not making payment of backwages is highly arbitrary and discriminatory inasmuch as the respondents are adopting double standard under the similar set of facts. It is contended that in similar circumstances one S.P. Singh, Assistant Grade I. after acquittal from criminal charges, has been paid backwages. In support of his contention, he has annexed a copy of the judgment passed by Patna High Court in Cr. Appeal No. 47/94 (R). In this connection, learned counsel also relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vikramaditya Pandey v. Industrial Tribunal, Lucknow. (2001) 2 SCC 423 . 5. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the respondents by relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vinod Bhanti v. State of Bihar, (2000) 10 SCC 146 . and Assistant General Manager, SBI v. Thomas Jose and another. (2000) 10 SCC 280 . 6. The admitted facts are that the petitioner, in terms of the judgment and order dated 20.1.94 passed by the Special Judge, CBI, was convicted and sentenced under Section 161, IPC read with Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Thereafter, on the ground of conviction of the petitioner in the criminal charge, he was dismissed from services by office order dated 11.7.94. The judgment of conviction and sentence was, however, set aside and the petitioner was acquitted from the charges in Cr. Appeal No. 16/94 (R) by judgment dated 17.8.2000. The petitioner then filed a representation for recall of the order of dismissal and for reinstatement on the ground of his acquittal in criminal charges. The representation of the petitioner was considered by the respondents and an office order was issued on 9.4.2001, whereby the petitioner was reinstated in service but without backwages. The petitioner then filed a representation for recall of the order of dismissal and for reinstatement on the ground of his acquittal in criminal charges. The representation of the petitioner was considered by the respondents and an office order was issued on 9.4.2001, whereby the petitioner was reinstated in service but without backwages. In the background of the aforesaid facts, the only question that falls for consideration is whether the petitioner is entitled to get backwages for the period he remained out of services. 7. Before answering the question, it would be useful first to look into the judgment of acquittal passed by the Patna High Court in Cr. Appeal No, 16/94 (R). The charge against the petitioner was that he used to demand illegal gratification for clearing the LTC bills of the employees of therespondent -Company. In 1983 one of the employees of the respondent-Company, namely, Ram Pravesh Singh submitted his LTC bill and when he enquired into the progress of the bill the petitioner told him that without spending something he would not get his LTC money. He demanded Rs. 275/- from the complainant as an illegal gratification. He was ultimately caught by the trip party. The trial Court convicted the petitioner but he Was acquitted in appeal. For better appreciation paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the judgment passed in appeal are quoted hereinbelow :-- "11. On perusal of the materials available on record, including the deposition of the witnesses, there remains no doubt that the transaction of the tainted money was done and the appellant received the money. However, the independent witness of the trap, namely. PW 11 Sri S.S. Tririar has stated that he did not know for what purpose the transaction was made. The other witnesses, namely, the complainant (PW 12) and Shri R.K. Bhattacharya (PW 13) have also admitted about the transaction of money and subsequent recovery of the alleged amount from the pocket of the full pant of the appellant. But on the question of recovery of money from the possession of the appellant there are certain contradictions and discrepancies in their deposition. One of the witness has stated that the money was recovered on the road near the tea stall, whereas according to PWs 12 and 13, the money was recovered in the office. But on the question of recovery of money from the possession of the appellant there are certain contradictions and discrepancies in their deposition. One of the witness has stated that the money was recovered on the road near the tea stall, whereas according to PWs 12 and 13, the money was recovered in the office. Even on the question of accepting the bribe there is evidence that the appellant was asked to take out the money from his pocket and as such he was forced to touch the tainted money and in that context it has been admitted on behalf of the appellant that mere washing of the hands of the appellant with the solution of sodium carbonate and turning the same into pink colour, no definite in ference could be drawn that the money was kept by the appellant himself after accepting the illegal gratification. The best thing would have been that before he was asked to take out the money from his pocket, his hands should have been washed with the solution of the sodium carbonate. 12. So far as the plea of nexus of the appellant as taken by the appellants counsel, 1 find that even though there was no direct nexus of the appellant, he used to check the LTC bill before sending it to accounts section, which is clear from Ext. 10, on which the signature of the appellant is there as he checked the bill for advance LTC. But the payment of advance money to the complainant for the LTC has become doubtful. The complainant (PW 12) himself has contradicted in his deposition as to whether he received the money as advance for LTC or not. From Ext. 8/a it appears that an amount of Rs. 840/-was sanctioned as advance money but there is no documentary proof as to whether the same was finally paid to the complainant or not. Even the Investigating Officer (PW 21) did not bother to take up this point whether the advance money was paid to the complainant or not. The prosecution also did not produce any further bill after commencement of the journey by the complainant, which was very much vital in this case. A bill for advance is not the final bill. Even the Investigating Officer (PW 21) did not bother to take up this point whether the advance money was paid to the complainant or not. The prosecution also did not produce any further bill after commencement of the journey by the complainant, which was very much vital in this case. A bill for advance is not the final bill. The subsequent bill after the journey is treated to be the final bill on the basis of which the amount is to be paid to an incumbent. As long as the bill after the journey is not submitted, the money which was taken in advance is not accounted for. In this case the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and the very genesis and origin of passing the LTC bill remains ambiguous. In the above view of the matter the appellant certainly would get benefit of doubt from the lapses on the part of the prosecution. 13. In view of the above discussions, the appellant deserves benefit of doubt and he is accordingly, acquitted from the charges levelled against him. The judgment and order of conviction dated 20.1.1994 passed by the learned special Judge, CBI. Ranchi in R.C. Case No. 6/84 against the appellant is set aside and this appeal is, accordingly, allowed. The appellant Ram Krishna Prasad Mahto is on bail and as such he is discharged from the liability of the bail bonds." 8. It is, therefore, clear that although the factum of demanding illegal gratification was found correct and the transaction of tainted money was done and the petitioner received the money but the appellate Court given benefit of doubt to the petitioner and he was acquitted from the charges. In other words, there is no clean acquittal of the petitioner from the criminal charges on a clear cut finding that the prosecution failed to prove the charges. 9. Mr. A.K. Mehta, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the point of discrimination, contended that in similar circumstances one Mr. S.P. Singh has been reinstated with full backwages. The said S.P. Singh was also convicted in accepting illegal gratification but he was acquitted by the High Court in Cr. Appeal No. 47/94 (R). A copy of the judgment passed in the aforesaid appeal has been annexed as Annexure 7 to the rejoinder to the counter affidavit. 10. S.P. Singh has been reinstated with full backwages. The said S.P. Singh was also convicted in accepting illegal gratification but he was acquitted by the High Court in Cr. Appeal No. 47/94 (R). A copy of the judgment passed in the aforesaid appeal has been annexed as Annexure 7 to the rejoinder to the counter affidavit. 10. From perusal of the Judgment, it appears that after reappreciating the entire evidence, the appellate Court came to the conclusion that the prosecution totally failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused. Para 23 of the judgment passed in Cr. Appeal No. 47/94 (R) is quoted hereinbelow :-- "23. Summoning up the depositions of three vital witnesses, PW 4, complainant, PWs 5 and 6 trap witnesses there remains no doubt that the prosecution could not establish any charge as levelled against the appellant and thus prosecution miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the appellant is acquitted of the charges levelled against him and order of conviction and sentence passed by the Court below is set aside and he is discharged from the liability of his bail bond." 11. It is, therefore, clear that in the case of Sri S.P. Singh, the charge levelled against him for illegal gratification has not at all been established by the prosecution and, therefore, the case of Sri S.P. Singh was given clean acquittal. In such circumstances, ground of discrimination taken by the petitioner cannot be accepted. 12. There is difference between clean acquittal and acquittal by giving benefit of doubt to the accused. Benefit of doubt is a solitary principle of criminal law to further justice. Benefit of doubt has nowhere been defined nor is it capable of an accurate scientific definition. All sorts of doubts fanciful, strange and baseless are hardly reasonable doubts on the basis of which any benefit might flow or the Court will take into consideration. Doubts which are real, genuine, well founded which a normal man with normal intelligence, in a given circumstance, would naturally harbour, are doubts that come within the fold of reasonable doubt, entitling one to the benefit thereof. Doubts which are real, genuine, well founded which a normal man with normal intelligence, in a given circumstance, would naturally harbour, are doubts that come within the fold of reasonable doubt, entitling one to the benefit thereof. If the facts and circumstances are suspectible on two interpretations; one in favour of the prosecution and the other in support of the defence version then the rule which applies to circumstantial evidence, would prevail and the benefit of doubt, if any, would have to go to the accused, whereas in the case of clean acquittal the Court comes to a finding that the charge has not at all been proved or established by the prosecution. 13. In Vikramaditya Pandeys case (supra), the Apex Court was considering a case where termination of services of the employee was found illegal. Their Lordships held that ordinarily once termination of service of an employee is held to be wrongful or illegal, normally relief of reinstatement with full backwages shall be available to an employee. However, it is open to the employer to specifically plead and establish that there were special circumstances which warranted either non-reinstatement or non-payment of backwages. The ratio decided by the Apex Court, in my opinion, does not apply in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 14. In the case of M. Paul Anthoni v. Bharat Gold Mines and Anr, reported in AIR 1999 SC 1416 , the facts of the case before the Apex Court was that a departmental proceeding and a criminal case was initiated against the employee on the identical set of charges and evidences in both the proceedings were common. The departmental proceeding was concluded and an order of dismissal was passed. However, the employee was acquitted in criminal case. In the criminal case, the whole case of prosecution was thrown out and the employee was acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with categorical finding that the prosecution has failed to establish its case. In the peculiar circumstances of the case it was held that the appellant was entitled to reinstatement with backwages. 15. In the criminal case, the whole case of prosecution was thrown out and the employee was acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with categorical finding that the prosecution has failed to establish its case. In the peculiar circumstances of the case it was held that the appellant was entitled to reinstatement with backwages. 15. In the instant case, as noticed above, the petitioner was not acquitted in the criminal case on the basis of categorical finding that the prosecution has failed to establish the charges, rather, benefit of doubt was given to the petitioner on the ground of lapses on the part of the prosecution to fully establish the charges. This Court is, therefore, of the view that the petitioner is not entitled to backwages. 16. For the reasons aforesaid, this writ application is allowed in part and it is held that the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service but without backwages. 17. Writ application allowed.